Gerald LeMell, the executive director of Africa Action forecasts US Africa policy and argues that In this election year, the U.S. government will pursue a mixed approach to elections in Africa, upholding democratic ideals or looking the other way, depend- ing on military, economic and political alliances. Climate change will be a hot topic in U.S. electoral debates, but it is unlikely that the devastating environmental prospects for Africa will be featured, much less addressed, in U.S.-Africa policy this year.

The Bush Administration's fixation on security and the "war on terror" is already escalating the militarization of U.S. policy in Africa in 2008. In his last year in office, President George W. Bush will no doubt duplicitously continue to promote economic policies that exacerbate inequalities while seeking to salvage his legacy as a compassionate conservative with rhetorical support for addressing human rights challenges including conflict in Sudan and continued promotion of his unilateral HIV/AIDS initiative. The third prong of U.S.-Africa policy in 2008 will be the contin- ued and relentless pursuit of African resources, especially oil, with clear implications for U.S. mili- tary and economic policy.

Private Sector Role

Deepening U.S. military ties to the African continent are visible in both the official and private sectors. Since 2002, the U.S. International Military and Training Program (IMET) has invested approximate- ly $10 million a year to train African military person- nel, and the FY 2008 budget request increased this sum to $13.7 million. At the same time, under State Department oversight, commercial sales by U.S. manufacturers delivered $281 million worth of weapons and equipment from FY 2006-2007 to Algeria alone. Such licensed commercial sales to sub- Saharan Africa were just $900,000 in 2000, but for FY 2008 they are estimated to reach $92 million, an 80% increase from FY 2006. At present, the U.S. has Cooperative Security Location (CSL) agreements with five African countries, which are now opera- tional in Entebbe, Uganda; Libreville, Gabon; Accra, Ghana; Dakar, Senegal; and Lusaka, Zambia. There is also a new joint U.S.-Ugandan intelligence fusion center, just outside of Kampala in Uganda.

This escalation has not gone unnoticed. Concerned civil society groups in the U.S. and across the conti- nent of Africa have expressed persistent apprehension over the potential dangers of this change and the absence of any accountability in the process. Democratic governance, sustainable development and human rights are serious challenges in many coun- tries in Africa, but considerable progress has been made by activists, advocates, and civil society organi- zations over the last few decades. The militarization of aid to Africa could dramatically sharpen the slope of this already uphill battle for social, political and economic justice on the continent.

The militarization of Africa comes at a time when the continent can least afford it. An Oxfam report on armed conflict in Africa released in October estimates that the cost of conflict at the expense of the conti- nent's development over a 15-year period was nearly $300 billion. According to this study, between 1990 and 2005, 23 African nations were involved in con- flict, and on average this cost African economies $18 billion a year. By these figures, the cost of conflict was equal to the amount of money received in aid during the same period.

The fundamental question for many is whether the U.S. will utilize this increased military presence to support freedom, self determination, growth, pros- perity, and accountability on behalf of the majority of the nearly one billion people in Africa or if this new initiative will instead serve to oversee surrogate nations whose leadership is accountable first to U.S. security and economic interests.

AFRICOM's Inspiration

This growing militarization of U.S.-Africa policy is certain to escalate sharply in 2008 as the United States hurtles full speed ahead with the launch of Bush's still ill-defined Africa Command (AFRICOM). While AFRICOM appears to be a done deal, with a budget request of $389 for FY 2009, the public explanations and justifications for it can only be described as seriously confusing if not downright evasive.

In October 2003, James Jay Carafano and Nile Gardiner, both from the Heritage Foundation, a con- servative think tank, proposed to the Bush Administration the creation of a centralized Africa command for the U.S. military. The Carafano/Gardiner proposal makes clear that the objective is to preserve U.S. access to African oil and other natural resources on the continent. Africa pro- duces 90% of the world's cobalt; 64% of its man- ganese; 50% of gold; 40% of platinum; 30% of ura- nium; 20% of total petroleum; 70% of cocoa; 60% of coffee; over 80% of coltan and 50% of palm oil. The Heritage report also points to the strategic importance of Africa in the global "war on terror." This proposal resonated with the Bush administration.

Altruistic Motives?

AFRICOM began initial operations in October 2007 with temporary headquarters in Stuttgart, Germany. But much like 150 years ago when Western countries argued that their real goals in Africa were to bring liberty and democratic ideals to the continent, the Bush Administration has been trying to convince skeptical audiences in Africa and elsewhere that AFRICOM is ultimately driven by altruistic motives. AFRICOM's projected structure would place human- itarian work previously done by the State Department and the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) under the directive of Department of Defense (DOD). To U.S. and African civil society groups, and even to AFRICOM's critics in Congress, the Bush administration has argued that the State Department will remain responsible for diplomacy and development while AFRICOM will "support" USAID and other humanitarian organiza- tions in the delivery of humanitarian aid and assis- tance. The Bush administration suggests there will be more civilian oversight of AFRICOM than any other military command. Yet it remains hard to see how African policy will not be driven by military engage- ment as opposed to a genuine partnership if the State Department and USAID are positioned under the Defense Department in AFRICOM. Military commands are simply not designed to do humanitar- ian work. For commissioned officers and the Defense Department, humanitarian work will never trump military objectives. This reality was clearly illustrated in Iraq when the State Department and humanitarian groups were simply cut out of planning discussions around the build up to the inva- sion and its aftermath. AFRICOM appears likely to follow a similar trajectory.

The United States is telling African governments that AFRICOM is simply a restructuring of African pro- grams currently split among the existing U.S. global military units of the U.S. European Command (EUCOM), U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM), and U.S. Pacific Command (PACOM). General William Ward, AFRICOM's designated commander, made the case for his new command at a meeting with African Union (AU) leaders in Addis Ababa in early November, arguing that the United States has a national interest in helping to "stabilize" Africa. "We come and do things to assist our African partners in increasing their capacity, their capability to provide a stable environment here in Africa, " he said. When asked whether AFRICOM was "simply a militariza- tion of the continent" he replied, "Absolutely false; not the case." His answer is, of course, contradicted by the very reality of the increasing militarization of U.S. foreign policy in Africa over the last five years.

Soldier of Fortune

AFRICOM is being touted in Soldier of Fortune and other private military contractor industry publica- tions as ushering in a bountiful new job market. In Iraq, contractors hired by the U.S. government were accountable to no one, resulting in unacceptable human rights violations. It is reasonable to be con- cerned that mercenaries and other contractors hired for AFRICOM's work will follow a similar pattern. African voices from civil society and from democrati- cally elected African governments should be heard and heeded in decisions relating to the location of AFRICOM and its role in Africa. Thus far, only Liberia has given any public support for this initiative. Other nations and regional bodies including the Southern African Development Community (SADC) have expressed deep concern about a deepened U.S. mili- tary footprint on African soil.

It's important for Africa advocates in the United States to stand in solidarity with African civil society voices on the continent by challenging not only the existence of AFRICOM but seeking several impor- tant changes to the proposed program. AFRICOM should decouple the U.S. Department of State and USAID from the Defense Department to ensure that U.S.-Africa policy will be driven by diplomacy, devel- opment and genuine partnership, not military engagement. Clear lines of accountability and mecha- nisms for transparency must be established not only for AFRICOM but also for any private military con- tractors employed by the United States in Africa to ensure the protection of the rule of law, democracy and human rights on the continent. Funding for AFRICOM and the increasing militarization of aid and engagement in Africa should be reallocated to serve a comprehensive agenda that promotes just security by supporting sustainable development, deeper debt cancellation for impoverished countries in Africa, and fully funding the fight against HIV/AIDS and other health challenges on the continent.

AFRICOM raises more questions then the Bush administration is able to answer at this point. Who does the United States intend to stabilize by intro- ducing more military equipment and approving more arms sales into the region? How does the United States decide when to use force in "stabilizing" a con- flict? If people are protesting unfair corporate prac- tices near the grounds of an oil company, will the United States use force, or encourage the use of force by African military units, to protect these corporate assets? Will U.S. soldiers be accountable in any way to African governments or their citizens? To what degree will the United States employ mercenaries and other contractors in Africa? Will U.S. economic interests trump the rule of law, democracy and accountability in Africa? The answers to the questions above will go a long way to determine whether AFRICOM constitutes a solution to a bureaucratic challenge of a region divided between other global military commands or is actually likely to encourage future conflicts.

Kenya

It's only February, but the recent turbulence in heretofore-stable Kenya brings U.S. policy toward Africa in 2008 into focus. U.S. interests in Kenya are well documented. Kenya's role as a manufacturing and financial hub for East Africa makes it an appeal- ing partner for Western investments. The country's geographic location, bordering on Somalia, a col- lapsed state, also appeals to U.S. security interests, particularly given President Mwai Kibaki's history of unswerving support for the Bush Administration's "war on terror." It is therefore not surprising that the United States initially responded to the dubious offi- cial election outcome and immediate swearing in of Kibaki for a second term by calling on the Kenyan people to "accept the results…calmly."

Once it became apparent that the elections were clearly tarnished, various U.S. officials backtracked and engaged in a clumsy game of semantics regarding what was actually said. But all of Africa saw the U.S. rally around Meles Zenawi when he also claimed to win the Ethiopian election in 2005, despite over- whelming evidence that he and his Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) had lost badly. Zenawi immediately cracked down on the opposition and at least 200 people were killed and 700 were injured. The EPRDF never relin- quished control of power and two years later, Zenawi's U.S.-backed troops invaded Somalia.

U.S. support of favored illegitimate regimes like Zenawi's in Ethiopia and the unhelpful, contradicto- ry U.S. diplomatic response to the botched elections in Kenya risk encouraging leadership around the con- tinent to ignore the will of their citizens when they have international backing. Do these two instances foreshadow the standard AFRICOM response to con- tested elections in Africa?

Other Elections

In 2002, Kenya appeared to be a shining example of the possibilities of democracy and the genuine emer- gence of freedom and real stability, after frequent government critic Kibaki was elected in a contest regarded as free and fair. The spectacle of Kenya in turmoil is certainly distressing to other democratic movements across the continent in a year that will see several other important African elections that may expe- rience unhealthy influence from U.S. militarization. Longtime U.S. foe, but now a new oil friend and military partner, Angola, will have its first legislative elections in September. Half of the country has regis- tered to vote in the long-awaited polls as citizens hope to usher in a new era of multiparty democracy after Angola's 27-year civil war ended in 2002. The legislative elections were initially scheduled to be held in 1997. A presidential election will follow next year. The Angola opposition group, the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA), has accused the government of deliberately delaying the elections. U.S. military operations in Angola have been growing by leaps and bounds since 2002, with arms sales up over of 1000% and ongoing International Military and Training Program trainings and security agreements with the U.S. Navy.

Divided Ivory Coast leaders aim to hold long-delayed elections in the first half of 2008. Rebels have con- trolled the northern half of the West African state and world's top cocoa producer since a 2002-2003 civil war, but President Laurent Gbagbo and former rebel leader Guillaume Soro, who became prime min- ister in April 2007, agreed in March 2007 on a process of disarmament, reunification and organiza- tion of elections. Many observers inside and outside the country are concerned by the slow pace of progress on practical aspects of this agreement and fear that the elections will be postponed again. Despite the fact that the United States has so clearly supported undemocratic regimes when it has served a military, economic or other political interest, the United States claims to be aggressively working for "democracy" in Zimbabwe. Although some in the Bush Administration seem to be realizing that overt U.S. engagement in Zimbabwe has been counter-pro- ductive, the United States has been intensifying sanc- tions and increased funding of opposition groups. This economic pressure for regime change not only strengthens Robert Mugabe's hand when blaming outside forces for the current economic crisis but it has the potential to undermine the opposition's legit- imacy both now and if they were to gain power.

The United States ought to cease and desist from this antagonistic unilateral engagement and instead step back to work with other elements of the international community to develop a multilateral engagement. U.S. policies should facilitate bringing together regional actors like Southern African Development Community and the African Union with internation- al agencies in order to promote the democratic process, a national and popular constitutional reform process, economic justice and human rights. A major shift in South Africa's political landscape occurred at the end of 2007, when the African National Congress (ANC) announced that its inten- tion to back Jacob Zuma in the 2009 presidential elections. Given the ANC's overwhelming strength, Zuma will be the heavy favorite to win. Still, 2008 will be an important year in the lead up to elections South Africa.

Sudan's Multiple Conflicts

Perhaps the most interesting upcoming African elec- tion from the U.S. perspective will be in the Sudan. The U.S.-brokered and Kenya-hosted Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) of 2005 ended the civil war between North and South, and declared that the year 2009 will witness an unprecedented and internation- ally monitored general election in the Sudan. In 2008 it will be determined whether these elections are a realistic possibility. As deadly violence against civil- ians raged on in Darfur in 2007, serious fractures emerged in the North-South peace agreement. The complete implementation of all the provisions of the CPA, including a nationwide census to prepare for the 2009 elections is critical to the process of democ- ratizing Sudan and achieving peace and development for its entire population.

There is little indication, however, that President Omar Al-Bashir's National Congress Party (NCP) regime in Khartoum has any intention of jeopardiz- ing its hold on power, and it will attempt to delay the election process as long as possible unless it faces credible pressure from the international community. If a legitimate census is not carried out and a national electoral commission is not successfully established and operating in 2008, a serious blow will be struck both to the CPA and the ability of Southerners to wait for the 2011 referendum that will determine if the South will stay united with the North of Sudan or opt for separation.

This election will be of particular interest because the United States has taken a strong rhetorical stance against the Sudanese government regarding Darfur while simultaneously maintaining strong intelligence and military ties with Khartoum, including arms sales and official military trainings. On December 31, Bush signed divestment legislation into law and pledged to uphold sanctions against the Sudanese government. For the first time, the Bush administra- tion seems to be becoming more comprehensive, at least in its public statements, in its approach to Sudan.

New Envoy

Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice swore in Richard Williamson as the new U.S. Special Envoy to Sudan on January 7 and the following day Bush made a statement committing the U.S. to supporting the implementation of the CPA, the deployment of an effective peacekeeping force in Darfur and the diplo- matic engagement necessary to support serious politi- cal dialogue between the region's stakeholders. Unfortunately, in the past several years, we have seen the Bush administration use powerful rhetoric that in reality meant nothing on the ground and masked insufficient or contradictory U.S. diplomatic action. Bush's statement says that the CPA, "laid the groundwork for lasting peace and unity for all of Sudan," a sentiment that is popularly promoted by policymakers and advocates alike. Africa Action's dia- logue with Sudanese in each region of the country reveals that the CPA - while a critical agreement that must be implemented - should not be held up as an exact model for all other agreements. Circumstances are different in every region and all new peace processes must both address these unique regional characteristics and avoid repeating some of the mis- takes of the CPA by being more inclusive, more par- ticipatory, and more transparent to the general Sudanese population.

The United States must also follow through with diplomatic engagement once peace agreements have been signed to ensure timely implementation. The real process of peace and justice happens after the political negotiations have been concluded when the agreements are put into practice.

If the Bush Administration is serious in its commit- ment to a comprehensive and productive Sudan poli- cy, it must prioritize these areas over the "war on ter- ror." It must use its influence on Sudan to ensure the prompt and comprehensive implementation of the CPA. In Darfur, it must use its leverage in the inter- national community to resolve the outstanding issues of UN command and control of the African Union/UN hybrid peacekeeping force known as UNAMID and to ensure that this peacekeeping force is fully resourced and deployed. The United States and the international community must not allow Khartoum to veto troop contributions from nations around the world. Tensions with Chad are heating up on the western border of Darfur, and the United States must begin to adopt a regional perspective when addressing this conflict.

There are over 8,000 helicopters among NATO countries, many of them that could pass the "hot and high" test needed to work in Darfur's extreme heat and high levels of dust. Darfur needs at least 70 of these, but contributing countries are resisting, argu- ing that they don't have the helicopters or that they are anxious about the command and control issues of UNAMID. The U.S. has the opportunity to finance the provision of helicopters by other NATO coun- tries as well as leverage the necessary international leadership to ensure UN command and control of the force. For myriad reasons, U.S. troops in Darfur are neither politically possible not practically desir- able. However, there might be ways for the U.S. to loan the United Nations the helicopters and other support vehicles that are essential for UNAMID. The deployment and support of UNAMID must go hand-in-hand with renewed efforts to build an inclu- sive and participatory peace process for the Darfur region and for the North of Sudan where new conflict is emerging. The International Criminal Court must get full international support to do the important work of accountability in Sudan's many conflicts.

Horn of Africa

The primacy of U.S. security interests and militariza- tion in the Horn of Africa has gone a long way towards further destabilizing an already volatile area. As part of Operation Enduring Freedom's Trans- Sahara Counter-Terrorism Initiative, U.S. naval ves- sels have engaged in several military strikes in Somalia. Over a thousand people have died since U.S. war planes bombed towns in southern Somalia and up to half a million people have fled the erup- tion of violence in Mogadishu to live in camps. The United States has allied with unpopular and repres- sive Ethiopian President Meles Zenawi and orches- trated the invasion of Somalia by Ethiopian troops. This appears to have accomplished little more than another human rights and humanitari- an crisis with hundreds of thousands of internally dis- placed people, untold num- bers of refugees in neighbor- ing countries, and regular reports noting the brutality of rape, beatings, shooting and indiscriminate shelling by all parties to the conflict in and around Mogadishu.

The exercise has weakened Ethiopia considerably in its still-unresolved border dispute with Eritrea (despite an Eritrea-Ethiopia Boundary Commission decision in 2002 which the Ethiopian government refuses to abide by even after both countries' repeated pledges that the decision of the commission would be binding and final). Ethiopia's actions have also angered and inspired ethnic Somalis in Ethiopia's Ogaden region. Given the increasingly complicated and tense reality on the Horn today, it would be interesting to see if American officials believe that U.S. policy in the region actually achieved any count- er-terrorism goals. Ironically, it is only in the interna- tionally unrecognized but clearly democratic state of Somaliland (known as northwest Somalia), that there is peace.

*For the full article, please visit the Foreign Policy In Focus (FPIF), a project of the Institute for Policy Studies (IPS, online at . Established in 1996, Foreign Policy In Focus is a network of policy analysts, advocates, and activists committed to “making the United States a more responsible global leader and global partner.” For more information, visit www.fpif.org

**Gerald LeMelle is the Executive Director of Africa Action and a contributor to Foreign Policy In Focus. Michael Swigert, Africa Action's Department of Policy Analysis and Communication Program Associate provided research support.

***Please send comments to [email protected] or comment online at www.pambazuka.org

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