Development projects, by their very nature, will always contain uncertainties and risks – factors and circumstances not ascertained or anticipated, elements subject to change or fluctuation, imponderables that may defy the best of planning and project preparation. This notwithstanding, over the thirty years since Albert Hirschman (1967) first endeavoured to analyse the project life cycle and the nature of the uncertainties facing projects, numerous scholars have continued this analysis in an effort to help project designers and practitioners to minimize uncertainties and thus improve the chances of project success. Discussed below are some of the common elements contributing to project risk and uncertainty, including some insights from the Groundnut Scheme of southern Tanzania (Tanganyika), which started in 1946 and terminated in 1949.

GENERALIZATION IN PROJECT DESIGN

One significant factor causing risks and uncertainties in projects is the tendency of designers to generalize in their project proposals. In these proposals, designers all too often make sweeping statements regarding issues about which they actually have little hard and fast information. Their inclination to reach for such generalizations is prompted by the assumption that a one-size-fits-all approach will work, especially for externally funded projects (Harrin, 2012). Responding to Harrin’s observations, Marcel D’Costa points out that “most projects are designed in the office, they bear no relation to the reality on the ground and are out of context” (Harrin, 2012).

Generalization continues to be a costly and embarrassing factor in the history of project management. A case in point is the groundnut scheme of southern Tanzania (Tanganyika) of the post-World War II years. A potential site for the project was identified by representatives of Unilever Company and the Colonial Office surveyed the site from the air and determined it was suitable for a large-scale mechanized agricultural project (Myddelton, 2007). By 1949, the British government had to swallow its pride and abandon the failed scheme, which by that time had cost a whopping 49 million pounds sterling (present value £1.526 billion). The officers who recommended the project were fired and, as Myddelton (2007) concludes, the venture was a complete fiasco.

Unfortunately, the problems relating to generalization have been repeated time and again in the history of project management in sub-Saharan Africa. They are costly and should be avoided. For this reason, “projects need to be designed so as to allow for flexibility and adjustments as and when needed, provided the changes have the concurrence of all the stakeholders,” (Akande, 2003 and WHO, 2003), an approach which certainly worked in the case of the long-running West African onchocerciasis (river blindness) project, which endured from 1974 to 2002.

LACK OF RESEARCH AND INFORMATION

Many projects, especially in Africa, are supported by woefully insufficient baseline data. The failure of the aforementioned groundnut scheme was due to lack of any research to generate the data needed to make informed decisions and the instigators’ dismissal of local knowledge. Specifically, Kimble (1960), and Jarret (1979) identify as a major shortcoming in the project the complete lack of information on climatic conditions, such as temperature, rainfall patterns, wind patterns and soils, during the design of the groundnut scheme. In recent years several studies, such as Falloux and Talbot (2009), have demonstrated that environmental factors have extensively contributed to the failure of agricultural projects in Africa.

Similarly, according to Horta (1994), who quotes the World Bank Project Performance Audit 1990 report, the World Bank project managers of Bura irrigation scheme in Kenya knew of earlier technical reports that identified a lack of suitable soils for irrigation in the area but ignored them, going ahead to recommend the project to the Board for approval, downplaying the risks and cost implications. This cavalier attitude to the need for theoretical studies, which has vitiated so many projects, is noted by Hyden (2013), writing about African rural development projects in the 1980s. He observes that, during the design of most of these projects, donors felt that carrying out academic research would take too long and would end by producing unwanted, unnecessary information. Chambers (1983) suggests that African governments may have collected the data required by donors in a quick and untidy manner, instead of relying on conventional academic research methods.

Despite the various arguments that research work is too expensive in sub-Saharan African, there are no shortcuts or easy fixes that will unlock the risks and uncertainties in project design and implementation. This tallies with the observation by the World Bank President on 4 October 2015, during the launch of an initiative for data for Africa, that “collecting good data is one of the most powerful tools to end extreme poverty”. African governments should therefore work closely with their universities, scientists and development partners to ensure that research activities and baseline studies are well funded and are integrated into project design and implementation, especially for sensitive and large scale projects.

DESIGNER BIAS

It sometimes happens that project designers come to their task with an inherent bias, causing them to overlook certain aspects of the project. As Mathews (1975) argues, planners tend to be subjective about the things that they know. In the past, most project designers focused their attention on economic rates of return to the exclusion of everything else, and had a tendency to ignore the socio-cultural aspects of a project, especially in Africa.

Many projects in sub-Saharan African countries are externally funded and the project designers and implementers are forced to focus on the outcomes that the donors want. Harrin (2012) argues that, to access donor funds, project designers should focus on visible, short-term outcomes and the efficiency of their projects. In addition, in some cases the designers of projects should not assume that what has worked in one country will work in another. Ika (2012) warns that, unfortunately, such replicability is not easily achieved in Africa and recommends instead a home-grown approach to project management on the continent that is based on African values and reality.

Given the challenges that many African countries face, project designers and planners need to consult target local communities before they start writing their projects. Further, Harrin (2012), quoting Ika, stipulates that to avoid biases externally funded project designers should refrain from using rigid methodologies, adopt methods that allow for flexibility and take into consideration local circumstances. In this case, the West Africa river blindness project is particularly instructive.

CAVALIER APPROACH TO PROJECT DESIGN AND MANAGEMENT

The “it doesn’t matter” mentality is nothing new in the history of project management in Africa. It may be found everywhere. For example, if a donor or development agency is under pressure to exhaust unspent funds before the end of financial year, they develop proposals to spend the money very quickly without asking too many questions. Specifically, areas targeted include training, procurement of basic equipment like computers, vehicles and others. Thus, in the case of the groundnut scheme, the Minister of Food was under pressure to fill the shortfall in edible oil after World War II. It did not matter what approach the field experts were to use to get the scheme started.

More recently, some charities and individuals have given materials to Africa without knowing whether these will be useful or not, or even injurious to the recipients. This was the case with the Jason Saddler “1 million T-shirt” project: according to Stupart (2012), Saddler had never been to Africa but decided to donate the T-shirts anyway. It did not matter to him that he had no first-hand experience of Africa or that Africa has 54 independent states which are quite distinct from one another. Furthermore, he gave no thought to the possible economic fall-out from his project and, after receiving unprecedented negative feedback from everywhere, he simply threw in the towel.

It is now well accepted that such activities can lead to unwanted – sometimes even disastrous – results. The designers of such projects took shelter behind the “it doesn’t matter” attitude because, first, they assumed that the perceived negative feedback was too minor to warrant the time and money necessary to quantify it, and, second, they believed that some elements of the project are unimportant. In any case, externally funded development projects in Africa often suffer the same problem – proponents mistakenly believe that the one-size-fits-all approach is perfectly workable.

Project donors usually follow standard procedures, although they sometimes allow for flexibility when tailor-made projects do not fit the local environment (Harrin 2012). Harrin highlights dishonesty as the most important factor for failure in some projects, especially the hiding of true facts and false reporting. Horta (1994) stipulated that the World Bank staff hid the truth from the Board to allow the Bura irrigation project to be approved. The truth of the matter is that the soils were not homogeneous and therefore not suitable for irrigation. However, this did not matter until after the scheme failed.

Similarly, Flyvbjerg (2006), noted that in one study a planner admitted that he had reluctantly but repeatedly adjusted the patronage figures upward, and the cost downwards, to satisfy a local elected official who wanted to win a competition for a federal grant. When the project was completed, and the patronage turned out to be lower and the costs higher than the published estimates, local politicians were asked by the press to explain the outcome. Their response was: “It’s not our fault, we had to rely on the forecasts by our staff, and they seem to have made a big mistake here”. Cases like this, where culprits blithely manifest a “don’t care” mentality, are unprofessional and have expensive consequences, and both the politicians and project management should be brought to book. This was precisely the action taken by the new UK Minister of Food in 1950, who took full responsibility for the groundnut fiasco, terminated the entire scheme and fired the responsible project managers (Myddelton, 2007).

POLITICAL PRESSURE

Projects exist within a political system and politics dictates the development of projects, externally financed or local. Experience shows that undue political pressure can skew the design and implementation of projects. For example, the impetus to start the notorious groundnuts scheme came from the UK Labour Government’s problems with the continuing low level of fat rations after the Second World War in 1945. According to Myddelton (2007), the Minister for Food was under pressure to improve the weekly allocation but there was a worldwide shortage of edible oils: he was keen to explore the possibility of groundnut production in the southern part of Tanzania. So within a very short time, the groundnut scheme was approved – without carrying out reconnaissance studies, much less cost-benefit analysis (Middleton 2007).

Another example can be found in Zambia, where Tangri (1999) notes that all the activities of the Zambia Industrial Development Corporation were politically motivated, rather than driven by economic or investment considerations, and a number were started without feasibility studies. From the word go, the politicians knew that some were clearly white elephants but they went ahead and approved them (Tangri 1999).

In contrast, pressure played a critical role in building a strong political will to eradicate river blindness (onchocerciasis) in eleven West African countries. Akande (2003) and the World Health Organization (WHO) (2003) acknowledge that the river blindness programme that was executed by WHO with the collaboration of 32 organizations, including the World Bank, United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), was possibly the most successful programme in the history of international cooperation in sub-Saharan Africa. It started in 1974 and ended in 2002 with exemplary support of the 9 out of 11 participating countries (Sierra Leone and Liberia were affected by the civil war) in both cash and in-kind contributions (WHO, 2003). Moreover, despite political differences between some of these countries at that time (and delays to complete the programme in the two countries affected by the civil war), the fight against river blindness united them until the end. Sometimes, politics can have both positive and negative impacts in terms of project design and implementation as shown by the examples above.

OVER- AMBITIOUS PROJECT DESIGN

During the design of projects several people are involved in the drafting and follow-up discussions until an agreement is reached on the way forward. More often than not, many assumptions are made, especially regarding the completion of activities on time. Once the project starts, it emerges that the assumptions are often unrealistic.

Thus, Myddelton (2007), citing the report on the groundnut scheme in southern Tanzania, shows that, by 1947 serious flaws had already manifested: planners and designers had grossly underestimated the cost of related activities such building roads, railway, airstrips, hospitals and water supplies and sanitation. Besides, they had badly misjudged the transport, supplies and workshops needed to maintain heavy tractors (Myddelton, 2007). After two years, the British Government realized that the area cleared for cultivation was negligible and the harvest, according to Myddelton, was 2,000 tonnes as opposed to the 57,000 tonnes projected in the plan. As Kimble (1960) concluded in his book “Tropical Africa” the African physical environment was complex with many unknown elements. The British Government should not have moved forward and started a large-scale agriculture scheme without adequate data on all important parameters. This serious shortcoming is unfortunately being repeated even today. The project designers and planners should have been modest and not over-ambitious, started with a pilot scheme and then rolled out the project gradually.

The recent World Bank evaluation of 2013 report also concluds that “project design has been a major factor, especially in the form of over ambitious projects in relation to limited and variable country capacity and deficient results framework”. In fact, the report indicates that this could have been avoided had there not been a marked lack of proactivity in supervision during the implementation stage of these projects.

CONCLUSION

From the foregoing, it is clear that there are many factors that cause uncertainties and risks in project management. This brief paper has suggested some ways in which these uncertainties and risks may be anticipated and prevented – or at least remedial measures adopted. These observations are not new, but all too often they are taken for granted. Clearly to address risks and uncertainties in project design and implementation calls for good governance – transparency (eliminating secrecy, e.g. the Bura irrigation scheme), accountability (accepting mistakes, as in the case of the groundnut scheme) and inclusiveness.

For a large agricultural project, starting with a pilot is the best way forward, for this will make it possible to identify any shortfalls before rolling out the project. The lessons drawn from the failure of the groundnut scheme should not be repeated time after time but should instead serve as pointers on things not to do when it comes to large-scale projects. As a general rule of thumb, in the conduct of nearly all donor-funded programmes and projects, the implementation procedures need to be made less cumbersome and complex. The West African river blindness project covered a huge geographical area with a multitude of risks. Fortunately, it had good management, which was transparent and convincing and this in turn persuaded donors and participating countries wholeheartedly to support the programme with funding over a period of almost three decades (WHO, 2003). The project also embraced research and building local capacity to ensure sustainability.

Overall, as shown by this brief article, the implementation of any project is invariably full of unforeseen eventualities and surprises – and surprises, by definition, are always uncertainties. As one risk is dealt with, others may develop: this is perhaps truest of all in Africa. Accordingly, throughout the entire project cycle, risks and uncertainties should be treated with the utmost caution and without any generalization. As Kimble (1960) concluded, the African operating environment is very complex and nothing should be taken for granted. It is clear from major evaluations of African projects that, to address the risks and uncertainties in projects and programmes, there is need for well-funded regular monitoring and evaluations and research, supported by a strong network in which successes – and failures – can be shared and lessons learned from these experiences for the design and implementation of future projects and programmes.

* Ambassador Dr. John O. Kakonge is an independent consultant.

REFERENCES

Akande, L. (2003).“Victory over river blindness”,Africa Recovery, vol. 17, No. 1.
Chambers, R. (1983). Rural Development: Putting the Last to First, Harlow: Prentice Hall, UK.
Falloux, F., and M. Talbot (1993). Crisis and Opportunity: Environment and Development in Africa, Earthscan, London.
Flyvbjerg, B. (2006). “Megaproject policy and planning, problems, causes and cures”.
Harrin, E. (2012). “Why projects are failing in Africa (part 1)”. http://pmtips.net/Blog/projects-failing-africa-part-1
Hirshman, A. (1967). Development Projects Observed, Brookings Institution Press, re-issued (2014).
Horta, K. (1994). “Troubled waters: World Bank disasters along Kenya’s Tana River”, http://multinationalmonitor.org/hyper/issues/1994/08/mm0894_08.html
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Kimble, G.H.T. (1960). Tropical Africa, vols. I and II, Twentieth Century Fund, USA.
Mathews, W.H. (1975). “Objective and subjective judgements in environmental impact analysis”, Environmental Conservation, vol. 2, issue 02, pp. 121–131.
Myddelton D.R.C. (2007). They Meant Well: Government Project Disasters, Institute of Economic Affairs, London.http://www.iea.org.uk-Research.
Stuppart, R. (2012). “7 worst international aid ideas”, Matador network. http://matadornetwork.com/change/7-worst-international-aid-ideas/
Tangri, R. (1999). Politics of Patronage in Africa, James Currey Publishers, UK.
World Bank (2013). Results and Performance of the World Bank Group 2013, An Independent Evaluation. Vol. I: Main Report, Independent Evaluation Group (IEG), World Bank, IFC, MIGA, Washington DC.
World Health Organization (2003). Success in Africa:The Onchocerciasis Control Programme in West Africa 1974–2002, WHO, Geneva, Switzerland.

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