Mary Ndlovu paints a desolate picture of the Zimbabwe of now and its political future: ‘The “Unity Government” has stumbled from pillar to post, ending for the time being, paralysed in the intensive or perhaps terminal care unit of the political hospital.’ Ndlovu takes us through the events of the last year and argues that ZANU PF’s tactics have shifted from the defensive to the offensive. Analysing the various options, such as calls for elections now, Ndlovu finds strong reasons to eliminate each. But she ends on a note of hope: ‘Debate on the constitution has… sparked considerable interest and determination to participate. Hopefully… a more active citizenry will eventually evolve, bringing promise of an empowered society which will develop new strategies to put in place a democratic government.’

A season of fear has returned to Zimbabwe, following Morgan Tsvangirai’s decision to ‘disengage’ from the country’s dysfunctional Government of National Unity, Mary Ndlovu writes in Pambazuka News. With unlawful arrests, abductions, beatings, torture, burning of homes and killings by Zanu PF and state agents on the increase again, ordinary Zimbabweans are sceptical that SADC’s latest attempts at mediation will bring the country’s people closer to peace and prosperity. But says Ndlovu, there is ‘still room to hope for a miracle’.

cc Human rights activist Mary Ndlovu considers the possible outcomes of a four-week-old ‘unholy alliance between Zimbabwe’s former ruling party Zanu PF (Zimbabwe African National Union – Patriotic Front) and the MDC (Movement for Democratic Change) into a ‘Government of National Unity’ (GNU). Already the GNU has survived the arrest and incarceration of senior MDC leaders, Zanu PF’s persistent failure to implement major clauses of the power-sharing agreement on which the government is based, and a car accident widely perceived as an assassination attempt on Prime Minister Morgan Tsvangirai, which killed his wife.

Some have been critical of the MDC’s decision to enter into a power-sharing agreement with Zanu PF before a fairer compromise was reached. But, notes Ndlovu, with the countrywide collapse of public services – from schools to electricity, hospitals, water treatment and banking – many Zimbabweans on the ground believed it was necessary for the MDC to get inside the government to begin the process of reconstruction.

There is cause for pessimism. Zanu PF hardliners seem determined to sabotage the GNU rather than work with the MDC to build Zimbabwe. Some say the MDC has been able to accomplish little since its swearing-in, and that the longer they are unable make progress on disputed issues, the more they will lose credibility and attract criticism from former supporters. Others fear the MDC will be swallowed by Zanu PF’s culture of corruption and cronyism, with Mercedes Benzes rolling out for both boys and girls alike.

But there is also cause for hope. Optimists believe that the combination of the finance ministry and several important service industries are enough for the MDC to show the people that they are concerned and are prepared to commit themselves to work feverishly to begin the formidable task of reconstruction.

Moreover, adds Ndlovu, rumours abound that the military top-brass are using the detainees as pawns or bargaining chips to obtain amnesty for their crimes, afraid to rely on the forces they command. Optimists believe hardliners won’t be able to hold the country hostage forever, as subtle power shifts begin to show themselves on the ground with a large percentage of intelligence officers and lower-ranking soldiers said to be disillusioned with Zanu PF and welcoming of change.

Nevertheless, Ndlovu is critical of the MDC’s failure to make any attempt to mobilise people to demonstrate the departure of the old and arrival of the new, with the task left to others like students and civil society groups such as WOZA (Women of Zimbabwe Arise) to test the waters and push the police to take a position.

It is unclear whether Tsvangirai’s injuries and bereavement will create a dangerous hiatus, causing the promise of the GNU to dissipate. What we do know, however, Ndlovu contends, is that each small step will be difficult and concessions will only be won through determination, perseverance and belief that progress can be achieved. And that belief can create reality.

cc. With its power-sharing agreement manifestly failing, Zimbabwe is on the brink of collapse, writes Mary Ndlovu. The author argues that in the face of an entrenched kleptocratic elite, life grows ever more difficult for the country’s population, a situation markedly exacerbated by a broader political culture of selfishness undermining the development of any form of effective collective action. Without an internationally sponsored, technocratically based transitional authority to replace ZANU-PF as soon as possible, Zimbabwe may yet be spoken of in the same breath as Somalia and the eastern DR Congo, she concludes.

http://www.pambazuka.org/images/articles/384/49051brutality2.jpgSince March, Zimbabwe has had no Parliament, no local government councils, no legitimate executive, and ZANU PF has ruled by decree in response to the orders of the JOC – acronym for the military junta which now controls the nation, along with Mr. Mugabe and Reserve Bank Governor Mr. Gono, who is needed to print money, writes Mary Ndlovu. SADC governments allowed the charade to continue, talked to and dealt with the illegitimate government as if nothing was wrong. If SADC fails in its self-assigned disaster management, if the AU is unable or unwilling to step into the breach - hunger, terror, displacement, and death stare Zimbabweans in the face.
====

A collective and audible sigh of relief spread through Zimbabwe on Sunday evening, June 22, as word got around that Morgan Tsvangirai had pulled out of the presidential run-off election. There were, to be sure, also some voices of dismay and anger that we would now be deprived of the opportunity of speaking with our ballots and finishing the task of liberation. Both responses were based on false assumptions – first that the violence could end if there were no contested election and second that voting in a re-run would mean a ZANU PF exit.

Tsvangirai’s reasons for withdrawing were clearly stated and unassailable – under the current circumstances of torture, burning of homes, rape, systematic destruction of MDC structures, killings and arrests, there could be no valid election. What made it possible for him to withdraw at all was the shift in position by the majority of SADC governments.

The MDC and most Zimbabweans believe that Tsvangirai won the first round. He won the contest in spite of it being seriously skewed against him at every stage of the process -from the bias of the Zimbabwe Election Commission, to voter registration, to delimitation of constituencies, to placement of polling stations, to counting and announcement of results. The charade of a run-off has been played out in an increasingly surreal atmosphere, not according to the law, not for democracy or the Zimbabwean people, but for the benefit of reluctant regional leaders who insisted that the MDC accept the deceitful maneuverings of a regime which had lost the support of the people but nevertheless maintained control of the levers of power.

Robert Mugabe and ZANU PF had ceased to enjoy legitimacy to rule Zimbabwe by April 1. The first election was held on March 29, and by the end of March 30 at the latest, all results should have been announced. Instead, the Zimbabwe Electoral Commission, evidently directed by ZANU PF, prevaricated and delayed and began a lengthy tragi-farce, pretending that they were re-counting, validating, and engaged in every other process they could devise to avoid admitting that they had been defeated at the polls, both in parliamentary and in presidential voting. They ignored all relevant provisions of the Electoral Act, and even proceeded to re-write the Act by statutory instrument. This gave them time to delay any run-off of the presidential vote until they could put in place their evil plan to terrorise the population into submission. Mugabe brazenly re-called the cabinet which was dissolved before the election; and without even a façade of legality, they resumed their positions, and continued to receive their salaries and perks of office in spite of the fact that many had themselves been defeated by the electorate.

Since March, Zimbabwe has had no Parliament, no local government councils, no legitimate executive, and ZANU PF has ruled by decree in response to the orders of the JOC – acronym for the military junta which now controls the nation, along with Mr. Mugabe and Reserve Bank Governor Mr. Gono, who is needed to print money. SADC governments allowed the charade to continue, talked to and dealt with the illegitimate government as if nothing was wrong. Although it is now painfully clear why the delay was orchestrated, it is not so clear why regional presidents supported it.

Through the past two months, the war, which Mugabe now threatens if he is defeated at the polls, has already been raging. The tactics used to terrorise opposition supporters are those, which were used during the liberation war. Militia bases recreate the guerilla bases of the 1970’s, while all-night meetings called “pungwes” claim to be re-educating the population. Those pungwes were and are meetings where people are forced to attend, sing songs and shout slogans while they watch anyone not openly supporting ZANU PF being beaten, tortured, and killed.

In April and May, ZANU PF militia and war vets were mobilized in the rural constituencies to eliminate known MDC supporters. Houses were burned, many people tortured and killed for the political allegiances not just of themselves, but also of their children, grandchildren, parents and neighbours. In June the terror spread to urban areas, especially Harare, and also to smaller cities, with ZANU PF mobs targeting not only opposition party officials but also anyone not displaying their regalia. The police force too has been targeted. It is not to intervene in “political” situations. Hence none of the perpetrators of this violence have been arrested or charged, while the victims have frequently been locked up and accused of inciting violence.

An election in such circumstances would be preposterous, a mockery of a process in which the will of the people is to be determined. The people’s voices are to be silenced and replaced by refrains echoing the slogans of ZANU PF. They are being informed that they voted “wrongly” and force will be used to ensure that the next vote is correct. But still, until two weeks ago the SADC governments sang a chorus of hope that the election would be free and fair, trying to pretend that something resembling an election would provide a “solution” to the Zimbabwean problem.

It was only after Thabo Mbeki sent his military mission to see what was happening, and early bird SADC election observers began witnessing the devastation and horror, that we began to hear noises from Southern African governments calling on Mugabe to restrain himself. One by one they have spoken out about the violence, calling on Mugabe to stop it, and finally in the past ten days sending a clearer message that if it did not stop they would not recognize the election result. Only then did Tsvangirai take the step of withdrawing from what most Zimbabweans had seen as an unnecessary punishment inflicted on them by regional governments. He could only afford to pull out when it was clear that those who had insisted that the charade be played out had understood the true nature of the ZANU PF regime, and its determination not to be removed from office by any electoral process.

Why has Zimbabwe been forced through this hell? Why couldn’t SADC do what should have been done in April – insist that ZANU PF adhere to the electoral law, produce results at the appropriate time, and accept their defeat? Were they too blind to see the truth? Or was it too painful and difficult for them to speak the truth, too complicated to devise a strategy for Mugabe’s removal? Only they can tell us, but the consequences of their blindness, hypocrisy or cowardice are clear for all to see. They gave ZANU PF three months’ leeway to bring Zimbabwe to its terrible fate of thousands more lives destroyed, trillions more worthless banknotes undermining an already dying economy, institutions in ruins, and the fallout strewn through the region.

But those three months have only made the problem more intractable – how to remove Mugabe. SADC governments have expressed the view that the violence must stop and that a Mugabe government after June 27 will not be legitimate. But they still have the task of devising both a solution and the means to achieve it – the same task they faced in April.

What next? In spite of Tsvangirai’s withdrawal, ZANU PF appears intent on proceeding with elections, forcing as many people as possible to vote, and declaring Mugabe the winner. What will the response be? What we have gained so far from the international community, both regional and global, is an agreement that the outcome of Friday’s re-vote will not produce a legitimate government. But beyond that we have nothing.

On Wednesday the Defence and Politics organ of SADC urged Mugabe to postpone the election until a conducive environment can be established. They did not state what should occur between now and the undecided date of such election. They did not indicate any action they might take to deal with Zimbabwe after Friday. On Saturday morning, Sunday and Monday, he will still be in State House, with every probability that his militia will still be terrorizing the population. And then what?

Tsvangirai has called for a transitional authority run by the African Union, and supported by peace-keepers. The most SADC seems to be able to do is to call for further negotiations between ZANU PF and the MDC – talks which have been on-going for over a year and have achieved very little. If Mugabe’s government is illegitimate after Friday, will he still be called “President” by his counterparts, and treated as such? Who will rule Zimbabwe while the “talks” are continuing? The illegitimate non-president and his non-ministers? Will SADC, the AU and the international community in general isolate their former comrade? Will they quickly find a mechanism, a means to remove his illegitimate government and install a transitional authority that can return the country to legitimacy? Can they rise to the occasion and act strongly and urgently enough to avert further catastrophe? The AU heads of state are meeting this weekend. Can they take over where SADC has so far failed? This is the challenge, this is what Zimbabweans wait for, but with more skepticism than hope. By withdrawing, Tsvangirai has effectively handed our fate to others to decide – others who have failed to act up to now.

If SADC fails in its self-assigned disaster management, if the AU is unable or unwilling to step into the breach - hunger, terror, displacement, and death stare Zimbabweans in the face. The economy has long since failed to sustain us; the rule of law was long ago abandoned; control by the military is presently established, but the prospect of total collapse into anarchy, warlord and mob rule looms ever closer. Only four short days later, even the echo of Sunday’s sigh of relief has faded, and Zimbabweans face the future with anxiety and fear.

*Mary Ndlovu is a Zimbabwean human rights activist.

*Also read more of Mary Ndlovu's Zimbabwe analysis by clicking on the following: ; .

*Please send comments to [email protected] or comment online at www.pambazuka.org

Mary Ndlovu argues that the MDC missed an opportunity to once and for all get rid of Mugabe and return democracy to the people. The likely outcome she argues is an agreement between Zimbabwean elites.

Zimbabwe’s opposition Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) has done it again – won an election but failed to dislodge the incumbent from power.  Ever since 2000, when they first experienced the dismay of seeing a victory turn to defeat in the hands of authorities, the MDC has been wandering in the wilderness, looking for a policy that can bring success in the face of repression, open violence and electoral fraud.  They have vacillated between taking to the courts, calling people onto the streets to protest, and boycotting outright.  They have appealed to every international body, both legal and political, but  nothing has brought the desired displacement from power of the aged “liberation” leader, Robert Mugabe.

What is wrong?  Why has the MDC failed?  Could they have succeeded with a different strategy?  Should they have boycotted this election as they threatened to do? 

CONDITIONS THAT MADE AN MDC VICTORY POSSIBLE

Many commentators warned that MDC could not win the recent election. They said that in spite of the people’s desperation and anger caused by the imploded economy, in the repressive situation where ZANU PF controlled everything, this could not translate into an election victory. Some were insisting until the announcement of the election date that the opposition should boycott the election. But it turned out that no one, including those who had boycotted senate elections, wanted to boycott, at least no one in the MDC party structures.  They wanted to stand for office; maybe they would be “lucky” this time.  Furthermore, many of the people wanted to vote.

And this time was different.  The fated “mediation” by Thabo Mbeki established two important changes: there must be a minimum of visible pre-election violence perpetrated by ZANU PF; and the legislation which had been previously ignored must be adhered to – all results must be posted outside the stations when they had been counted -  including the presidential vote.  Probably Mbeki assured Mugabe that if these conditions were observed, then he would back the result.  All other shenanigans such as a partisan electoral commission, gerrymandering of constituencies, tampering with the voters’ roll, inadequacy of the “indelible” ink, complete manipulation of postal votes would be forgiven in the interests of obtaining another ZANU PF win.

But these two conditions proved fatal to Mugabe and ZANU PF.   By mid-morning of the day after the voting it was known that Mugabe had lost – not just the parliament but also the Presidential vote.  ZESN observers had the results, MDC had them through their polling agents and through photographs, and it would be next to impossible to deny.

The second condition loosened up the rural vote.  No longer intimidated, beaten tortured and burned out of their homes, the disaffected rural voters of Midlands, Mashonaland, Manicaland and Masvingo, who had previously voted for ZANU PF, took courage. Disappointed by the failure of the land reform and the deteriorating standards of living, they voted against Mugabe.  They voted out his Ministers, they voted out the old man as President.  Faced with a choice of opponents, they opted for Tsvangirai as the man they knew over Makoni, who had no structures on the ground and was tainted by his refusal to make a clean break with ZANU PF.

A ZIMBABWEAN HOUDINI

Since the 29 March elections Zimbabweans dared to hope that Mugabe would concede defeat.

And then what happened?  MDC did not count on the Houdini they confronted. Mugabe still had tricks up his sleeves.  He really didn’t care what the truth on the ground demonstrated or whether anyone believed the excuses and prevarications.  While still in a state of shock, and divided about how to respond to the losses, ZANU PF released the House of Assembly results in a carefully crafted slow drip to keep people in suspense.  But it was all a charade – the results were known by anyone who cared to ask. 

The MDC were taken in by the “negotiations for a solution” which proceeded parallel to the release of results.  Were they genuine or were they a deliberate delaying tactic? Or was it the agenda of one section of a divided ZANU PF?  Probably the latter, but Tsvangirai now admits he agreed to many compromises to achieve a negotiated transfer of power. Mugabe rallied his troops at a Politburo meeting on April 4, and then it became clear that no deal would be made.  ZANU PF would use all sorts of trickery, even dismantling the Electoral Commission command centre without releasing the presidential results.

The MDC then followed a double-barrelled strategy to get the results released:  appeal to the court, and appeal to the SADC Presidents. The court was owned by Mugabe and the statement wrung from a reluctant and divided SADC a week later on April 12 was too little and too late. By then Mugabe had time to muster his shock troops and the retribution was taking place in the villages – burnings of homes, torture, forced meetings to witness atrocities, and a few killings.  All of this would render both the results and a run-off second round of presidential voting irrelevant to MDC, as the people would this time be intimidated into either not voting or voting “correctly” to ensure the continuation of Mugabe’s Presidency.

THE INADEQUACY OF THE BALLOT BOX

The MDC have once again been taught a hard lesson:  the ballot box is necessary, but is not enough.  Where was the “Plan B”, the “defend your vote” campaign? Where is it now, as Tsvangirai shunts from one regional capital to another? Mugabe’s regime is tottering, even as they cling to power.  What was needed in order to make it collapse, to deprive it immediately of the support of the police, the army and the civil service, was popular action.  MDC had to show its people power outside the ballot box in order to dissolve the feet of sand. 
But it did not.  Why? Since at least 2002, the MDC has known it has been necessary to have a Plan B.  At each election they have insisted that they had one but it has never been implemented.

Were the MDC afraid to get the people out to visibly demonstrate that they had the power in their hands?  Were they incompetent to mobilise mass action?  Probably a little of both. In the first few days, while people were still waiting for the results, MDC was saying privately and publicly that they could not call for mass action because ZANU-PF wanted to provoke them so that they could declare a state of emergency. They did not want people to suffer. That position looked less and less tenable as Mugabe’s terror began to spread through the countryside, targeting supporters and lower level organisers.  It is a tough leadership decision to call the people to action which may put many in danger, but it has to be taken at critical moments. Tsvangirai has confirmed to his critics that he does not have the toughness to rise to the moment.  MDC had neither organised the people on the ground nor were they prepared to lead them into the final push.

That last push could not just be taken by elites behind closed doors; nor could it be forced by an international midwife; that last push had to come from a disciplined, organised, people acting together.  That action has to be understood by the people, it has to be worked for – it does not just happen.  It should have been an integral part of the election campaign strategy, that the people would know what to do when the moment to act came.  When the call finally did come, through foreign media, text messages, and some fliers in Harare, it barely reached a disheartened, frightened and confused people.  The moment to act was not when elite deal-making had failed, but the minute the result was known and ZANU PF was in shock.  The people could have spoken immediately, ZANU PF was divided, and might well have fallen.  But the MDC leadership was afraid to call for the required sacrifices, and the moment was missed.

Progress has of course in some way been made.  The world has seen, that Mugabe is not wanted by the people of this country; his hypocrisy, deceit and nakedness have been exposed; ZANU PF is further divided in spite of its façade of unity; the SADC establishment has been forced into an open split.  But the opportunity to bring a popular party to power through their own struggle using democratic processes has been missed.   The transition is now likely to come – and come it must – through the collapse by implosion of ZANU PF and its law enforcement agencies, possibly some open skirmishes and some type of negotiated agreement between elites.  It is doubtful whether we have moved much towards any genuine democracy or achievement of social justice for the people.  All we can hope is that lessons have been learned by the people and by their leaders and when the next opportunity knocks on the door they will be more ready.

*Mary Ndlovu is a Zimbabwean socialist. This article first appeared at

**Please send comments to [email protected] or comment online at www.pambazuka.org

Mary Ndlovu argues that in spite of the obstacles placed by ZANU-PF, Zimbabwean people must at a minimum strive to vote Mugabe out of power and elect a leadership that will unite Zimbabwe, rebuild the economy and deliver justice and healing as opposed to revenge

http://www.pambazuka.org/images/articles/356/46869mugabe.jpgAnyone trying to predict the outcome of the Zimbabwean election must be either bold or foolhardy or both. No sooner has a prophesy gone to press than a new factor slips into the equation and everything has to be re-calculated. Commentators are reduced to scenarios – and the number of scenarios required to cover all eventualities and twists of fate multiplies by the day.

And yet six short weeks ago it all looked sealed and delivered to Robert Mugabe. Morgan Tsvangirai’s formation of the MDC had refused, against their own party’s and President’s apparent interests, to form a coalition with the Mutambara faction. Without a united opposition, ZANU PF could not fail to win. Nothing would change, our downward rush to disaster would not be halted.

If a week is a long time in politics, six weeks is an eon. Enter Simba Makoni, and it all looked different. For the first time, the long talked-of split in ZANU PF would make a difference at the polling stations. For the first time, there would be a three-way contest for the top position. For the first time, Mugabe might not know who would do his bidding and who would subvert it. For the first time, there could be a run-off vote.

As campaigning has picked up to full steam, several further factors have come into play. The economy deteriorates at a faster pace than ever, with the value of the Zimbabwe dollar dropping by mid March to one tenth of its value in the middle of January. Food is either unavailable or unaffordable, and ZANU PF seems to be short of supplies to give out to their loyal supporters (if they can identify them). The civil service goes on strike and has to be enticed back by massive salary increases, which in fact, it seems will mostly not be paid before the election. Even the army have yet to be paid the amounts promised. The salary increases will further increase the pace of the downward plunge in standards of living as inflation spirals upward.

Even more important, as opposition candidates move into the rural areas, a miracle seems to be happening – the rural voters are awakening from the trance which made them believe that ZANU PF was their party and Robert Mugabe their man.

But the questions only multiply. Who will the rural voters support in place of Mugabe – Makoni or Tsvangirai? And who will they vote for in the parliamentary elections, where instead of the straight ZANU PF-MDC choice of the last three elections, there are sometimes two ZANU PF candidates and two or even three MDC candidates, plus several others, including independents supporting Makoni.

http://www.pambazuka.org/images/articles/356/46869billb.jpgWhat kind of chaos will result as the Zimbabwe Electoral Commission attempts to stage a highly complex election composed of four ballots being cast and counted in 11,000 polling stations? What will Mugabe do if he realizes that he has lost any possibility of winning the vote and at the same time can’t rely on a dedicated rigging system? Will he rely on the military brass, who insist they will not allow anyone else to win? And will they be able to rely on their troops, reportedly supporting opposition candidates, and even said to be short of ammunition? All or at least some of these questions will be answered very soon, but to try to predict them requires a high level of audacity.

Are there any certainties regarding this election? Two very important ones.

The first is that there is no minutest possibility of a “free and fair” election. Those observers from SADC who boast that it can still be so are only destroying their own credibility. The government has totally ignored amendments to the Electoral Act, to POSA and AIPPA. There is no independent electronic media, there is blatant campaigning for the ruling party in the state media, there is bias in the behaviour of the police, the arrangements for the electoral process are shambolic, with ZEC even having to withdraw some of their own information pamphlets, no meaningful voter education has been allowed, not to mention the chaos of the voters’ roll, the partisan nature of the delimitation which went before and the uneven allocation of polling stations. And now the familiar process of last-minute amendments to the Electoral Act has begun – using the Presidential Powers Act to reverse changes made by agreement during the Mbeki-led mediation

The second certainty is that this election presents the electorate with two tasks: getting rid of the incumbent President in spite of the unevenness of the playing field, and replacing his government with one which can unite Zimbabweans to renew and rebuild the Zimbabwean nation in all its aspects.

http://www.pambazuka.org/images/articles/356/46869Makoni.jpgAre Zimbabweans capable of using the seriously flawed electoral process to remove Mugabe, or will he manage to hang on once again? That is the first issue, and there is no doubt that with the entry of Simba Makoni into the game, it becomes a distinct possibility. Why? Because Makoni has created the necessary split in ZANU PF, and he has offered a three-way contest. This makes it very difficult for any of the three to win over 50% of the vote. But who will the ZANU PF deserters vote for? Sizes of crowds and results of rudimentary opinion polls can not be relied on, and people in rural areas are still making acquaintance with the challengers. Makoni apparently believed that he needed to present himself as ZANU PF in order to gain the disaffected vote, but he could be wrong. Once the spell is broken, people may desert not only the leader but the party as well. Tsvangirai is reported to be drawing large crowds at rallies in smaller towns, but Makoni too is being greeted with excitement as he whistle-stops through rural areas.

Will the people speak for Makoni, or will they speak for Tsvangirai, and will Mugabe be able to stifle their voices through manipulation of the process? These are the questions that this election should answer.

To look at the last question first. There is no doubt that there is a loosening of the hold of state security over the people, even in Mugabe strongholds. The fear factor and the patronage factor are still there, but their influence will not be as great this time in securing ZANU PF votes. The rigging factor is impossible to calculate. It will surely play some role, but if people vote in large numbers, as it seems they may do, it will be more difficult, it may have to take place at the very top, and the loyalty of the riggers is in any case in doubt.

But all Zimbabweans need to look around and see that the new political landscape requires new responses. They have, like many voters around the world, voted with their emotions and their hearts, demonstrating their loyalties to the parties with which they have long identified, and to individuals whom they trusted to govern them. That is no longer a viable approach to voting. Zimbabweans must learn to think strategically. What vote is most likely to dislodge Robert Mugabe, to end the corrupt and despotic rule of ZANU PF?

A vote for Tsvangirai assumes that his party can win enough votes from ZANU PF to carry the day. Mutambara’s MDC has already declared for Makoni, and there are signs that much of Matabeleland will heed that call. Can Tsvangirai, with so many of his supporters outside the country, retain the rest of his traditional following, and gain a very large number of former ZANU PF voters? Or is Makoni more likely to draw support as a new, fresh face appealing to both disaffected former MDC and former ZANU PF voters, and representing the idea of co-operation rather than polarisation? A vote for Makoni will assume that Tsvangirai’s time has passed and he would not be able to attract enough of ZANU PF to gain large numbers. Zimbabweans have to consider these possibilities carefully, and vote for the one they think is most likely to oust Mugabe.

If this election is primarily about showing Robert Mugabe the door, the key question for voters is which of the two challengers is likely to succeed in drawing more votes.

But the second task is to choose which of the two is more likely to take us into re-building mode selflessly, with the interests of social justice for the people the main motivation. Again, both have baggage – Tsvangirai is dragged down by the self-interested squabbling within his party which begins to look more and more like ZANU-PF itself; their tendency to insult and denigrate other opposition forces instead of seeing them as allies in a common cause is not promising. Makoni will bring with him some ZANU PF loyalists who could not stand up to criticize their party’s evil doings, and others who have been direct beneficiaries of that evil.

http://www.pambazuka.org/images/articles/356/46869airball.jpgWhat will be needed will be strong leadership which can give the country a new vision of a united people, while curbing any excesses of their adherents. Zimbabwe needs someone who can reach across party lines and treat the sicknesses of hatred and greed, while ensuring that evil-doers do not escape with impunity. Each voter will have to ask himself, not which candidate gains his sympathy, but which candidate can do both jobs.
Political goals cannot be reached in a single leap. This election will not bring social justice in Zimbabwe. But there are critical achievements that can be made through this election:

- Remove Robert Mugabe from power and end his catastrophic rule.

- Put into power a government that can unite the people to embark on the tasks of restoring rule of law, rebuilding the economy, bringing justice not revenge, healing and dignity to Zimbabweans.

We would dream for the achievement of both, but even if only the first is attained we will have taken at least one step forward.

There is of course the possibility that even the first task will fail. But it is clear that there is a seismic shift in the Zimbabwean political scene which has to produce significant change. If it is prevented from coming through the ballot box, then we surely will face some very dark days in Zimbabwe. Many dangers lurk in the coming weeks, whoever is declared the winner. But progressive Zimbabweans must not give way to despair and assume that the election is already pre-determined against us. If we want change through the vote we must hope and believe and work to reach our goals. In spite of all the odds, if Zimbabweans are prepared to overcome fear, to cast aside emotional loyalties, to think and vote strategically, and to keep their eyes on the goals of peace and social justice, much is possible.

*Mary Ndlovu is a Zimbabwean human rights activist.

**Please send comments to or comment online at www.pambazuka.org

***Also read more of Mary Ndlovu's Zimbabwe analysis.
Blowing Away the Rhetorical Smokescreeens in Zimbabwe

Mary Ndlovu presents some hard truths about life in Zimbabwe and questions those Pan Africanists who fall for Mugabe’s “anti-imperalist rhetoric”. She asks if there is hope? Yes there is but only if Pan Africanism is “turned on it’s head” and “seized by the people” away from leaders not just in Zimbabwe but across Africa who have consistently betrayed the people.

Thanks to Rotimi Sankore for blowing aside the smokescreen which obscures the real issues in Zimbabwe for many well-wishers of a Pan Africanist persuasion. President Mugabe is very clever in his use of anti-imperialistic rhetoric to attract the loyalty of many unsuspecting supporters throughout Africa. It saddens Zimbabweans to see how easily people can be misled by words and ignore the true facts on the ground, thus failing to reach a meaningful understanding of our tragedy. Perhaps their perspective could be improved by a few hard realities:

Zimbabweans have a lower material standard of living now than they have had since the 1940's up to one quarter of the population has fled the country, due either to political harassment and torture or to inability to survive and feed their families tens of thousands of Zimbabweans are dying of treatable diseases because the health system has collapsed teachers earn less than the cost of their transport to work; their monthly salary will buy ten litres of petrol, but none can afford a car chiefs, discredited during the liberation war as supporters of the Smith regime, are being restored and elevated, imposed on the rural population as unelected leaders, and placed on the government payroll a small elite of ruling party cronies, families and relatives, without any evidence of working for it, live at a standard far beyond the expectations of most middle class professionals of the developed world Anyone who wishes to study the situation honestly will have to admit that none of this is caused by western "sanctions".

Our government has systematically destroyed an already troubled economy, for the purpose of staying in power. Rather than respond falling living standards in the 1990's by devising rational policies which could serve the people - or alternatively admitting failure and allowing the opposition to try their own solutions - the government panicked, determined to stay in power at all costs, put politics ahead of economic sense, and the whole descent into repression and chaos resulted.

It is an insult to Zimbabweans to expect that, faced with declining living standards, they would not seek to change a government which might bring them something better. Why should they be used by foreign exploiters - any more than the nationalist movement of the 60's and 70's was being used by communist meddlers?

Here are better explanations of the current Zimbabwean crisis:

There is a shortage of food because government forcibly stopped the most knowledgeable and skilled farmers from growing food there is a shortage of almost everything, including food, medicine, transport, manufactures and services because government has forced everyone to sell their goods and services at less than the production cost people are dying of starvation because government would prefer them to die than to lose control of food distribution to donors Bulawayo, a city of a million people has no water because government, since Independence in 1980, has not constructed a single new source for a population which has multiplied five times; it would prefer to kill a city which has the reputation of being an opposition stronghold those who dare to protest publicly that the situation is intolerable are arrested, battered, tortured, and thrown into lice, flea and excrement infested cells It is also true that there were poor rains in 2007. There have been poor rains before, and much of Zimbabwe is drought-prone. It is the responsibility of governments to deal with this type of problem and develop contingencies. If the government has not found out in 27 years how to deal with recurring drought, then they do not know how to fulfil their responsibilities.

Imperialists have been around for at least two centuries. If government has not found out how to deal with modern day "imperialists" (or globalisation) to protect their own people, they do not know how to lead an African nation. No amount of rhetoric is going to change the world order. But the rhetoric, along with the repression that has destroyed the economy, the society and the polity has killed a once vibrant nation full of hope. The dismemberment of families and the moral and material destruction of an entire society may have kept our government in power; it will never solve the problem of imperialism.

It is one thing to analyse what has gone wrong in Zimbabwe. It is quite another to take action which will promote positive change. Zimbabweans once (only seven long years ago) naively believed that leaders in Africa would understand the true nature of the tragedy which has struck us. No longer. It is now crystal clear that they are cast in a similar mould. Problems in their own countries stem from some of the same causes. If other governments in the region faced the same strength of opposition as Zimbabwe did in 2000 and 2002, they might look very similar to ours. We have only to watch the repression of protesters over housing and service provision in South Africa to understand the true position. Yes Mbeki may succeed in forcing some kind of accommodation between the MDC and ZANU PF. It might just improve the sad lot of Zimbabweans in some small way. But let us not fool ourselves into believing that it will promote any kind of social justice.

Opposition parties are cut from the same cloth and in countries where they have gained power have yet to show that they can deliver to the people Our nationalist movements for independence were led by intellectuals, by petty bourgeoisie, by labour aristocrats frustrated by their own lack of opportunity. They gained the support of the peasantry and the workers. But once in power they became distracted by the comforts of office, the self-importance of command and the prospect of fabulous wealth through corruption. Africa as a whole has been betrayed by nationalist movements, by governments, by liberation movements, and even by the new elite- the NGOs. So let us not expect much from our "leaders". They are not going to bring us social justice, whatever elite-pacting may take place in the secret places behind closed doors.

Where, then lies the future? Must we stop hoping and trying? Does Pan Africanism have any role to play? Of course it does. But only if we claim it away from the rhetoricians and the charlatans and the leaders who have betrayed us. We must turn it on its head and seize it for the people. Only through Herculean efforts of the social movements who demand a share of the wealth, and respect and comfort for the people will we make progress. And for this purpose we must form cross-border alliances at grass roots level to counter those alliances of corrupt leaders that the AU and SADC have become.

No one said this could be easy. Just as the liberation struggle was long and hard, so will this one be. But this time we must be more aware of the reality of not just potential but probable betrayal by leaders. We must develop new styles of leadership based on service not power and privilege. Then we can support each other across Africa, and step by careful step build a new Pan Africanism based on social justice for the people.

* Mary Ndlovu is a Zimbabwean human rights activist.

* Please send comments to [email protected] or comment online at www.pambazuka.org

The past three weeks have seen an embattled Zimbabwean government unleash terror on its citizens. Mary Ndlovu believes that the last weeks have brought qualitative change to Zimbabwe that spells the end of Mugabe ‘s rule sooner than later. Change is coming, she writes, but it is not likely to bring us close to that goal. Rather it will be the first step of another very long journey.

Three weeks ago an embattled Zimbabwe government declared a ban on public meetings for three months. A week later, when a defiant opposition attempted to hold a prayer rally in a historic Harare suburb, government responded with brutal and calculated beatings of hundreds of opposition supporters, residents and stunned by-standers – resulting in two known deaths and many life-threatening injuries. Since then the world’s press and diplomatic communities have been in an uproar and newspaper editors have fallen over each other predicting the pending demise of Robert Mugabe’s 27 years of misrule.

Has Robert Mugabe’s game finally come to an end? Has he now gone a step too far for even his protectors to tolerate? Will the coming weeks see progress toward the genuine change so many Zimbabweans are longing for?

Opposition leaders have said so – we have reached the tipping point, claims Morgan Tsvangirai. Others are calling it the beginning of the end; Mugabe’s last stand. Not so hasty say the more cautious, it has happened before; we have had massive public protests; we have had government brutality and world condemnation before.

The Zimbabwean people are not ready to face the dangers of extended public protest, they say, and will likely again be cowed by the terror tactics of government. At this point, we do not even have a state of emergency; Mugabe still has many weapons in his arsenal, both literal and figurative. Mugabe may have been weakened, he may be down for the count, but he is not out, and could rise to his feet again.

The past weeks have indeed brought a qualitative change to Zimbabwe, with a significant shift in the balance of power between the forces which keep Mugabe in power and those which wish to remove him. Ultimately a government’s endurance rests on its success in maintaining a productive and healthy economy which delivers at least subsistence to the population. Mugabe has failed spectacularly in this sphere, with the economy in a state of contraction for the past seven years, and in free fall for the past year.

This collapse has effects which undermine his political support. Firstly, it makes it more difficult for him to dispense the largesse necessary to buy the continuing loyalty of the political and security elite, and to keep the lower ranks of the forces in line. Second, it makes the population, which has remained largely quiescent and submissive in the face of oppression, restive and prepared to risk more in confronting a hugely unpopular government which has destroyed their lives. And thirdly it has spill-over consequences in the region which are beginning to annoy and frustrate neighbouring governments.

Perceiving a weakening in Mugabe’s power base, opposition leaders in political parties, civil society organisations, student movements and churches, have taken their cue and demonstrated greater determination and willingness to come together to push him out.

Within the past weeks opposition elements have shown greater cohesion than at any time in the past few years, the people are less afraid, neighbouring governments are at last speaking out on the need for change, and the ZANU PF elite are themselves realising that they do not want Mugabe to continue in power any longer.

Add to this the alienation of the regular police, army and intelligence forces, and the increasing unwillingness of a previously tamed judiciary to play ball, and we do have a recipe for change in the near future. Most critical of these elements in effecting an early change, is the ZANU PF elite.

The opposition would take much more time to bring sufficient pressure to bear, but the ZANU PF hierarchy has seemingly realised that rather than squabbling about succession, their interests will be better served by working together to ditch their unpopular and ageing leader. That may be the only way they can save themselves, their positions and their misgotten wealth.

Certainly, Mugabe will not go easily. He is determined to hang on, and prepared to use any violent means within his grasp. In case the regular police waver in their support, he has side-stepped them by utilising youth militia and party thugs, with or without uniforms, to intimidate opposition forces by brutality, both targeted and indiscriminate.

Now he has declared that the traditionally loyal although also divided war veterans will form a reserve army. And a pact with Angola to provide police to support his rule is rumoured. Dissenters to Mugabe’s continued rule from within ZANU PF have the permanent threat of arrest and punishment for economic crimes dangled over them, and the implied threat of violence as well.

Clearly the food weapon will again be used against any who do not show their loyalty in another year of drought and scarcity. He is a master at splitting any social or political force which he does not control; in Zimbabwe he has split the churches, the political opposition, and civil society organisations; internationally he succeeded in splitting the Commonwealth and now there are signs that the Angolan alliance is an attempt to split SADC. Down he may be, perhaps, but certainly still fighting, with no intention of leaving the ring.

But Mugabe will eventually go, and it appears now that it will be sooner rather than later. If his own party supporters see him as a liability his days are numbered. Their loyalty has for some time been conditional on his ability to protect their criminal activities. With this becoming less and less possible, they have no reason to keep him in place. While it is useless to speculate on the timing, when Morgan Tsvangirai says that he will be gone before the end of this year, it is now believable.

Our focus then shifts to the question of how he will go, bringing us to consider the scenarios which could play out before us. We have reached the time of greatest hope but the time of greatest danger, because the way in which Mugabe goes is of utmost importance to the future of Zimbabwe and Zimbabweans.

There are two major issues – will it be a peaceful change, or will it be violent – and will the change bring progressive forces into power, or will it simply be more of the same?

Mugabe’s use of violence, denying non-violent means of resisting him, tends to provoke violence in response. Although all the opposition forces espouse non-violence, in the face of intensifying, irrational repression, it is possible that groups of dissenters will turn to violence.

The current sporadic use of sabotage tactics against police and civilian targets could be the work of agents provocateurs, but could also be the work of disgruntled opposition elements who want to do anything to express their anger. They are not a threat to the government, as they lack organisation and weaponry, at least at the present moment.

A more serious threat to government would be action by disaffected army units, with or without the connivance of senior military and political figures. Serious fighting could result if the army were to divide into units loyal to Mugabe and units loyal to other factions of ZANU PF, or acting independently. It might well lead to the removal of Mugabe, but could also usher in a period of civil strife and uncertainty such as has occurred in Cote d’Ivoire. It would probably also lead to international intervention of various sorts, which might or might not produce a satisfactory political resolution.

But experience in the rest of Africa shows that once weapons are used to promote the interests of individuals or groups, the results are highly detrimental to civilians at all levels, and the chaos produced is normally long-term, not short-term. Thus civil strife, or even a violent overthrow of Mugabe by his own soldiers can hardly be considered a desirable solution. Fortunately, it does not appear very likely, but is certainly a possibility.

The second scenario would be one in which opposition forces, acting on their own without support from the ZANU PF hierarchy, but possibly with assistance from within the police and army, were able to pressure Mugabe into resigning or fleeing as he sees his support base melting away. In such a case, opposition forces would be likely to call for international assistance in effecting a transition and holding new elections. A transition which is driven by popular mass action is desirable as it empowers the people to make the leaders accountable to them. Furthermore, it is likely to put in place a system of trial and punishment for perpetrators of violence and exploiters of the nation’s wealth, ending impunity for crimes.

But the truth is that the opposition in Zimbabwe would take many months to organise the people into such a powerful formation. Although the capacity of the combined opposition forces to pressurise Mugabe is probably underestimated, the main goal which unites them is to remove the man himself. Even if they were able to pull off an 'Orange revolution' which is always being held up as a model, their ability to deliver the dreams of the masses of Zimbabwe is highly questionable.

Elements amongst them which show a commitment to genuine participatory democracy and an economy of fair distribution of wealth are very weak. They have not shown that they have the will or the skills to replace a highly corrupt political and government structure which answer to the people’s needs.

Nevertheless, such a people driven change would be the most desirable, simply because it would remove the corrupt power structure of ZANU PF and hold it accountable for the destruction of a once vibrant nation and the immiseration of its people. We live in hope that it would at least produce something better than what we have been subjected to for the past 27 years.

The other likely prospect is a 'negotiated settlement'. This is currently being promoted, not only by Western governments, but also probably by South Africa and the majority of SADC. This position sees the opposition MDC as being too divided and too weak to effect the removal of Mugabe, making factions of ZANU PF opposed to Mugabe’s continuation in power critical to removing him.

The idea is to use some of his immediate subordinates in the party to broker a deal in which Mugabe is persuaded (or even forced) to vacate office in exchange for impunity from any form of accountability for his crimes against his people. Talks between ZANU PF and the MDC on a new constitution and arrangements for 'free and fair' internationally supervised elections in 2008, would follow, resulting in a new government taking office. It would then receive massive support from the IMF to resurrect the economy.

The first scenario is the most dangerous, the second the most desirable, but the third ultimately the most probable. If current reports of 'talks' can be believed, the second 'solution' may already be in process.

Much as we would like to see a change, we should not be fooled into believing that such an outcome will solve our problems. Since it relies on Mugabe’s lieutenants to remove him, it means they will remain in place; but they are equally guilty of the crimes of which he would stand charged. Unless they are also removed, impunity will prevail and they will keep the current corrupt anti-democratic patronage system in place. Moreover, can we trust SADC to supervise a transition? Who will repeal the oppressive legislation which ensured that recent elections could not be fair?

The same people who put it in place? Who will restore citizenship to those Zimbabweans who have been stripped of it and denied their vote? How do we install a new election machinery and overhaul the Registrar General’s electoral roll if ZANU PF leaders remain? And how can we trust those African governments which previously declared obviously flawed elections free and fair to guide us through new elections?

We may wish for a peaceful transition, but are we wise to again allow the perpetrators of massive human rights abuses to go unpunished? Many voices are raised to urge Zimbabweans to allow Mugabe to retire gracefully in order that we gain a peaceful transition. But does this mean we allow the establishment through which he perpetrated the abuses to continue as well? The lessons of history are that when there is impunity abuses continue. Such an outcome does not augur well for the future.

There is a danger in this scenario that we will see a sort of replay of 1979. At that time, when liberation movements had a complete victory over Ian Smith within their grasp, the international community intervened to prevent it, and force compromises whose consequences remained to haunt our independence.

Is this what is happening again? Will Western and Southern African nations intervene to help remove Mugabe himself, enforce compromises in the shape of impunity for perpetrators of human rights abuses, re-establish a safe environment for world and regional capital, and leave the people little better off than before?

The main difference, however, is that opposition forces in 2007 are much further from victory on their own, and history will not wait for those who are unable to seize the moment.

In spite of a history of 'people’s struggle' in Southern Africa, the outcome has almost always been the appropriation of the political process by the few. Deals are worked out between opposing elites which put one or the other or a combination in power.

In general, the need to deal with abuses is swept aside, international capital pours in to revitalise investment opportunities for the world’s entrepreneurs, and the people are fed an illusion that change has occurred.

Sadly, we must accept the truth that progressive forces have not yet evolved sufficiently to achieve power in Zimbabwe or indeed the region as a whole. A non-violent negotiated removal of Mugabe by elites in Zimbabwe and outside will at least break the current impasse.

We can only hope that it will open some cracks which the committed might use to create democratic space. In that space they must continue the struggle to achieve the vision of a just society. Change is coming, but it is not likely to bring us close to that goal. Rather it will be the first step of another very long journey.

* Mary Ndlovu is a Zimbabwean human rights activist.
* Please send comments to or comment online at www.pambazuka.org