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‘The history of Sudan is a complex one which can’t be reduced to a linear narrative of south versus north,’ writes Yohannes Woldemariam. Can South Sudan resolve the sticking points standing in the way of successful secession?

Most western countries tacitly supported the creation of a divided Sudan even before the referendum took place. However, separation is not necessarily the ideal solution. Professor Mahmood Mamdani’s article, ‘South Sudan: Rethinking citizenship, sovereignty and self-determination’ is excellent for understanding the variety of issues involved in the separation of south and north Sudan. If certain outstanding issues are not ironed out, the divorce can be messy. I also like that Mamdani unsettles the casual essentialist dichotomy that frames the conflict in a simple South versus North categories. The history of Sudan is a complex one which can’t be reduced to a linear narrative of south versus north.

Mamdani is right in his assertion that the external factor/pressure was crucial in Omer Al Bashir’s ‘acceptance’ of the outcome of the referendum. Al Bashir hoped to diffuse the negative publicity from Darfur and his trouble with the ICJ by accepting the secession of south Sudan. The possible intervention of the United States was of serious concern to Al Bashir.

While most writing on Sudan is focused on the potential conflict between the north and the South, Mamdani’s look into internal southern Sudanese issues is another perceptive insight. With 92 per cent illiteracy rate and several ethnic groupings, the perceived national cohesiveness of southern Sudan is fragile at best.

Will South Sudan learn from the 50 to 60 years of experience of post-independence Africa, where the nation state model is under assault in significant part of the continent? The factional violence that is already evident is a worrying sign. This potential issue of further fragmentation in the south may have been behind the late John Garang's conviction of a new Sudan within the context of unity. The role of regional actors (Egypt, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Kenya, Uganda and Israel), to try to use Southern Sudan as a proxy by supporting different factions is another potential destabilising factor.

For a successful divorce between north and south Sudan to occur, there are still many sticking points:

– Division of oil revenues: Where will the oil-rich Abyei region end up--in the north or the south? Or can some formula be found where both south and north can share revenue and ownership? This is crucial to resolve because the southern Sudan constitution has included Abyei as part of Sudan to which Al Bashir is reacting by threatening to withdraw his recognition of the referendum results. Perhaps, Al Bashir is recalculating his position in light of new developments in the region with the Arab Spring. The reconfiguration of alliances is still to be determined and the dictators in the region are very worried for their survival.
– What currency will an independent south Sudan adopt? How will this affect partitioned Sudan?
– Water security (the issue of Jonglei canal and the Nile has regional dimensions). Upstream countries Ethiopia, Burundi, Rwanda, Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda recently signed an agreement to try to reverse Nile water sharing, currently regulated by two 1929 and 1959 deals. The emergence of south Sudan as a potential ally for this group is of concern for Egypt.
– The demarcation of the border.

These are among the issues which require urgent attention for an amicable divorce.

Another important issue is the rights of citizens across the border of the two countries and the migrants. Here, the vulnerability of Ethiopians of Eritrean ancestry during the 1998-2000 war between the two countries provides a useful lesson. Tens of thousands of Ethiopian Eritreans who lived in Ethiopia for over half a century and others who were born and raised in Ethiopia and never set foot in Eritrea were maltreated and deported after being stripped of all their possessions. To avoid tragic consequences, they should be granted citizenship in both states as Mamdani suggests. Internally, South Sudan should strive for ‘territorial federalism’ with genuine democratic power sharing in order to avoid the possible degeneration to personal rule and authoritarianism.

The disarmament of rival militias in south Sudan giving way to a national army is of utmost importance if we are to prevent a UNITA versus MPLA or a Renamo versus FRELIMO type debilitating civil war.

Professor Mamdani, thank you for your enlightening and timely article!

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