Since 1999 there has been a consistent deterioration in the conduct of Nigerian elections. Abdul Raufu Mustapha assesses the impact on Nigeria’s recent fraudulent elections on the future political and economic development of Nigeria.

Nigerians have not forgotten the June 12th 1993 Presidential elections which were annulled under controversial circumstances by General Babangida, plunging the country into political crises. Similarly, Nigerians are unlikely to forget the state and national elections of April 2007. There was much hype in anticipation of the 2007 elections: US National Security Adviser, Negroponte testified before Congress that these were the most important elections in Africa in 2007, while Nigerians themselves trumpeted the fact that this was going to be the first time that a civilian-to-civilian transition took place in the country.

The elections have come and gone, trailed by near universal condemnation. But we need to pause and ask, what do the elections mean for Nigeria’s future? The problems with the elections can be classified into three broad categories: incompetence and deliberate bungling by the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC); widespread use of thugs and the security forces against voters; and the flagrant abuse of the powers of incumbency.

The Electoral Commission’s catalogue of illegalities included the flouting of court orders; illegal/unconstitutional disqualification of candidates; refusal to include the names and pictures of major opposition candidates for the gubernatorial elections in Anambra State in spite of subsisting court rulings; the late arrival or non-arrival of voting materials in many places followed often by no voting, yet results were announced; in some states, the INEC headquarters announced a result when the Resident Electoral Commissioner in situ said there was no result; declaration of results while collation and counting of votes were still going on; and a month after the April polls ended, three INEC staff were caught thumb-printing ballot papers meant for the election at Igarra, Edo State, in a bid to manufacture supporting evidence for their already declared result. These can hardly be said to be the actions of a competent and fair arbiter in an electoral contest.

INEC’s commissions and omissions were compounded by the widespread use of violence in the party primaries and during the actual elections. Patterns of the systematic use of violence included the use of thugs, bombings and assassinations during the party primaries to select party candidates; the use of the police and soldiers to intimidate voters and in many places they were also observed to have participated in the seizure of ballot boxes; the use of thugs to perpetrate violence with impunity, leading to the killing of 260 people on April 14, according to Amnesty International; the assassination in a Kano Mosque on April 13th Sheik Jafar Adam, an act possibly aimed at provoking ethno-religious rioting; the attack by the so-called ‘Taliban’ on April 17th on the police in Kano and the subsequent killing of 21 policemen; and post election political assassinations in Ondo state.

Finally, there was the blatant abuse of incumbency particularly by the PDP-controlled Federal government, including the sudden declaration of a two-day public holiday to frustrate the judicial process involving opposition candidates; the unannounced closure of Kaduna airport the day before an opposition party was to hold its congress there; the block booking of hotels in Abuja to frustrate another opposition party from holding its convention; the use of the Nigerian Television Authority (NTA) to announce controversial results, such as in Jigawa State where the NTA reported that the opposition ANPP had won and two minutes later, reversed itself and awarded victory to the PDP; and finally, the physical assault on the Abia State Resident Electoral Commissioner by PDP party leaders.

Weeks before the presidential election on 21 April 2007, local and international pollsters predicted a tight race, all putting the opposition ANPP candidate Mohammadu Buhari slightly in front. In the end, INEC announced the victory of the Obasanjo protégé and PDP candidate Umaru Yar’ Adua with 24.3 million votes, with Buhari garnering 6.6 million votes and Action Congress candidate and Obasanjo antagonist, Vice-President Atiku Abubakar, trailing with 2.6 million votes.

These elections have been roundly condemned by local and foreign observers, with the exception of Baroness Linda Chalker. Condemnations and strong reservations have come from the Nigerian Bar Association, Nigeria Labour Congress, Trade Union Congress, Nigeria Union of Journalists, Academic Staff Union of the Universities, and a host of local NGOs and religious organizations. Similar condemnations have come from international bodies, including the National Democratic Institute, National Republican Institute, European Union, Economic Community of West African States, the Commonwealth, COSATU, International Crisis Group, Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch, the committee of 48 Nobel Laureates, the Canadian parliament, and even Hilary Clinton. The EU observer delegation reflected generally held opinion when it concluded that the elections:

"were marred by poor organisation, lack of essential transparency, widespread procedural irregularities, significant evidence of fraud, particularly during the result collation process, voters' disenchantment at different stages of the process, lack of equal conditions for contestants and numerous incidents of violence."

Implications of the Elections: Perils of Succession Politics

Some have argued that all elections in Nigeria have been rigged. 2007 is therefore not any different. While it may be true that rigging has been a recurring feature of Nigerian politics with all parties guilty of different degrees of undemocratic conduct, 2007 nevertheless represent a qualitative difference in election rigging in Nigeria. To miss this point is to miss the danger that the 2007 elections represent.

In previous elections, you needed a minimum level of social support and acceptance to rig; there was a sociological foundation to rigging. Where rigging took place without the necessary social support, as in the Western Region in 1965 and Ondo State in 1983, widespread violence often followed. Scholars of African elections like Staffan Lindberg have argued that were repeated elections are held, they tend to entrench democratic norms. Repeated contestation between parties is seen as leading to the gradual sedimentation of democratic norms and practices. Unfortunately, Nigeria’s experience of elections since the return to civil democratic rule in 1999 contradicts this observation.

Between 1999 and 2007, Nigeria has held three elections, and there has been a systematic and persistent deterioration in the quality of the elections; 1999 was not problem-free, but it was better than 2003 which was itself better than the 2007 elections. These observations are supported by a comparison of election monitors’ reports from 1999. In 1999, there were some complaints of old-style ‘competitive’ rigging as the different parties sought to press home their advantages in different constituencies across the country. Most observers remarked that the 1999 elections were peaceful, and that despite the perceived problems the announced outcome was roughly consistent with the wishes of the Nigerian electorate, even if the margins of victory had been inflated. In 2003, however, we begin to see the systematic deployment of organized thuggery, violence and the brazen manipulation of party congresses and the actual elections in few states, particularly in the Niger Delta and the South East. In 2007, this violence and brazen manipulation was broadcast across much of the country. In 2007, Nigeria decisively moved from ‘competitive rigging’ to ‘coercive rigging’; from elections, no matter how flawed, to brazen ‘selection’.

Under ‘competitive rigging’, your supporters simply stuffed some more ballot papers for their preferred candidate and party thugs sought to intimidate the opposition. But the law enforcement agencies generally tried to stop the thugs and maintain a semblance of public order. In some instances, the sanitary inspector, the local authority police, or the Emir’s courts were used to harass opponents of the ruling party. Under ‘coercive rigging’, there is the outright resort to state-sponsored violence, the blatant abuse of the electoral machinery, and the deliberate undermining of the courts. Cudgels, guns and administrative subterfuge have replaced the microphone as the preferred instrument of political communication. When Obasanjo said the elections were going to be a ‘do-or-die’ affair, most Nigerians missed the import of that statement for he must have meant exactly that. It is therefore not surprising that guns and ammunitions were imported for the election even when basic electoral material had not been provided!

It is little wonder that the declared winner, Yar’ Adua, claimed that he won ‘fair & square’, rather than ‘free & fair’. God he said gives power to whosoever He wants! I thought elections were about citizens’ choice? Between 1999 and 2007, there has been the gradual constriction of democratic space, as ‘selection’ of candidates replaced ‘elections’. If this trend is not corrected, future elections in Nigeria have the potential of degenerating into widespread social conflict as the opposition will quickly learn that ‘preparing for elections’ means training your own vigilante groups and thugs as counter-terror confronts state-sponsored terror. Yar Adua has rightly promised electoral reforms in tacit acknowledgement of the gravely flawed process that brought him to power. Without these promised reforms, democracy, or even the continued existence of the country, will be severely put at risk. Nigerians are lucky in that the current sharp political divisions do not correspond to the entrenched cleavages of ethnicity, region and religion. The country may not be so lucky in future, if it continues with the culture of shambolic elections and impunity. The simple message is that there can be no democracy without respect for voters’ choice; if this basic fact is not quickly grasped, Nigeria faces the peril of succession politics in subsequent elections.

After 2007, What Next?

There has been some suggestion that once the transition to another administration takes place, things will quieten down and the much-trumpeted economic reforms of the Obasanjo presidency will resume. This desire for reform continuity in the West is often exacerbated by the politics of oil supplies. Let no one have any illusions: 2007 has sown the seed of insecurity and instability and things will not get back to normal until that ghost, like the ghost of the 1993 election, is addressed.

Such has been the enormity of the assault of the 2007 elections on the collective psyche of the nation that it could easily have provided the pretext for military opportunists to begin plotting to seize power. The National Party of Nigeria’s rigged ‘landslide victory’ in 1983 provoked the Buhari/Idiagbon military regime. In earlier times, therefore, we could safely assume that some factions within the military are already planning some mischief. I doubt though that a military coup is a possibility today for various intra-military and extra-military reasons. And if, out of national misfortune, one were to happen, it is likely to cause more problems than it will solve. It is therefore gratifying that the opposition Action Congress recently slapped down a military chief who hinted that in the post April election situation, the military will not fold its arms if there is widespread breakdown of law and order. All Nigerians must resist the temptation of seeing the military as a solution to the current political crisis.

If we remove the military from the equation, then we have three other factors to ponder: the response of the opposition and Civil Society groups to Yar Adua’s ‘(s)election’; ex-president Obasanjo’s intentions and his real ‘exit strategy’; and the likely trajectories of Yar Adua’s administration.

Opposition & Civil Society
When the opposition failed to get the proposed mass action going on May 1st 2007, many felt that Nigerians had accepted the fait accompli of the enthronement of the new administration. In the face of belligerent threats from the police, many activists felt that they could not put themselves at risk for the benefit of unreliable opposition politicians. Ordinary Nigerians probably wanted to get on with their struggle to eek out a living. It would be wrong, however, based on the inaction of May 1st, to conclude that Nigerians have now accepted the Yar Adua administration. Importantly, a number of significant actions continue to signify widespread displeasure. For instance, the Nigerian Bar Association conducted a successful boycott of courts in protest at the elections and has suggested the likelihood of conducting a judicial review of the elections to document what happened; the Nigeria Labour Congress carried out a partially successful 2-day sit-at-home protest, and refused to serve on the presidential inauguration committee; there was also the unprecedented demonstration by the ‘Women in Black’ in Abuja and similar demonstrations against the elections have been held in London and 10 American cities. Nigerians United for Democracy (NUD), an umbrella group of prominent pro-democracy activists and politicians has given Yar Adua an ultimatum to quit office, while prominent opposition figures like Wole Soyinka have testified before a committee of the American Congress and demanded that Yar Adua set up a panel to investigate the failed elections which he blamed on the ‘criminal quartet’ of Obasanjo, INEC chair Iwu, former Police chief Ehindero, and PDP chair, Ahmadu Ali. Meanwhile, the legal challenge by opposition politicians in 11 states and the federal level continue at various election tribunals.

These actions may not be as dramatic of mass action, but collectively, they cast a dark shadow of illegitimacy on the Yar Adua administration. It is this obvious lack of legitimacy that made it difficult for ex-president Obasanjo to pay a proposed farewell visit to Washington just before his departure from office. Both Britain and the US sent relatively lower ranking officers to Yar Adua’s inauguration; for the inauguration of the President of Liberia, the US sent a delegation led by Laura Bush and included Secretary of State Rice. For Yar Adua’s inauguration, it was left to the State Department, not the White House, to send a low-key delegation led by Jendayi Frazer. It is speculated that Obasanjo might loose his membership of the club of ex-presidents and Prime ministers, Interaction, and his invitation to serve on Tony Blair’s Africa Panel has been publicly challenged in the British media. Blighted by its heritage and lacking both domestic and international legitimacy, the Yar Adua administration is vulnerable.

Obasanjo’s Intentions
A second important piece of our jig-saw is ex-president Obasanjo’s real intentions in foisting Yar Adua first on the PDP, and then on Nigeria as a whole. Under Obasanjo, the PDP changed its rules so that only he can be the leader and ‘conscience’ of the party. Candidates on the party’s platform were also compelled to sign contracts of ‘obedience’ to the party, and the rules have been changed so that the party is said to be supreme to its elected members in public office. Ladipo Adamolekun recently pointed what he called the ‘dangerous doctrine of party supremacy’ that now pervades the PDP as Obasanjo’s presidential term came to an end. Central to this syndrome was the equation of loyalty to the PDP to loyalty to the Nigerian nation, and a division of labour by which the party under Obasanjo’s control decided policy, while the elected governments under the party’s platform, including the Yar Adua administration, are given the role of policy implementation. There is no doubt that Obasanjo is seeking to entrench his influence in the new administration. But to what ends? One reason may be to defend his back as he moves off the centre stage of presidential power? Or to tele-guide Yar Adua from behind and consolidate his alleged status as the ‘founder of modern Nigeria’? Obasanjo’s real intentions will influence the stability of the Yar Adua administration for while Yar Adua is likely to be willing to defend him, it is not clear if Yar Adua is willing, or can afford, to be a tele-guided robot.

Yar Adua
The final piece of our jig-saw is Yar Adua himself. He has so far given contradictory signals with regard to his intentions. Will he be an Obasanjo robot? Or will he unfold an independent agenda once he consolidates his hold on power? On the one hand, he promised to only marginally tinker with the personnel and policies of Obasanjo’s government. On the other, he has promised a ‘servant-leadership’ style, which can only be taken as an oblique criticism of Obasanjo’s proverbial high-handedness; he has also promised a programme of national ‘restoration’, another Freudian acknowledgement of his tarnished inheritance.

Much of what we have heard about Yar Adua is that he is taciturn, ascetic and relatively incorrupt. These are good leadership qualities by Nigerian standards. We should also remember, however, that he is equally capable of political ruthlessness. For examples, he forced out all the five leading members of the Katsina State PDP after he became governor in 1999; he successfully frustrated Aminu Masari, influential Speaker of the Federal House of Representatives from running for Katsina governor under the PDP in 2007; force and violence were freely used against the opposition in Katsina and Daura in the 2007 elections. We are clearly not dealing with a bumbling saint, but it remains to be seen if he has the will and determination to resist being turned into a puppet.

The stability and security of post-election Nigeria will therefore depend on three critical factors: what the opposition and civil society do; what Obasanjo’s real intentions are; and Yar Adua’s capabilities and response to both. If out of vulnerability, Yar Adua sticks with Obasanjo and the PDP, he is likely to face increasing civil protest and rely more on the coercive apparatus set up under the Obasanjo presidency. If, on the other hand, he decides to be independent of Obasanjo, then he is likely to confront opposition from entrenched forces from within the PDP. Significantly, two people are already on record as saying that Yar’ Adua will ‘deal with’ Obasanjo: General TY Danjuma and Alhaji Makama, PDP Kaduna State Chairman. Whichever direction Yar Adua turns, he is likely to be confronted with stiff resistance, at least in the next 12 to 15 months. Those who think that reforms will continue once the transition to a new administration has taken place may well be mistaken. Nigerians live in the proverbial interesting times.

The Future of Democracy.

It is understandable that most Nigerians are disappointed and traumatized by the 2007 elections. There is no doubt that INEC’s conduct has brought dishonor to the country.

This current disappointment is coming on top of a long-run decline in support for the democratic administration since 1999. According to Afrobarometer surveys between 2000 and 2005, support for democracy in Nigeria has gone down from 81% of those surveyed in 2000, to 65% in 2005. Over the same period, ex-president Obasanjo’s approval rating plummeted from 84% to 32%. The ‘(s)election’ of April 2007 further aggravates this growing disillusionment. Under the circumstances, it is easy to understand the air of despair that pervades the country.

Nigerians however need to remind themselves of some of the positive things that came out of the 2007 experience. Firstly, Yar Adua was not Obasanjo’s first choice; Obasanjo’s first choice through term elongation was Obasanjo himself. The political will that defeated the sit-tight design under the ‘third term’ can also be mustered to defeat ‘the son of third term’. Secondly the judiciary and the media have largely been beacons of hope. In the Ararume and Atiku cases that went to the Supreme and Federal Appeal courts, we see a judiciary committed to the rule of law and worthy of respect and support. This was certainly not the case in the electoral debacle of June 12th 1993. Thirdly, important organs and personalities of civil society have shown that they remain unbowed in the face of authoritarianism. Fourthly, General Buhari, in his statesman-like conduct, and Atiku, through his dogged reliance on the courts, have shown that they can still make useful contributions to the entrenchment of democratic norms in Nigeria. Finally, it should also be borne in mind that this was also the election in which the middle classes came out in post-colonial Nigeria to stand for something new and refreshing: Utomi, Agbaje, Oshiomole, Bugaje, and Fayemi.

It will be important for the opposition and civil society to use the courts, the media, and all peaceful avenues to force Yar Adua to redeem his promise of electoral reform. Nigerian democracy, or even the country itself, will not survive without serious and urgent electoral/constitutional reforms. Logically, it would seem that the correct strategy would be to put enough pressure on Yar Adua to make him sit up and redeem his pledge, but not so much that his only source of succour is the bosom of the Obasanjo-controlled PDP. Only Nigerians can save their country from the scourge of impunity which the sham elections of 2007 represent.

* Abdul Raufu Mustapha is a University Lecturer in African Politics & Kirk-Greene Fellow, University of Oxford.

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