The following letter, addressed to Jeni Whalan, Convenor, RSSAF, is reproduced here with the permission of the author.

Dear Jeni,

Really glad that you have decided to clarify where Afrisoc and RSSAF lie on this issue and that censorship of the book is not your intention.

Not sure about the portrayal of the book as one sided, but in any case, is this necessarily a bad thing? If you held to this principle, I am not sure whether we would be able to display very many books, including that of the Chinese Government's own perspective on contributing to development in Africa.

I am disappointed that you have held to your earlier decision. Displaying the book should not imply endorsement, the organisers could make this clear and even go as far as disassociating the organisers from the perspectives contained in the book if you feel so strongly. It clearly sets a bad precedence to refuse to display materials that are central to the discussions being planned. The more commercial issues are less controversial given Fahamu's non-profit mission. I am sure you could work out something with Firoze Manji.

I would urge you to reconsider and not block the book from being displayed. In so doing, you would uphold rather than violate a fundamental freedom, the freedom of expression. Perhaps there are other books on China and Africa that could be displayed as well.

I have no vested interests in the book, sit 4,500kms away in Nairobi but feel these small decisions create the climate for more fundamental victories and failures. Closing down the space for any perspective, any view on such a significant development in Africa's political economy will hurt us as Africans and Africanists in the long run.

This week, African Health Ministers and Experts meet in Maputo, Mozambique to adopt an action plan which will deliver on the 2005 Gaborone Declaration. The Declaration committed African governments to universal access to comprehensive sexual and reproductive health services in Africa. Ir?ng? Houghton reviews emerging policies on sexual and reproductive health, the reality for women and girls and what governments need to adopt during this Ministerial.

Since 2001, Africa’s leaders have committed the African Union (AU) and their governments to promote and protect the right to health in a series of international and continental legal protocols and declarations. These commitments provide a comprehensive package for addressing the challenges of maternal mortality, HIV/AIDS, violence and disease.

The Promise of the Continental Policy Triangle

On 26 and 27 April 2001, African Heads of States and governments of the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) declared that they would allocate 15% of their annual national budgets to health services in order to meet “the exceptional challenge of HIV/AIDS, Tuberculosis and Other Related Infectious Diseases”. [1] Health issues have been a consistent item on the agenda of meetings of African leaders for the last five years. The adoption of the Continental Sexual and Reproductive Health Policy Framework by 53 African Health Ministers in October 2005 was a landmark moment in the struggle to improve the lives and health of women and girls in Africa. [2] This year, the Africa Common Position on Universal Access for the UN General Assembly Special Session (UNGASS) in New York saw African Governments undertake to ensure; “100% access to sexual and reproductive health services including antenatal care”.

These policy statements received legal underpinning when the Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights on the Rights of Women in Africa came into force on 25th November 2005. [3] The Protocol provides a critical framework to access sexual and reproductive health services such as safe abortion, pregnancy, childbirth and HIV, among others. Its provisions state that women’s sexual and reproductive health should be both respected and promoted. [4] This policy triangle of the Abuja Declaration, Continental Sexual and Reproductive Health Policy framework and the Protocol clearly establishes the obligation on African states to address the healthcare needs of all citizens, but in particular the rights of women and girls.

“The reality of sexual abuse and HIV/AIDS must make us rage against women’s oppression. I call on African leaders sitting here to protect and promote the human rights of all people and vulnerable groups, particularly women and girls. We ask you not to fail us again.” (Ms. Nkhensani Mavasa, Deputy Chairperson, Treatment Action Campaign, UN General Assembly, May 2006)

While there has been significant improvement in women’s health globally, none of this progress has benefited mothers in sub-Saharan Africa. Notwithstanding the international and African commitments, inadequate access to quality health services, unsafe abortions and lack of reproductive health care cause the deaths of at least 250,000 women each year in Africa, one of the highest rates in the world. Women in the United Kingdom have a 1 in 5,800 lifetime risk of maternal death, in Ethiopia the equivalent risk is 1:14.

High maternal death rates have multiple causes, but one major underlying problem is the deep-rooted inequalities between men and women. Women have fewer opportunities for education, they do a disproportionate high share of manual work, have less influence on policy making and are disadvantaged in terms of nutrition and access to health care. Lack of access to health care is a major cause of maternal mortality.

Even where there are positive legislative and policy frameworks, women often battle to exercise these rights within the family and the community. Traditional gender norms and practices, along with the unequal status of women, relegate women to being primarily responsible for contraception and childcare, with little power to negotiate when, with whom and why to have sex.

Inequalities in health are exacerbated by unequal access to other public services. For example, the number of years that a girl spends in primary education has a direct and positive correlation with her chances of avoiding HIV, her children surviving, and her subsequent income thereafter. Yet on average, girls in Africa spend only three years in school. [5]

It is within this context that women and girls are more vulnerable to HIV. Women comprise 57% of all adults infected with the virus in sub Saharan Africa. Of these, younger women account for a disproportionately large number of new infections. According to the African Union, AIDS, malaria and tuberculosis threaten life on a scale unparalleled, erases between 1-2% of Africa’s growth rate and reduces life expectancy by 25% for some countries. [6]

Key to the loss of women’s control over their own sexuality is the prevalence of female genital mutilation, domestic violence, and rape. More than 90 million women and girls are survivors of female genital mutilation, a practice outlawed in many national laws across Africa and under the Protocol. [7] Violence against women is a recurrent problem in many countries. In Kenya for instance, despite a relatively peaceful history, 49% of women have experienced violence, with one in four having experienced violence in the previous 12 months. [8]

Putting the money where it is needed

A key precondition for accelerating the provision of universal access to sexual and reproductive health services in Africa is the adequate funding of effective healthcare systems. However, there is a sharp disparity between the stated intention to act and the resources pledged to enable these laudable commitments to be implemented.

Five years after the Abuja Summit, only Botswana and The Gambia have met the 15% target for national expenditure. 15 countries mostly from West and Central Africa spent less than 5% with only 18 Africa states spending more than 10% on healthcare. Yet, since 2000, 85% and 77% of African countries have formed national AIDS machineries and approved relevant health policies. [9]

According the World Health Organisation, the minimum expenditure on healthcare per person per year, necessary to provide an essential package of health services is US$ 34. In 29 countries, government expenditure per person per year was less than US$ 10. This includes Angola that has one of the fastest growing economies on the continent.

The burden of this funding gap invariably falls on the poorest and most vulnerable sections of the population. Inadequate investment in primary healthcare infrastructure, acute shortage of human resources, ineffective or non-existent data collection and information management systems and the lack of inexpensive medicines and basic equipment all combine to disproportionately affect the poorest and most vulnerable. In order to close the financing gap, many countries have been encouraged to impose user fees on healthcare services.

User fees have proved to be a barrier to many poor men and women who simply cannot afford to access healthcare even with minimum fees. Throughout the 1990s, Ugandans faced high costs for fragmented health services. When in the run up to the 2001 presidential election, President Museveni ended user fees for all government health clinics, the public response was phenomenal. Most health facilities saw 50 to 100 per cent increases in patients. This access was particularly significant for poor women in rural areas who could not afford to pay for care.

Oxfam research shows that relatively small investments can yield high returns in terms of saving lives. The cost of providing basic services for mothers and infants averages US$3 per capita in Africa. This year, approximately 63,000 women will die from obstetric problems in Ethiopia, Mozambique, Tanzania and Uganda. An investment of US$411 million would prevent 80 percent of these deaths: – roughly US$700 for every maternal and child life saved.

African governments could reverse the situation by dropping user fees, improving the effectiveness of the health care system and raising their health expenditure to 15%. External development assistance is necessary to expand the financing available, preferably within a predictable and long-term cycle that targets front line services like primary and reproductive health care. It is estimated that an initial immediate investment of $90 billion per annum is required for healthcare personnel, hospitals and other infrastructure, medicines and so forth in Africa, as against the $25 billion promised for Africa by 2010. [10]

Back to the Basics: Engendered Health Services and Access to Essential Medicines

The year 2005 saw an important return to the concept of a developmental state in Africa. This state would enshrine the right to essential services, the fight against poverty and economic growth as core obligations. [11] Recent Oxfam research into Essential Services re-affirms the primacy of governments in the provision of effective, universally accessible and regulated health and services.

There is a crisis of health workers in Africa. At least 10 countries (Liberia, Uganda, the Central African Republic, Mali, Chad, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Rwanda, Somalia and The Gambia) have only enough trained health workers to cover 10% of the population. The African Union should maintain its position that additional financing should be found not only for medical facilities and medicines, but also for the recruitment and remuneration of doctors, nurses and other health cadres.

African governments, parliaments and civil society organisations must guard against public resource diversion away from social services through lack of prioritisation, corruption, misuse of national resources and military expenditure. A number of African countries including Sudan, Angola and Ethiopia are currently experiencing rapid economic growth, yet they continue to spend a paltry 2-5% on health expenditure.

Several African organisations and parliamentarians have cited the IMF/World Bank Medium Term Expenditure Frameworks/Ceilings (three year planning tools) as too restrictive on public expenditure on health and education. African governments should consider carefully all policy advice that undermines their capacity to promote and realise the right to health. [12] The comments of Kenyan Assistant Minister Hon Enock Kibunguchy are relevant for many African countries. In March of this year he said, “The country needs 10,000 health workers to offer improved services… We have to put our foot down and employ. We can tell the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank to go to hell." Kenya urgently needs 7,000 nurses, 600 doctors and 2,000 clinicians and laboratory experts. In the absence of employment, government estimates indicate that 1,000 nurses leave the country every year.

African governments must demand that IMF assistance be modelled on long-term growth rather than short-term sustainability, in order to fulfil internationally agreed commitments to achieve the Millennium Development Goals, rather than the narrow goal of sustaining debt repayments from low-income countries. The Global Call to Action Against Poverty as well as specialist African debt networks such as the Jubilee movement in Africa and AFRODAD have joined the African Union call in 2005 for full debt cancellation to be extended to many more countries. To do otherwise, would be to render sustainable financing for Universal Access in Africa unachievable.

What do Africa’s leaders need to do next?

African governments must deliver on the Abuja Commitment to allocate 15% of the national budget to health services by setting annual funding targets that will finance comprehensive national public health plans that particularly target men and women living and working in poverty. Targeted provision of quality reproductive and health services to women by establishing and strengthen existing antenatal, delivery, post-natal and family planning services for all African women would go a long way in making the lives of women more safe and dignified. To do this would require the recruitment, training, and retention of an adequate healthcare workforce in line with international standards and with special attention to remuneration of female health workers in rural areas.

Further, more countries must remove user fees for primary health care and sexual and reproductive health services and essential medicine. By enacting and implementing national laws that enshrine the AU Protocol on the Rights of Women in Africa especially Articles 5 and 14, governments would demonstrate a clear commitment to end female genital mutilation in Africa and violence against women.

Despite the tremendous investment of development NGOs in the areas of HIV/AIDS, reproductive and primary health, only a small number of civil society organisations are attending the Maputo Ministerial meetings. On their return, they can do no better than to hold their leaders and industrialised countries to account for the global and continental commitments made over the last five years. One way of doing this would be to strengthen citizen representation and state oversight mechanisms in monitoring public services at national and local levels.

* This article is drawn from a policy briefing written by Ir?ng? Houghton, Oxfam Pan Africa Policy Advisor which was developed and presented to the Special Session of Ministers, Maputo, Mozambique, September 18-22th . He can be contacted at [email][email protected]

* Please send comments to [email protected] or comment online at www.pambazuka.org

References:

[1]The OAU officially became the African Union on 9 July 2002 at the Durban Summit.
[2]The AU Special Summit in Abuja reviewed progress since the 2001 Abuja Declarations on HIV/AIDS, Malaria and Tuberculosis.
[3]For an extract of the Protocol on the Rights of Women in Africa, see www.african-union.org
[4]In a few countries like South Africa, the Constitution provides women with more rights than the African Women’s Protocol. However, for others like Zamibia, it is an advance on national legislation. Under Zambian law, a panel of 3 doctors have to agree that the mother’s health is threatened. The law does not provide for termination even in cases of rape, sexual assault or incest. See Mukasa R; (2005): Protocol on the Rights of Women in Africa: Harnessing a Potential Force for Change, Oxfam GB Southern Africa Office.
[5]Oxfam; (2006): In the Public Interest: Health, Education, and Water and Sanitation for All.
[6]African Union; (2005): Progress Report on the Implementation of the Plans of Action of the Abuja Declaration for Malaria, HIV/AIDS and Tuberculosis.
[7]Solidarity for African Women’s Rights Coalition and the African Union Commission;(2006): Breathing Life into the African Women’s Protocol on Women’s Rights in Africa.
[8]UNICEF; (2006): Violence against Women and Girls in the Era of HIV and AIDS in Kenya.
[9]African Union; (2005): Progress Report on the Implementation of the Plans of Action of the Abuja Declaration for Malaria, HIV/AIDS and Tuberculosis.
[10]Oxfam; (2004): The Cost of Childbirth: How Women are Paying for Broken Promises on Aid.
[11]Apart from African Union positions and declarations, other influential development literature such as the Commission for Africa report, 2005, the UN Human Development Report took up this theme squarely in 2005.
[12]Statement from 75 representatives of Civil Society Groups and SADC Parliamentarians to African Heads of States, Health Ministers meeting at African Union/UN meeting on Universal Access to Act Immediately to Save Africa from worsening HIV/AIDS Epidemic, Johannesburg, 3rd March 2006

The speed with which the Protocol on the Rights of Women in Africa was ratified broke all records for the ratification of continental human rights instruments in Africa. By 25th November 2005, the Protocol came into force having received the required 15 ratifications. Irungu Houghton reviews the origins of the Protocol, its ratification process and the path that lies ahead.

This paper outlines the background to the coming into force of the Protocol to the African Charter on the Human and Peoples Rights on the Rights of Women in Africa. It sets out the legal status of the Protocol and the instruments and mechanism for enforcing its provisions. It then frames future challenges for its ratification, domestication and implementation and ends by recommending four priority areas for the Committee to consider alongside the advisory role it has been assigned.

Background to the Protocol on the Rights of Women in Africa

A quick examination of the reality for women and girls lives in 2006 establishes the strategic importance of the Protocol for changing negative power relations, gender inequality and the disempowerment and impoverishment of women in Africa.

Our Political and Economic Reality and Provisions of the Protocol:

- Over 60% of the two million victims of conflict in the 1990s were women and children. 50% of Africa’s six million refugees and 17 million internally displaced peoples are women.

The Protocol makes special provisions for female refugees and also calls for the promotion and maintenance of peace, as well as protection in times of armed conflict. This includes needs arising from shelter, supplies, healthcare and protection from violence.

- 70% of the estimated 1.3 billion poor people in the world are women and girls.

The Protocol specifically recognises the rights of vulnerable groups of women, including widows, elderly women, disabled women and ‘women in distress’, which includes poor women, women from marginalised population groups.

- Problems with safe abortion, pregnancy and childbirth cause the deaths of at least 250,000 women each year in Africa. Against the total population, this is the highest figure in the world.

The Protocol states that women’s sexual and reproductive health is to be both respected and promoted, which is predicated on women's right to control their fertility and by the obligation of states to provide adequate, affordable and accessible health services. It also demands that governments establish and strengthen existing pre-natal, delivery and post-natal services for all African women. The Protocol also calls for the authorisation of medical abortions in cases of sexual assault/rape, incest or unsafe pregnancies.

- 57% of the 23 million adults with HIV/AIDS in sub- Saharan Africa are women. Young women (between the ages of 15 and 24) are three times more likely to be infected.

The Protocol enforces the right to self-protection, and to be informed of one’s health status and that of one’s partner. It also provides for health services to cope with the effects of HIV/AIDS.

- Slight positive increase in the percentage of women parliamentarians in the single or lower house from 7.2% in 1990 to 14.2% and some African countries have enforced a quota for the number of women in parliament such as Rwanda.

The Protocol endorses affirmative action to promote the equal participation of women, including equal representation of women in elected office, and calls for the equal representation of women in the judiciary and law enforcement agencies. Articulating a right to peace, the Protocol recognises the right of women to participate in the promotion and maintenance of peace.

The Protocol provides a critical framework to address other integral issues to realising African women’s rights. (Karoline Kemp’s article in a forthcoming book goes further to popularise this.)

The African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights

The African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights came into force on 21 October 1986. It includes the right to self-determination and full sovereignty over natural resources, the right to peace and the right to a favourable environment for development. The Charter established the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights, which is responsible for enforcing the rights enshrined in the charter.

Though the African charter recognises the importance of women’s rights, it was widely acknowledged to be inadequate on the areas in which women need protection and gender equality. (The charter recognises the importance of women’s rights through four key articles namely: Article 2, the non-discrimination clause, which provides that the rights and freedoms enshrined in the charter will be enjoyed by all irrespective of their sex; Article 3, which states that every individual will be equal before the law and be entitled to the equal protection of the law, Article 18(3), which is specifically about the protection of the family and promises to ensure the elimination of discrimination against women and protect their rights and Article 60, which states that the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights will draw inspiration from international human rights instruments such as CEDAW (See Rita Anyumba chapter on Instruments on women’s rights in forthcoming book “Breathing Life into the African Union Protocol on Women’s Rights in Africa”)

The Protocol on the Rights of Women in Africa

The Protocol on the Rights of Women in Africa is a protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights (ACHPR). The Protocol was adopted on 11 July 2003 during the Second Ordinary Heads of States and Governments Summit held in Maputo, Mozambique. This was a long-awaited realisation, as it had taken eight years for the draft text of this critical new human rights instrument for African women to be adopted. Article 26 of the Protocol cites obligations of the state parties. They are expected to implement and monitor the actualisation of the rights provided in the Protocol and, in
particular, provide budgetary and other resources for the full and effective implementation of the rights recognised in the Protocol. They are also expected to report on progress in their periodic reports to the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights.

With only The Comoros having ratified the Protocol one year after its adoption, there was a concern that its ratification and domestication would take the same time or even longer. (Similar instruments have taken a long time to be ratified and enter into force. The ACHPR was adopted in 1981, but only came into force in 1986 – five years later. The Protocol establishing the African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights came into force in 2004, six years after its adoption in 1998. And the African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child, which was adopted in 1990, came into force nine years later.) Women’s and human rights organisations took stock of the slow progress of ratification in April 2004 and reached out with the African Union Commission to encourage governments to bring the Protocol into force swiftly and ensure its
subsequent domestication.

Legal Status of the Protocol in May 2006

“I write in response to your (SOAWR) letter in which you expressed concern that only 15 African countries had ratified the Protocol … Whilst I take note of your concern that although Botswana has not ratified the Protocol, our country is totally committed to ensuring that women’s rights are observed…” H.E. Festus G. Mogae, President of the Republic of Botswana, 20th December 2005

“I am ..pleased to note the excellent partnership between the AUC Directorate of Women, Gender and development and Solidarity on African Women’s Rights. This Coalition has achieved impressive results in terms of a speedy ratification process. It is indeed a successful partnership with lessons for all at the AUC.” Adv. Bience Gawanas, Commissioner for Social Affairs, close of conference remarks, September 2005

State of Ratifications

From June 2004, the pace of ratification has accelerated with amazing success. On the 25th November 2005, the Protocol came into force having received the required 15 ratifications. The speed of the ratification broke all records for the ratification of continental human rights instruments in Africa. This date was also significant as it also coincided with the start of the international 16 days of activism on ending violence against women.

Mechanisms for accessing Justice under the Protocol

Like the African Charter, the Protocol does not contain clauses, which permit member states to opt out of or derogate from applying its provisions. It is binding on all member-states that have ratified it. Under the African Charter, member states are obliged to undertake to submit to the Commission ‘a report on legislative or other measures taken…to giving effect to the rights and freedoms recognised and guaranteed by the present Charter’ every two years. Following the debate about a state’s report, the Commission prepares a set of final remarks which ordinarily includes information on the positive actions taken by a member state, core concerns and recommendations. They are then sent to the member state which is then required to provide, within two years, information on the measures taken in order to implement the said recommendations.

Although a small but growing number of states do make periodical reports and take it upon themselves to implement the recommendations they are given, the number of states that regularly present periodical reports is still few. This and the poor popularisation of the Protocol at national and regional levels will act to severely undermine its potential. Unless these trends are reversed, women and men will be prevented from claiming the rights accorded in the Protocol. It is critical that public information campaigns be undertaken periodically to increase public awareness and actions to close down the space for human rights violations and impunity.

As Mary Wandia has also noted at the national level, there is a lack of connection between the ministries of justice (closely linked with the African Court on Human and Peoples' Rights), the ministries of foreign affairs (closely linked with the AU) and the ministries of gender/women. The first two ministries do not usually communicate effectively the commitments undertaken at the regional level to the latter. This has led to gaps in implementation and monitoring.

There are also multiple legal systems in place at national level in many African countries. It is the coexistence of statutory, religious and traditional systems that has led to violations of women’s rights in areas of marriage, inheritance and divorce. At the national level, parliaments, judiciary, ministries of gender/foreign affairs/justice/finance and national human rights institutions should be encouraged to support litigation, implementation and reporting mechanisms for the Protocol. These institutions could be more effective by ensuring regular tripartite meetings with CSOs to facilitate reporting on the progress in implementing the Protocol to the African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights as well as making the newly established Court on Human Rights relevant and accessible for all African peoples.

From Ratification to Implementation: The next frontier

The different status of countries requires a dual track approach. For countries that are yet to ratify they must be encouraged to do so with a sense of urgency.

It is important also that states ratify the Protocol establishing the African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights. As of 14 December 2005, only 22 of the 53 AU member states have ratified this Protocol. When ratifying, states should enter provisions for the public to access justice under the African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights. Currently, only Burkina Faso has made the declaration under Article 34(6) of the Protocol, granting individuals and non-governmental organizations direct access to the Court. To not do so, is to betray the vision of the African Union and the commitment of Governments to the promotion and protection of human rights in Africa.

For countries that have ratified, it is important to recognise that it is here that the promise of the Protocol will be either fulfilled or betrayed. As Ugandan activist Sarah Mukasa has noted, there is often a “disconnection between the pronouncements made at regional level and the action taken nationally and locally…domestication and implementation is riddled with challenges that will have to be overcome if the Protocol is to benefit the women it seeks to protect”. She goes on to identify three major obstacles in most countries namely; weak public appreciation of the centrality of constitutionalism and the rule of law, inadequately resourced national gender machinery and lastly, the precedence of entering reservations on progressive clauses. It is critical therefore that states are encouraged to domesticate the Protocol and expedite its implementation.

The review of Beijing plus 10 revealed the dangers of starving progressive visions and commitments. The Protocol requires finances and other resources to be an important tool for the realization of the rights of women. It should be noted, that there are a number of actions that can be taken that have little or no-monetary implications. This includes the removal of all discriminatory laws. States could also identify easy ‘quick wins’ for initial budgetary allocations, which demonstrate real change in the administration of justice. States would go a long way in breathing life to the Protocol by considering its
articles while mainstreaming gender in all budgets and programmes.

Distinguishing a role for the African Union Women’s Committee

With several continental mechanisms working on women’s empowerment, rights and gender equality, it is important to distinguish the role and aspiration of the Committee. There are five priority areas that the committee should consider focusing their energies on. (This is a menu of options, mandate, resources and time does not allow for the Committee to take on all agendas, but three to four objectives with appropriate benchmarks would be sufficient.)

The committee could schedule high-profile missions to capitals to urge the ratification, domestication and implementation of the SDGEA and the AU protocol on the Rights of Women (PRW). Developing key linkages with pan African women’s networks and movements as well as associations of women judges, lawyers and the Pan African Parliament, could strengthen the committee’s voice.

While encouraging universal ratification, it would be important for the committee to monitor, influence and encourage clean reservations to the Protocol. South Africa and The Gambia ratified the Protocol with reservations. In the case of South Africa, one of the reservations is to restrict access to the African Court by forcing citizens to apply for permission to a Parliamentary Committee. In the case of The Gambia, the reservations were fairly far-reaching. Recently, it has been inspiring to learn that these
harmful reservations are on the verge of being formally lifted. It would be important for the Committee members to make a personal commitment to ensuring “clean” ratifications from all countries.

Thirdly, the Committee can undertake high-profile missions or actions in the form of writing open letters either in solidarity against specific violations against women or also to celebrate breakthroughs and victories. This could be done either by advising the Chairperson of the AUC to speak out or by releasing them in the name of the Committee members. This will also breathe life into the concept of non-indifference on gender equality and roll back cultures of impunity.

While Darfur continues to be a scar on the conscience on Africa, the committee must break new frontiers in war-torn areas such as Northern Uganda. (Northern Uganda, at 19 years is Africa’s longest war and has not had the same attention as Darfur, Sudan.) The full committee need not undertake the missions but a few members could be selected on the basis of their knowledge of the issue, its importance and regional expertise.

Lastly, the committee could look outwards to the processes of UN reform and the monitoring of the Millennium Development Goals with a view to using the Solemn Declaration and the Protocol on Women’s Rights as a lens for measuring progress and agreeing on benchmarks and targets. To not do so, would be to run the danger of repeating the experience of the UN Millennium Summit last year where the deadline for the gender parity MDG passed without protest or censure of the 180 leaders present.

The Committee could champion the process of implementation by directly advocating with all African Governments that gender mainstreaming be vested and adequately resourced at the highest level of Government. Without this, the Protocol could die an early death confined to legal statutes and far from the living experiences of women and men on this continent.

* Country Status on the ratification of the Protocol on the Rights of Women in Africa
Country Status on the ratification of the Protocol on th
Not yet Signed

Angola, Botswana, Cameroon, Central Africa Republic, Egypt, Eritrea, Sahrawi Arab Democratic
Republic, Sao Tome & Principe, Sudan, Tunisia

Signed, but not Ratified

Algeria, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Chad, Congo, Cote d’Ivoire, Democratic Rep. Of Congo, Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, Gabon, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Kenya, Liberia, Madagascar, Mauritius, Niger, Sierra Leone, Swaziland, Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia, Zimbabwe, Seychelles, Somalia,

Ratified

Benin, Cape Verde, The Comoros, Djibouti, The Gambia, Lesotho, Libya, Malawi, Mali, Mauritania,
Mozambique, Namibia, Nigeria, Rwanda, Senegal, South Africa, Togo

Sources for this briefing

- African Union Protocol to the African Charter on the Human and Peoples Rights on the Rights of
Women in Africa, Addis

- African Union and SOAWR Breathing life into the African Union Protocol on Women's Rights in Africa, forthcoming July 2006

- SOAWR Not Yet a Force for Freedom, 2004

- PAMBAZUKA NEWS Issue 245 Islam and Women, 2006

- PAMBAZUKA NEWS Issue 231 Protocol comes into force, 2005

* This is the final version of a paper presented by invitation to the inauguration of the African Union Women’s Committee, April 28-29th 2006, Addis Ababa. Irungu Houghton is the Pan Africa Advisor for Oxfam based in Nairobi. He represents Oxfam in the Steering Committee for the Solidarity for African Women’s Rights Coalition, a pan African coalition of 20 development and women’s organisations working to popularise, ratify and implement the Protocol on the Rights of Women in Africa. He acknowledges the analysis of colleagues within the SOAWR coalition that will be published in forthcoming book co-published with the African Union entitled Breathing life into the African Union Protocol on Women's Rights in Africa, July 2006.

* Please send comments to or comment online at http://www.pambazuka.org/

African Union heads of state and government meet in Khartoum, Sudan, from 23-24 January for the sixth ordinary session of the continental body. Human rights groups have protested against the decision to hold the summit in Khartoum, due to the continuing conflict in the Darfur region of the country. For the latest news, information and statements coming out of the summit, visit http://www.pambazuka.org/aumonitor/ In the article below, Irungu Houghton tackles the subject of civil society engagement with the African Union, noting that as 2007 nears a series of important events offer the opportunity to “get things right”. He concludes that: “With the completion of the AU Strategic Plan, 2007 marks the first major review moment for understanding the progress towards the union. The year is also very powerfully symbolic in that it also marks the year in which the World Social Forum will take place in Nairobi, Kenya. It will also mark the advent of celebrations towards the 50th anniversary of Ghanaian and Guinean independence and 200 years since the abolition of slavery. Within this context, we cannot but remained inspired that Africa can, and must move to new heights of relationships between its states and its peoples before 2007.”

“We continue to interact with civil society groups at various levels. On a generic level, a civil society desk has been established at the NEPAD Secretariat with a view to having a one-stop focal point for civil society. At a sector level, all programmes are being implemented in consultation with relevant civil society groups. However, it must be noted that the level and extent of civil society participation in the implementation of NEPAD programmes is largely dependent on the capacity of civil society groups.” - Prof. W.L Nkuhlu, Former Chief Executive, The New Partnership for Africa’s Development, June 2005

"The Economic, Social and Cultural Council of the African Union (ECOSOCC) must be against authoritarian regimes, hostile external efforts and the negative waves of globalization ...You should be by the side of those who suffer injustice and are deprived of their basic human rights." - H.E. Alpha Oumar Konare, Chairman, African Union Commission at launch of ECOSOCC, March 2005.

“Many colleagues in the NGO sector have cited instances when they have been asked if they would facilitate an interface between civil society and some public institution – at first because the institution wanted to look good in the eyes of some donor or other. More recently though, it appears that creative leaders are starting to recognize the value that comes from engaging broadly and seeking wide participation of all stakeholders.” - Ezra Mbogori, in Landsberg C. & Mckay C, Engaging the new Pan-Africanism: Strategies for Civil Society Paper

The establishment of the key facilitating structures for CSO and parliamentary participation within the African Union and NEPAD over 2005 come mid-way in the African Union Strategic Plan (2004-2007). Experience so far, suggests that the vision of a people driven Pan Africanism is yet to be translated into sustainable relationships in practice. The experience so far suggests that partnership between African CSOs and continental institutions would be more mutually respectful if they were re-designed around principles of solidarity, inclusion and autonomy. Until then, partnership will remain stuck at a very minimal level of the more comprehensive project of building a pan African consciousness and citizenship in Africa.

With the completion of the AU Strategic Plan, 2007 marks the first major review moment for understanding the progress towards the union. The year is also very powerfully symbolic in that it also marks the year in which the World Social Forum will take place in Nairobi, Kenya. It will also mark the advent of celebrations towards the 50th anniversary of Ghanaian and Guinean independence and 100 years since the abolition of slavery.

Making the links with Continental Citizenship, Public Accountability and Governance

Theories of citizenship often draw from the relationship between citizens and their rights and responsibilities and states and their duties and obligations on the other. Good governance is built on the understanding that the state is accountable to the public for the stewardship of public resources, public services and the upholding of the rights of its citizens (2). This model is only partially true for the path that the AU, NEPAD and even the RECs have embarked upon. In the absence of a basic state infrastructure such as the African passport, a Cape to Cairo driving licence, the Afro note, payment of taxes and delivery of public services, the concept of a collective Pan African citizenship seems remote. For this reason, it is in the development of a pan African consciousness and the willingness to struggle for the realisation of common continental rights standards such as the African Charter for Human and Peoples Rights and its Protocol on the Rights of Women in Africa that African citizenship can be built. Nurturing and deepening actions by civil society organisations around the policies and programmes of continental integration is one important way of accelerating pan African consciousness. To illustrate this further, any observer of continental institutions can see the upward accountability to Heads of States. Yet, downward accountability is still very unclearly defined with certain consequences.

Travelling as a Kenyan, in Senegal, South Africa, Tanzania and Nigeria, I used to be struck by the negative comments of ordinary citizens to the travelling of their Heads of States. The Pan African project was often seen as competing for scarce national resources – the attention of the President and senior officials, the national budget and so on. With a number of active Presidents coming to the end of their terms or losing their credibility by refusing to keep to theirs, it is important to think about succession issues. Who will replace Mbeki, Wade, Mkapa and Obasanjo? Will it be Kikwete, Sirleaf-Johnson or Nkurunziza? Will public opinion demand that the new crop of leaders protect and expand the existing path or will it swallow them in a myriad of local and national concerns?

Background and the Promise

It is in the light of the quotes by Nkuhlu, Konare and Mbogori that the establishment of three critical structures namely the African Parliament (May 2004), The Economic, Social and Cultural Council of the African Union (ECOSOCC), (March 2005) and the NEPAD CSO Think Tank launch (December 2005) find their relevance (3). On the one hand, the urgency at which Africa must take new and radical steps towards the universal realisation of human rights, economic and social justice and on the other, the critical imperative for a form of governance that is accountable and consistently responsive to Africa’s 870 million people.

Elsewhere, Charles Mutasa has provided a useful history of AU-CSO relations going back fifteen years to the Arusha Charter on Popular Participation (1990). Despite it’s recognition of the need for African governance to fully integrate African civil society in order for them to define the long term development policies of the continent, “the charter of the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) made no reference to African civil society and OAU ... invited African Civil Society Organisations (CSOs) to participate in some of its meetings and structures as observers”.

This framework did not allow for direct participation of CSO representatives at the meetings and had no reporting or follow-up systems. Furthermore, it enabled the widespread perception of the OAU as a meeting of elite leaders to persist. More serious attempts to integrate public participation in the public affairs of the continent took form after 2001 with a number of Summit declarations and decisions that sought to make CSOs not be observers of the African Union proceedings but be an integral part of the organization's decision and policymaking process. The Economic, Social and Cultural Council of the African Union (ECOSOCC), established under the founding charter of the African Union, defined African civil society as an advisory organ and explicitly invites African civil society through its various organisations to fully participate in the institutions of the Union (4).

New Energies bring new Possibilities

In 2005, a small but growing number of African CSOs and alliances are at the forefront of advocating continentally and globally on a range of human rights and equity issues. They are currently engaging the African Union Commission, Pan African Parliament, NEPAD, African Development Bank and the offices of other regional and sub regional organisations such as IGADD, ECOWAS, and SADEC (5). It is clear over 2004-2005 that CSOs have been able to engage effectively to influence continental policies and practices in as diverse areas as HIV/AIDS strategy development (March 2005), Bejing+10 review (September 2005), WTO Inter-Ministerial Conferences (September 2003) and trade meetings (African Trade Ministers Meetings, 2003-2005).

Other important joint advocacy initiatives include work on human rights reporting and the state’s responsibility to protect civilians in Darfur, streamlining the establishment of an African Court of Justice, lobbying for greater protection for journalists and calls for an end to impunity for crimes against humanity and the arrests and indictment of Taylor and Habre among others. The coming into force of the AU Protocol on the Rights of Women in Africa (2004-2005) on November 25 within a remarkably short period of time is a good example of what can be done.

Together with their international allies, African CSOs are also campaigning for global economic and social justice at the various international Summits including the G8 Summit, the World Summit, the Information Summit, World Bank and IMF meetings and the 6th WTO Interministerial. Significant and progressive calls for alternatives to a world economic and political order that keeps Africa disempowered and economically unviable have emerged as part of the World Social Forum. Leading up to the WSF in Nairobi in 2007, their vision that “another world is possible” will become a central theme in Africa (7).

2005 saw also the emergence of the largest single anti-poverty alliance in the world, The Global Call to Action against Poverty (GCAP). African civil society leaders have been instrumental in expanding the movement both in Africa to 17 countries and across the world (8).

The SOAWR campaign reflects important lessons for CSO-AU relationships. It is clear that the open door policy by the AUC office of the Cabinet, the Commissioner for Political Affairs and some key Ambassadors enabled an autonomous constituency of women’s organisations to amplify the AUC call for countries to sign and ratify the Protocol. The Protocol has now come to force, the fastest coming into force of a Protocol in the history of the AU/OAU. Members of GCAP successfully sought access to the working papers of the NEPAD Heads of States and position papers for the G8 Summit. Furthermore, NEPAD secured space for African CSOs to participate in the African Partnership Forum.

Current Circumstances and Challenges

Despite these new energies, it is clear that we are far from seeing them as mainstream to the affairs of continental institutions. During the middle of 2005, thirty African CSO leaders were interviewed at length on CSO-AU relations. Overall, the study revealed very limited knowledge among CSOs about the AU, NEPAD and other key organs, their roles and policy-making processes. Due to their proximity to the respective offices, Southern African NGOs are relatively more familiar with NEPAD, whilst NGOs in Ethiopia know relatively more about the AU Commission. When asked whether they were aware that the AU has opened political space for dialogue with CSOs most said they were, but had very little knowledge of how this has happened and what the entry points were.

Communication between CSOs and continental institutions was described as reactive and ad hoc. It was interesting to note that individuals from CSOs and pan African secretariats spoke about the other in non-institutionalised terms thus; “good communication depends on who you know”, but often there is “no feedback”. For these reasons, the current accountability mechanisms remain weak.

Despite good intentions, it would not be unfair to say that African CSOs have insufficient capacity to monitor the fulfilment of agreed promises, policies and commitments by the African Union and related institutions on the full range of issues that are vital to the people of the continent (9). There are few independent networks and mechanisms for monitoring the effectiveness and impact of the decisions by African institutions. If this is the case for a particularly well-resourced and better-positioned constituency, then the vision of a people-driven AU is even further.

Citizens of Africa have extremely limited opportunities to participate and/or scrutinise strategic continental policy documents and processes during their conception, drafting, implementation and review. Even relatively well informed and educated individuals working for African CSOs have frankly exposed how little they know about the AU and its functions and the work of other sub regional organisations. Consequently, this has hampered ownership building with wider constituencies and marred the outcome of important policy development. Currently, important debates on universalising access to essential medicine are taking place without the participation of people living with AIDs. This pattern robs the AU and specialised agencies of the possibility of building public opinion across Africa and safeguarding the emergence of new Pan Africanist leadership long after the current crop of leaders have gone.

Overall, CSOs and citizens in Africa are ill prepared to be able to articulate or express their needs, aspirations and policy priorities. The absence of pan African media (radio, newspapers and television), social and political divisions conspire to keep the pan African project too remote from the consciousness of the majority. Consequently, a large number of African citizens continue to hold onto the stereotypes that characterised the OAU namely, “as too remote”, “captured by political elites”, largely unaccountable and donor dependent” (10).

Old Contradictions strangle new Possibilities

The African Union Fifth Assembly of African heads of States in Sirte, Libya, 28 June to 5th July 2005 brought the momentum that was building up between the political leadership and African CSOs to a screeching halt. Discussions between members of ECOSOCC and the AUC revealed that there were no plans by the AUC to hold a civil society side-event that could feed into the Council of Ministers. Consequently there were no invitations for even leadership of ECOSOCC to attend the event. Through a separate process, Chairperson Hon Wangari Maathai attended and spoke at the meeting, but in the absence of a pre-consultation could not have been speaking on behalf of any specific constituency (11).

The failure of other activists to get visas to attend the AU Summit in Libya dislocated them from access to African political leadership three days before the G8 Summit. Attempts to request AUC help were met with this helpless response; “Dear colleagues, the Director has asked me to inform you that unfortunately due to host government guidelines, the AU will not be able to invite any more NGOs and other partners to the Summit in Libya. We hope to be able to invite your Group to such meetings in future”. (12)

Sankore and Odinkalu had sounded the warning bell nearly a month before the Summit in the following way. It is worth quoting extensively from their correspondence:

“Unlike with previous summits, there will be no AU facilitated civil society meeting preceeding the Summit in Libya. As there has been no official and public explanation by the AU, it is best not to speculate on why the expected meeting will not be holding.

The fact that it will not be holding it however raises important questions. The most obvious of which is - should African civil society be reliant on the AU to fund its pre summit meetings? A No answer has its implications, the major question being how then will it be funded. A Yes answer also has implications in respect of independence and ethical questions, especially given that the state, its agents and agencies in many African countries are the main violators of human, political, economic and social rights on the continent. This is not withstanding the fact that the AU as an institution has surpassed the expectations of many cynics in terms of its engagement with civil society and its vision for Africa. Nevertheless, the fact that the regular AU supported civil society meeting will not be holding will raise a question mark over the relationship of civil society with the AU with regards to summit arrangements. Will this be a one off situation? Will the next one be guaranteed to hold? How is it that African civil society's major annual meeting will not be holding in the very year when Africa and Africa's problems are the focus of the world? Is it that African civil society is so insignificant in the equation that the governments of Africa, Europe, America and the G8 can decide Africa's future without the input of civil society - even at a time when rock musicians and pop stars across the West can claim to have influence on the future of Africa. The issues of debt; gender equality; human rights and democracy; conflict, peace and security; HIV/AIDS; agriculture and food security and many more are too crucial to be left to drift for another year without African civil society input (13).”

It is partially this lack of engagement that led to the vast gap in the verdicts between African civil society and the African Union minutes after the G8 Communiqué was read (14).

This experience reveals areas of weaknesses in the relationship of CSOs to the AUC through ECOSOCC. It was unclear whether a budget existed for the pre-consultation or the process for laying claim on resources. There was not an alternative source of financing. The leadership of ECOSOCC were not sufficiently cohesive to act decisively and protect their space. Lastly, the host state was able to impose its very low public record of facilitating the inclusion of people and participation on the entire continent.

As the 6th Assembly approaches in Khartoum, Sudan, in January, many observers will be watching carefully to see whether pan African citizenship and democracy dies a second time. Should this be the case, then our resolve to resist the cynicism of one of my colleagues when she says “the African Union only exists in Durban, Maputo, Addis and Abuja, elsewhere, it cannot even operate towards the realisation of its own vision” will be further weakened.

Implications for new ways of working

For the remaining duration of the African Union Strategic Plan 2004-2007, the AU Commission, NEPAD, African Parliament, African Court of Justice and the Heads of State Summits are all expected to involve CSOs in their work. Yet for the AU vision of “an integrated Africa, a prosperous and peaceful Africa, driven by its own citizens and representing a dynamic force in the international arena” to become a reality, we need to realise some pre-conditions. Firstly, we would all require the principles of transparency and dialogue to become evident in the practise of these institutions.

Secondly, we would require the active and meaningful participation of civil society in African governance. If both pre-conditions were met and sustained, we could collectively, Governments and citizens, claim to have strengthened the accountability of the African Union and NEPAD to continental constituencies. Secondly, we would have increased the credibility of the political and economic integration process underway in Africa today. Over the next two years, great synergies could be harvested. We could see the Common African Position defined not as the position of African states but as the position of states and their peoples. To do this we must shift the current model of collaboration between continental policymaking institutions and African civil society organisations and their networks. Firstly, continental policy-making institutions have to see interaction with CSOs less as an opportunity for technical advise, funding and in-put on policy development but rather as the humble beginnings of a process that increases their own accountability to the public. Instrumentalising this relationship subverts the principles of inclusion and participation and reduces the desirability for expanding circles of influence and involvement to key interest groups such as associations of farmers, people living with AIDS, youth, women etc.

Secondly, lessons from ECOSOCC suggest that a more resilient model could be built around democratising information and resources. Bridging structures, in the case of NEPAD the think tank, must be enabled to in-put in the development of the annual planning and budgeting processes. Specific elements of this include the annual calendar, the overall budget and the specific budget for CSO engagement. CSOs need to be aware what spaces exist for participation, both at the level of the Secretariat as they prepare documents but also with the political leadership.

Thirdly, it should be recognised that in the light of the vast population of Africa, existing spaces and mechanisms are only minimum arrangements for people to speak at a continental level. Other mechanisms should be established for widening public feed-back. AU and NEPAD could explore with civil society organisations, the use of citizens report-cards, independent reports on the projects performance, public hearings and social audits among others. The language of roles and stakeholders displaces the language of rights, responsibilities and obligations. Partnerships will be more mutually respectful if we are able to establish greater predictability and agreement on what both parties are obligated to do. Applying this, it should be possible to answer for NEPAD and CSOs that engage it, what obligations must exist for public accountability to be nurtured and sustained? Does the AU and NEPAD have a duty to enable the independent voice of civil society? Do CSOs have a duty to respond the formulation and implementation of policies and programmes? If the answer to these questions is in the affirmative then African citizenship can emerge in this continent.

On the side of civil society, organisations must be more demanding on the continental institutions to go beyond providing invited spaces to ensuring that the obligations on public participation enshrined in all the documents that matter are upheld consistently. Making claims on how the institutions think and act (public policies and behaviour) is a tried and tested way of keeping these institutions relevant and responsive to the broader public. Maintaining an autonomous capacity is a pre-requisite for effective influencing and engagement. At this early stage, relying on the continental institutions to completely manage this engagement will more likely end up in the agenda of civil society being subsumed, subordinated or at best, reduced to what the people managing these institutions think they can manage. Independent budgets, constituency meetings and independent leadership structures are key to this.

Lastly, from an institutional design perspective on future CSO-AU/NEPAD relations, I would propose three values and make some suggestions on processes that would assist thus;

Values

Inclusion:

- AU/ NEPAD should include guarantees that civil society representatives and non-state actors will have access to establish side-events alongside the formal agenda of Summits and key conferences.

- AU/NEPAD should open up spaces within the formal meetings for civil society to speak directly to various fora including the African Partnership Forum and Summits.

- Annual calendar of events should be shared in advance.

- CSO participation should look towards widening the space and/or rotating involvement in a manner that consolidates a culture and experience of working continentally.

Solidarity:

- Expectations should be clarified in order to identify those that are shared and those that are distinct to either party. These should then be negotiated as agreements.

- NEPAD and AU Budgets and Plans should be accessible either through arrangements with CSOs or simply placed on the website.

Autonomy:

- NEPAD and CSOs should facilitate regular pre-consultations of civil society prior to important decision-making fora, but managed by the latter.

- CSOs should organise themselves to ensure that they have the capacity to deliver on the agreements it makes with NEPAD.

Conclusion

In the absence of increasing the number of voices and actions and improving the quality of CSO engagement at the continental level, there are two scenarios for us. Firstly, the Pan African project remains an add-on for “five star civil society” alone. AU and NEPAD staff manipulate CSO involvement and constrain them to what they can themselves manage. Secondly, even this privileged group gets frustrated and is inspired by more protest-based models to make their views heard. Insecurity and the fear of external challenges gives rise to eagles in the Secretariat who spend more time defending their institutions than promoting and expanding their interaction with African citizens.

A series of important events towards 2007 give us an opportunity to get things right. With the completion of the AU Strategic Plan, 2007 marks the first major review moment for understanding the progress towards the union. The year is also very powerfully symbolic in that it also marks the year in which the World Social Forum will take place in Nairobi, Kenya. It will also mark the advent of celebrations towards the 50 th anniversary of Ghanaian and Guinean independence and 200 years since the abolition of slavery. Within this context, we cannot but remained inspired that Africa can, and must move to new heights of relationships between its states and its peoples before 2007.

* Irungu Houghton is Pan Africa Policy Advisor for OxfamGB and can be reached on [email protected] and Tel: +254-202820155. The author wishes to acknowledges paper by Wordofa D., Odete E. and Andipatin P. Report on the Consultative Process for African CSO initiative to establish an independent facility, 20 July 2005 in the preparation of this paper. This paper was presented by invitation to the Launch of the NEPAD CSO think tank and induction workshop, Nairobi, December 14-16 th.

* Pleased send comments to [email protected]

Notes:

2 See papers within Naila Kabeer (ed) Inclusive Citizenship: Meanings and Expressions 2005, Zed Books
3 While this paper largely focuses on the African Union and its specialised organs, the author recognises the importance of avenues for dialogue that have opened up in the ECA, ADB and other regions
4 Mutasa C. Is the African Union ECOSCC: a new dawn and a new deal?
5 Wordofa D., Odete E. and Andipatin P. Report on the Consultative Process for African CSO initiative to establish an independent facility, 20 July 2005
6 You can read about and join this campaign at www.pambazuka.org or send an email to [email protected].
7 See www.africansocialforum.org or www.enda.sn
8 See www.whiteband.org or www.gcapsms.org
9 It should be noted that International CSOs with operational presence in Africa are not relatively better poised despite access to more flexible resources.
10 Oxfam GB From Unity to Union: The Changes we seek, October 2994
11 In the light of civil society concerns over the capacity of a sitting Cabinet Minister to represent a civil society platform, this had further ramifications. 12 Name of the author of letter withheld
13 Sankore R. & Odinkalu C. African Civil Society and the African Union: Time for Self-Organisation? www.pambazuka.org, June 2005
14 Linda Odhiambo Are the African Union and Civil Society Organisations failing to find common cause in approaching the international community? Unpublished paper, August 2005
15 Full copy of the statement available at http://www.oxfam.org.uk/what_we_do/issues/panafrica/downloads/ african_orgs_statement_g8.rtf

Caught between the need to dismiss the Global Call to Action Against Poverty and remind us of the valuable and important actions of social movements, Bond, Brutus and Setshedi's article in the last issue of Pambazuka News almost missed a great opportunity to create a bridge for dialogue.

The characterization of the GCAP's leadership as naive about the global political economy, the importance of social movements and the interests that control trans-national capital and international finance and trade organizations is misplaced. Many of us in the alliance would agree with the structural analysis in the article. We would find common ground (perhaps) in the analysis that the crushing reality of power inequalities, absolute poverty, conflict and human rights denial combine to produce gross injustices globally.

Less agreeable may be, is that a confluence of global policy processes over 2005 combine with high policy rhetoric and mass expectation to provide the conditions for a mass global constituency for change. 2005 is simply, a moment for broad based mobilization.

GCAP is organized around four core pillars; 100% debt cancellation, increased and better quality aid, trade justice and democratic and responsive domestic governance. The article singled out only some of GCAP demands linking them with some fairly eclectic and "out of context" references over the last 5 years. It would be important to note also that GCAP has called explicitly against imposed conditionality and for the realization of fundamental entitlements and basic rights as a way of eradicating absolute poverty. This framework resonates with the positions of many of the movements, organizations and networks named in the article. Nevertheless, it is true that GCAP does not call for the abolition of global capitalism or global institutions of finance and trade.

GCAP is a broad platform and includes many shades of opinion. For this reason, criticisms from within (and without) that strengthen our theory-action (praxis) can only be welcome. However, divisive and paternalistic language ("many excellent African organisations have joined the campaign, but have they fully applied their minds, and social-change instincts?") will defeat the objective of criticism - to improve, to strengthen. The analogy of white-bands as a "symbol of collaborators to apartheid" was tenuous but deliberately destructive, particularly to the colleagues in South Africa. Lastly, I resist the temptation to parry the allegations leveled against Oxfam as we have done this elsewhere (see www.oxfam.org for a response to the New Stateman article).

Yet, important and strategic questions are provoked by Bond etal's article. Have the campaigns started to make life better for poor people in Africa, Asia and Latin America? What strategies can keep the campaign rooted in real ground level struggles and ensure the involvement of people living in poverty in our campaigns?

Since September 2004, this Alliance has grown from the original 50 organisations that came together in Johannesburg to over a hundred national coalitions of over 1000 organizations and networks across the world. GCAP members co-organized two weeks in April on trade and education (this included members of Another World is for Sale and Global Campaign for Education). With a base among trade unions, NGOs, youth and women's networks it has been able to mobilize thousands of people through simultaneous events, influence public opinion through mass media and project the symbol of the white-band.

African organizations not mainstream NGOs are in the forefront of the work in Africa. On June 16th, mobilization of children and youth took place in countries as far as Zambia, Mozambique, Sierra Leone, Nigeria, Tanzania, Zimbabwe, South Africa and Kenya among others. While northern attention has been on live8, over one hundred African musicians, sportspeople and celebrities (Lucky Dube, Salif Keita, Baaba Maal, Oumou Sangare among others) have endorsed the campaign. Thousands of ordinary men, women and children wore white-bands and declared their commitment to GCAP positions. July 2nd looks set to see this impact multiplied by a factor of ten.

Yet it is clear in June, that effective outreach among the productive classes in our societies is still but an aspiration. We need to accelerate the involvement of teachers and health-workers unions to demand changes in the light of the debt cancellation victories and farmers to challenge the inadequacy of state protection from rice, sugar and cotton dumping and lack of effective public support for agriculture among others. What about the unemployed, pastoralists, women, youth? Sweet will be the victory when at this level, we can see growing confidence, organisation and self-representation in the corridors of power and policy by some of these groups. Sweet also, will be the moment when GCAP can look back and identify 100 new leaders that emerged from our work. It is only this context that will safeguard the gains of the recent victories around debt cancellation and aid. In the next few weeks, we must consciously develop strategies to nurture this.

Thousands of kilometers in any direction from Edinborough on July 2nd, millions of people will demonstrate for set of global policy and practise changes. If your conscience does not allow you to go to Gleneagles, I invite you to join us in any of the cities and rural settlements around Dhaka, New Delhi, Tripoli, Johannesburg, Maputo, Dar es Salaam, Lusaka and Montevideo with or without a white band. There is space for us all.

Njooni pamoja Patrick, Dennis and Virginia!

Irungu Houghton is a Kenyan working as Pan Africa Policy Advisor for Oxfam GB.

Send comments to [email protected]

On March 18th 2004, 256 citizens step forward and assume their new role as pan African parliamentarians. The inauguration of the pan African parliament in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia this week is a major significant step for continental unity.

We in Africa must celebrate the inauguration but immediately place on its agenda the challenge of negotiating better global terms for Africa around debt, trade and aid. Yet, this is only half the agenda. The pan African Parliament must be empowered with research and communications facilities to legislate laws, monitor compliance of African states to agreed standards of governance and human rights and lastly, popularise the major protocols and instruments of the African Union. It must be enabled to receive representation by individuals and associations representing interests affected by international or continental public policies or practises. Simply, it must be able to intervene decisively to protect human rights in member states.

The treaty establishing the pan African Parliament states its vision as “a common platform for African peoples and their grassroots organisations to be more involved in discussions and decision-making on the problems and challenges facing the continent”. The Parliament shall provide oversight for the budget of the AU, harmonisation of policies towards regional integration and make recommendations that promote human rights, democratic institutions and good governance among other functions. During the first five-year term of its existence, the Parliament shall “exercise advisory and consultative powers only [article 11]”. Most African countries have nominated five legislators of which one must be a woman from national parliaments and deliberative organs.

The three-day event will be presided over by AU Chairperson H.E. President Joachim Chissano of Mozambique in the presence of several heads of state and citizens past and present. The spirits of Yaa Asantewa, Nkrumah, Ben Bella, Bibi Titi, Nyerere, Mbuya Nehanda, Sobukwe and Kenyatta will, no doubt, be there to see this long unfulfilled dream come to fruition. Yet, the revitalisation of state Pan-Africanism occurs in a rapidly changing international policy context.

The hope of new approaches to old problems of inequitable trade relations and inadequate aid flows over 2001-2 were severely punctured by a return to aid scepticism, a pervasive anti-terrorist lens and the subsequent undermining of multi-lateralism in 2003. In 2004, these developments unfortunately seem set to continue crowding out national sovereignty and dominating the policy discourse on and in Africa for the next three years. It is in this context that the pan African parliament and other organs of the AU must act and do so urgently.

On the surface, it would seem that the experience of parliamentary representation at national levels could strangle the potential of the new Parliament. At a rough estimate, across Africa there are over 9,210 national parliamentarians elected from Africa’s population of over 700 million people. That is, one legislator for every 76,000 people. However, most poor people in Africa, parliaments and legislative bodies seem disconnected from the day-to-day realities and challenges they face.

If the crisis of relevance seems stark in some national contexts, then at regional levels the challenge for parliamentarians is multiplied. 265 nominated legislators in a continent of over 700 million people (one pan African MP for every 2.6 million people) does not embody a high capacity for representative democracy, much less “a platform for African peoples and their grassroots organisations”. For example, this compares unfavourably with India where 795 MPs represent one billion people (one MP per 126,000 people).

For the first five years and until members are elected by universal adult suffrage, the credibility of the pan African Parliament cannot rest on their representational quality but on the issues they espouse, the causes they champion and the changes they bring to the lives of ordinary people across Africa. By doing this, the pan African Parliament can deepen its credibility and relevance to African peoples struggling with poverty and injustice across the continent.

* Irungu Houghton is pan African Policy Advisor, Oxfam GB

* What do you think of the African Parliament? Send your comments to for inclusion in our letters page.