Onyekachi Wambu reviews a ‘really useful’ new collection of essays that looks at how governments can integrate the contributions of their diaspora communities into national development programmes and policies, drawing on detailed examples from India, the Phillipines, Mali and Mexico. ‘Closing the Distance’ demonstrates what has always been clear in this area, writes Wambu – that ‘while countries can learn from each other, it is their own national priorities and understanding of the needs of their migrants and diasporas that should drive policy.’

Onyekachi Wambu looks at post-liberation South Africa and the contradictions of promise and reality and duly warns that the ANC government might very well be condemning South Africa to repeat Zimbabwe's mistakes.

This story has been brewing since the mid-1990s, and, as usual, we have ignored it our peril.

Despite all the 'Rainbow' dreams, everytime I have visited SA since 1992 I have been more & more worried about the real fundamentals - a very poor, and increasingly angry people, amidst great wealth which is not distributed equitably. African people are very patient but it usually takes about 10 -15 years after independence (see Zimbabwe) for people to realise that they can't eat 'freedom', and for real politics to kick in.

The economic facts in SA are this - the deal that buried apartheid in 1994, contained no redistribution of economic power. Black empowerment would only come if the economy expanded and through some mild forms of positive discrimination (BEE). Affirmative action (see what it has done for white women in the US) only really benefits a small minority of middleclass, educated, or (politically) connected Africans, just as it has done in SA. So it meant, that for the vast majority to benefit - the economy needed to expand more than 5%. At 5% it would just about absorb those coming onto the job market, not soaking up the historic apartheid unemployed.

Now watch what happened in the real world. Between 1994 - 2004 growth averaged around 3%. In 2004 it reached 4%. By 2005 (eleven years after apartheid ended) it finally reached 5% and only went beyond that in 2006 and 2007. Even then the last 3 year growth has not been pro-poor growth, but has benefited the already rich, selling commodities, etc.

Nevertheless the SA government by 2005, alongside its enormous house building, water and electrification programmes, was finally in a postition to deal with its historic unemployed and those coming onto the job market

Only it wasn't. Because at the same time over the last 13 years, 5 million new migrants had come into the country (3 million from Zimbabwe alone), many of them better educated and working for less money than native South Africans. So even the growth of the last 3 years has not really made an impact on those native unemployement figures and the anger has continued simmering.

This anger has been expressed all along since 1994 as a crime problem - I always feared what would happen eventually when a 'demagogue' would exploit it and make it 'political'. I thought when this happened, the emergent 'political' campaign to gain traction would target the whites -as in Zimbabwe. But I guess SA is different. People there can see the economic disaster in Zim, when international capital and white expertise fled, and do not want a repetition (although for how long?).

Most voters are still reluctant to punish the ANC government (which has given many a pension, houses, water, electricity) for this state of affairs. This reluctance is reinforced by the fact that there is not a viable opposition (the main ones being all nationalist/ethinic minority parties DA,Inkatha, PAC, etc).

So the mob scape-goat and attack foreigners.

Perhaps as William Gumede suggests elsewhere, it might be time for the ANC to break up and for a wing of it to become a workers party -championing the poor and another wing to represent the interests of the middle-class. Politics would then be about finding a balance that satisfies all and could then be done peacfully through votes and street protests, not through violence and killing, as in so much of Africa.

This might even be the best option, given the reluctance of Southern African liberation movements to concede legitimacy to other forces that did not 'win' the liberation war and establish the new post liberation state. Different traditions within the ANC would thus represent the different emerging interests following the national liberation phase.

The ANC need only to look over the horizon to Zimbabwe, to see a liberation party that still seeks to manage within itself, the tensions and contradictions within the nation. Having failed to do this and people went elsewhere to establish another possibility, ZANU-PF, wanting to continue monopolising power, decided not to recognise that alternative, deepening the original crisis even further.

Presideent Mbeki, having failed to heed the real meaning of the Zimbabwe crisis (how to transit from liberation to ordinary politics), might be doomed to repeat Zimbabwe. And the catalyst for the unravelling crisis in SA might be those self same Zimbabwe migrants who have fled because they cannot find a space to engage in peaceful politics back home.

*Onyekachi Wambu's lastest publication is 'Under the tree of talking - leadership for change in Africa' (2007, British Council). This article first appeared in the Africa Without Borders Forum.

*Please send comments to or comment online at http://www.pambazuka.org/

As an open space that brings together social movements, civil society organisations, community based organizations, academics, activists and individuals, under the rubric 'another Africa is possible', ASF is in many ways, a living manifestation of this new fangled Pan-Africanism that has so begun to preoccupy our governments. It is a powerful new movement that can exploit the endless opportunities that exist to begin the process of real development - shifting genuine power and resources back to Africa and entrenching our autonomy and self-determination.

But as we meet to begin to chart ways forward, we must also raise questions about the identity of this Pan-Africanism that is represented this week in Lusaka, and whether in its narrowness, it is in fact ignoring a powerful partner for African development?

The diaspora - Africa's biggest 'aid' donors How wide is the definition of Pan-Africanism at the ASF? If you take African civil society, is it merely civil society in Africa, or is African identity a key factor in defining this entity? In which case space and time become relevant. Surely, the Pan-Africanism that is represented this week cannot be complete, with the old and new African diasporas (both by-products of the very globalization being critiqued this week) glaring absent.

The absence of the African diaspora in all its complexity is partially due to historic factors. Despite the massive contributions the diaspora has been making towards development in Africa, there are still very few structured partnerships with African civil society, community forums and social movements. The diaspora tends to organize itself around identity structures (involving home towns, ethnic groups, alumni associations, etc), formations frequently viewed as regressive and conservative by civil society and social movements. Instead, there has been a tendency amongst African civil society, community forums, and social movements to be more focused on Northern NGOs and agencies.

The absence is also due to a lack of awareness of the dramatic role the African diaspora plays in development. There is need for the ASF to recognise, legitimise and support the self-help efforts of African diaspora groups in contributing to development in their regions of origin in Africa. This will acknowledge the long tradition, going back to the slave trade, of self-help by the diaspora in supporting Africa's development. More recently in the post war period, working in partnership with identity based groups from their villages, home towns, ethnic groups, diaspora organisations have enabled people to take control of their lives.

We should understand the diaspora's historic and continuing contribution to Africa through the transfer of five forms of capital: social (networks, trust), intellectual (skills), political (advocacy), cultural (food, music) and financial (investment, remittances).

Remittances, one element of this diverse diaspora capital pool, has become highly visible and is beginning to form a key discourse of development, with some even calling it a 'new paradigm' of development. But it is not new. There has always been a history of internal remittances in every country, people going to the capital city or from a poorer area to a more prosperous area, or to a neighbouring country and sending money to those relatives they left behind. Globalisation has given this phenomenon a huge dimension. According to the 2004 World Bank Global Development Finance, at $93 billion, remittances now exceed the flow of aid, and are second only to Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) as a source of external financing. In the African context, over 9 years $28 billion dollars was sent through Western Union alone to Nigeria (Earlier this year at the G8 Summit - a State Department official was quoted as saying that Nigerian diaspora sent $12 billion - this would be about 5% - 10% of GDP. The Bank of Ghana tracked $1.3 Billion between 2002 and 2003, and in Lesotho remittances represent 28.7% of GDP.

Diaspora/African Government Partnerships Increasingly there is recognition of the diaspora as Africa's biggest 'aid donors'. In recent years, some proactive governments and the diaspora have begun to meet to chart a way forward on socializing, not just remittances, but the whole range of capital the diaspora contribute. The Government of Ghana has highlighted the key role that the Ghanaian diaspora does and can play in national development. The Ghana Poverty Reduction Strategy (GPRS), the policy framework for supporting growth and poverty reduction in the short term, identifies the Ghanaian diaspora as a potential source of funds for the GPRS.

Shortly after the turn of the Millennium, the Ghanaian government also held a 'Home Coming Summit' for investment and other exchanges. The Summit was attended by 1600 members of the Ghanaian diaspora. Since then Ghanaian Embassies and foreign missions have tried to help Ghana's diaspora to direct their resources through more formal channels for national development. Examples include the 'A Dollar a month for Ghana' initiative by the High Commission in Sierra Leone, the 'Five Pounds No Balance Police' initiative by the High Commission in the United Kingdom to purchase basic tools for the Ghana Police Service.

Northern NGOs - partnership or cooption? African governments are not the only ones seeking partnerships with the diaspora. Multi-lateral and international agencies have also begun to see the diaspora, and particularly their remittances, as a 'new paradigm' of development. There is obviously no 'newness' in the paradigm of development, but what there is are recently launched attempts by various multilateral and international agencies to 'capture', 'shape', 'control' and 'regulate' remittances for their own purposes, and many times over the heads of those making the contributions. The International Development Committee (IDC), which scrutinizes the work of DFID, the UK government's department for International aid, recently produced a report 'Migration and Development: How to make migration work for poverty reduction': In an otherwise useful report - this sentence stood out and concerned us at the African Foundation for Development (AFFORD):

'(Northern) NGOs and private sector organisations have a role to play too, employing their expertise so that migrants can remit more productively, at the same time getting in at the ground floor of a good business opportunity' (p.120)

There are two parts of that sentence that are loaded. What does it mean by remit more 'productively'? And what does it mean by good business opportunity?

None of us should be against organisations assessing the global environment and seeking to avoid possible threats, whilst capitalising on opportunities. This is natural. But if in seeking to capitalise on a new opportunity, mainstream players once again co-opt and begin to take away real power from people in the developing world, as they have done in the last 30 years, then there is cause for concern.

Such concern was raised at the experts meeting - 'Bridging the Gap: International Migration and the Role of Migrants and their Remittances in Development' organized by Dutch NGO, Novib. Around 40 participants, gathered, many of them carrying out specific advocacy programmes for diaspora/migrant workers originating from Asia, Africa, and Latin America. Key objectives of the meeting were to gather issues related to migrant remittances and its role as a tool in development; to formulate recommendations to improve polices and practices around remittances, including workable mechanisms to ensure inclusion of migrants diaspora in policy-making processes around this 'new paradigm' of development. AFFORD posed specific questions to the conference: * who frames the questions around remittances? Those who make the contributions or the multilateral and international agencies who see a 'new' paradigm of development? * Why are the diasporas who are central to this contribution considered 'marginalised' in discussions? * If the relationships involved in remittances are ultimately between the diasporas who remit, the host country they remit from and the homeland country they remit to, where do international NGOs and others add value to this process? * In the research that is badly needed to understand the impact of these remittances, whose capacity will be strengthened - those of the diasporas and their beneficiaries in the South or those of international agencies - who have placed themselves at the centre of this process? * Why did Novib take the lead and place itself at the centre of a conference aimed at bringing together diasporas? * In support of and empowerment of southern initiatives, how has Novib sought to build upon a similar initiative launched in Amsterdam last December by AfroNeth, a Dutch based African organisation, seeking to mobilise and connect the African diaspora in the Netherlands for development purposes in Africa? * Finally, Novib, will take forward some of the outcomes of this meeting to the corridors of power in the EU and elsewhere, why? Does this not disempower diaspora/migrant groups further?

Beyond AFFORD's questions, others were also provoked. For Peter Payoyo from the Philippine Seafarers Assistance Programme, 'the mention of an AfroNeth initiative brought to my mind the Bohol Conference which took place in the Philippines in October 2003 (co-organized by two Novib partners, the AMC and PSAP, together with other NGOs and the Philippine Ministry of Labour).' He openly wandered whether the Novib Experts Meeting would build on the accomplishments of this initiative?

Payoyo's post-conference paper ('Bridging the Gap...a Critical Synthesis') raised further questions, which I will quote at length, given the important points being addressed:

'The immediate position of Novib is furthermore to be seen in Novib's involvement in certain key policy processes that the Meeting was also appraised. Novib was notably a member of the Inter-Agency Remittances Task Force, an international steering group which was set up in the aftermath of the International Conference on Migrant Remittances held in London in October 2003. The other members of the Remittances Task Force, led by the World Bank and the UK's DFID, include the ADB, ILO, IOM, UK ONS, WSBI, CGAP, and the EU. Novib is the only agency that may be considered as "non-governmental" in the context of the composition of this Task Force. Allusion was also made to Novib's involvement in the formulation of an EU-wide 'Directive on Migration and Development' to be released in early 2005.

'There was unease. It was uneasiness about a probable self-anointed mission on the part of Novib to directly represent civil society views and positions in the EU and in the World Bank-led Task Force, as well as in the other fast-multiplying global fora on migrant remittances. This unease was not assuaged by the closing remarks of the Meeting organizer, who called on migrant organizations to unite and get their act together, and flatly denied that Novib was out to grab a space that was reserved for civil society actors, in this case, the diaspora organizations from the developing world.

'In this light, AFFORD's keen observation that Novib's forays into the arena of international remittances could lead to the further disempowerment of migrant groups must be seriously considered and reflected upon. The conceptualization of the "Expert Meeting" as well as the process of selection and exclusion involved in the invitations to Meeting have already revealed a glaring bias against migrant groups and migrant advocates who can claim no expertise in the "new" field of remittance flows, an esoteric field in international development policy that is presently defined not by Novib, and certainly not by the 'diasporas' themselves.

'In a polite gathering, there is no need to insist on something that the host chooses to avoid. So it was that AFFORD's questions, chewed or eschewed by participants who smiled through the proceedings, remained unanswered.'

Peter Payoyo is right. For AFFORD the answers to these questions are important because they go to the heart of how we should all see issues of organic development or non-development. Arguably remittances historically are a form of engagement through which diasporas have sought to respond directly to the needs of their home communities, while avoiding:

a) Their governments (at both ends), b) International/multi-lateral agencies c) And while subverting traditional development paradigms.

That diasporas choose this form of engagement is a powerful comment in itself. By voting with their feet in this way, they are registering dissatisfaction with existing models of development. Remittances are thus an implicit critique of the development models which people in the South are confronted by. Through remittances diasporas have lit a beacon about the agency and resources of ordinary people from the South.

Conclusions: Shifting power to South In recognition of the massive contributions being made by the diaspora and in the drive to more effectively socialise this contribution (particularly remittances), African governments and Pan African institutions like the African Union have begun seeking partnerships with the diaspora. More problematically, as has been pointed out above, multi-lateral and international NGOs have also begun the same process. However, allies on the ground such as civil society groups, community forums and other social movements represented at the ASF have been much slower in recognising and developing such partnerships with the diaspora. The ASF and the participants attending this week need to be challenged to understand and engage with the diaspora and the way it contributes its various forms of capital.

The diaspora has been working, has been learning and building its capacity to contribute to Africa's development. It has shaped its own priorities in response to partners on the ground in Africa, and in response to the wider context provided by governments (at both ends) and the international development sector. It has guarded its autonomy and self-determination jealously. Through its contributions it dispelled the myth that Africans don't have agency, transferred genuine resources, particularly to the rural areas, and has provided an implicit critique of mainstream development models. Its presence enables profound questions to be raised - around issues of Pan African identity, around issues of development, and around issues of partnerships which seek to shift genuine resources and power to Africa, rather than disempowering those partners.

These are issues, some of which are already at the heart of the work of ASF this week. Will the ASF finally rise to the challenge of the diaspora and how we develop new equitable partnerships for Africa's development? Will it finally anchor the civil society movement in Africa along some clear principles and recognise the importance of identity?

Another Africa is possible. But we have to be proactive and seize the opportunities.

Onyekachi Wambu Information Officer, AFFORD (Thanks to Peter Payoyo of the Philippine Seafarers Assistance Programme for permission to quote from his Paper 'Bridging the Gap: International Migration and the Role of Migrants and their Remittances in Development - a Critical Synthesis')