In response to Mphutlane wa Bofelo’s : It's a good point that the same ANC office bearers who have failed dismally in service delivery at local government level are likely to be back in their positions in COPE T-shirts - with similarly disastrous consequences. The same thing can be seen in the Western Cape. It IS an important point which gets buried beneath the argument that South Africa will no longer have a one party monopoly on power and that this will be good for democracy.

It may be, but how does it help if SA moves from one party power to two party power, both of whom can't deliver the goods? COPE by and large doesn't seem to be tapping into a new, inspirational leadership - instead its leadership face is made up of those who have held positions elsewhere previously. Nor is it offering inspirational policies.

This week, police in Zimbabwe used tear gas, water cannon and live ammunition to crush Sunday's gathering by the Save Zimbabwe Campaign, a coalition of opposition, church and civic groups, in Harare's western township of Highfield. Police shot and killed one opposition activist, Gift Tandare. Lawyers and fellow opposition activists said Tsvangirai had suffered a suspected skull fracture after being beaten by police. Patrick Burnett summarises voices from the ground and highlights some key messages from articles published in Pambazuka News in the recent past. Is it a year of hope or will it all simply collapse into a quagmire?

'In pairs we were being led to the cells where there were five people dressed in police uniforms holding baton sticks who were beating the hell out of us," relates an unnamed woman opposition activist. "They would beat each pair for between 15 and 20 minutes after which they would order the pair out to fetch the next pair from the van." The woman describes how her head was banged against a wall causing her to fall down to the ground. "It took a long time according to what I was seeing and I was only praying if they could stop," she tells the camera in this video as her testimony is interspersed with shots of police brutally beating arrested protesters with batons in order to force them into a police van.

Another activist states in the same video: "We wanted the government to see and show the world at large that the Zimbabweans are suffering. The money they are getting is peanuts, it does not take them anywhere. It is the government that regulates the prices. You can hardly pay for a child at school. You have to feed the family and sometimes you have only one meal a day. We wanted to show the leadership of Zimbabwe that what they are doing is not fair."

Even video sharing site knows what's happening in Zimbabwe. This video was not testimony from Sunday's protest, though, but of a peaceful labour union demonstration in September 2006 in which 23 people were beaten and tortured. No doubt, videos of Sunday's march will find their way onto youtube, providing a valuable window into the situation – the above video already has over 12 000 views - but in the meantime compare testimonies from the video quoted above with that of MDC leader Morgan Tsvangirai, as told to the BBC:

"It was almost as if they were waiting for me…Before I could even settle down I was subjected to a lot of beatings, in fact it was random beatings but I think the intention was to inflict as much harm as they could. I suffered injuries on the head, six stitches, body blows, a broken arm. I also suffered injuries on the knees and on my back several body blows, but I think the most serious injury was the head injury because I lost a lot of blood. They have just administered almost two pints of blood."

Police used tear gas, water cannon and live ammunition to crush Sunday's gathering by the Save Zimbabwe Campaign, a coalition of opposition, church and civic groups, in Harare's western township of Highfield. Police shot and killed one opposition activist, Gift Tandare. Lawyers and fellow opposition activists said Tsvangirai had suffered a suspected skull fracture after being beaten by police.

World outrage followed news of the crackdown, with calls for more stringent sanctions and renewed engagement with Zimbabwe. African leadership, long muted on the issue of Zimbabwe, was also more strident. Ghanaian President John Kufuor, also the African Union chair, said: "I know personally that presidents like (South Africa's Thabo) Mbeki tried desperately to exercise some influence for the better," as reported by numerous media. "Please don't think that Africa is not concerned. Africa is very much concerned. What can Mbeki as a man do? Are you proposing that Africa compose an expedition team to march on Zimbabwe and oppose? It does not happen like that. We are in our various ways trying very hard."

As demonstrated by the youtube video and numerous human rights reports in the past months and years, Tsvangirai's beatings are the result of long term repression to which numerous Zimbabweans have been subject over the past years.

At this stage its worth trolling through a few of the articles published by Pambazuka News about Zimbabwe over the last five years, not because they are the only record of the Zimbabwean crisis or because they comprehensively cover all the issues faced by the country, but because they show the progression of events in the country, and provide useful analysis and insight into the complex Zimbabwean situation. At times like this its important to remember that short-term political outrage shouldn't mask the long-term nature of the situation in Zimbabwe – nor the long-term nature of political inaction.

Perhaps the most useful insight into Zimbabwe's path is provided in a series of articles written in March of each year since 2002 by Mary Ndlovu, a human rights activist from Zimbabwe. Her articles take readers into the heart of life in Zimbabwe, documenting the politics and effect of the land reform crisis, the controversial elections and the downward economic spiral and its effect on the Zimbabwean people.

In March 2004, Ndlovu writes: "On our side of the looking glass, the mounting catastrophe has political, economic, social and cultural components. Most objective observers would trace the economic problems back at least to the late 1980's. Certainly the introduction of structural adjustment at the beginning of the 90's can be seen as the process which eroded the living standards of Zimbabweans, and spawned the first broad-based opposition party. It also generated pressure from interest groups such as war veterans and ambitious black businessmen who felt they had waited too long to share in the country's wealth. The government's response to these developments sent the country into the downward spiral which today ensnares us. Instead of taking the criticism and the pressure and sitting back to plan a coherent strategy of how to deal with the inter-related issues, ZANU PF panicked, saw their ruling position threatened, and from 1997 on have responded piecemeal, reactively and irrationally, bringing us to the tragedy which unfolds before our eyes."

In another article, she writes: "In February 2000, ZANU PF discovered, in a rare moment of truth, that they were unpopular enough to be defeated at the polls, in spite of all the advantages they had in controlling most of the media, the electoral machinery and all the state security apparatus. They immediately began the process of ensuring that no matter what the people wanted, never again would ZANU PF lose a vote. The electoral process would be turned into a stage-managed spectacle."

Following on from this and assessing the 2005 Parliamentary elections, Ndlovu warns of economic collapse and "dire consequences" for the region should ZANU PF take power against the wishes of Zimbabweans. She makes three points on the back of this:

- SADC unwillingness to insist that regional electoral standards be upheld appears to signal that they are not prepared to implement them for their own countries either.

- Democrats should be aware that governments cannot be trusted with the task of defending democracy, in their own countries or anywhere else.

- There is a long road ahead for the building of democracy in Southern Africa, "from the bottom up, with much struggle to claim rights against the autocratic tendencies of all the governments and ruling parties of the region".

The startling lack of progress on the Zimbabwean front is evident in Ndlovu's articles. In March last year, Ndlovu wrote that: "Certainly we know that the multiple crises which embody Zimbabwe's millennium experience are intensifying, making life barely livable for the majority of the population. The crises have engulfed the working world, the learning world, the consumer world, the world of the supermarket and even of sport. The economy limps along, agriculture crawling, tourism virtually defunct, manufacturing crippled, and mining, the one still flickering light of the economy, under recent assault from government policies. Electricity comes and goes at will, water likewise in many places; fuel supplies (black market only) are erratic and prices exploitative. Schools are places of confusion, teachers demoralized, pupils unable to afford textbooks if they manage to pay fees, and only finding bus fare for half the school days. Courts barely function, police cells are filthy putrid hell holes, prisons even worse."

Writing in 2004, Steve Kibble points out the long-term nature of Zimbabwe's problems. "The inheritance of violent colonial dispossession and dehumanisation with the response of (in Brian Kagoro's words) a 'violent and hegemonic struggle for decolonisation…culminated in a largely symbolic independence devoid of material gain for the majority black population.' This meant an authoritarian elite unable/unwilling to transform the repressive state colonial structures into democratic institutions, and the emergence of neo-patrimonialism and clientilist structures along with long lasting cultures of intolerance and impunity."

In pointing to why regional responses to the Zimbabwean situation have been muted, Kibble writes in another article that: "The 'national security' strategy of the ZANU PF elite has led to economic collapse, severe repression, flight and severe economic consequences for the region, but as yet there has been no concerted regional reaction to this in terms of security. This in turn relates to national elites being unable to formulate a path directed to human security, and largely because of their lack of engagement with and mistrust of new social forces (which of course are not themselves necessarily united or coherent)."

Kibble questions how to shift the security focus from military to human security to focus on those without power and those affected by poverty, environmental degradation and human rights abuses. Values would include peace and the promotion of human rights. "It may not seem obvious when there seem more immediate concerns, but the fight against repression in Zimbabwe illustrates much of this, and involves what values postcolonial states and regions should have, their road to development, democracy and overcoming of colonial and apartheid structures, all of which pose human security dilemmas."

Patrick Bond and David Moore, in April 2006 ask what can be done to offer solidarity with the people of Zimbabwe: "…the real solidarity action ahead may revolve around COSATU and broader civil society forces. They must shake free of Mbeki's influence and establish a strategy for longer-term support. This would more forcefully and surgically target Mugabe and his cronies, and nurture the unpredictable resurgence of Zimbabwean protests, which certainly still lie ahead." More broadly, one could add to this the need for pressure on the African Union and other regional and international human rights bodies.

Perhaps the last word, before noting that based on the progression of events in Zimbabwe the happenings of the last week are hardly surprising and without concerted effort on behalf of all stakeholders worse will surely follow, should go to Ndlovu, writing in 2006: "The tension of expectation is building as the people's misery becomes unsustainable. Will this be the year, and if it is, will it hold hope for the future, or will we simply all fall down together?"

* Patrick Burnett is contributing editor of Pambazuka News
* Please send comments to [email protected] or comment online at www.pambazuka.org

Ever heard of street soccer activism? In Zimbabwe, the Uhuru Collective is using soccer to fight for social justice, mobilizing residents and encouraging them to challenge their local council on rates fees.

The full story is featured on the website a Zimbabwean portal on civil society, but it’s not only the use of street soccer for activism that is interesting, but the way in which Kubatana have integrated short audio recordings into the story. The result is not only a web-based story that provides context and background, but through the power of voice conveys the story first hand through those involved.

And so you can listen to Sam Farai Monro, the co-ordinator of the Uhuru Collective, talk about what they aim to achieve through soccer activism, how commentators at the matches highlight important social concerns, and why unfair social delivery needs to be challenged.

The spoken word is not new to storytelling or information dissemination, with radio being popular worldwide. But while the potential for distributing audio via the internet is a possibility that has existed since the first websites, it has only recently become more feasible due to developments that allow easy production and distribution.

Portable recording devices allow anyone to produce high quality sound. Easy editing and mixing – previously the domain of professional sound buffs – is made possible through software packages. Giant steps taken in the ease with which one can create a personal website and upload written, audio or video content makes it possible for anyone to be heard – theoretically speaking at least.

As a result mega-industries have sprung up and there are a growing number of internet search engines that specialize specifically in audio or video files. Even giants like Google =http://video.google.com/ have been forced to add video search functionality and hosting to their services.

The new craze has given rise to its own terminology - podcasting. As defined by Wikipedia, the free online encyclopedia, “Podcasting is the method of distributing multimedia files, such as audio or video programs, over the Internet using syndication feeds, for playback on mobile devices and personal computers. The term podcast, like 'radio', can mean both the content and the method of delivery.”

Sadly, if you type Africa into any of the search engines listing podcasts, the returns are not very satisfactory. In Africa, low internet access and high access costs mean that in large parts even downloading email can be a problem and that’s if you even have access to a computer. Listening to audio distributed through the internet is a rarity. The podcast trend is driven by North American and Western European interest and voices.

This is not to say that it doesn’t have potential for Africa. The medium has the ability for people to get their voices heard without having to navigate the complex gate-keeping of mainstream media; it has the power to reach a global audience; and it has potential for networking and activism. Africa has made some strides in internet access and many countries are now rolling out broadband internet access – the real sweetener when it comes to internet audio and video.

Distribution of audio via the internet in Africa is in its infancy, but with growing number of broadband users and Africa’s huge Diaspora population the audience is out there. It remains to be seen whether all the factors needed for the growth of the technology will eventually lead to a culture of listening online.

If you want to start listening, here are some starting points. Broadcasting weekly out of Berkeley, California, is Walter Turner’s Africa Today programme (http://www.kpfa.org/1pro_bio/1b_afric.htm). One of his more interesting recent interviews is with the journalist Gary Younge, who is the correspondent for the London Guardian in the United States. You can hear Younge talking about his latest book ‘Stranger in a Strange Land’, being black in Britain, international solidarity and the oddness of living in America. “You see people walking around with cellphones and yet you still get the feeling that they think the world is flat,” Younge tells Turner.

Check out Indymedia South Africa http://southafrica.indymedia.org/ for audio and video content on what South Africa’s social movements are up to. The latest video content from the site is about a march to the Israeli embassy to protest against the recent war between Israel and Lebanon. The video shows the march with clips from speakers Sallim Vally from the Palestine Solidarity Committee and Willie Madisha of the Congress of South African Trade Unions (Cosatu). Also on the site are a series of audio files discussing the World Social Forum’s Bamako appeal, including an interesting speech from Samir Amin.

Further offerings can be found on the website of One World Radio Africa =http://radioafrica.oneworld.net/, which has a series of regularly updated files, the latest being a discussion on climate change. Democracy Radio =http://www.idasa.org.za, on the website of South Africa’s Idasa, includes a series of recordings on child poverty in South Africa, political party funding and the struggle for women’s rights. These recordings are dated from 2004/05 but are still worth a visit.

Africa Files produces a regular podcast called ‘Africa Files: The Pulse’, with Silence Genti as the host. You can access the programme by visiting

"I was not aware of anything until they were hitting me. I think there were five policemen for every refugee. When we started to defend ourselves, there were many more coming. They came and attacked. I saw one person I knew. They were beating him and when he fell down, they broke his neck. One of the police broke his neck with his baton. One pregnant woman also died in the same place." – An interview with a demonstrator, as quoted in a report compiled by the Forced Migration and Refugee Studies unit at the American University in Cairo.

On 29 September 2005, Sudanese refugees began gathering at Mustafa Mahmoud Park in central Cairo for a protest that eventually swelled to between 1,800 to 2,500 protestors and lasted for three months until it was broken up by Egyptian security forces in the early hours of December 30. The protestors were demanding refugee status interviews, a clearer and transparent process, protection from the Sudanese government, protection of the vulnerable and investigation of detentions and mission persons. Egyptian security operatives forcefully ended the protest, an action that resulted in the death of 27 refugees and asylum seekers and the injuring of hundreds.

A new report compiled by the Forced Migration and Refugee Studies unit at the American University in Cairo and released this month, details the origins of the protest and the aftermath of its violent end on December 30. Entitled “A Tragedy of Failures and False Expectations”, it ends with recommendations to the parties involved. Coming as it does in a month when the world marks World Refugee Day, the report will be of interest firstly to those who followed the unprecedented protest and secondly to all interested in the rights of refugees.

Describing the situation in the park during the three months of the protest, the report states that although protestors were faced with obvious discomfort, there was an “unprecedented” level of community and solidarity in the park where the protest was held, situated near to the UNHCR offices. Meals were prepared in a communal kitchen, money was pooled to buy food and impromptu shops sprung up around the park. Art lessons and puppet shows were held for children.

But in the early hours of December 30, Egyptian security operatives moved in without warning, resulting in death, injury and detentions that lasted several weeks. The report says: "There are some indications that the level of violence was unplanned, or at least that not all security officers were enthusiastic participants in the mayhem. Two bystanders reported plainclothes officers shouting at low-ranking police to stop the beating but being ignored." The report describes the scene after the park was cleared as one of "stunned silence and desolation". "Hundreds of blankets and suitcases are strewn all over the park. Other private belongings, such as notebooks, family pictures, children's toys, and blue and yellow refugee identity cards, are scattered on the ground."

But the report is not only concerned with the events of December 30, but rather with what caused the protest. It intends not to assign responsibility, but to promote understanding of why the protest happened, what the issues were, and how similar tragedies can be avoided.

As such, the historical background provided in the report is extremely useful, describing how the first wave of Sudanese came to Egypt in 1955 as a result of the beginning of civil war. This continued into the mid 1980s, says the report. Further outbreaks of war led to more Sudanese arriving in Egypt in 1983. Most recently, the conflict in Darfur had led to a further exodus from Sudan. Egypt thus became a recipient country for refugees who were firstly in need of refuge from war and secondly seeking to be resettled in third countries, explains the report.

Responsibility for these people fell to UNHCR, whose Cairo office eventually developed one of the largest resettlement operations in the world, says the report. However – and this is where the problem comes in - only about 25 percent had the expectation of resettlement met, leaving them stuck in an Egypt often hostile to their needs. Acute problems detailed in the report relate to work, housing, education, public health and racist attitudes towards refugees and asylum seekers.

A more immediate catalyst to the protest came as a result of the 2004 ceasefire between the government of Sudan and the Sudan People's Liberation Army. The report explains that UNHCR suspended Refugee Status Determination (RSD) procedures for all Sudanese asylum seekers, instead providing applicants with yellow asylum seeker cards that provided temporary protection against forced repatriation. This decision, reviewed every six months, was based on the argument that this was a better method than possible rejection of applicants on the basis of a change in their country of origin. "Sudanese asylum seekers were deeply disappointed and worried by UNHCR's decision, especially as it put a heavy damper on their hopes for resettlement and relegated them to a longer waiting period under difficult conditions in Egypt," says the report.

It was these factors, contends the report, that combined to create frustration amongst the Sudanese refugee community in Egypt. "Their decision to sit in at Mustafa Mahmoud Park and to demand fundamental changes in their circumstances should have come as no surprise."

In terms of its comments and recommendations, the report highlights the role of all three of the major actors – the Egyptian government, the UNHCR and the leaders of the protest – for failing to prevent the events of December 30. "A series of failures on the part of the Egyptian government and UNHCR, combined with unrealistic expectations and grave miscalculations on the part of the demonstrators and their leaders, resulted in the tragedies of the forced eviction. This is a complicated story with many actors, each of whom bears some level of responsibility for the unnecessary deaths of so many people, including 12 children, and the physical injuries and psychological damage to hundreds more."

According to the report, Egyptian security used "excessive and disproportionate force in removing the protesters, leaving no alternatives or avenues for escape". The use of "indiscriminate violence" and lack of immediate medical attention was a matter for Egyptian and international human rights organizations to pursue. "With attention focused on asylum seekers and refugees, and the issue discussed openly in the People's Assembly, this may be an opportune time for the government to seriously consider the passage of domestic legislation to detail and systematize Egypt's obligations under the 1951 and OAU refugee conventions, as well as to make its policies and procedures clear. Without transparency and clarity, asylum seekers and refugees cannot access services, and this translates into frustration that could lead to a repeat of the protest strategy."

Turning to UNHCR, the report says that despite its mandate being the protection of refugees and asylum seekers, the agency had adopted a "hostile and confrontational attitude” towards the protestors. The attitude of UNHCR had served to confirm the protesters' grievances and frustrations. "UNHCR took a number of grave risks concerning the safety of the population in the park. It must accept accountability for a number of failures and miscalculations that, at least indirectly, led to the tragic results."

Perhaps surprisingly, the leaders of the protest and the protesters themselves also come in for criticism. The report says: "The protesters remained adamant about their demands throughout the three months and refused to accept any compromise that may have ended the protest, such as that offered by UNHCR in the failed December 17 agreement. While the protest leaders did accept and sign the agreement with UNHCR, dissenting voices within the park succeeded in overturning the decision, despite warnings from supporters and friends, and convinced others to continue the protest."

In conclusion, the report notes that if a similar situation is to be averted, the same problems and issues that led to the protest need to be addressed through long term solutions. "These issues include problems of communication and trust, the provision of adequate services that make life livable even in limbo, and a redefinition of responsibilities and roles," said the report

* The full 68 page report is available at

* To read an article detailing the response of UNHCR to the report, visit
- Compounding the tragedy of 30 December in Cairo

* Please send comments to [email protected] or comment online at www.pambazuka.org

As internet usage in Africa grows, governments are beginning to wake up to the power of the online medium to communicate, influence and organize. Already numerous examples of internet censorship in the form of arrests and website blocking can be found. This is likely to grow, says Patrick Burnett.

News last week was that Internet giant Yahoo! had been fingered in the November 2003 imprisonment of Chinese cyber-dissident Jiang Lijun, who was sentenced to four years for pro-democracy postings on the internet. The company found itself in the hot seat after Reporters Without Borders published documents it said proved that Yahoo! provided information that led to the jailing. Lijun, 40, was sentenced for “subversion”, accused of seeking to use “violent means” to impose democracy. It is the third time that Yahoo! has been implicated in collaborating with the Chinese authorities in tracking down those who use the internet to express divergent opinions, says the press freedom group.

Not that Yahoo! is alone. Microsoft and Google have also been accused of assisting the Chinese government to enforce their censorship laws. An enormous internet market of 111 million users combined with an official intolerance for opposing views has led the Chinese to develop sophisticated web monitoring and censoring systems. Web sites and blogs are frequently blocked and internet searchers disrupted.

Compared to China, Africa has a tiny internet market of only 23 million users, or 2-3 percent of the total population. As a result it has been easy for governments to ignore the threat that the internet poses to them in terms of its organizing potential and its ability to act as a vehicle for diverse thoughts and opinions. The reality is that this is changing. Regimes are likely to make greater use of internet censorship techniques and crack down on those who use the internet to express contrary views. Africa already has a poor record of press freedom and locking up of journalists. This record is likely to be duplicated in cyber-space.

It’s no coincidence that Zimbabwe, which relies heavily on China for financial and technical support, has drafted the Interception of Communications Bill 2006, which seeks to empower the authorities to intercept telephone, e-mail and cell phone messages. When the Bill comes into force the government will establish a telecommunications agency called the Monitoring and Interception of Communications Centre to monitor mail, according to the Zimbabwe Independent (http://www.kubatana.net/html/archive/legisl/060324zimind.asp?sector=LEGISL). The Bill will compel operators to install software and hardware to enable them to intercept and store information as directed by the state. The service providers will also be asked to link their message monitoring equipment to the government agency. Failure to comply will result in a fine or imprisonment.

While the Zimbabwean government has thus clearly recognised that control of information extends to email and have plans to govern this area, examples of direct internet censorship are already easy to find. In February, the Ugandan government deployed filtering techniques against a Ugandan news radio station's website. This was the first known case of internet censorship in Uganda and came at a time when public debate was crucial - just before presidential and parliamentary elections on 23 February. The blocking was done by local Internet Service Providers, who effectively barred the site’s internet identity number, known as an IP address. This method of censorship meant that 700 other sites hosted by the same server were also blocked, according to tests by Nart Villeneuve, head of research at Toronto University. (http://ice.citizenlab.org/index.php?s=Uganda)

In Ethiopia, where up to 70 journalists are believed to be detained, Ethiopian security forces on January 27 detained Frezer Negash, a correspondent for the US-based Web site Ethiopian Review. The Committee to Protect Journalists reported at the time that Ethiopian officials had cracked down on Negash over her online writings, which were unfavourable to the government. Negash was freed from custody on March 10 after a court ordered her release on bail. (http://www.cpj.org/news/2006/africa/ethiopia30jan06na.html)

But the most sophisticated examples of internet censorship have emerged from North Africa. The extent of the problem was starkly demonstrated by the actions of the Tunisian government during the World Summit on the Information Society (WSIS) in November 2005, when it was made clear that any opinions outside what the Tunisian government deemed acceptable were not to be tolerated. Online writers have been imprisoned and websites are routinely blocked. According to a Human Rights Watch report, tests conducted in 2005 found that Tunisia censors hundreds of websites. In addition, Human Rights Watch reported that internet users believed the government monitored email and internet traffic. Stiff laws were used to detain online writers for expressing their opinions. In neighbouring Libya, the government has blocked critical web sites based outside the country and hacked a website critical of the government, Human Rights Watch says. Egypt, reports Human Rights Watch, had detained people for their activities online and used the internet to monitor and entrap homosexuals. (http://hrw.org/reports/2005/mena1105/2.htm#_Toc119125694)

These examples show that some African governments, caught between a rock and a hard place as liberalization of telecommunications opens up the internet market to more users but at the same time reluctant to let go of state controlled information channels, are beginning to wake up to the threat the internet presents to maintaining the status quo. Crucially, governments are not seeking to shut down the internet entirely and in many cases have facilitated its growth, but what they are seeking to do is to control the flow of information, in much the same way as traditional media channels have been controlled. This presents dangers in that it fosters an environment of self-censorship where citizens of a country do not feel free to express their opinions online. Internet Service Providers, fearful that they will face the wrath of the law, would rather remove content that may be remotely offensive, thus abrogating censorship to the private sector. This in itself can be profoundly unscientific. As the Ugandan example demonstrates, by taking down a single internet site, 700 additional sites were inadvertently blocked.

If the above examples and trends are anything to go by, as the internet spreads and new forms of expression such as blogging become more popular, internet censorship is going to increase as governments realize the power of the online medium. Control is likely to involve governments blocking websites they deem undesirable, the arrest and persecution of those who use the internet to express critical views and the introduction of laws that allow government to control the internet, given that in many African countries laws governing traditional media and forms of expression may not extend to the internet. Internet censorship is likely to take place with greater vigour in countries that already have poor freedom of expression records. Unless a government has an entrenched respect for human rights that extends to all areas of society, repression is likely to replicate itself in the virtual environment of the internet.

Lastly, an enormous barrier to the benefits of the internet in Africa lies in the fact that so few people have access – and that this is not going to change in the near future, even though growth rates between 2000-2005 were over 400 percent. In this sense, it is the structural inequities of the global economic order that censor tens of millions of people. As a 2003 Privacy International (http://www.privacyinternational.org/article.shtml?cmd[347]=x-347-103801 ) report noted:

“Thus, the solution to African Internet censorship lies as much in finding global solutions to these problems, as it is about reinforcing national and regional respect for freedom of expression on the medium of the Internet.”

* Patrick Burnett is online news editor, Pambazuka News

* Please send comments to

Last week, the South African defence minister Mosiuoa Lekota took final delivery of the SAS Amatola, a R1,5-billion, 36 000 ton, 121 metre long warship complete with biological and chemical defense mechanisms, automated damage control and armour protection. The state-of-the-art Amatola is the first of four corvettes to be fully completed and is currently docked at the military harbour in the picturesque naval town of Simon’s Town near Cape Town.

The mountain peaks above Simon’s Town provide the best view of the four warships moored in the harbour below and while this may seem like an odd place to begin a discussion about South Africa’s March 1 local government elections, the ships speak to a number of issues that are relevant to the vote for 9 000 councilors in 284 South African city, town and district councils.

Amidst much criticism that the money could have been better spent on services delivery, the purchase of the corvettes formed part of a multi-billion rand arms deal which also included a shopping list of 30 helicopters, 24 Hawk fighter trainers and 28 Gripen light fighter aircraft. It was with the corvettes that the controversy over the arms deal started, with contractor Richard Young alleging a conflict of interest involving the government's former acquisitions chief, "Chippy" Shaik. Schabir Shaik, brother of “Chippy”, was a shareholder in the Thomson Group and African Defence Systems, which were awarded the contract to provide combat technology for the four corvettes. Schabir Shaik was found guilty in 2005 on two charges of corruption and one of fraud, and sentenced to an effective 15 years' imprisonment. His appeal will be heard later this year. But it was Judge Hilary Squire’s assertion in that case that Shaik had enjoyed a “generally corrupt” relationship with former deputy president Jacob Zuma that rocked politics in South Africa to its foundations.

As a result of the outcome of the Shaik trial, Zuma was fired by president Thabo Mbeki and now faces court later in the year on corruption charges. The charges have been characterized by Zuma’s camp as an attempt to eliminate him from the race for the presidency in 2009 elections. Zuma also faces a March trial in connection with the alleged rape of a 31-year old Aids activist. The events have pitted factions in support of Zuma against those of Mbeki and further strained the relationship between the ANC and its alliance partners, the Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU) and the South African Communist Party (SACP).

So when you’re looking down on the four corvettes in Simon’s Town harbour its impossible to divorce them from South Africa’s wider political reality. There’s no doubt that the arms deal has been part of a defining period that will resonate far into the future. For this reason, local government elections, taking place in an atmosphere of heightened national political tension, seem far more significant this time around than when they were last held in 2000.

Simon’s Town and the resident corvettes are linked to the rest of South Africa in other ways. The town forms part of a string of coastal villages along the False Bay coast that since 2000 have seen a doubling and in some cases even a trebling of property prices. The coastal enclaves that hug the mountains have become the home of a mix of foreign property owners, old and new money, all attracted by the beauty of the False Bay coast and the massive returns offered by a lucrative property portfolio.

Yet alongside this boom are communities that the wealth windfall has bypassed completely. Just over the hill from Simon’s Town harbour is the shack settlement of Red Hill, where high unemployment rates, poor housing and lack of services are common problems. A few valleys and mountains from Red Hill is Ocean View, where the apartheid government dumped the original inhabitants of places like Simon’s Town under its forced removals policy and where unemployment, gangsterism and drugs are rife. And a few kilometers from Ocean View is Masiphumelele, where unemployment and lack of housing are common problems.

These communities, segregated by high walls, electric fences and an enormous privatized security industry from properties literally next door to them that sell for millions of rands, mirror the broader South African picture that shows a widening gap between rich and poor, a gap already large as a result of apartheid but compounded by market friendly economic policies which have favoured those who are able to access resources.

It’s in communities like Ocean View and Masiphumelele where a new flank has opened up in the South African political story. In May last year, Ocean View erupted in protest over housing shortages and poor services. Protests in Masiphumelele over education led to clashes with the police. These small, localized protests have sprung up in towns across South Africa, peaking across the country in a 2005 “winter of discontent” and simmering ever since. Although the causes of these protests have been diverse and sometimes rooted in local politics, a common characteristic has been that they have all included an element of protest against a lack of government delivery in the area of housing, electricity, water or sanitation.

As the local government elections near, the media has sometimes used these protests as evidence that the ANC is going to be punished at the polls through low voter turn out, even if victory is assured (Only 48% turned out in 2000). This may still turn out to be the case in some areas, but there are also indications that the equation might not be so simple. A recent ACNielsen survey, for example, shows that support for the ANC does not dissipate in correlation with support of protests. Factors such as loyalty to the ANC exists together with support of protest.

This suggests that the protests could oddly assist the ANC, something a recent Markinor poll published by the Sunday Times newspaper pointed out. Protests had raised awareness in some municipalities and would increase voter turn out. In this sense the protests could assist the ANC not only by getting voters to the polls, but by pressurizing councilors to get on with the job of delivering services. This line of argument, however, only holds for so long as the ANC can maintain some kind of control over the protests. Arguably, events of the last week, where Lekota, a senior ANC figure and defence minister, was chased out of the town of Khutsong and prevented from addressing a rally, is not an example that the ANC leadership in Pretoria would want to encourage.

But what these community actions have done is to raise the profile of issues of delivery at the local government level, even though the voices of those protesting seem to have been sidelined from the mainstream political debate, characterized by reports which show the protestors as violent even when the police fired on them first, or by a lack of voices articulating the concerns of communities beyond the initial sound bites in media coverage of protest action.

Why has there been an apparent short out at local government level? The reasons advanced are many. Massive apartheid era backlogs at local government level meant that the process of service delivery started out on the back foot. The ANC top guard, typified by President Thabo Mbeki’s remote style of leadership and centralization of power, has detached itself from the hurly burly of service delivery. Bruising battles within the ANC for control of the organisation have detracted attention from grassroots delivery. Local councilors, faced with massive backlogs and little capacity, have simply buckled under the pressure. Widespread corruption based on power and patronage has permeated the local government level. The Growth Economic and Redistribution (GEAR) strategy, the unilaterally adopted market-focused growth path adopted by the ANC in 1996, limited the amount of money that could be invested in social development projects, boosting the rich to be even richer, but leaving the poor behind.

Which ever or all of those reasons you choose it’s clear that the ANC has an ever-increasing workload if it is to meet its service delivery commitments. As long as this situation is allowed to continue, the pressure from below is likely to increase rather than decrease, no matter what the result of voting next week.

* Patrick Burnett is online news editor, Pambazuka News

* Please send comments to [email protected]