Thanks for the excellent piece [The Complexities of Zimbabwe, by Chido with which I am very much in agreement. Perhaps there is one small element not addressed though in the line up of the players. Whilst of course there is massive Western (and indeed African) leaders' hypocrisy in relation to Zimbabwe, there is also a strong element of Western (Northern?) civil society that is often conflated by outsiders into an undifferentiated 'West'. Although solidarity and anti-imperialism have been massively undermined, it is entirely consistent to be anti the Iraq war as well as the excesses of Mugabe etc - as indeed Pambazuka testifies. Indeed it seems only correct to be opposed to both neo-liberalism and authoritarian economic nationalism - which seem the different sides of the same coin

A luta continua.

Steve Kibble argues that the upcoming elections in Zimbabwe are tilted to a ruling party victory and will be marred by serious political and technical problems.

The unilateral declaration by President Mugabe of March 29th 2008 as the date for Zimbabwean elections (presidential, house of assembly, senate and local) was followed by the president’s reported statements at the recent African Union summit that he would never accept an opposition victory. This means that the negotiation process between the ruling party Zanu PF and the opposition parties (two fractions of the MDC) undertaken by Zimbabwe’s SADC neighbours is dead. Even if SADC itself publicly applauded this mediation as successful, it privately acknowledged failure. It was widely predicted to fail especially by civil society and progressive church personnel, given the unlikelihood of the ruling ZANU-PF party relinquishing power. It did, however, for a time give some hope as it provided for the first time since 2000 an opening up in an otherwise blocked situation.

South African president Mbeki, charged with bringing a solution to the crisis, staked his reputation on solving the Zimbabwean crisis, even recently telling visiting Irish Prime Minister Bertie Ahern that a solution was near. But he has been unable to persuade ZANU-PF to take the supposed negotiations seriously. The ruling party, despite concessions by the divided opposition party the MDC, refused to recognise the necessity for a free and fair electoral process and a new democratic constitution to be in place before any elections.

The actual electoral process has not only been geared to a ruling party victory but marked by serious political and technical problems, as well as intimidation. The electoral commission has no independence or impartiality, and the judicial process has still to hear petitions relating to the unfree and unfair elections of 2005. The constituencies have been increased in number and altered to favour the rural population – more under the control of ZANU-PF - and the delimitation exercise was opaque. The voter registration process has been problematic with many left off the register and unable to rectify this within the seven days allowed for inspection of the new roll. Even those who are registered have little or no idea where they are supposed to vote. Independent international election observers and foreign media will not be allowed in.

These elections are taking place in a dire economic and humanitarian situation amid reports of politicisation of food aid The local independent media whilst still alive is fighting for space and due to shortages of paper and power cuts even the state media, has found it difficult to publish its own biased information about elections, for which they are noted. The opposition having said earlier that it would not contest a skewed election, has now decided to stand, although with rival candidates. It acknowledges it will not win under current circumstances but also want “a piece of the small cake”. It will however have massive problems in getting sufficient candidates in place in time and with any access to the population.

This all means that energies are now directed towards a ruling party victory (including the reported hiring of Mossad, the Israeli spy agency, to help them do so) whilst the economy contracts, infrastructure collapses and the population is surviving on a day to day process, even worse failing to, or leaving the country. Some see the presidential electoral challenge to Mugabe by former Finance Minister, Simba Makoni, as opening up a little democratic space and opening up the cracks within the ruling party. Whilst popular in urban areas and amongst the international community, it seems unlikely he can seriously challenge ZANU-PF’s rural hegemony, even if he is supported by powerful ruling party Mugabe opponents such as ex army chief Solomon Mujuru. It may be that his sole impact is to split further the opposition vote.

What other pressures for necessary transformation remain? It is useful to distinguish here between transition and transformation. The SADC process was aimed at the former – with the hope that a reformed and re-elected ZANU-PF minus Mugabe could hope to attract international support for re-engagement and reconstruction. More necessary now, though is a complete overhaul of the repressive, corrupt and ineffectual system of governance. At present neither the opposition party/ies, nor civil society, having been under constant attack, have the capacity to bring about such change and there seems little international or regional support for them to do so. Church leaders have never seemed sure of their role, preferring quiet diplomacy with the government, alleviated by the occasional critical statement, rather than attempting to provide alternative leadership and solutions to the crisis. With former Catholic archbishop Pius Ncube silenced, there are few voices except groups like the Christian Alliance coming forward to lead such a process. Of paramount importance in such a transformation process will be the need to work at and include the grassroots level. Not only in advocating for a people driven constitution – but supporting peoples organising themselves, particularly in the rural areas.

It seems likely that Zimbabweans faced with a 6% shrinking of gross domestic produce last year and 50% decline since 2000, inflation officially at 27,000% and according to the IMF at 150,000%, employment at 8% with formal incomes depreciated by 90%, constant food, crops, fuel, transport and power shortages and continued repression face a disastrous future. The elections will do nothing to halt this spiral of decline. As Cardinal Cormac Murphy-O’Connor said after his recent visit ‘The economy no longer functions, the health service and education systems have collapsed, most of the skilled workforce has left the country’. Zimbabweans are going to need all the international solidarity and support they can get.

*Steve Kibble is a human rights activist. This article wasriginally commissioned by NigrIzia the Italian faith-based development magazine.

* Please send comments to or comment online at www.pambazuka.org

On Wednesday, Angolan President Jose Eduardo dos Santos declared that his country would go to the polls before the end of 2008. Elections, not held since 1992, have been constantly delayed in the country, leading human rights activists to accuse the government of clinging to power. Steve Kibble analyses the complex nature of the Angolan state, concluding that: “Despite rhetoric on increased transparency, accountability and democratisation little has yet been accomplished to overcome the gap between ruler and ruled.”

Angola became independent from the Portuguese in 1975 after a costly and long running liberation war with three antagonistic independence movements based on different ethno-linguistic, ideological constituencies. In its almost fourth year of peace there is no immediate reason why war should resume. This follows 27 years of nearly continuous civil war between Uniao Nacional para a Independencia total de Angola (UNITA) rebels under their dictatorial leader Jonas Savimbi, and the governing Movimento Popular de Libertacao de Angola (MPLA). The former were US and apartheid South Africa-backed, with a rhetoric of representing the poor ‘real’ rural Africans of the interior. The governing party was based on the coastal elite which has large urban and mestizo elements, with a commitment to nationalism, socialism, and anti-imperialism in a conflict overlaid by the Cold War.

In 1991 the Stalinist state with an inefficient command economy changed to a supposed multiparty democratic state and market economy. Few freedoms were realised although free and fair elections were won by the government in 1992 – the ‘excuse’ for UNITA to renew the war. The state remained heavily centralised with the president able to control extra-budgetary revenues for his own accumulation and clientilist purposes. It has massive oil production, revenues and potential. Much of the infrastructure, agriculture and rudimentary health services were destroyed by war with millions of landmines being laid - with knock-on effects on agriculture, transport as well as people’s lives.

War also meant excess mortality of one million deaths - roughly a tenth of Angola’s population, displacement and urbanisation with about half of all Angolans, perhaps seven million people, living in cities and towns. The agrarian system collapsed as did the health and education services – only 37 percent of primary-aged children were enrolled in school whilst most of the health budget goes to hospital-based curative services, including elite spending in South Africa and Portugal.

Peace broke out in April 2002 when Savimbi was killed, leaving the MPLA-controlled government undisputed victor, but espousing reconciliation (Although reconciliation here largely means (six) blanket amnesties, no truth commissions and inviting selected opposition elements into the elite) - for which civil society can claim some credit. The country in theory faces a triple transition from war to peace, from devastation to reconstruction, and from a state/elite patronage system to a transparent market economy. The first two are better advanced including a greater commitment to infrastructural (re)construction. Many in civil society express concerns over delays in and government commitment to reform. Inflation has been brought down although no major structural reform has occurred. In particular there is unlikely to be a challenge to the key nature of the bazaar economy (Cadongo) in trade and services controlled upstream by commercial tycoons and army officers able to accumulate resources by using special powers, granted them by senior politicians, to import goods (Angola is ranked 133 out of 145 countries on Transparency International’s corruption index. Between 1997 and 2001, $8.45 billion of public money was unaccounted for (an average of 23% of GDP)- IMF.).

Transition or Steady State?

There is an assumption that Angola is in transition and that its current dysfunctionality will change. Conversely we can see the ‘politics of disorder’ as a functional ‘steady state’ for the Angolan elite. It holds a number of cards, despite dependence on conditionalities such as high oil prices and ability to attract concessional oil-backed loans such as from Standard Bank and $2billion from the Chinese Eximbank in 2005 (As part of the loan agreement, the Chinese are repairing infrastructure but in an opaque non-competitive deal with only 30% of the work going to local (elite-linked) firms.).

Africa's second largest producer is one of its fastest growing economies with some of its poorest people (Revista Energia’, a publication that monitors the country's energy sector, puts yearly government oil revenues at between US $4 billion and $5 billion). In 2005 oil production was 1.3 million barrels a day set to increase to two million by 2008. Much of this estimated $6.88 billion revenue goes to a small number of wealthy Angolans with little reaching citizens (Nearly all of Angola's production is offshore and for every million invested in the industry, only $100,000 is spent onshore.). The government budgeted for 16% growth although the IMF paper projected annual growth at 18% a year over 2005-2007 [1].

The country had a UNDP Human Development Index of 0.445 – making it 160 of 177. There was neither formal agreement with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) in 2005 or the much-heralded donors’ conference. Donors appeared reluctant to commit to a poor country with a rich elite in relation to a conference or humanitarian appeals.

Angola is also the 4th or 5th largest diamond producer - like oil, an enclave sector with little regulation or accountability, where forced labour, ill-treatment and disappearances were common. Production was expected to raise around $900 million despite continued smuggling (Despite expulsions of 127,000 foreign nationals involved in the illegal diamond trade between April 2004 and February 2005 – accompanied by allegations of brutality).

Like many oil-producing countries. Angola sees the paradox between exploitation of oil, gas and minerals and high rates of poverty indicators of child malnutrition, low health care spending, low school enrolment rates and poor adult literacy (and war). Over one million Angolan people remained dependent on food aid, and one child died every three minutes of preventable causes – 480 per day.

The effect of oil wealth (‘Dutch disease’) is to cause economic contraction and inflation through high local prices, expensive exchange rates and depressed levels of manufacturing in other sectors plus lack of national accountability, especially with increased world demand, tightening supply and in 2005 continued high prices. The underlying problem is the ‘resource curse’ of oil-based economic enclaves with greater external than internal linkages, meaning a lack of reciprocity between domestic rulers and ruled in all spheres – ‘a state without citizens’ or certainly state-citizen reciprocity [2]. The industry employs only 10,000, although accounting for 90% of exports and 80% of tax revenues. Necessary economic diversification is complicated because it is uncertain the elite wants diversification given its control over import and export and reluctance to allow an unfettered free market.

There have been changes. Transparency has improved in revenue if not expenditure through publication of an oil diagnostic undertaken by outside consultants KPMG and moves towards declaration of signature bonus payments. Although allegations of corruption persist, with high-ranking government officials implicated in private business deals related to their public office, there were successful prosecutions of senior officials in 2003-2004. In July 2004 Angola signed up to the African Union’s Peer Review Mechanism – although it is far from meeting its conditions.

Angola then faces the task of moving from a state of non-war to a ‘Civil / Social Peace’. But despite GDP growth, a current account surplus, and the lowest inflation rate ever [3], transition would have to be from a fragmented national economy with a history of financial embezzlement and misappropriation of funds, a lack of international confidence and donor coordination, poor administrative capacity, a large child population at risk from disease, and largely weak opposition and civil society. If a genuine transition it would mean ending corruption, tackling poverty, allowing the development of a genuinely independent private sector, creating an open and transparent tendering process, transforming the political system into a pluralist democracy. Civil society also calls for action on disarming the armed civilian Angolans (an estimated one third of the population but not a government priority), clearing (the unknown numbers of) landmines, and addressing the exclusion of the poor and marginalised, especially women. A widely owned electoral process would legitimise the institutions of government, debatedly without it since 1996, and lead to a constitution guaranteeing citizens' rights.

But there are a number of reasons why the government can ignore these problems whilst maintaining its own stability and security. Renewal of war is highly unlikely whereas continued high oil prices and fields for development and oil-backed loans look set to continue. The latter are not as cheap as multilateral funding, but are more government controllable. Continued Middle East instability combined with US (disputed) hegemony over the Gulf of Guinea/ the ‘American Lake’ means that Washington is looking to increased African oil, expecting it to provide 25% of its supplies. The increasing market share for Angolan oil going to the USA and other states means national and international security considerations precede transparency or human rights questions.

Angola is a strong security state under few internal or regional threats. Cooption, division and occasional repression work well to negate any possible internal threats. The Angolan elite remain largely immune to what international pressure there is for good governance - directed more towards questions of transparency, and a secure climate for foreign investment (FDI) rather than democracy and poverty alleviation. The West wants to engage with a booming economy, keen to compete with China’s lion’s share of contracts for infrastructural (re)construction.

The continuing geo-petroleo-strategic interest of the USA in the Gulf of Guinea and Angola in particular as alternative sources of supply to the Middle East was shown in continued good relations. The country gained a growing share of the US market (although oil exports to China overtook those to the USA) and the latter continues as Angola’s chief trading partner, political patron and major aid donor and gives it on rather inconsistent grounds preferential African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) treatment. Relations improved with Bern after the resolution of ‘Falconegate [4]’ whereby the Swiss released $17m for humanitarian purposes of frozen Angolan funds [5].

This lack of international pressure is against the background of declining world oil production now over the ‘Bell curve’. Regionally, excluding Zimbabwe and (parts of) the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), the region has been stabilised - in part by previous Angolan interventions to destroy UNITA bases. Angola is able to use the rhetoric of sovereignty and anti-imperialism which resonates well in the southern African region, despite the more partial AU view of sovereignty as opposed to the absolutist OAU version.

Luanda alleges negotiations are taking place on ending the Cabindan separatist conflict - distinct from though entangled with the civil war. Cabinda enclave from where oil wealth derives has separatist factions fighting for independence. Cabindan human rights organisation Mpalabanda Cabinda Civic Association (MACC) says although it received a document from the government in February 2006 on ‘greater autonomy’ for the enclave, it has heard little since of any negotiations. If Cabinda can be stabilised, Angola’s rulers can open up human rights a little especially in the coastal region/ Luanda without endangering control.

Additionally, rather than seeing forthcoming elections whenever they are as an opportunity, the population being only too aware of what happened in 1992, seems as much fearful or apathetic.

The governing MPLA can pay off and play off other parties [6]. Whilst there are factions, the president runs a parallel state and seems in control as with his reversal of not standing as its presidential candidate. Through government reshuffles he negates existing and potential opponents such as the chief of external intelligence agency General Fernando Miala (who paid the price for becoming too popular).

UNITA formally reconciled its three factions after 2002, but leader Isaias Samakuva is under threat for operating a patronage system and expelling possible leadership challengers. Other parties seem more concerned with ‘getting their snouts in the trough’ rather than representing distinct interests and policies.

Political disorder and its uses

Angola is an example of the use of ‘disorder as a political instrument’ where non-transparency, non-accountable authority, and a weak legal framework provide dynamics for elite accumulation. Historically there has been a ‘Bermuda triangle’ of resource flows between Presidency, Sonangol and the national bank, bypassing formal organs such as the Ministry of Finance (although the latter is gaining greater control). As well as vast corruption in the past detailed by many reports including from the IMF, Global Witness and Human Rights Watch etc, practices continue as shown in the reports from Brazil alleging illegal financial dealings linking the Angola Minister of Finance, and the Governor of the Central Bank [7].

Sogge notes that the domestic Angolan political economy “cannot be separated from the external constituencies, chiefly the global oil and banking industries, and strongly favourable diplomatic and military currents driven by Western (especially US) strategic interests.” [8] In this sense Angola’s problems of domestic governance “are at the same time problems of global governance” in which the constrained forms of global citizenship “practised by institutions offshore set limits to citizenship for ordinary Angolans onshore”.

Elections – paths to democracy or ensuring the right result?

Elections have been promised and not held since the end of the war in 2002. The parliamentary and presidential elections announced unconvincingly in 2005 for September 2006 and 2007 respectively are now postponed until there are infrastructural improvements – for which the government would gain electoral advantage and increased control over the process.

Civil society - small, autonomous but with some resistance

A third of Angola’s population live in atomised musseques (shantytowns), with little spontaneous collective action to solve common problems. Despite little alternative leadership and vision, there have recently been protests over forced removals in some neighbourhoods in Luanda, leading to the arrest of SOS-Habitat coordinator Luis Araujo and others. Change due to citizen pressure has been limited by the absence of public systems and institutions – part of the general disorder that has served elites well for many years. There has been civil society questioning the continuation of José Eduardo dos Santos as President, transparency and corruption in government, the land law and the new constitution, the DDR process, police and military impunity, freedom of expression and political action, and Cabinda.

International activism has raised issues and set agendas in corporate behaviour such as the ‘Publish What You Pay’ campaign on transparency of payments by oil companies.

There has been talk of freeing up government control of the media and willingness to address the low rate of HIV/AIDS and associated vulnerabilities despite difficulties in access to rural areas.

Despite low population density land is scarce, with an estimated four million people relying on subsistence agriculture for survival as the only source of family income. Land tenure and use are flashpoints for disputes with large-scale population return to rural areas. In the ideological shifts of the early 1990s, a huge privatisation programme saw an elite land grab at the expense of small peasants. There is potential for conflict between customary law and state land law with the former discriminating against women.

Although the 2005 land reform law allowed communities to access and legally register their land - leading to hopes of greater security for and improvement in Angola's agricultural production - it is doubted it will eliminate conflict.

Women – the burdens of war become those of peace

Women suffered enormously during the war both through the direct effects of violent conflict and the indirect effect of poverty on families and communities. 80% of IDPs were women and children, suffering high levels of mortality, malnutrition, illiteracy, poverty and HIV/AIDS and lack of access to health, information, education and water – and decision-making. Current government crack downs on informal commercial activity increase poverty levels amongst poor urban women with a knock on effect on domestic violence against women.

Enter the IMF – or not?

Angola has applied for an IMF programme to restructure its debt [9], but not for new loans given the ‘tiny amounts’ compared to Chinese and other loans. A syndicate of European banks led by French bank Calyon are organising a $2.25 billion [10] oil-backed loan to Sonangol to refinance existing debt and $800 million in new money for undisclosed use, with the Chinese buying the oil. Finance Minister Jose Pedro de Morais said endless failed talks with the IMF were due to its not having an accumulated knowledge of Angolan economics – interpreted locally as being unwilling to understand elite needs.

Conclusion

The ruling MPLA has for many years with justification been able to blame the war for its repressive and unaccountable policies. Subsequently it has been able to point to the need to move from a war economy and polity into transition. But we do not have to believe the rhetoric over transition and its difficulties if we consider Angola as is in a ‘steady state’ with economic and political policies marked heavily by the structures established by war and from command economy and state. It is able to use its oil wealth for elite accumulation and for overcoming resistance to its rule. Clientilism has largely replaced more repressive measures. As its oil wealth and ultra deep oil exploration possibilities increase it is increasingly able to ride out any international disquiet over its policies – accessing available if expensive oil-backed loans and able to put resources where it wishes. There are some constraints in the present and future - such as wanting to present itself as not so corrupt to attract FDI, a desire to deal with its debts and its dependence on the maintenance of high oil prices – but not sufficiently to disturb the equanimity of the elite and its accumulation strategy. Any opposition can be marginalised, bought off or in the last resort got rid off.

Despite rhetoric on increased transparency, accountability and democratisation little has yet been accomplished to overcome the gap between ruler and ruled. Apart from some NGOs it seems there is little help they can expect in terms of support or pressure from the international community. As well as the increased autonomy for the elite with high oil prices and vulnerable supply, there are significant shifts in international and regional alliances in the face of the ‘Chinese threat’ and the war against terror.

* Dr. Steve Kibble is Advocacy Coordinator for Africa/Yemen, Progressio

* This is a revised version of a talk to the Africa Business Group at SOAS, 16 March 2006, and based on a chapter on Angola for Africa Yearbook 2005 to be published by Brill on behalf of Africa Institute in Hamburg, Afrikacentrum, Leiden and Nordic Afrika Instituut Uppsala. A longer version has been commissioned by the Review of African Political Economy for publication later in 2006. Visit for more information.

* Please send comments to [email protected]

References:

[1] IMF, 2005, Staff Report for the 2004 Article IV Consultation, IMF Country Report No. 05/228, Washington DC: IMF July.

[2] Thanks to David Sogge (personal communication) for this insight.

[3] In January 2006, the National Statistics Institute estimated it as averaging 18.5% over the year whilst the EIU country report thought 23.4% more likely (EIU Angola Country Report December 2005 p.11).

[4] French businessman Pierre Falcone was suspected of embezzling funds flowing from the restructuring of Angola's debt to Russia.

[5] although $37 million held in a Luxemburg-based bank account owned by a Panama-based company called Camparal, which belongs to Dos Santos allegedly vanished into tax havens

[6] Over 150 political parties continued to exist, many with identical platforms, undemocratic internal practices and with little parliamentary initiative, coalitions between opposition forces or promulgation of alternative policies or monitoring of government policies. A recent law on political parties allows government funding of parties not represented in the National Assembly during the election period (Diário da República 1.7.05).

[7] Over 150 political parties continued to exist, many with identical platforms, undemocratic internal practices and with little parliamentary initiative, coalitions between opposition forces or promulgation of alternative policies or monitoring of government policies. A recent law on political parties allows government funding of parties not represented in the National Assembly during the election period (Diário da República 1.7.05).

[8] Sogge personal communication.

[9] With estimated external debts of $10 billion Angola wants IMF approval of its would-be home-grown programme through a Policy Support Instrument (PSI) to tackle its $1.5 - $1.8 billion Paris Club debt and provide a seal of approval for creditors wanting assurances before discussing debt rescheduling.

[10] According to Global Witness, although the French press says over $3 billion.

Zimbabwe, according to Chris Alden, faces multiple crises - legitimacy as the postcolonial consensus crumbles, expectations stemming from the failure of the economy and polity, and confidence in the impartiality of the institutions of the state. All of these aspects can be seen as a crisis of security. The state is increasingly repressive as it is centralised but undermined to defend the elite and its clients/ supporters simultaneously. Many see this as illogical, but it marks the ultimate if narrow realpolitik form of security where the state re-defines itself as the only element of society that needs security. It parallels the transition of the state from settler forms to the immediate (and popular) post colonial nationalist path to the incorporation of neo-patrimonial elements as an emerging economic and power bloc uses naked power as its only form of survival.

Traditionally the idea of ‘security’ has been associated with the national state, agreements between different militaries and different politicians - and it has been a male arena. What are the implications for security and identity when weak nation states are increasingly unable to make policy as power shifts to global social formations and policy is formulated through global networks and markets led by transnational corporations, multilateral financial and trading institutions, and (to some extent the ‘Aid’ and NGO community) rather than territorially-based states?

Whilst there have been sometimes successful resistance and democratisation struggles within southern Africa, this has been halting and liable to reversal. Often it has been formalistic with little empowerment of the population. Recent resistance has arisen to stabilisation programmes in which Southern regimes under pressure from Northern financial institutions and growing balance of payments constraints introduced policies abandoning service provider functions that led to breakdown of social services. Priorities moved from fulfilling popular demands to the removal of market barriers. The upshot of states losing their distributive capacity means state-society relations become highly confrontational. ‘Good governance’ breaks down under the effects of neo-liberalism leading to the disappearance of consensus, political centralisation, peripheralisation of certain groups and generalised repression.

One form of resistance is regionalisation. It is however, contradictory, as both part of and a reaction to globalisation. As the Cold War world system of two antagonistic blocs ended, security has certainly become regionalised. Economically this is reflected by TNCs dominating regional economies as the new basis of international relations.

The President of the Crisis in Zimbabwe Committee (linking 480 NGOs), Brian Raftopoulos, sees the fight for democracy as part of the struggle for an alternative political dispensation in Africa between two uninviting positions. ‘On the one hand there is a global superpower, espousing liberal democratic values, but policing an economic agenda producing widespread global impoverishment; on the other hand this system of global inequalities is breeding an authoritarian nationalism in countries like Zimbabwe, that demands uncritical solidarity, and in which there is no place for national state accountability. Solidarity seems to mean little more than a defensive reaction to broader geo-political concerns. While it may provide some short- term solace to regimes facing a national crisis of legitimacy, it is a grossly inadequate basis for imagining alternative futures. The real need to build up co-ordinated African positions on global inequalities has also to be based on the democratic accountability of African nation states themselves’.

There are other relevant polarities. There is a gap in perception between how Northerners/Westerners perceive their own models and practice of development, human rights etc and how others in the world perceive it - one might call this a subset of perceptions of globalisation. Western oil and strategic interests find greater stability in backing corrupt and oligarchic regimes, than in pursuing human rights. This gap is probably most advanced in the Muslim/ Arab world and has ready-made foci in the Israeli-Palestinian dispute - and now the Iraq post-conflict impacts on Iran, Syria and Lebanon. But it provides anywhere a breeding ground for the authoritarian nationalism alluded to by Raftopoulos.

Other polarities include: a polarity of 'recent history versus recent amnesia'. For many Zimbabweans alive today, the colonial and settler periods are very much part of their life experience and the forcible conquest of their lands is only three generations back - very recent in most understandings of history. By contrast, most British and other European peoples have only a sketchy idea of what went on under colonial rule and its implications today in terms of 'failed' or collapsing states, skewed and inappropriate economies and state structures, manipulation of ethnic identities and authoritarian nationalism.

Within the structures of colonialism there is/was a specific intensity amongst regions/ areas/ countries that involuntarily received large numbers of settlers, especially when combined with systems of land expropriation, racial domination and imposed division - apartheid being the supreme example. But as happened in South Africa and Zimbabwe there were also the creation of diversified economies geared to settler needs, but capable of being operated by newly- decolonising (black) elites. Such elites inherited powerful centralised state apparatuses, although little political or economic power. The parallels between the way Smith and Mugabe have used this kind of state – similar to the apartheid ‘national security state’ - are oft remarked on.

The ‘national security’ strategy of the ZANU-PF elite has led to economic collapse, severe repression, flight and severe economic consequences for the region, but as yet there has been no concerted regional reaction to this in terms of security. This in turn relates to national elites being unable to formulate a path directed to human security, and largely because of their lack of engagement with and mistrust of new social forces (which of course are not themselves necessarily united or coherent).

The other states in the region, particularly South Africa, hesitate between a closed form of regional security and of opening up to world economic forces for increased and supposedly more effective linkages with the global economy. South Africa pushes a process where integrated manufacturing becomes the basis for a regional industrial strategy - an integral part of supply chains for globally competitive manufacturing processes. South Africa knows that for this to occur outside investment is crucial and highly dependent on improvements in governance which the NEPAD programme (an uneasy mix of pan-African idealism and neo-liberalism) seeks to bring about. However this whole process is marked by contradiction which does nothing to lessen conflict and insecurity in Zimbabwe and the region.

South Africa insists on 'quiet diplomacy' for regional solidarity reasons, not wishing to jump at the behest of former colonial masters. It also points to misconceptions about the extent of its power as the 'regional hegemon' saying it cannot unilaterally reorder the region. Rather it vaunts a united regional approach based on avoiding confrontation and promoting multilateralism.

Historically, divisions inside SADC had to be overcome as well as in Pretoria’s internal foreign policy discussions. Additionally, in Pretoria’s view while South Africa has necessary leverage over Zimbabwe in areas of finance, energy and oil to effect change, the economies are too closely linked to impose sanctions. It at least initially believed that its model of negotiated settlement and compromise was transferable to Zimbabwe. It also knows that it is vulnerable on the land question. Both the ANC and ZANU-PF see themselves as the legitimate inheritors of the anti-colonial struggle with any other parties being seen as tainted by association with the previous regime(s). For this reason it and other southern Africa states have been only too ready to accept ZANU-PF’s policies in some way as a Pan Africanist and anti-imperialist position in the face of global inequalities and British neo-colonialism.

Strangely, and contrary to the support given to the ANC in exile, Pretoria foreign policy has never provided support for human rights groups and other opposition forces within societies whose governments are undemocratic and/or human rights violators. This suggests reliance on notions of the legitimacy of heads of state and of sovereignty, both of which are formalistic concepts even if they are key AU positions. Taken with the support for ‘a just world order’ which means equity amongst nations there is no concern for more far-reaching restructuring of power to embrace human security concerns.

Mugabe’s charge is that the UK is attempting to recolonise Zimbabwe acts to disguise structural rather than conspiratorial processes in the world economy. It does this on behalf of a new power bloc inside Zimbabwe clinging on to power in the face of global inequalities, popular pressure from new and old social movements, but using a Cold War rhetoric that has similar although different resonances with both African and Third World elites and with landless and frustrated African and other third world populations. The contradiction of the policy of this power bloc is that it is unable to create resistance to globalisation precisely because it does not engage with its own population. Some in the Zimbabwe nationalist spectrum might well disagree given that some allege that the ‘war veterans’ are a popular social movement.

How do we shift the monopoly on security from the military, and build a framework of human security addressing the concerns of those without power, the oppressed, and those adversely affected by the current disorder, poverty, environmental degradation and human rights abuse?

How does an alternative perspective able to suggest regional, national and local policies - based on globalisation from below in order to transform the South and overcome the global organisation of inequality - get constructed? Increasingly, world and regional social fora have attempted to come up with answers involving global civil society and non-governmental organisations (not to confuse the two) stressing international humanitarian values and citizenship to counter nationhood, ‘civilisation blocs’ or geo-economic units.

Such values would include peace, promotion of human rights, and concepts of the common good as the building blocks for security, reciprocity and multilateral power centres. It would also demand that domestic security concerns need to pay greater attention to violence against women and children ignored by state agencies. It may not seem obvious when there seem more immediate concerns, but the fight against repression in Zimbabwe illustrates much of this, and involves what values postcolonial states and regions should have, their road to development, democracy and overcoming of colonial and apartheid structures, all of which pose human security dilemmas.

* Steve Kibble is Africa/ Yemen Advocacy Coordinator at the Catholic Institute of International Relations (CIIR)

* Please send comments to

The railroading through Parliament in November 2004 of the NGO Bill means that the government of Zimbabwe (GOZ) has now completed its strangling of three basic freedoms. Freedom of association has now joined freedom of information (the Access to Information and Protection of Privacy Act - AIPPA - shut down the only independent daily newspaper) and freedom of assembly (the Public Order and Safety Act - POSA - makes any gathering subject to police permission and scrutiny) in the oxygen tent in line with the GOZ strategy of shutting down all independent voices and democratic spaces. By contrast, the government sponsored Youth Militias (Green Bombers) operate with impunity.

ZANU-PF's strategy for survival and retention of their ill-gotten assets is a holistic strategy of repression with mutually reinforcing elements. Increased militarisation sees military and security sectors immune from the law and occupying increasingly prominent positions in the intelligence, provincial administrations and electoral authorities. Secondly the regime has used its presidential powers to amend the Criminal Procedure and Evidence Act allowing police to detain without formal charges opponents of the regime, supposedly to counter corruption. Thirdly the judiciary is almost completely compliant, as shown in its confirming most of the contentious legislation. The neutralising of the judiciary has important knock-on effects in areas like press and media freedom and intimidation, information starvation, freedom of the opposition to assemble and be heard, politicisation of the police, further land 'resettlement', human rights violations, show trials of the opposition, politicisation of governmental-controlled food aid, public order and the like.

The NGO Act bans foreign funding for political governance, human rights and anti-corruption work and effectively proscribes international NGOs from carrying out such work. It makes registration of NGOs subject to arbitrary authority under a government-controlled NGO Council and provides severe penalties including shutting down NGOs and imprisoning staff for contravention of the Act. Very wide-ranging definitions leave much to ministerial dictate and arbitrary decision-making from both formal and informal government structures.

It is unclear how much the Act will affect the churches in Zimbabwe; government assurances that they will be fine if they stick to 'religious matters' contrast with the police closing down meetings held in churches to discuss the Act. The Act went through despite its running contrary not just to the Zimbabwean constitution, but also to several regional and international rights conventions that Harare has signed up to, and despite its likely economic impact given the numbers employed in the NGO sector and its effect on foreign exchange and tourism (what is left of it).

The NGO Act, the Electoral Amendment Act as well as legislation to provide payments to collaborators (non-combatant forces in the 1970s liberation war) are all in the context of the forthcoming parliamentary elections. These are set for March 2005 although the opposition Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) is currently suspending participation until the conditions for a free and fair election are met, although it will be meeting in late November to review this. The combined legislation will severely limit any check on the government, make illegal non-governmental funding for civic and voter education, ensure government control of the electoral process and support from a potential opposition force of 'collaborators'.

It is widely believed that 'a dirty dozen' of NGOs already named in the newspapers and mostly operating within the human rights arena were the primary target although the bill would affect all NGOs. This would include the national Constitutional Assembly, the Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace, the Crisis in Zimbabwe Coalition, the Zimbabwe Human Rights NGO Forum and Transparency International Zimbabwe.

For a local journalist, although the immediate target are indeed NGOs (foreign and national) the wider context is of control of black, particularly rural, Zimbabweans to ensure not just obedience but the impossibility of thinking any other way than in channels laid down by ZANU-PF and of destroying the MDC. A peace activist described the strategy as - 'the regime attempting a scorched earth policy in terms of social formations. While it wants to hold elections so as to appear democratic it wants to prevent thought, communication, information, and analysis.'

The act has been on the way since 2000 when the GOZ saw then the result of civil society lobbying in the rejection of the government's draft constitution in a referendum. It was given additional impetus by Zimbabwean civil society providing much of the evidence for the African Commission on Human and Peoples Rights report on Zimbabwe finally submitted to the African Union to outrage from Harare at being criticised by fellow Africans (far harder to bear than from the West). The GOZ is convinced that NGOS are a front and money conduit for the MDC who are themselves a front for Tony Blair - a position hardly helped by the Blair statement in July 2004 in the UK parliament that he was working for regime change in Zimbabwe.

In fact the act could be said to be already in operation before its official date. A climate of fear and arbitrariness around NGO work has existed for some time with local ZANU-PF activists and youth militias feeling free to determine who is allowed into 'their' area whatever local governors might say. Work permits (TEPs) for outside NGO staff are being refused almost as a matter of course. To see how the proposed NGO Council would look, says a local human rights activist, we should examine the workings of the supine pro-government Media Information Council.

The Act has served its purpose of dividing and confusing civil society as to the best response to the legislation - pretending it is not happening, ignoring the plight of others and carrying on programmes as much as possible, seeking friendly 'godfathers' inside ZANU-PF, relocating and/ or shutting down in Zimbabwe. The use of repressive divide and rule tactics make the NGOs the latest in a series including the judiciary, the media, the churches and farmworkers and farmers.

Internationally and regionally the GOZ has divided or silenced critics with even the limited sanctions regime ineffectual, despite their renewal in Europe in February 2004 and in the USA. The GOZ control strategy appears to be to survive until the elections, despite the likely gap in food supplies and then to get an African 'free and fair' verdict which would take the heat off, challenge the international community to lose interest and give it a strong hand in post-election negotiations with the MDC. This would also give Mbeki a vindication of 'quiet diplomacy' even though Harare is in undoubted breach of the Southern African Development Community (SADC) electoral protocol it signed up to in Mauritius in August 2004.

Who is then standing up to the government on the NGO bill? Foreign embassies are not able or not willing to say much. NANGO, the Zimbabwe local NGO umbrella body presented a forceful case to the Parliamentary Portfolio committee examining the bill, but is unable to affect the strategy. Whilst rights-oriented Zimbabwean NGOs protest, the churches appear busy defending their own territory and interests, but not those of wider civil society. International development NGOs who are mostly Western do not wish to be painted like their governments as part of the plot to 'recolonise' Zimbabwe. Despite the brutal expulsion from Harare in October 2004 of a Congress of South African Trade Union (COSATU) fact-finding and solidarity delegation to Zimbabwe, the South African government appeared keener on criticising their fellow Alliance members than the Mugabe regime. Some regional churches and NGOs have provided critical support for Zimbabweans but have been unable to persuade their governments or ruling parties to make much beyond the occasional muted criticism as happened in Botswana.

However it does appear that the confidence of the ruling party in its hold on power has run into a number of problems even if they are unlikely to result in any other electoral scenario but ZANU-PF maintaining its electoral hold including enough seats to change the constitution. Its propaganda is subject to massive public scepticism in relation to the supposedly improving economy -the public does not believe that inflation is going down in light of its own experience. Some of the first wave of settlers who seized land are in turn being thrown off their land so that the elite can have it (breeding a kind of sans culotte bitterness). Economically, the crisis of production and livelihood continues - a systematic process of de-professionalisation and de-capitalisation. A very significant proportion of professionals, such as doctors, engineers, educationalists and financial managers have sought employment elsewhere. Despite rumours of its demise, the parallel market is up and running again with the rate against £1 being roughly Zim $14,000. A much -vaunted accommodation with the IMF is no more likely than returning foreign investment. 99% of the population live with an income less than the poverty datum line, mitigated only by remittances from the 15 to 25 % of the population living outside.

The cabinet decision to expel COSATU showed the South African public its contempt for the neighbours and indeed for court orders against the expulsion. COSATU was mobilising itself and civic groups in the region to "seal entry points into Zimbabwe for four days" from December 4 to 8.

Internationally, parliamentarians were horrified by the treatment of MDC MP Roy Bennett - who physically attacked the Minister of Justice after endless taunting from him, and was sent to prison with a sentence of hard labour. The not guilty verdict in the trial of MDC leader Morgan Tsvangirai for treason showed how threadbare the case was, according to a lawyer observing the trial. The latter said that although there was no case to answer, the judge with a vestige of professional self-respect, but allegedly a recipient of a farm under the fast-track land reform process, prolonged the trail as long as possible so that the state could tie up Tsvangirai in a lengthy legal process.

The government appears to have little strategy or resources to deal with an expected food gap between January and March, although it has loudly proclaimed that it will be self-sufficient - to widespread disbelief - and does not need NGO or World Food Programme help. Nor does the refusal to allow in British media organisations to cover the cricket in late November show Harare in a good light.

The debate on whether free and fair elections can be held or not is critical, for the coming months. Some form of transitional administration, with international (UN, AU, SADC) support, will be needed. But how can such a transitional arrangement be brought about? In the end the whole system of neo-patrimonialism and endemic corruption presided over by the regime needs root and branch change. The authoritarian mindset has little ability to think alternatives other than repression and blame on outside conspirators. In the words of the Crisis in Zimbabwe NGO Coalition 'Slurs, verbal abuse, violence and intimidation may win arguments, but they can never reconstitute, heal or rehabilitate societies. NGOs may be closed, elections may be rigged, newspapers may be bombed and millions starved, but it will never kill the people's love for liberty.'

* Steve Kibble is Africa/Yemen Advocacy Coordinator for the Catholic Institute for International Relations.

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‘Give ZANU-PF credit, it has ridden the crisis, seen off the opposition and now all it has to do is manage the crisis and aim for re-election and then change the constitution’ – Zimbabwean human rights lawyer, early 2004.

How are we to reconcile Zimbabwe’s seemingly inevitable slide towards being a ‘failed state’ and the continued confidence within ZANU-PF that they can handle the crisis and stay in power until after parliamentary elections due in 2005? More pertinently, what is the popular response to the multilayered crisis of the Zimbabwean state?

Since the government’s defeat in the February 2000 constitutional referendum, ZANU-PF has largely succeeded in reimposing its control through a ‘holistic strategy of repression’. A peace activist described the strategy as a sort of ‘scorched earth policy in terms of social formations … while it wants to hold elections so as to appear democratic it wants to prevent thought, communication, information, and analysis.’

Broadly speaking the strategy entails a continuation of the militarisation/securitisation of the country, under which these sectors are immune from the law and occupy increasingly prominent positions in intelligence, provincial administration, electoral administration and the like. Secondly, it includes the use of presidential powers – supposedly introduced as part of attempts to clamp down on corruption – allowing police to hold opponents of the regime in prison for up to a month without legal process on charges of ‘subversion’. Thirdly, the regime continues its sustained attack on any foci of independence or opposition.

This strategy has the following elements:

· A state-driven violent land occupation process without resolving contradictions in the rural economy.
· The use of the police and security apparatus against opponents, including the use of sexual violence as retribution.
· The use of terror and judicial intimidation as well as ideological demonisation of the opposition to shut down space for independent voices.
· The ‘restructuring’ of the judiciary towards complete compliance.
· Legal and extra-legal harassment of the independent media, notably through the Access to Information and Protection of Privacy Act which shut down the Daily News.
· Destabilisation of trades unions, NGOs and other civic bodies. The draft legislation already exists for NGOs to be the next target.
· Widespread torture and intimidation. The opposition has been softened up by four years of sustained repression and abuse. There has been a crackdown on the human rights sector, although brutal intimidation has often been replaced by more subtle forms.
· The co-option or denigration of religious leadership.
· The reorganisation of ZANU-PF structures to ensure a strategy of coercive mobilisation.
· Use of violence as an election strategy with the bodies responsible for electoral administration firmly under government control including use of military personnel.
· The use of the land reform process, the indigenisation strategy, the stripping of state assets and the politically partisan use of government-controlled food as a ‘primitive accumulation’ tool to create a new economic bloc based on party affiliation and loyalty (although its sustainability is open to question).
· An authoritarian economic nationalist (‘anti-imperialist’) rhetoric that has resonance in the region and continent, bringing together race, land and historical injustice in order to demonise the internal opposition and legitimise and maintain ZANU-PF’s rule through repression.

ZANU-PF rides out the crisis?

Since the decision in December 2003 by Harare to react to continued suspension by withdrawing from the Commonwealth, events have seemed to turn ZANU-PF’s way. There have been victories in by-elections marked by the usual violence and intimidation, including retaking the urban constituency of Zengeza in late March 2004.

The Reserve Bank Governor Gideon Gono responded to recent dramatic collapses in the banking sector linked to endemic corruption by changing the foreign exchange system leading to an initial decline in inflation. This was combined with a drive against corruption. A prominent ZANU-PF MP and proponent/symbol of black economic empowerment, Philip Chiyangwa, was briefly (and illegally) detained over charges of corruption. Indeed the anti-corruption drive in April 2004 claimed the arrest of the recently appointed finance minister but political lightweight Chris Kuruneri on charges of corruption in terms of illegally dealing in foreign currency.

Does this mean that after years of presiding over gross corruption, systemic human rights abuses, and spectacular economic and political decline, the Mugabe government is about to reform (as in the February Cabinet ‘reshuffle’), re-enter the ‘civilised world’ (as a victory for the ‘quiet diplomacy’ of the Mbeki government) and aim for clean parliamentary elections in 2005?

Certainly Thabo Mbeki has given June 2004 as a ‘final deadline’ for serious negotiations to be underway and (hopefully for him) lead to a government of national unity under a reformed ZANU-PF, but not necessarily under Robert Mugabe. Few in the region and even fewer in Zimbabwe find this believable: so many promises, so many broken – and so many basically untrue claims from Mbeki that genuine talks are about to start.

Perhaps a greater indication of South Africa’s stance was its backing at the UN Human Rights Commission in Geneva on 15 April 2004, just before South Africa’s own elections, for a successfully carried African/Asian/Russian ‘no action’ resolution on the human rights situation in Zimbabwe – for the second year running.

Brian Kagoro, coordinator of the Crisis in Zimbabwe Coalition, said: ‘It is disheartening … that ... the human rights of the people of Zimbabwe have been reduced to the flexing of muscles between the global South and the global North.’ As long as Mbeki still (in public at least) accepts the Mugabe rhetoric that the crisis is not about ‘governance’ and human rights but about resolving the triangle of race, land and colonial dispossession, serious pressure or ending of South African financial support seems unlikely.

The arrest of Chiyangwa is supposedly linked to the three factions fighting within ZANU-PF over the succession to Mugabe – John Nkomo, party boss, Emmerson Mnangagwa, and Defence Minister Sydney Sekeramayi. Mugabe is thought to have removed his support for Mnangagwa after the latter was named in a recent UN report as heavily involved in the illegal diamond trade from the Democratic Republic of Congo. However both Mnangagwa and Sekeramayi are long term Mugabe allies and were involved in the massacres in Matabeleland in the 1980s. Conversely the Nkomo group are his key allies inside Matabeleland.

This is all part of what appears to be conflict between continuing the ‘succession debate’ on behalf of Mnangagwa and having no succession debate, meaning Mugabe stays in power. The easiest strategy is for Mugabe to put the succession on hold and proclaim he is staying out his period of office until 2008. This does little, however, to resolve internal and external questions of the legitimacy and sustainability of the regime or Mbeki’s diplomatic strategy.

ZANU-PF is likely to continue a strategic mix of coercion, bribery and electoral manipulation for the forthcoming 2005 parliamentary elections. According to the Justice in Agriculture Group there is likely to be a ‘ring around the cities’ with land being granted to pro-ZANU-PF settlers in peri-urban areas plus some redrawing of urban constituencies to draw in rural dwellers under the party’s control. The Harare government thus hopes to get a ‘free and fair’ verdict which would take the heat off, challenge the international community to lose interest and then be in a strong position to have the upper hand in post-election negotiations with the opposition Movement for Democratic Change (MDC).

In terms of negotiations after elections some elements of the MDC, weakened and weary of constant repression, infighting and lack of direction, may well be tempted to join a ‘government of national unity’. Civil society would of course reject such a course given their demand for broad-based negotiations rather than elite deals but their capacity to push this demand is very limited at present.

Another element of the ZANU-PF strategy is the continued use of food as a political weapon in a situation where an estimated five million Zimbabweans will be reliant on food aid. The Famine Early Warning System estimates that Zimbabwe’s 2004 season is likely to see a harvest of between 800,000 and 900,000 tonnes, 33 to 38 per cent below its cereal requirements. The government however has stockpiled 240,000 tonnes of maize, has supposedly bought 70,000 tonnes from South Africa and according to diplomatic sources has additional stocks that it has seized. Although the World Food Programme and international NGOs report little overt political interference, the grain at the government’s direct disposal provides it with a powerful weapon at election time.

Nor have the Zimbabwean churches in what is a very religious society managed to present a united voice in response to the crisis (or crises). It seemed in mid 2003 that there had been a recovery of the prophetic voice when the leader of the Zimbabwe Council of Churches publicly apologised to Zimbabweans for not bearing witness to the crisis, but this has now been downplayed by the churches seeking to push a negotiations and peace building strategy. The church leaders’ dialogue process with ZANU-PF and MDC appears on and off – possibly depending on how much pressure ZANU-PF feels itself under electorally, regionally and internationally (seemingly little at present).

Even if ZANU-PF has the upper hand it has substantial problems. According to the IMF in April 2004, ‘Zimbabwe’s economy has experienced a sharp deterioration in the last five years. Real GDP has declined by about 30% and is still contracting. Inflation doubled in each of the last three years to reach 600% at the end of 2003… Unemployment is high and rising, poverty has doubled since 1995, school enrolment declined to 65% in 2003, and the HIV/AIDS pandemic [affecting 25% of the sexually active population] remains largely unchecked.’

After a staff visit in March 2004, the IMF called for tripartite talks between government, business and the unions. This was in response to Kuruneri’s attempt to reach accommodation with the IMF by making some small repayments to service debt. The IMF had suspended technical assistance in 2002 and in late 2003 initiated Zimbabwe’s compulsory withdrawal due to Harare’s lack of cooperation and unwillingness or inability to repay the US$273 million owed (53 per cent of its quota). Nor did Zimbabwe pay US$110 million owed to the Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility (PRGF) – the first and only country ever to have protracted overdue obligations to the PRGF.

It is unlikely that the dual interest rate regime, or the continuing fast track resettlement with its lack of recognition of property rights for either commercial farmers or the new settlers, will appeal to the IMF any more than Zimbabwe’s chronic inability to pay its debts.

Nor is Gono’s financial strategy guaranteed success economically or politically. Politically, big questions arise immediately – did the Cabinet understand the strategy and will Gono have the heavyweight political backing to carry it through? As Lovemore Madhuku asked, what happens when key ZANU-PF ‘untouchables’, such as those given licences to import oil without open tendering or favoured by other forms of party/state patronage, become dragged into the war against corruption?

There is little strategy either to address what a local activist in the Catholic church described as the country’s simultaneous deprofessionalisation (driving professionals overseas and destroying the sector’s autonomy) and decapitalisation. Fifteen to 20 per cent of the population (ie 2–3 million) is living outside the country, mostly as economic refugees, and 500,000, largely farmworkers, are internally displaced.

Even with all of its strategies for staying in power, most delivery systems have collapsed in Zimbabwe making it hard to sustain patronage systems, especially in the rural areas where ZANU-PF needs to maintain its iron grip. And whilst the factions inside ZANU-PF may have been temporarily silenced over the succession, the struggle remains ready to erupt again within the context of fighting over the Gono recovery strategy. Although renewed targeted sanctions against the elite are unlikely to have much material impact, the elite resents them, and they suggest not just (some) international disapproval, but also unwillingness to invest or lend money (not that Zimbabwe has much to offer at present).

There remains the possibility that Mbeki, freshly mandated from the April 2004 elections in South Africa and ready to concentrate on outside matters (although it would seem that peacekeeping in Burundi is of higher importance), will actually put more weight behind his June 2004 deadline. Few Zimbabweans I spoke to would, however, welcome a government of national unity, given that it would be a rerun of the Unity Accord of 1987 when ZANU-PF forced PF-ZAPU into the shotgun marriage of a de facto one-party state.

Without substantial constitutional and electoral changes, any such government of national unity would be suicidal for the MDC. Whilst opposition forces including the MDC have weakened under sustained assault inside the country they appear to have some hope that they are regrouping internationally and in the region. The MDC are currently examining whether or not they should contest the next elections given the manifest impossibility of them being free and fair.

What can outsiders do? What does the future hold?

Many of Zimbabwe’s problems are of long term duration. The inheritance of violent colonial dispossession and dehumanisation with the response of (in Brian Kagoro’s words) a ‘violent and hegemonic struggle for decolonisation … culminated in a largely symbolic independence devoid of material gain for the majority black population.’ This meant an authoritarian elite unable/ unwilling to transform the repressive state colonial structures into democratic institutions, and the emergence of neo-patrimonialism and clientilist structures along with long lasting cultures of intolerance and impunity.

What development there was in the 1980s was concerned with state-building rather than nation-building, within the context initially of apartheid destabilisation, followed by structural adjustment. Once the post-apartheid, post Cold War moments arrived the implications of this history in terms of repression, corruption and abuse became clearer (except of course for kneejerk ‘anti-imperialists’).

So where do progressives go from here? There is still a massive ideological battle to be won between the prescriptions of what Patrick Bond has called ‘exhausted nationalism’ and global neo-liberalism, in line with many of the directions pointed to in the various world and regional social fora. Equally Bond points to an existing tradition inside Zimbabwe itself with work on alternate policies having in the past been pursued by the Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Unions (ZCTU), the coalitions on debt, the United Nations Development Programme, and not least the National Working People’s Convention of 1999.

This may help to counter the pessimism of a Catholic Institute for International Relations (CIIR) partner who saw at present ‘a dearth of “thinking”, a sort of anti-intellectualism in nearly every quarter … and essentially … a kind of absence of politics in the real sense, of positions and ideological clarity and coherence, of strategic thinking and organising.’ He added that it is ‘very significant that there is a very deep malaise and unhappiness among a large proportion of traditional leaders and spirit mediums, about the disregard for tradition and cultural wholeness.’

Certainly Zimbabweans, while happy to observe stayaways, have not shown great keenness to face the overwhelming firepower of the state on the streets. The sheer struggle for survival and the fact that remittances from abroad are helping keep them alive (and as Gono is aware, the economy as well) cannot be discounted in terms of seeming passivity in the face of desperate circumstances.

There is little leadership either from the MDC – which in any case has done well just to survive itself – from the trade unions or indeed the churches. Although there have been calls, notably by Morgan Tsvangirai, for a much greater coherence amongst opposition forces, notably the ZCTU, the National Constitutional Assembly and the MDC, the sector has great difficulty in doing this. It also has difficulty agreeing on tactics, including on mass action and what its aims are – overthrow Mugabe, force ZANU-PF to the negotiating table, etc. One thing that is unlikely to occur is any kind of armed response.

Outside Zimbabwe there have been a number of initiatives regionally and North-South in bringing together activists and academics in understanding the nature of the crisis. A particularly resonant one was the bringing together of the Zimbabwean and South African diasporas in London. There could be much greater North-South solidarity in a number of fora – NGO, academic, church and use of links with southern African organisations. Outside organisations need to provide support for those in Zimbabwe and the region who are providing information about the human rights and general situation inside Zimbabwe, and those under threat standing up to repression.

There is continuing need for pressure on the ANC government including from within the region. Pressure also needs to be directed at the other elements in the tripartite alliance such as the trade unions and the Communist Party, given Pretoria’s assurances to the outside world that Mugabe would step down and serious negotiations would commence. What is it about a transition to democracy inside Zimbabwe that worries them more than the ‘chaos that they know’? The International Crisis Group believes that the focus should be on promoting a free and fair election for March 2005 rather than pursuing the chimera of inter-party talks.

There should also be pressure for the long-delayed African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights report on Zimbabwe to be released as called for by Zimbabwean, regional and human rights organisations.

* Send comments on this editorial - and other events in Africa - to

* Steve Kibble is the Africa/Yemen Advocacy Coordinator for the Catholic Institute for International Relations

* This article is a shortened version of a paper to be published in the Review of African Political Economy (ROAPE) No. 100, of June 2004. Our thanks to the editors of ROAPE.

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It is almost ten years since the end of apartheid - a moment that appeared to promise peace and prosperity for the future of the region. It is also roughly a decade after several other major regional political events - Namibian independence, Mozambique's first multi-party election, Zambia's first non-liberation movement government, the Lusaka Accord for (temporary) peace in Angola. The above organisations held a symposium in southern Africa on the grounds that it was an appropriate time for an evaluation. It was also the time for some thinking aloud about the future. Has the promised peace dividend come to the region? Have the hopes expressed for peace and prosperity in the region come to fruition? If not why not and was another path possible? Are we stuck with a choice of authoritarian nationalism or neo-liberalism?

Our three-day discussion analysed developments over the past ten years such as:
· The challenge of turning liberation movements into governments
· The NEPAD initiative - a "home grown" African leaders response to the worsening crises in Africa. But what of its neo-liberal approach and its lack of consultation and participation in planning?
· The formation of the African Union with its commitments to human rights, and setting limits to absolute state sovereignty.
· It is impossible to speak of liberation without coming to gender considerations, and yet development here appears stalled and inherently liable to reverse.
· The HIV/AIDS pandemic, which has tragically become the context within which development has to take place.
· The political, social and economic crisis in Zimbabwe and lack of firm regional response
· The outbreak of peace, initially inside Angola, and then the Democratic Republic of Congo (the 'African scramble for Africa') but the legacy of major divisions and problems of reconstruction.

Connections between conflicts in Africa and its lack of development seem to speak for themselves. The 1990s saw three million African people killed while 160 million lived in countries with intra-state conflict. Intra-state conflict comprised 79 of the 82 conflicts of the last decade and 90% of casualties were civilians. Average income per capita in the continent is less than the 1960s, and it has the largest proportion of the world's poor. African wars are fought with few military resources so that appropriation of natural resources is a natural form of accumulation. Resources become used for pillage, protection money, to trade for arms, labour exploitation, land, and to claims for its mineral and water resources. Conflict is obviously anti-developmental, and an arena where the civilian poor, and women in particular, are likely to be the major casualties.

Within Africa four key structural conditions lead to violent intra-state conflict: authoritarian rule, marginalisation of ethnic minorities, socio-economic deprivation and inequality, and weak states lacking capacity to manage conflict effectively. The potential for conflict is heightened when these conditions are simultaneously present. Other problems add to that potential – lack of fit between nations and states due to the imposition of the 80,000 kilometres of colonial borders, land and environmental pressures, the small arms trade in itself linked to resource-based conflict, debt, and economic imbalance and unfair trade practices.

Within the last fifteen years the inter-relation between conflict and lack of development has been overlaid by the HIV/ AIDS pandemic. Conflict has arisen in response to stabilisation programmes where Southern regimes under pressure from Northern financial institutions and growing balance of payments constraints introduced policies abandoning social services. Policy moved from fulfilling popular demand to the removal of market barriers so that state-society relations became highly confrontational.

But conflict, including violent conflict, can also drive forward development and the fight for liberation and justice, as in South Africa. It is the reaction of social elites which determines whether such conflicts become violent. Violence may also be a liberating outlet for disaffected youth with no economic future and available for clan warlords as in Somalia or for gerontocratic leaders hanging on to power in Zimbabwe. Equally, 'development' can provoke conflict over resources and/ if its benefits are inequitably distributed (arguably a contributory factor in the Rwanda genocide). Emergency aid in 1980s Somalia for the victims of war and drought subsidised clan warfare. Terrorism is not strongly linked to poverty, but more to frustration, alienation and humiliation by, for example, colonization or marginalisation. Peace (or 'negative peace' in Johan Galtung's words) may hide major fault lines and human rights abuses, as is currently happening in Zimbabwe. Often gender discrimination is the most hidden, which poses problems for those who want a quick fix in peace-making and development.

At the moment we see a number of paradoxes when analysing the link between conflict and development. Indeed, historically, those working in peace/conflict resolution and those in development (for cynics neither of them spectacularly successful) long occupied different spheres (first and second generation human rights). Rethinking started in the mid-90s after post Berlin Wall hopes of a new international order were dashed by Somalia, Rwanda, Bosnia and Angola. Conflicts subsumed under Cold War ideologies have now become more properly understood. The conflict and development disciplines are edging closer to each other nervously bringing 'identity', 'democracy' and 'good governance' with them. Increasingly, both spheres are aware that globalisation in making the world safe for investment is simultaneously widening inequalities and provoking insecurity as it reaches into less opened up regions. In response, there have been the beginnings of a reordering of international human rights work marked by: new international institutions like the International Criminal Court and various tribunals, qualifying absolute state sovereignty in the interests of a people's right to protection ('responsible state sovereignty'), tying basic human needs (including the right to enjoy a self-ascribed identity) into conflict avoidance or management (human security) and a critical examination of humanitarian intervention and the role of the United Nations (including the Brahimi Report).

In development the technical fixes of the 1960s moved into the basic needs approach of the 1970s to the rights-based approaches we currently see. To say this in a different way, people have begun to assert their right to be the subject rather than the object of development – the poor as claimers of their rights rather than passive recipients. Conflict mediation has ceased to be merely the preserve of nations and the rich and powerful. Recognition of needing to understand and address the roots of conflict has seen the emergence of alternative or Track Two diplomacy/mediation on a people-people basis.

On the other side, mantras like sustainable or rights-based development, and governance, become neutralised and depoliticised by the multilateral agencies and international financial institutions vaunting the magic and inevitability of the impersonal hand of the market. Good governance is a long way from 'democratic governance' where non-market development could be a preferred option.

At the present time we see a preponderance of ethnic conflict plus the resurgence of religious-focused conflict with overtones of medieval Europe and Asia meeting. In fact these conflicts can be posed as being over identity in which human needs are not being met, meaning that we have to see peace and development within the new thinking around human security. Traditionally, security has been viewed as firmly rooted in the nation state, itself the source of 'identity'. It has operated through agreements between different militaries and political elites: a strongly male arena. But what happens to traditional security - and identity - when weaker nation states are less able to control their own policy as power shifts to global social formations, and markets are dominated by (Northern) transnational corporations, multilateral financial and trading institutions? Building development on more strongly felt 'ethnic' identities and diversities may be one way forward in overcoming conflict and promoting development. There is a natural link here with human security - of people not just territory, individuals not just nations, through development not arms.

Finally if we are talking genuine North-South partnership to deal with conflict and lack of development, partners have the right to demand of British-based NGOs what they are doing in relation to their own government's rush to war. It is important therefore that we and they understand what is happening, as we have attempted to do in a joint Catholic Institute for International Relations(CIIR) and Conflict, Development and Peace network (CODEP) seminar in October 2002. In disputing he was 'Bush's poodle' Tony Blair said ironically 'it's much worse than that, I would do it anyway', i.e. be prepared to engage in war with Iraq. This re-running of Gladstonian moral foreign policy is more worrying as we are being invited to be a junior global policeman on shaky international legal justification in an open-ended war without frontiers against terrorism. The challenge is for principled opposition to war against Iraq to respond in an analytical and measured way to the question 'what would you do against terrorism?' 'Attack global poverty, Western hypocrisy, and dismantle unfair global economic architecture' is a necessary but not sufficient answer. Obviously the Al-Quaeda - Iraq link demands a great deal more proof beyond the fact they both share the letter Q. The British government's linkage with the USA is based on a fallacy. London's case rests on attacking both poverty and terrorism in an attempt to link attributed cause and effect. All evidence from Washington over such disparate but developmental and conflict-related matters as Kyoto, Israel, International Criminal Court, and increased subsidies for farmers show a unilateralist approach based on dominance and firepower without regard to either cause or effect. The questions posed at a recent CIIR/ CODEP seminar - how do we use global resources equitably, how do we control weapons of mass destruction and how we deal with the imbalance between the powerful and the rest of the world still remain the key questions in the relation between violent conflict and development.

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