The speech wove together China’s traditional friendship with Africa and the forging of a new consensus. It indicated how Beijing seeks to cement its ties with the continent in a changing global environment of instability and economic uncertainty. A five-point proposal was unveiled as the basis of this new consensus:

1.Cementing solidarity and extending mutual support to cope with the international financial crisis.
2.Improving mutual trust and consolidating the political foundation of China-Africa traditional friendship.
3.Lifting up the mutually beneficial and practical trade and economic cooperation between China and Africa.
4.Widening exchanges and deepening cultural and educational cooperation.
5.Collaborating closely and stepping up coordination in international affairs.
On a first reading this five-point plan seems merely to reiterate previous rhetoric and could easily be dismissed as nothing new and more of the same. But as ever, the true significance is in the small print which defined the meaning of each of the five apparent platitudes.

For example, the first point was fleshed out as;
‘China will faithfully implement the assistant measures concerning Africa defined at the Beijing Summit, continue to increase assistance within its capacity, reduce or exempt debts of African countries, expand trade with them and reinforce China-Africa pragmatic cooperation. China is also ready to enhance exchanges and cooperation with them on how to prevent and manage financial crisis’.

- clearly intended as a contrast with fears that Western interest and investment will fall off as a result of the crisis.

The second point was fleshed out as;
‘China hopes to step up high-level contacts, strengthen strategic dialogue and communications and enhance mutual understanding and trust with African countries. China firmly supports the efforts of African countries and the African Union (AU) of maintaining national sovereignty and solving their own problems independently, will continue to take an active part in the UN peace operations in Africa and play a constructive role of settling conflicts and hot issues and maintaining peace and security in Africa’.

Again this indicates a continuing development of the traditional principle of ‘non-interference’ to take account of decisions at AU level, as well as flagging up a potential conflict between ‘non-interference’ and conflict resolution – Darfur comes to mind…
There was also solid content to the explanation of the third point;
‘China is willing to boost trade with Africa, take care of Africa’s concerns and take preferential measures to increase import from Africa. The Chinese government encourages and supports the competitive Chinese businesses to invest in Africa, create more jobs for the local people, increase technology transfer to the continent and urge them to shoulder greater social responsibilities and live in harmony with local communities’.

Clearly the concerns of African civil society about the social impact of some Chinese investments have registered in Beijing though the impact in practice is of course another matter.

While the details on cultural exchanges did not appear to go beyond previous statements, the final point on stepping up international cooperation reinforced the theme of working together to ‘deepen cooperation with African countries in such multilateral organizations as the UN and the World Trade Organization to address global challenges like climate change, food security, poverty alleviation and development. We also hope to participate jointly with them in developing international economic, financial and trade rules and pushing forward the international economic order in a fair and just manner’.

This last point would appear to reinforce the point made by the Ghanaian observer, Bright B Simons, that
…the visit to the four African countries is actually one plank in what seems to be a multi-prong diplomatic offensive aimed at consolidating some kind of Southern Hemisphere solidarity in anticipation of an era of mercantilist alliances arrayed to the effect of greater multilateralism and the breaking of Euro-American economic hegemony.

Indeed, the China-Africa debate seems currently caught between the market-centric approach and the geostrategic angle. For the market pundits this new consensus is framed more along how China’s multi-billion dollar stimulus package is going to reignite Africa’s commodity exports. This was reflected at the Mining Indaba hosted in Cape Town last week. It is true that markets are cyclical, and follow trends of booms-busts-booms. China can stimulate Africa’s commodities export earnings though it remains optimistic to assume that this will happen in the immediate or medium term future.
However, this approach overlooks the most significant feature of the visit – that it avoided the major historic trading partners and sources of raw materials. Angola, Sudan and South Africa were all off the itinerary.

The agreements that President Hu signed in the four African countries where he pushed for more trade vowed to increase its aid to Africa despite the financial crisis, or the promise by the Foreign Affairs Ministry spokesperson, Jiang Yu that 2009 will be a ‘turning point for China and Africa’ marked by ‘great opportunities’ all underlined this aspect.

In Mali President Hu inaugurated , the Sino-Malian Friendship Bridge which has a project cost of US$74,9 million and will stretch over the Niger River.

In Senegal, the Chinese presence could be felt in Dakar with the 212 Chinese shops that are in the market even before President Hu could offer over US$90million in gifts and loans. The deals included:

* A grant for US$18 million.
* A loan of US$49 million for national security.
* A second loan of US$23 million for renovation of the country’s buses. And
* A contract to buy 10 000 tons of Senegal’s peanut oil.

In Tanzania, expectations were high that President Hu’s visit would stimulate more business joint ventures in mining, large-scale agro-business, processing of agro-products, promotion of tourism and infrastructure investments as well as see China help bail out two state assets, namelyTanzania’s failing national carrier, Air Tanzania and the privatization of the Tazara Railway. While very little was said about the two state assets, President Hu undertook the following commitments totaling US$21,95 million split between the mainland and the island of Zanzibar:
A US$17.5 million agricultural cooperation agreement to finance investments, especially providing loans to importers of agricultural machinery.
A US$4,4 million agreement to rehabilitate the state radio and television in Zanzibar.

In Mauritius, President Hu took advantage of the statement by Raju Jaddu, Chairman of the Board of Investment, that the island state could become ‘a value added service platform between the two continents ‘ and committed China to :
* A US$260 million to expand the main airport building.
* A US$6.5 million interest free loan.
* A US$ 5 million grant

Hoping to become the strategic trade corridor between Asia and Africa, President Hu also pledged that construction on the China-funded $730 million Economic and Trade Zone or Tianli Project in the north of the capital would be accelerated.
Even industry analysts like Craig Bond, chief executive of Standard Bank were betting that the time is ripe for Chinese companies to strengthen their investments in Africa as ‘some developed countries have withdrawn their investments from Africa due to the worsening global crisis, thereby , opening up more opportunities for Chinese companies.
With such emphasis on the trade, investment and aid side of things, it is easy to see how this visit by President Hu could be interpreted as an indicator that forging a new consensus actually means strengthening trade and investments ties with Africa.

Yet, as President Hu cautioned about the contagion effect of the global financial crisis on the developing world, it should be remembered that the inherent lesson from this crisis is precisely that the market led approach that has created winners and losers, not least a growing problem of economically marginalized people who remain underemployed.

Thus, if this new China-Africa consensus is about the market only being able to deliver the right formula for Africa’s development, then China will face an uphill battle in convincing the rest of the Africa’s citizens that its strengthened trade and investment ties holds significant benefits for a ‘better life for all’. A moot point that President Hu implicitly acknowledged when highlighting that the future of China’s African engagements should be shaped by achieving the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), and consolidating people to people collaboration.

The choice of countries for the visit certainly seems to indicate that China is concerned to dispel the impression that its African interest is merely generated by an appetite for the continent’s raw materials, and also reflects the importance of broader political alliances between China and African states in international arenas, whose importance acquires new prominence in the wake of the crisis.

If the purpose of President Hu’s visit was to win the hearts and minds of ordinary people and not only appease the market, he certainly did so by even unwittingly opening a space for a new consensus - less about what the market wants and more about greater collaboration and civic partnership between Chinese and African non-state actors.

Moreover, he also reiterated the need for Chinese firms ‘to shoulder more social responsibilities and forge amicable relations with the local communities’. This definitely provides an opportunity for African CSOs to take up President Hu’s challenge, especially since the State Council made a similar call before the 2006 FOCAC Summit by proposing the ‘Nine Principles on Encouraging and Standardizing Foreign Investment’ namely:

1"> Insisting on mutual respect, equality, and mutual benefit, complementarity and win-win cooperation. 

2"> Strengthening of policy guidance, coordinating and standardizing orderly and rational distribution, preventing disorderly competition, and safeguarding national interests. 

3"> Improving the policy-making mechanism, the implementation of overseas investment enterprises, the autonomy of scientific studies and careful decision-making, and prevention of investment and operational risks. 

4"> Strengthening supervision of state-owned assets overseas, and supervision of sound evaluation and examination systems, establishment of security risk assessment and project cost accounting systems, and preserving and increasing the value of assets. 

5"> Complying with local laws and regulations, and adhering to fair, transparent public works project contracts, making a commitment to and fulfilling the necessary social responsibility to protect the legitimate rights and interests of local employees, paying attention to environmental resource protection, caring for and supporting the local community and people’s livelihood. 

6"> Increasing the level of offshore project building contracts, improving product quality and efficiency, and constantly enhancing overall competitiveness. 

7"> Strengthening safety training, improving safe production responsibility systems, increasing protection of foreign-funded enterprises, institutions and property safety. 

8"> Accelerating personnel training, paying attention to the cultivation of operating in the international talents, and enhance their transnational operations management capabilities. 

9"> Creating a friendly environment for public opinion, propaganda, walk the road of peaceful development policy, and to preserve our good image and a good corporate reputation.
The time has come to take the China-Africa engagement to a new level and in forging any new consensus there should be a special focus around the CSO Dialogue. This is because as much as the market may hold important benefits for economic development, in the end it is the impact on human development and community experiences, which will be the basis of history’s judgement on China’s African engagement, and determine who are its ultimate beneficiaries.

* Stephen Marks is Research Associate and co-ordinator
* Sanusha Naidu is the research director, of Fahamu's China-Africa programme

* Please send comments to [email protected] or comment online at http://www.pambazuka.org/