cc With Kenya's exploitative elites continuing to monopolise the country's resources, Antony Otieno Ong’ayo argues that profound change is needed to halt a debilitating 46-year status quo of marginalisation and impoverishment for much of the Kenyan populace. While change will ultimately need to come from below, Otieno Ong’ayo contends, Kenya's leadership will need to moderate its relentless appetite for wealth if 'business-as-usual' is to be prevented.

http://www.pambazuka.org/images/articles/358/46928powershare.jpgAs Zimbabwe threatens to pull a 'Kenya', this is a good time to consider the implications of the Annan mediated power-sharing deal. Antony Otieno Ong'ayo dissects and weighs the Kenya power sharing deal.

While the tensions and apprehension as a result of the post election violence in Kenya subsides, focus is now placed on the newfound relationship between the antagonists during the 2007 elections. More important are the hopes of thousands who have been since the onset of electoral violence, displaced and still live in degrading conditions in various camps in the country. Business in various parts of the country seem to return to “normal” although large sections of the population are not sure of what will come next? Commentators have pointed to the optimism about the peace agreement between Raila Odinga and Mwai Kibaki; however, less attention is being given to the implications of the deal for governance and state restructuring.

In the recent past, two positions have defined the discussion about power in Kenyan politics. This begun with the commencement of the Bomas constitutional review process, where one position has been against devolution of powers, arguing that two centres of power is not workable. The other view is that devolution of powers is possible within a framework that provides for accountability in the highest office in the land. However interest-ridden views and adversarial approach hijacked the debate hence, a stalemate in finding a best alternative. Proponents of centralised power, failed to justify that position, except for suggestions that doing so is likely to lead into chaos and disunity. They did not state what benefits the country has enjoyed under such a system since independence. Their arguments seem to ignore the historical injustices caused by a presidential system with concentrated powers, a system that took the country through decades of authoritarianism and dictatorship. The previous presidents abused these enormous powers; hence politicised ethnicity that now threatens to tear the country apart. Through their abuse of power, the country continued to experience high levels of poverty, illiteracy and high unemployment rates, leave alone poor roads, lack of health and educational facilities. They used this power to detain opponents and allocate resources in a skewed manner to their own regions. They used the power to employ their own kinsmen in the armed forces, state corporations, and government departments without regard for the multiethnic composition of the country. Moreover if the centralised system was meant for the unity of the country, ethnic tensions that have plagued the country for decades is but a sign that the much touted unity was a coerced unification or a unity/peace that was forced, first by the colonial state and later by the three post-colonial regimes. These regimes did not take into account the institutional and constitutional arrangements that would pull every group towards the centre, but instead, adopted a system which broadly kept them under one (“roof”) territory, at the same time keeping them apart as much as possible. The economic and political marginalisation of certain regions in Kenya is a manifestation that the system was and is still not conducive for a country with a complex mix of diversity.

The common contradictions in the two positions are however inherent in the views of when change is necessary, which is also informed by which “group”, is in power. The attitude in Kenya is that if our man is in power, then nothing is wrong with the system, hence no need to re-negotiate or restructure the state. The malgovernance problem in Kenya, which lies in the elaborate power structure built up around the presidency, is also synonymous with the state structure. This has been done through minor constitutional change that entrenched the status quo in which “elite minority” monopolise state power and resources and in most cases in the name of an ethnic group. During the process there are extremists who have shown through their power strategy mix that they do not think about long-term interests of the entire country, instead, they are focused on short-term benefits and to have a place in the ‘grand coalition’. This rush to create positions without reflecting on how the very institutions could serve the country well undermines their potentials to diffuse the tension around access to and use of state power. All over sudden, both the opponents and proponents of centralised power are “silent”, and are not questioning the implications of this new arrangement for “national unity”. Therefore would the 2008 Bill be that different from its predecessor bills?

The concept of power sharing has been used in many contexts as a response to conflicts ranging from ethnicity, political differences of resources allocation and use, a means of setting up governing coalition in context where political parties have failed to win majority seats in parliament or in post-conflict situations where multiple actors who represent diverse backgrounds seek to control the state power. Power sharing it is also seen as “a multiple vehicle to create broad-based governing coalitions of a society's significant groups in a political system that provides influence to legitimate representatives of minority groups." It is also described as “a strategy for resolving disputes over who should have the most powerful position in the social hierarchy”. But it also implies a joint exercise of power where such an agreement is reached. While Kenya cannot be described as a deeply divided polity or experienced conflicts of a highly intense nature, enormous powers in the presidency have been used to “command monopolistic access to available resources, to employ violence and exclusion to safeguard interests”.

RELEVANCE IN THE KENYAN CONTEXT

While application of power sharing agreements might entail “the creation of broad-based coalition of significant groups, in a political system”, in the case of Kenya, it is however not a power sharing or negotiation between “ethnic minority groups”, but between an “elite minority”. The majority of “minority groups” that would have qualified for consideration under this conception are not part of the deal being signed in Nairobi nor are they represented in any way. For instance, those minority groups that are politically and economically marginalised, such as the Ogieks, Jemps, Rendile, are not represented in the process. Instead, we see some form of representation based on “political parties” even though some of them have no “official structures” other than in paper. This is because the political competition in Kenya has been between the dominant forces against the citizenry, and with the advent of multiparty, it has been between political parties that are individualistic, and disconnected with the citizenry they claim to represent, while at the same time using or whipping ethnic feelings for political expediency. So what difference would it make with the new power-sharing arrangement? This scenario raises problems with representation, but also aspects of collaboration and block building, which could reflect consociational arrangements that takes care of the interests of minority groups at the political table.

In the foregoing, Kenya of today demands some level of patriotism and commitment to the principles of effective representation and leadership for change. In order to bring back the confidence of Kenyans on leadership and use of power there is need to turn these negative and dangerous trends around, through power sharing. But this could also be problematic if there will be no equity and fair play through properly constituted institutions of the state. Turning the current volatile politics into a more amicable order is crucial, because a less conflictual politics would lead to and prompt elite disposition towards political accommodation and adoption of non-majoritarian political arrangements. Therefore what does the current power sharing deal mean for the ordinary Kenyan whose life has been disrupted or cut short by the police bullet, gang machete, or tribal fire? What are the long-term implications of this re-negotiation for governance in Kenya? What precedence would it set in the context of contested election results in the future? From a political and constitutional law perspectives, many important questions have not been asked while there is a rush to return to “normal” life. High hopes have been placed on the deal between Raila and Kibaki, but not much is asked whether it is the medicine Kenya needs for the many constitutional and institutional defects and deficiencies, that have plagued the country for decades. It is therefore crucial to question whether the deal is a step towards deal a long-term goal to devolution of powers or decongestion of the system from Presidentialism, which has been at the core of governance deficiency in Kenya? Is the current power sharing deal any different from previous manipulation of the system to serve partisan interests? What is the role of the citizenry in the process of state restructuring of this magnitude, and during a contested legitimacy?

IMPLEMENTATION OF THE PEACE ACCORD

It is hoped that the peace accord, would be entrenched in the constitution, peace would return and that some level of democratic governance, equity and accountability, would be realised, however the accord as legally framed does not take into the account the stability, cushioning and democratic governance role of the very institutions it is creating. The bill provides for the “insertion” of a new section into the constitution but at the same time (in section 15 A (3) (a) provides for its termination at the whims of the parliament. Here too the drafters either intentional ignored the interest-ridden nature of parliamentary politics in Kenya, or potentials for “stomach philosophy” to carry the day and not constitutional considerations that matter to the millions of impoverished Kenyans. With such discrepancies, implementation of the accord might not entail the prospects for fostering a durable peace or devolution of powers that many Kenyans desire. This is because the “deal” and the “bills” are not about the internally displaced; land squatters, voters whose right was violated during the 2007 elections, nor it is for posterity, it seems to solve the differences between “elite minorities”.

Another concern is the way in which various groups are making claim to diverse stakes. Power sharing often includes reviewing such key institutions as “federalism and the devolution of power to ethnic groups in territories that they control; or providing for minority vetoes on issues of particular importance; grand coalition cabinets in a parliamentary framework, and proportionality in all spheres of public life such as budgeting and civil service appointments”. Taking this path in Kenya has implications for “ethnic” re-orientation” in the face of state re-negotiation and could present further obstacles to reconciliation, national cohesion and efforts towards a national identity. Un realistic power sharing will not augur well for development of issue oriented political parties since “ethnicity” and other particularistic considerations would come first in the national psyche. All signs point to some kind of elite mobilisation, bankrolling and interference with state apparatus to bolster their power at the centre, which is currently being negotiated. Therefore if power sharing is done with these factors as the underlying forces, then it will “reinforce the ethnic divisions in society rather than promote cross-cultural understanding”

The power-sharing deal also falls short of addressing the very factors that underpinned the post-election violence namely the decades of political and economic marginalisation, and the deprivation of millions of Kenyans, spanning generations to realise their full potentials as citizens of Kenya. It fails to address the problems of non-democratic governance, politicised ethnicity, draconian and defective constitutional order whose beneficiaries are local elites in collaboration with international interests. The deal fails to address the system of exploitation and expropriation the national resources in the name of millions of Kenyans who toil under harsh labour conditions and dehumanising wages. It also fails to address the relationship between various institutions within the broader governance structure that could directly link and relate to local needs, participatory democratic processes and decision-making.

POINTS FOR REFLECTION

The contents of the accord could still be fine-tuned to give it substance, through an integrative approach, to “eschew ethnic groups as the building blocks of a common society”. Power sharing in this direction can entail re-designing of the institutional and constitutional frameworks to provide for "centripetalism," whereby political dynamics are engineered in a “centre-oriented spin”. Examples include “multiethnic political parties, electoral systems that encourage pre-election pacts across ethnic lines, non-ethnic federalism that diffuses points of power, and public policies that promote political allegiances that transcend groups”. Recent political realignments have shown that there are potentials for ethnic accommodation due to crosscutting interests.

Another consideration is for the power sharing to move towards a group block building approach, a form of “consociationalism” in which there is an accommodation of the various “ethnic-groups” at the political centre and guarantees for minority rights. Such an approach might not necessarily lead to demands for autonomy because the interdependency of the various regions and groups within Kenya would not allow such a framework to function. This interdependency is caused by unequal availability of resources, un-equal infrastructure development, and disparities in climatic conditions with serious implication for food production or subsistence economy, which is still common in most part of Kenya. However a consociational arrangement could also lead to an outcome that “reflects the divisions in society but fails to provide incentives for building bridges across community lines”, hence the need for a framework, that encourages the various groups to identify with the state. This is also possible if the institutional framework and constitutional dispensation provides for receiving “something” back from the state regardless of “ethnicity”.

A "consociational" framework could also encourage collaborative decision-making, policy formulation and budgetary allocations that reflect the diversity of the Kenyan citizenry. The reality is that only through a broad based dialogue that the country can chart its way forward in these times of intensified globalisation. Arendt Lijphart maintains, “consociational democracy is the most viable structural model of politics for multiethnic societies”. But this is only possible if there is a political will, combined with the “will of the capital”, foreign forces and interests. Crucial at this juncture is a system that provides for institutional independence, holds people in power accountable and that decision-making is “consociational” as much as possible. It is only through centripetalism that all Kenyans would feel that they “belong” not just in words, but also through the policies of equity. The on-going power sharing therefore needs to look beyond Raila and Kibaki, focus on improving governance, accountability, equity and national cohesion and foster a common identity. It should also lead to institutional re-engineering to cater for governance conflicts. Although there exists a contrary notion that “fundamental conflicts in segmented politics cannot be solved by constitution writing and constitutional engineering”, it is also recognised that “rules can restructure a political system and cause changes in the game where there is some determination to obey the rules”.

Finally, re-thinking of an integrative approach would be a viable option. These would include “making persuasive appeals to people on the other side (usually focused on common values, goals, or needs), offering apologies and/or forgiveness for past deeds, seeking areas of commonality, reversing the de-humanisation process and building trust with opponents”. Integrative options are noted to be “less expensive to implement than force based options, and they are often more successful, as they do not generate the level of resistance and backlash that force often does”. Non-the less, how and whether the process will be taken seriously is a matter that heavily depends on the contents of the peace accord, its implementation, and acceptability by the citizenry. The success of the on-going power sharing however depends on whether the “grand coalition” would survive the conflict of interest and destructive confrontation, which are the hallmarks of Kenyan politics.

*Antony Otieno Ong’ayo is a researcher at the Transnational Institute, Amsterdam.

**Please send comments to or comment online at www.pambazuka.org

Historical and political dimensions

Recent political problems that threaten to tear Kenya apart require analysis that goes beyond ethnicity as portrayed in the media and current analyses that attempt to explain the situation. More correctly, emphasis and focus should be placed on the interpenetration of historical and current political developments whose origins can be traced in the early stages of state formation in Kenya. In 19th century the area that became Kenya could be described as stateless, but was made up of various nationalities (currently considered sub-nationalities if seen from the eye of British Historians and ethnographers). Some commentators have claimed that peoples' civility, and ethnicity was shaped by their subsistence farming or herding, or some mixture of both".

However what ethnographers and Eurocentric commentators ignore is that there was clear territorial ownership of space by each “nation” even though at times there were conflicts over pasture and adventurer expeditions into the regions occupied by other groups. In the late 19th century most of the people of Kenya resisted British conquest, and land grabbing when white settlements began in the fertile highlands of Rift Valley and central province. Administrative structures were designed and to-date, have been effectively used as part of state machinery to impose illegitimate authority on the people. Besides land, there were conflicts over forced “labour” (basically Africans and latter Indians) and hut tax. These conflicts led to the 1923 Devonshire White paper, which stated that ‘Kenya is an African country and the interest of the natives must be paramount’. The Africans especially the Kikuyu in Central province, Masaai and Kalenjin in the Rift Valley, lost much of their best land to the white settlers and the growing population meant increasing land hunger and discontent. A new land redistribution scheme was introduced under Lyttleton constitution of 1954 followed by other constitutional changes however these scheme did not adequately address the land question.

Nationalism in Kenya begun as early as 1922. Violence and armed struggle was led by the Mau Mau and by 1955, 13,000 Africans had lost their lives (see Anderson, 2007). In the early 1960s, Moi, Muliro and Ngala of KADU supported regionalism against Kenyatta, Odinga and Mboya and KANU's nationalism (associated with the centralised system). By 1960, two national parties were formed (what could be described as the first multi party era in Kenya). These two parties were already divided over the type of system that would serve the African interests. Alliance by leadings lights from various groups which made up KADU and KANU respectively, also played out in the struggles for release of those in detention and efforts to form the first government. The British were forced to retreat from Kenya and subsequently, release Jomo Kenyatta from detention at Kapenguria.

When Kenya gained “independence” from Britain in 1963, it inherited non-democratic institutions and cultures, which later fell into the hands of corrupted politicians and governments. This exemplifies the de-colonization programme that retained the colonial apparatuses of security forces and political repression in the post-colony (see Anderson, 1998) and compromise over the land question. Post-colonial “officials” lavished themselves with political and economic favours in a pattern that has extended into the post-post-colonial era (Moi who was a member of KADU and later KANU, Kibaki who was technocrat in KANU from 1963, Michuki the Internal Security Minister, Njenga Karume, the Defence Minister among others). This process has been captured by some analysts who have pointed out that these developments mirrors what was a distinctly colonial view of the rule of law, which saw the British leave behind legal systems that facilitated tyranny, oppression and poverty rather than open, accountable government(Elkins, 2007/8)

Ethnic composition and competitive politics

While national level political competition in Kenya is often misunderstood and shallowly interpreted in terms of a competition between the Kikuyu and the Luo, most commentators on Kenya’s politics do ignore the position and role of the Kalenjin, Luhya, Kamba, Kisii, Coastal peoples (Mijikenda), Swahili, Arabs, Indians and Europeans who live in large farms/ranches and important urban areas in Kenya. Each of these groups subsumes a number of smaller ethnic units that become relevant bases of social identity in more localized settings. The groups hardly mentioned are the Ogieks, and the Jemps who are the original occupants of some parts of present Rift valley but have since been displaced or evicted to create room for current occupants. What is however neglected in the debate about Kenyan politics is the reality that all groups have a stake in the running of the Kenyan polity, but due to systematic exclusion of some groups from the national leadership, competitive politics in Kenya is bound to have an ethnic dimension

When Kenya became a one-party state in 1969 Kenyatta ruled the country with a clique around him mainly from his ethnic Kikuyu, who eventually alienated other groups in Kenya from the political and economic order for his entire reign (1963-1978). Although Kenyatta did not instigate ethnic clashes, he targeted eminent persons from ethnic groups that he felt were a threat to his leadership. Many people were assassinated including Pio Gama Pinto (Kenyan Indian), JM Kariuki (Kikuyu) Tom Mboya, D.O Makasembo, Arwgings Kodhek (all Luo) Ronald Ngala (Mijikenda of Coast), Seroney (Kalenjin) among others. This was a strategy that Moi also adopted at the height of his reign when prominent persons were assassinated or died in mysterious circumstances. They include, Robert Ouko, Owiti Ongili, Otieno Ambala, Hezekiah Oyugi (all Luo) Bishop Kipsang Muge, (Kalenjin), Adungosi and Muliro (all Luhya,). Many students, journalists, lecturers, and politicians like Raila Odinga, Charles Rubia, Keneth Matiba, Martin Shikuku, among others were also detained and tortured. What is also missing in most analyses is the role of other communities during the struggle for independence, while the Mau Mau has been presented as the epicentre of everything around impendence struggle, but historical facts point to other contributions but because this ignorance has been presented as the truth, coupled with arrogance and superiority complex, Kenyan liberation history has been constantly distorted.

The struggles for political ascendancy begun immediately after the postcolonial government were formed. While the first cabinet was quite representative of the face of Kenya, soon ideological difference, impact of cold war and betrayal on key issues cropped in, thus dividing the original personalities in the independence struggle; the Mau Mau veterans were sidelined and politics of exclusion and elimination begun with earnest, sometimes combined with assassinations. Electoral politics never took shape in a democratic sense since Kenyatta who ruled mainly through the provincial administration, outside the KANU framework, rendered the party system that could have rallied the people around issues and programmes meaningless. Fears of ethnic ascendancies, power-hungry ethnic political elites, undemocratic processes and institution, which are all hallmarks of today's Kenya, begun to play out; a confirmation of the undemocratic historical trajectory that Kenya has been moving along. The 2007 election fiasco has exposed the deliberate stoking of ethnic tension by power-hungry elites, feeble democratic traditions and institutions in Kenya, one that threatens to consume it if not adequately addressed.

Electoral politics

Electoral politics in Kenya can also be understood best by looking at the role of the process and institutions charged with overseeing such a process. The electoral system in Kenya is based on constituencies whose boundaries are congruent with the boundaries of tribal areas. These boundaries have been used to manipulate democratic outcomes. The constituencies are represented by a member of parliament and a number of local authority representatives at ward, town and urban council levels. Their election takes place at the same time as that of presidential and parliamentary ones. The boundaries are determined by the electoral commission if there is evidence that populations have outgrown the current demarcations. This decision is however made by the electoral commission without consulting the local communities and in most cases at the directive of the president. The president without parliamentary approval appoints the Commission. However the problem with numbers in Kenyan politics is that they are never correct or close to truth. This originates from history of manipulation of constituency population numbers during the single party era, but also lack of regular census and update of births and deaths records. It is therefore not surprising to see “ghost names” in voter registers (not deleted even after a whole five year preparation and multibillion investment in the process) or to see number of registered voters increase during presidential vote tallying contrary to the actual number at constituency level or previous attempt to create extra constituencies in the incumbent friendly regions in order to meet the 25% constitutional requirement for presidential eligibility.

But the problem with the electoral process did not start in recent years; the political competition that followed immediately after independence gave birth to the mechanisations, manipulation of the institutions responsible for electoral process and the blatant rape of the constitution to suit those in power. This begun with the erosion of the party system, when immediately after independence in 1963, the political alliances begun to fall apart with KADU joining KANU and internal struggles within KANU leading to the formation of KPU. Although the fall out between Kenyatta and Odinga has been described as ideological, the actual cause was the feeling that Kenyatta had betrayed his colleagues and the entire nation on three crucial promises at independence, namely eradication of poverty, illiteracy and disease. Kenyatta betrayed this cause by allocating huge parcels of land left by white settlers to himself and cronies, including large tracts in the present Rift Valley province.

Upon Kenyatta’s death in 1978, Daniel arap Moi, a member of the Kalenjin, assumed power in 1978. During his 24 year reign, Moi exploited the Kenyan diversity and politicised ethnicity to levels where he could instigate clashes in districts and provinces with mixed groups, a practice he perfected in the 90’s in order to discredit the onset of multiparty democracy in Kenya. Politically motivated ethnic clashes were used to disrupt and displace populations and groups that supported the opposition (mainly the Kikuyu in Rift Valley, Luo in the slums of Nairobi and Mombasa). He also used divide and rule tactics, pitting on group against another and at times bought politician through patronage in order to have more support in parliament. These tactics ensured that that the opposition lost the elections of 1992 and 1997. It was not until 2002, when his constitutional terms in office expired that he had no options, but also due to the unity of the opposition through NARC (Rainbow coalition of Kijana Wamalwa FORD- Kenya, Raila Odinga of LDP, Charity Ngilu and Kibaki of NAK/DP) got together and managed to defeated Moi’s preferred choice of successor, Uhuru Kenyatta (the son of Jomo Kenyatta). Moi was voted out of office in 2002, and Kibaki became president.

Anger against Kibaki’s leadership is real and genuine and it stems from the fact that Kibaki was elected on a platform of reform, in the sphere of constitutional change, end to corruption, tribalism and establishment of an equitable system that could uplift the living conditions of all Kenyans regardless of their ethnicity and other background factors. Kibaki’s failure to grasp these genuine concerns, self imprisonment from reasoning and lack of desire to leave a legacy in Kenya, caused a great anger in the majority of Kenyans whose hopes had been dashed by Kibaki’s conduct, corruption and arrogance of people around him. For instance People’s disgust with Kibaki’s regime was expressed at the 2005 referendum in which the Wako Draft (a diluted version of the Boma’s draft, which was a constitutional product of a people led process) was defeated. Seven provinces made up of diverse ethnic groups voted for “NO” while the Yes vote was only represented by central province. This outcome reflected the wishes of the majority and cannot be seen as a vote against the Kikuyu since the vote was for a devolved system or a unitary system. But then, one cannot lose sight to the ethnic dimension the vote took during the campaigns, when people of central province were told to vote for “Yes” because it meant protecting “their presidency”. This anger and frustration was captured in the 2007 elections in which Kibaki lost his close allies from his own backyard (central province) and high profile lieutenants from other regions who were rejected at grassroots level. The 2007 elections also saw a new trend of ethnic alliances, which were formed for political expediency, even though hidden behind critical issues. Some groups could however identify with each other in terms of political and economic marginalisation than others, thus the divide the has been reflected in the post ethic conflict even if some analysis attempt to reduce it to the work of political leaders as the ones behind the ethnic divide. In the current situation, old wounds have been revived but the degree of suffering under previous regimes differ from group to group, while frustration also exists within the groups themselves, whereby, Kalenjin rejected their own, in Moi and his sons, while the Kikuyu rejected the cabal that have surrounded Kibaki since 2002. The same was witnessed in Nyanza where Luo and Kisii Nyanza voted out MPs that they thought did not deserve another parliamentary mandate.

* Antony Otieno Ong’ayo is a researcher at the Transnational Institute, Amsterdam.

* Please send comments to or comment online at www.pambazuka.org

While the whole world is aware of the crisis is in Kenya, thanks to the international and local media, most of their reporting is accurate, however, there is need for an honest analysis of the situation in Kenya

The media

It is sad at this moment in time to apply outdated tactics of muzzling the people who are expressing a democratic right. In the case of Kenya, gagging the media would not help Kibaki and his cohorts, since the level of awareness and resolve among Kenyans not to return to the dark days of dictatorship is so high. The courage of the Kenyan media and journalists despite setbacks initiated by Internal security Minster (Michuki) is worth noting, but more so the way in which they reported events during the campaigns and eventful day of vote counting. However, there are problems with headlines (both local and international) that have appeared since the outbreak of post elections violence.

The ethnic dimension is appearing to be the main focus of international press and they are also reporting that it is a Kikuyu-Luo issue but that is not true. Besides the fighting in the slums in Nairobi, Nakuru and Mombasa whose inhabitants are from all backgrounds though dominated by communities from western Kenya, Killings taking pace in the Rift Valley; Coast provinces are not perpetrated by the Luos. The fact that Raila is a Luo is not a justification enough to tag a whole community, just because one of them is a leading personality in the current stalemate.

Such bias will direct attention in the wrong direction, and could be used to gang up against other communities, as has been the case in the past. There is no mention of killings taking place in Nyanza province especially in the Lake Town of Kisumu where Police has been shooting protesters at the orders of the internal Security Minister (Michuki).

Condemnation of violence should be applied across the board. Victims of the violence are from all over especially in the slums, but where it is perpetrated by the state in a selective manner, condemnation should be focused on security forces and those who give such orders) These kinds of statements misinform the world of the actual facts on the ground and hinder insights that could help get Kenya out of the situation.

Secondly reducing the current post election conflict to a Kikuyu-Luo affair is cheap analysis that is devoid of facts and reflections of what happens on the ground. Most of the current Western media analyses do not taken into account the underlying factors such as the failure of institutions of the state, such as the electoral commission of Kenya whose mediocre performance has plunged the country into bloodshed, a draconian constitutional framework that has been at the service of ethnic chauvinists and jingoist in power since 1963, the centralised power and networks that benefit from it, whose abuse and actions have led to marginalisation of certain groups from national resources, equitable public appointments, and the grand scheme involving local and international elites who exploit Kenya under the “old order”, interests/forces that want to keep the status quo and their role in the current problem.

Bias and partisan analyses are also observed in the local media especially the media owners association, Kenya broadcasting corporation, Kenyan citizens in the diaspora through various blog sites and debaters in the local Newspapers where intellectuals, opinion and church leaders have taken sides, instead of guiding the debate in a more honest way so that all Kenyans can identify where the problem lies (draconian laws, out-dated political system, poverty, inequality, corruption, unequal distribution of resources countrywide and lack of access to essential services among others). Kenyans suffer under these conditions regardless of their tribe, and that is why those who live in the slums are from all tribes, even though previously marginalized by earlier regimes such as the Luo, Luhya and other minority groups make up the majority in those dwellings.

Leadership and national interest

The question that people need to ask is why did Kibaki sought to be Kenya’s president, in 1992, 1997, and finally became one in 2002? Was it because he lacked money? Was he someone with an agenda for the “whole “ nation?

And if he had one, what was the agenda? Was that agenda realised between 2003 and 2007? Why are Kenyans having a problem with his agenda presented during the campaigns and the people around him majority of whom have been rejected in their own backyards? Why did most Kenyans have a problem with giving him another mandate? Why would someone who is a billionaire and aged 76, not want to leave a legacy that would be remembered in positive terms? What is so painful to forego that Kibaki would not want a clean election? More important to ask is why the current “elite” and morons around Kibaki are afraid of change of the current system and/or leadership to go into the hands of “lesser” communities? And lastly, why was the current regime rejected by majority of provinces and communities? Even though there are arguments that Kenya’s economy has grown at 6% over the past two years, the gap between the rich and poor has widened, with more people falling below the poverty line. The slums did not get smaller, nor did North Eastern and North-Eastern provinces get piped water from lake Victoria, the Samburus did not receive hospitals and tarmac roads, no fish industry was built along Lake Victoria and loans given to fishermen. 40 years is a long time for the Samburu, Turkana, Rendile and Somalis to wait for basic and essential services to reach them, it is a long time for Kamba people to wait for water and receive food hand outs during starvation, it is a long time before the fishermen along Lake Victoria receive funding through a fishing Board to take care of their interests in agriculture as done to coffee, tea, pyrethrum and dairy farmers; it is along time to wait for any major industry in Western Kenya; it too long time for Mijikenda to have resources from Coastal investments recycled back to alleviate their poverty, thirst for water, better schools and hospitals.

Obstacle to dialogue

In my view Kibaki is hostage to a number of factors that seems to contradict his call for putting the nation first. First and foremost are the networks of buddies and business comrades and elite form Mt Kenya who have been on the Gravy train since 2003. For what explains the refusal to find a middle ground while knowing so well that the outcome of the elections are not acceptable to everyone including their own people? The people holding Kibaki hostage are the ones Kenyans need to address in their quest for finding a peaceful solution to the current crisis. These people have a lot to loose if the man goes, thus the reason they are against recount, judicial review or re-run of presidential elections. Kenyans regardless of their ethnic background come distant in their priority of needs and actions. The opposition also has a role to play in the process and that will depend on the kind of proposal they put on table, which should be scrutinised by Kenyans since the issue at hand is about how Kenyans are governed and therefore Kibaki or Raila are just but people they expect to govern them through their mandate which includes listening to their views and respecting their will as expressed through the social contract via the vote and representative democracy.

A Government of National Unity, or a recount of ballots papers will not solve any problem. It is a well-known fact that ballot papers especially those used for tallying presidential votes were already tampered with and might mot be traced. Secondly Keep never keeps any promise. He did not keep his promise to Kenyans after he made promises upon election in 2002; he never honoured agreements with his comrades upon enthronement, he renegade on the fight against corruption, poverty and tribalism. He does not have the will to keep his promises therefore arrangements such as a government of national unity will just be a soft landing for him, it will be a process that legitimises his hold onto power at the expense of democracy and the will of Kenyans who came out to vote on the 27^th December 2007. Kibaki and his handlers, do not care about democracy, it is a word they use at their convenience. The best arbitrator in this case is the voter. All mediators coming to Kenya should not let Kenyans down by proposing frameworks that will maintain the status quo. It will be a mockery to democracy and great betrayal to the many Kenyans who have lots their lives since the 50s, to liberate the country from colonial yokes but also from the yokes of fellow Kenyans such as Kenyatta, Moi and Kibaki.

The Killings

Kenyans should stop Killing each other. The culprits are few people who are out busy with self-aggrandisement at the expense of a whole nation.

Although the current killings are unacceptable since they are an outcome of a stupidity of failure by Kenyan politicians to grasp the communality interest, Kenyans and more so those who abuse the political system and state institutions and resources should know that "Kenya belongs to all who belong in it" and all should be given equal treatment. There is no justification for the minister of internal security to use outdated and counterproductive tactics of targeting specific ethnic groups with paramilitary force and orders to kill. The images on television screens, shows that most of these people could be apprehended and taken to court.

Senseless beating and shooting based on orders of a politician with colonial hangovers will exacerbate acts of revenge instead of resorting to the rule of law to settle disputes or address acts pf violence that are currently being perpetrated by some Kenyans who exploit the chaotic situation. The paramilitary police used by Michuki on the Luo (historical tactic, used by Kenyatta, in the 60s and early seventies) is selective and directed in one direction towards a group of people but that too will create more anger and feelings for revenge.

Struggles in the Rift Valley are also about past wrongs against the minority communities like Ogieks who were chased out of the forest and the places given to the central province groups. Maasai and Kalenjin whose prime land were taken by the British, and later by the elite around Kenyatta. These grievances have never been addressed and due to the complex nature of ethnic blend in those regions, Moi for instance exploited this mix to cause chaos in order to vilify the onset of multiparty in Kenya. Ethnic clashes in 1992 and 1997, produced suffering and anger which have been kept low, but now fully exploited in the face of a dashed hope for change. These people thought there could be some equity with change of government but that hope is gone, so we expect anger, but also revenge as result of past clashes that were instigated by Moi prior to 1992, and 97 elections.

Democratic test What I fear most is that if Kibaki is allowed to rule, Kenya will return to the dark ages, all the democratic gains will be lost. They will know that they can always rig elections and get away with it no matter what people do including protest, they don’t mind whether people die or not, since they will be able to get away with it.

Kibaki’s behaviour in relation to vote tallying and results in the 2007 elections makes democracy look sick in Africa. It brings to mind the question whether there are free and fair elections? Or whether franchise or high voter turn out as witnessed in Kenya can turn a regime out of office? What about the role of institutions to support such a process like an independent police, electoral commission, judiciary and a parliament that is sensitive to the needs of the country, free and non-partisan media, respect for the rule of law by all parties involved in the electoral process? Even though democracy has never been perfect although being adopted by nations and peoples, its institutionalisation depend more on local history, culture and geography and not analyses and prescription as it is applied in other contexts. In the case of Kenya, the political, economic and social systems are complex and full of nuances, combined with other forces/vested interests/pressure groups that exert more power, thus making the ordinary voter appear to be a pawn rather than a "king" maker.

Therefore if Kenya is to build on the already made gains on the democratic front, a solution to the current crisis must be found in tandem with the reality on the ground. The reality that the “presidential election was rigged” and the incumbent is hell-bent on hanging to power no mater what cost, but also the reality that the opposition is making claims which have been proved right by the electoral commission itself and the various poll observers that Kibaki did not win the elections”. Although, calling for peace or on the major players to urge their supporters to clam down is a first step, but the call for peace should not water down the main cause of the problem which is “rigged elections” which is a threat to democratic gains. Being soft on this point would embolden the antagonists especially the “winners” and based on their history of arrogance and lack of decorum in addressing national issues, they will brush aside the issue at stake and this will fuel anger which is not only expressed by the opposition, but the very people the winners want to “rule” at all cost.

Way out

Asking Raila or Kenyans to forget this and forge ahead, and wait for another 5 years by many partisan authors in various local dailies and international blogs is not sincere and honest since such calls are directed at one party and not the other two. Why are people not asking Kibaki to resign? Why not ask for recount and audit of the votes? If the Electoral commission is not honest, how sure can we be of the courts in Kenya? Kenyans know that the system is rotten thus the overwhelming vote and a clear message that they want something different. They should not be denied this difference by hiding behind discourses that keeps on mystifying the problem. If Kibaki goes on without the approval of Kenyans, he is not making it better for those already hurt in one way or the other through killings and destruction seen in the past days. These things will haunt the nation after he is long gone and people around him or groups supporting him will not escape blame and demands to be held accountable. Peace can only come when the two parties agree to talk, engage and get into a process that will heal wounds on both sides of the divide (the people, the Opposition and PNU politicians). Allowing Kibaki to go ahead and bury his head as if nothing serious has happened will only exacerbate the arrogance of the group around him as witnessed during a recent press conference and the exchange between PNU Ministers and the press. Such one sided approach and attack on the opposition will only help strengthen the status quo, the exploitation, discrimination and inequality along tribal lines, which will exacerbate problems even if calmness would return today.

What is urgently needed are; Curfew in Opposition areas to be lifted and regular police patrols with a humane face be initiated in hot spots to give people confidence in the state institutions for their safety. The general service unit has no role in the process since it is a catalyst instead of providing safety.
The Kenya Pipeline Corporation should immediately resume pumping oil to western Kenya and Uganda. Cutting this supply is not different from scorched earth policy and if someone in the government has ordered such action, which was observed already before the election days then he/she or they are fueling the crisis instead of solving it. This should apply to other services like electricity, food items among others Kenyan civil society organisations, Law Society, The Kenya National Human Rights Commission and invited institutions to help in the process of reconciliation and putting in place a framework that would bring back the credibility of the electoral process and an acceptable conclusion A re-run of presidential election supervised by a team of independent observers and representatives of the two parties (ODM and PNU) within an agreed time frame. It is now clear from ECK that they did not know who won. The ECK had put aside funds for a run off, and that money can be used to SAVE KENYA.

* Antony Otieno Ong'ayo is a Researcher in the New Politics Programme at the Transnational Institute

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