Laurie Nathan, formerly the head of the Centre for Conflict Resolution in Cape Town, was a member of the African Union (AU) mediation team based in Abuja that facilitated negotiations for the Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA). In this interview he offers some perspectives on the negotiations and the Agreement.

Pambazuka News: Many analysts and observers have warned that the ceasefire promised by the DPA is unlikely to be attained. What are the main problems in this regard?

Laurie Nathan: The most obvious problem is that the Agreement has not been signed by all the armed groups in Darfur. Two of the rebel movements that participated in the AU mediation – the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) and the faction of the Sudan Liberation Movement/Army (SLM/A) that is headed by Abdul Wahid Mohammed al-Nur – refused to sign. The Agreement concluded on 5 May was endorsed only by the Sudanese government and the SLM/A faction headed by Minni Minawi. Abdul Wahid is the rebel leader with the most popular support in Darfur. Without his endorsement of the Agreement, there is little prospect of a lasting peace. [Note from Pambazuka News editors: Subsequent to this interview, reports indicate that some groups have now committed to the terms of the agreement. See for further details.]

In addition, there are numerous armed groups in Darfur that were not present at the Abuja negotiations. Most significantly, these groups include the Janjaweed, the rampaging militia that have been responsible for so much of the death and destruction in the region and that are used by the government to crush the rebels and their communities.

It should also be recalled that the government, JEM and the SLM/A have signed several humanitarian ceasefire agreements over the past two years and then violated these agreements repeatedly and egregiously. This constitutes fair warning of the possibility of further violations, especially if the signatories are not genuinely committed to the new agreement.

Another huge problem is that the AU peacekeeping mission in Darfur is hopelessly ill-equipped to oversee the ceasefire and protect civilians from attacks by government, militia, rebels and bandits. The AU has roughly 7,000 troops when it needs, according to the AU Force Commander, as many as 60,000 troops to cover inhospitable badlands the size of France.

Pambazuka News: Do you think the signatories are genuinely committed to the new agreement?

One of the most remarkable things about the Abuja peace process was that, for months on end, the negotiating parties were unable or unwilling to engage in serious negotiations. They made no effort to accommodate each other’s positions and showed no interest in trying to forge common ground. None of them was willing to make concessions to its opponents. There was no bargaining, let alone collaborative problem-solving.

Instead, the parties spent their time reiterating their demands ad nauseum, rejecting the positions of their opponents, trading accusations and recriminations, grandstanding for the benefit of the international observers and attempting to win support for their positions from the mediators. In the midst of this immensely frustrating experience, the head of the AU mediation team, Sam Ibok, was quoted as saying that “our experience over the past sixteen months had led us to conclude that there is neither good faith nor commitment on the part of any of the Parties”.

In light of all this, one of the most important points about the DPA is that it is not by any stretch of the imagination a negotiated settlement. It is a document which was drawn up by the mediators and which the Sudanese government and Minni Minawi signed under pressure from sections of the international community. The final draft of the text prepared by the mediators was presented to the parties on a take-it-or-leave-it basis five days before the final deadline of 30 April set by the AU Peace and Security Council.

The government and Minawi evidently believed that their interests would not be served by refusing to sign the document and being portrayed as spoilers. In the absence of real negotiations and hard-won concessions, however, none of the Sudanese parties has any sense of ownership of the Agreement and it is therefore unlikely that they are committed to it.

Several commentators have pointed out that the DPA contains more compromises on the part of the rebels than on the part of the government, particularly in relation to power sharing. (A summary and critique of the DPA appeared in the Sudan Tribune on 3 May; see www.crisisgroup.org and www.hrw.org The Darfur Relief and Documentation Centre has an excellent website (www.darfurcentre.ch). I would also strongly recommend “Darfur: A Short History of a Long War” by Julie Flint and Alex de Waal.

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