Muammar Gaddafi’s 42-year reign as leader of Libya is now history thanks to an armed rebellion which was helped across the finish line by NATO and the Western powers. What will the new Libya look like? Will it become a stable democracy or an outpost for Islamic extremist? Will the National Transition Council (NTC) hold together or will it collapse like a pack of cards and plunge the country in a Somalia-type chaos? Was it all about oil or about freedom for the Libyan people? And, are we witnessing the (re)colonisation of Africa? These are some of the questions that bloggers have been grappling with since the fall of Tripoli a couple of weeks ago.

Pipeline Dreams
http://bit.ly/nckpr8

Pipeline Dreams points out while the narrative about the Libyan revolution has been largely one-sided in the West, it is a more nuanced narrative that prevails in Africa:

‘Despite all the indications that NATO has played a critical role in the “uprising,” the disdain for Gaddafi in the West has led to incomplete and one-sided coverage of the Libyan situation.

‘If you read reporting on Libya from across Africa, however, you’ll discover a slightly different appreciation of the current situation…

‘Many of the people I’ve spoken with in Ghana are deeply troubled by NATO actions in Libya. Rather than debating the relative merits of Gaddafi and the rebels, they’re looking at what the NATO actions in Libya mean for the rest of the continent. After watching the French take out Gbagbo a few months ago and NATO forces bringing about the demise of Gaddafi today, it’s hardly surprising that many wonder who may be next.

‘With the scramble on for Africa’s resources, how much room for maneuver do African governments really have?

‘One thing is certain: when Western actions are selective and seemingly motivated by resources and self-interest, talk of human rights and support for democracy building fall on deaf ears.’

Shabablibya
http://bit.ly/pu805F

Shabablibya argues that the West’s Libya strategy of the past six months (both political and military) was incoherent and inept:

‘Libya has been a classic exercise in coercive diplomacy — more exactly, a classic case of how not to conduct it. The first lesson to draw is that in a game of intimidation, the psychological factor is key. Actual use of military force is designed to undermine the morale and break the will of the targeted leadership. To succeed, it should be swift, concentrated and carry a credible threat of more to come unless they comply with the ultimatum. The United States and NATO failed completely to meet those requirements. Implementation of a vague, incoherent strategy was disjointed in the extreme. Military and diplomatic actions both were irresolute and fitful…

‘Almost no battlefield support was given the insurgents at critical moments early in the campaign when Gaddafi and his loyalists were barely holding on. For more than a month, the thousands of claimed NATO air sorties had so little practical effect that opposition leaders voiced concerns that they had been misled if not betrayed. The incoherence and ineptitude of the air campaign undercut the political strategy of putting intolerable pressure on Gaddafi and his associates. The hand-off from the United States was abrupt and uncoordinated. President Obama was anxious to limit American exposure at a time of mounting domestic criticism about American overextension and the fierce opposition of the Pentagon led by Robert Gates. As for NATO and the Europeans, their weak political will — individual and collective — is notorious. Once again they have demonstrated an inability collectively to manage difficult, complex missions when the United States is not there to lead them. This judgment holds despite the initiatives of French President Sarkozy who has been too erratic and lacking in the authority to orchestrate the behavior of other governments.’

Sahel Blog
http://bit.ly/pW1yn9

Sahel blog believes that the Libyan crisis will have a destabilising effect on the Sahel region:

‘As I said in February, there are multiple categories of foreign fighters in Libya, including the Tuaregs mentioned in the article, who had been there for years, as well as fighters who only went to Libya this year. There are also black-skinned Africans who are targeted in Libya on suspicion of being mercenaries.

‘Regarding Sahelians who actually fought in Libya, though, whether they were there for a decade or a month, their return to Mali, Niger, Chad, or elsewhere could, as Mamadou Diallo told AFP, prove destabilizing. This movement of fighters also points to a new political reality in the Sahel: the absence of Qadhafi’s presence as a political mediator (and sometime instigator) in various internal conflicts throughout the region. Sahelian governments have been working to prepare for a post-Qadhafi future, but they are deeply concerned not only about security issues, but also about the potential economic and humanitarian impact that returnees will have on poor and remote areas.

‘I am no expert on the Tuaregs, but it would seem to me that new rebellions are not inevitable. Still, a period of uncertainty seems likely, as individuals, communities, and nations adjust to the changes that the fall of Qadhafi is bringing.’

The Moor Next Door
http://bit.ly/ofckIa

The Moor Next Door assesses the role of Algeria in the Libyan conflict:

‘The mixed messages coming from Algiers — the contradictory statements from high officials and party leaders and the tone of articles in newspapers considered close to one or the other faction of the political elite — have exposed Algeria to conspiracy theories and accusations from the Libyan resistance and even traditional adversaries such as Moroccan propaganda outlets. Early in the conflict it seemed the Algerians hoped that a strong showing of solidarity by major developing countries and rising powers would help push back against the will of NATO and the Gulf Arabs…

‘Algeria’s policy appears symptomatic of its leadership’s general lack of finesse in managing emerging trends moving east to west in the Arab region. Algeria will likely face criticism internationally for having taken in the Qadhafis; it is also likely to suffer pressure from Gulf Arab states pushing the consensus position on Libya. Algiers lost the propaganda campaign during the Libyan crisis and is likely to continue to take a lashing when it comes to regional opinion and media coverage. Its links to NATO are unlikely to suffer seriously but may be put at some risk if it continues to dig into its defiant stance. France is a likely source of pressure…

‘At the domestic level, standing by the Qadhafis will not earn anyone in the Algerian leadership any kind of kudos from the Algerian people who are hungry for political change themselves. As Qadhafi scrapes out of the political scene, Algeria is ending the Libyan crisis more isolated than when it began.’

Lenin’s Tomb
http://ht.ly/68Vw2

Lenin’s Tomb argues that Libya will not plunge into chaos like Iraq did because the NTC’s Western allies will stabilise the situation:

‘There will be no analogue to “de-Baathification”. The old state structures will be preserved and adapted, and the new government will enjoy considerable legitimacy provided it delivers on a basic menu of elections and political rights. Moreover, the parties that win those elections will likely be the more pro-capitalist elements allied to the ruling class factions in the leadership of the transitional council. The government that now follows will be less oppressive and more democratic than the one it ousted, and it will probably be less sectional than the Qadhafi regime.

‘It would be hard for the coming government to do worse than Qadhafi. In one respect, however, they may do just that. EU powers will certainly demand that the new regime hold to their promise to continue Qadhafi's policy of containing immigration from Africa to the EU. Given the way that some elements in this rebellion have treated black and migrant workers - you know, lynchings and that - the EU can probably have full confidence in the new regime's handling of this remit. It always made sense, of course, for the bourgeois elements of the rebellion to scapegoat black workers as the “alien” elements, the fifth column depended on by Qadhafi. In government, the temptation to resort to racist hysteria in order to frustrate and divide potential opposition will be magnified many times over.’

Africa Works
http://bit.ly/oxJFCx

Africa Works calls for a more humane treatment of African migrants in Libya who are being persecuted on the grounds that they are mercenaries who fought for the Gaddafi regime:

‘Libyan rebels have happily received decisive support from an international community — led by France and the U.S. — who subscribe to race-blind principles. Having been empowered by aid based on these principles, the rebels should not abandon basic human decency in their treatment of migrants from ‘black Africa,’ whom they are unfairly labeling as mercenaries hired by the former regime.

‘In truth, Ghaddafi cynically manipulated Libya’s relations with sub-Saharan Africa, opening his country to economic migrants, especially from West Africa, and to human smugglers who helped these migrants find ways into Europe. In his brittle attempt at finding international allies, Ghaddafi promoted a pan-Africanism that sought, again cynically, to unite North Africa with the sub-Saharan. That Ghaddafi had no interest in actually building bridges between these two regions fatally undermined his pan-African project. Moreoever, by permitting large numbers of black migrants into Libya, Ghaddafi sowed the seeds of resentment against them by his own resentful and alienated population.

‘Now that Ghaddafi is gone, rebellious Libyans want the Africans migrants out as well. The views of the Libyan people should be respected but there also should be no violent and immediate expulsion of black Africans either. These migrants in Libya don’t deserve punishment. Rather they should be helped out of the country in an orderly process supervised by the International Organization for Migration or individual governments, perhaps France.’

Asmarino
http://bit.ly/ovgRqR

Asmarino draws parallels between the Gaddafi regime and that of Isaias Afwerki in Eritrea:

‘Under a false pretense of championing the African cause, Gaddafi lavished million of dollars on notorious tyrants such as Idi Amin of Uganda, the Chad warlords in the late 80s and countless other places in the continent. One of his clients was until recently our own dictator Isaias Afwerki, whose regime had for years made a habit of soliciting from him petrol and undisclosed amount of grants and investments. It is possible that he kissed his hand (after all, Berlusconi, the prime minister, of Italy has done it.) Gaddafi was not his mentor, however. The path to tyranny that manifested itself in Libya following a military coup in 1969 and the rebellion in Eritrea that produced the misanthrope, Isaias, followed different trajectories.

‘In Libya it was young military officers who, influenced by Gamal Abdel Nasser, launched a top down social engineering. In short, the Libyan type had its roots in military barracks. Their Eritrean counterparts were, however, mostly college students who abandoned their studies to wage a war in the sparsely populated areas of Eritrea. Thanks to the protracted nature of the war and the resource-deficit environment of the theater of war, the largely student elite from the urban areas finally ended up as a military class. The breed in Eritrea was not the ordinary type of military juntas for only this reason: its totalitarian ideology.’

Richard Falk
http://bit.ly/p5YYrN

Richard Falk best captures the prevailing uncertainty about Libya’s future with a series of questions:

‘Qaddafi and his loyalists are apparently a spent force, and the future of Libya now becomes a work in progress without any clear understanding of who will call the shots from now on. Will it be the Libyan victors in the war now battling among themselves for the control of the country? Will it be their NATO minders hiding behind the scenes? Will it be the NATO representatives doing the bidding of the oil companies and the various corporate and financial interests that make no secret of seeking a robust profit-making stake in Libya’s future? Or will it be some combination of these influences, more or less harmoniously collaborating? And most relevant of all, will this process be seen as having the claimed liberating impact on the lives and destinies of the Libyan people? It is far too early to pronounce on such momentous issues, although sitting on the sidelines one can only hope and pray for the best for a country substantially destroyed by external forces.’

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* Dibussi Tande blogs at Scribbles from the Den.
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