Will the Java generation please stand up?

Kenya has had roughly three phases of the reform movement- the anti-colonial movement, the second liberation, which called for multiparty politics?, and we are now in the third stage, the entrenchment of the reforms inaugurated in the second phase, with the signature achievement being the passage of the new constitution on 27 August 2010.Throughout all these phases, how power is organised has been the overarching concern.

The first attempt at reforming the Kenyan state started during the Lancaster constitutional conferences in London, on the eve of independence from Britain.

ANTI-COLONIAL MOVEMENT

At the independence conferences in London the debate on how state power would be organised pitted two foremost opposition parties, the Kenya African National Union (KANU) - which represented the large ethnic groups, and the Kenya African Democratic Union (KADU) which represented the conglomeration of smaller marginal ethic groups.

KADU favoured decentralisation of power and resources which it argued would act as a vanguard against the large ethnic groups. KANU, which favoured centralisation of state powers, argued that decentralisation would lead to the balkanisation of the then young country, while KADU argued centralisation of power and resources in Nairobi would lead to an authoritarian state.

The fact that KADU was supported by the outgoing colonial settlers and Kenyatta, who favoured centralised government, controlled the reins of power, scuttled any efforts at having a decentralised state. Decades later, the consequences of the centralised state are sorely evident in the cult of personality, massive economic inequality between regions, and entrenched patronage. The later constitutional reform push was anchored on devolution.

MULTIPARTY MOVEMENT

The second wave, probably, the most energetic reform movement, was the struggle to introduce multi-party politics. If the first reform efforts were directed at the colonial government. The second reform movement targeted the illegitimate and overreaching Moi state. Moi’s accession to the presidency was everything but smooth. People close to the ailing president Kenyatta felt that by allowing Moi, the then vice president, to succeed Kenyatta would, in effect, make power slip through the hands of the Mount Kenya power barons. They spared no effort in scuttling Moi’s accession to the presidency.

When all else failed, they attempted to amend the constitution to prevent the Vice President from automatically becoming the president, in the event of president’s death. Their attempt failed. They consoled themselves with the fact that Moi after all, without a huge distinct political base and money, was a ‘passing cloud.’

Cognisant he was starting from a point of weakness, Moi embarked on an outreach mission to his political foes. Additionally he reassured the public that he would follow in Kenyatta's footsteps- Nyayo. His outreach was received with cold feet, which made him politically insecure, and thus he governed through paranoia and personalisation of the state.

The failed coup attempt in 1982, gave Moi more reason to clamp down on the pro-reform movement. The government moved quickly and amended the constitution making Kenya a de jure single party state. This was followed by systematic expunging from the government, people who were either not loyal enough, or, people whom Moi deemed to be a threat to his rule.

Despite growing pressure for reform, both from within and outside, Moi incessantly held the line, multiparty politics would heighten ethnicity, which later became a self-fulfilling prophesy.

The multiparty advocate were hugely outnumbered and outmuscled by the Moi‘s state, but they were innovative and adroit in their use of the mainstream media, and galvanised the public for the course.

THE PASSAGE AND ENTRENCHMENT OF THE NEW CONSTITUTION

The third phase of reform began with the establishment of the Constitution of Kenya Review Commission (CKRC). The CKRC’s primary mandate was a comprehensive review of the constitution. It was also mandated to provide civic education, seek public input and prepare a draft constitution for consideration by an enlarged National Constitutional Conference (NCC).

The NCC, the Bomas constitution conference, comprised all parliamentarians, 42 political party representatives, 3 delegates from each district, as well as 125 representatives of religious groups, women’s groups, and youth groups, the disabled, trade unions and NGOs. This was the most comprehensive and participatory effort in constitution making thus far. Huge credit should be given to the reform movement for ensuring that the desire for a new constitution was kept alive.

The process was derailed by deep politicization and disagreements among the stakeholders as well as the government’s lack of political will. In a bizarre twist, president Kibaki and his team rejected the Bomas draft. They walked out of the conference in protest at what they saw as Odinga’s attempt to have an executive prime minister be included in the draft. The word prime minister, for a while in Kenya’s parlance, was synonymous with Odinga. The government eventually watered down some of the provisions of the draft, and subjected it to a referendum in 2005, which was defeated by a spirited campaign by the Orange Democratic Movement (ODM) led by Odinga. Once Moi was out of the scene the old mistrust amongst the reform movement came into the open. But they briefly buried the hatchet post the 2007 elections and pulled in the same direction, by design, and thus, in 2010, the new constitution was promulgated after a referendum.

THE ACTIVISTS AND THE END OF IDEOLOGY

The adoption of the new constitution was undoubtedly a huge victory for the reform movement, but the even bigger victory will be overseeing its entrenchment.

The two generations that filled the rank and file of the two previous processes will need to eventually hand in the batons of reform, however, scanning the horizon, there is distinct lack of generational eternal vigilance from the Java generation about the constitution save for rhetorical posturing and online activism.

In part, the words reform and activism have become dirty words. This mind set was acutely revealed, and was part of the campaign fodder in the 2013 elections, when the civil society was called the evil society working against, especially team Uhuru, at the behest of imperialists. The International Criminal Court’s (ICC) intervention in Kenya following the 2007 elections violence internationalised and placed impunity at the core of the elections. Naturally, the fact that impunity and human rights issues have been their bread and butter issues, and that the majority of the reform movement support them inevitably placed them in a collision course with team Uhuru. But the distinct lack of vigour and clarity in the reform movement, a movement that has for decades redefined the frontiers of engagement despite the odds being stacked against them, is disheartening. Even more worrying is the younger generation’s disinterest at best and disdain at worst, considering the historic arc on which the country is on.

The passage of the new constitution was a product of the dogged determination of the second liberation movements and it needs different generation of reformers to guard it.

The Kibaki presidency should be the starting point of diagnosing the trouble with the reform movement- Kibaki appointed some to join his government – John Githongo was appointed the anticorruption Czar, Maina Kiai was appointed the chairman of National Commission on Human Rights, and Rachel Odongo was appointed an ambassador, just to mention a few -- the loss of some of these stalwarts affected the group.

Additionally, they were ill prepared for post Moi’s political landscape, which many felt was the end of ideology- the movement was ill prepared for post ideology world. Personalisation of reform- to remove Moi from power was their major undoing as was the lack of recruitment of new cadre of younger generation.

One of the least acknowledged impacts of the 2007 post-election violence was its severe impact on the collective psyche of key institutions, including the reform movements. Many of these institutions suffered a serious crisis of confidence, partly because of their sins of omission prior, during and after the 2007 elections.

Few carried out serious soul searching regarding their roles. The church is the only institution that has come out and sought forgiveness for their indiscretion. Unlike the church, which with some degree of success has embarked on course correction, the rest of the reform movement still lives in denial, with business as usual as their mode of operation.

ECONOMIC EXPANSION- SEE NO EVIL, HEAR NO EVIL

Expansion of the economy under Kibaki enabled the ‘middle class’ to grow and feel comfortable, and thus disengaged from politics. While elsewhere, such a growth would have acted the catalyst for agitation for change- since they are less able to be manipulated by politicians, Kenya’s middle class instead has taken to shopping at Java and Nakumat, going to parks, and for those with means, sending their kids to private school or abroad, frequenting private hospital and buying comfortable vehicles. Private schools and hospitals have inoculated them from the problems still facing those left behind in public institutions and their comfortable vehicles prevent them from feeling the potholes still plaguing the streets.

Their dissociation with politics, has allowed the politicians to nakedly go on with their nefarious activities without being chastised.

But the Java generation’s see no evil, and hear no evil will surely make the politicians, who already feel they are entitled to have a pay raise without breaking sweat, feel embolden as they continue to live in their alternative world bubble.

Further, some java generation have taken their anger and rage to the social media as opposed to doing the ‘dirty work’- mobilising, organising and canvasing for votes. Outside the urban areas, politicians can safely consider their rage as music to their ears.

Technology while indisputably useful has its place- to complement the hard work of knocking on the doors, but it cannot substitute it.

There is a serious need for a new cadre of reformers to take over the mantle, the older generation needs to pass on their battons. The reform movement needs to negotiate this tricky and dicey transition with enormous care -the manner of the transition will determine the arc the reform movement will take. As it is, the movement needs a reboot and find its true north if it will remain significant moving forward in an unfamiliar Kenya.

It would be cruel, if a movement that valiantly fought for the enactment of the new constitution fails at the critical stage of its entrenchment.

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