The Chair of the African Union Commission

1.  Introduction

The Chair of the African Union (AU) Commission is the head of the Commission that is the organisation’s secretariat, its main task being the implementation of the Assembly’s decisions.[1] The Commission is also responsible for the day to day running of the organisation. [2] Made up of portfolios,[3] the Commission’s mission is to be an ‘…efficient and value-adding institution…’ that drives integration between African states, as well as the ‘…development process in close collaboration with African Union Member States, the Regional Economic Communities and African citizens.’[4] In fulfilling such a mission, the Chair, who bears the responsibility of leading, is entrusted with the executive management of the organisation. Assisted by a deputy chairperson, 8 commissioners and other supportive staff, they represent the AU; the Chair being the ‘legal representative.’[5] Just how much power and independence does the Chair have? This paper seeks to review the position of the Chair, assess the capacity of the Chair to effect change, manage and improve the AUC by examining the establishment of the AUC and the performance of past Chairs whilst analysing the requirements for the job in an attempt to suggest that the election process of the Chair be amended.

2. The role of the Chair of the African Union Commission

The administrative management of a multinational organisation is not an easy task, and the Commission has the following values that guide and govern its activities in its efforts to fulfil its mission and create a culture of service for the AU as a whole:

.                Respect for diversity and team work;

.                Think Africa above all;

.                Transparency and accountability;

.                Integrity and impartiality;

.                Efficiency and professionalism; and,

.                Information and knowledge sharing.[6]

Further, the Commission is guided by 5 principles:

1.           Subsidiarity and complementarity with other Organs, Member States and RECs;

2.          Results orientation, feasibility and impact focus;

3.          Close coordination and cooperation with the RECs;

4.          Coherence of policies and programmes; and

5.          A networking approach that takes advantage of available resources through other players.[7]

These principles are to guide the Commission to realize its mission by implementing clear ‘…goals and strategies and by committing the requisite resources for effective discharge of its mandate.’

The AU Commission in its current structure is different from what the Organisation of African Unity (OAU), the AU’s predecessor, had. The OAU had a general secretariat with a Secretary General rather than a Commission.[8] The OAU had three specialized commissions rather than portfolios.[9] The change from an organization to a union required a change in the administrative processes, and the reasons for the change of organisation informed the decision to have a Commission rather than a general secretariat. The change from OAU to AU was a result of the debate as to how to revitalise the OAU that culminated in the Sirte Declaration of 1999.[10] The Declaration put forward, inter alia, the need for revitalising ‘…the Continental Organisation to play a more active role in addressing the needs of the people…’,[11] and that a union was the best way forward. Thus a Commission to replace a secretariat was created.

It has been noted that of ‘… crucial importance in the establishment of the Organs of the Union is the challenge to move away from the overly state-centric character of the OAU and its concomitant lack of civil participation.’[12] Thus, established ‘…as a corrective measure to the observable inadequacies in its predecessor…’,[13] the AU requires a ‘…strong AU Commission or Authority, endowed with the necessary political clout, capacities and resources…’ to enable it to ‘…to assume a driving role in the continental integration process…’,[14] and indeed, to help the organisation meet the needs of the African people. It is assumed that a strong Commission requires an equally strong Chair to assist it assume a driving role. However, the Chair of the Commission, according to Thabo Mbeki ‘…is merely the most senior civil servant of the AU…’ [15] He notes that although important, the Chair ‘…cannot determine AU and therefore African policy, as this is decided by the Foreign Ministers’ meeting as the AU Executive Council and the Heads of State and Government, meeting as the AU Assembly.’[16] Nonetheless, the commission led by its Chairperson can ‘…present policy initiatives or interventions to the constitutional structures of the AU, and thus … act as more than a mere administrative structure.’[17] The Chair’s functions are numerous, and some beyond mere administration, as articulated in Article 8(1) of the Commission’s Statute:

a) chair all meetings and deliberations of the Commission;

b) undertake measures aimed at promoting and popularising the objectives of the Union and enhancing its performance; 


c) promote cooperation with other organizations for the furtherance of the objectives of the Union; 


d) participate in and keep records of the deliberations of the Assembly, the Executive Council, the PRC, the Committees and any other organs of the Union as may be required; 


e) submit reports requested by the Assembly, the Executive Council, the PRC, the Committees and any other organs of the Union as may be required; 


f) prepare, in conjunction with the PRC, and submit the Staff Rules to the Executive Council, for approval; 


g) prepare, together with the PRC, and transmit to Member States the Budget, Audited Accounts and Programme of Work at least one (1) month before the commencement of the sessions of the Assembly and the Executive Council; 


h) act as depository of all Union and OAU Treaties and other legal instruments of the Union and perform depository functions thereof; 


i) act as a depository for instruments of ratification, accession or adherence of all international agreements concluded under the auspices of the Union and communicate information in this respect to Member States; 


j) receive copies of international agreements entered into between or amongst Member States; 


k) receive the notification of Member States which may desire to renounce their membership in the Union as provided for in Article 31 of the Constitutive Act; 


l) communicate to Member States, and include in the Agenda of the Assembly, as provided in Article 32 of the Constitutive Act, written requests of Member States for amendments or revisions to the Constitutive Act; 


m) circulate the provisional agenda of sessions of the Assembly, the Executive Council and the PRC to Member States; 


n) receive proposals, together with explanatory notes, for the inclusion of items on the agenda of the Assembly and the Executive Council at least sixty (60) days prior to the session; 


o) receive and circulate requests which conform to the correct Rules of Procedure of the Assembly or the Executive Council, from any Member State, for the convening of an extraordinary session of the Assembly or the Executive Council; 


p) in conjunction with the PRC, assess the need for branches, administrative and technical offices as may be considered necessary for the adequate functioning of the Commission, and create or abolish them as necessary, with the approval of the Assembly; 


q) consult and coordinate with the Governments and other institutions of Member States and the RECs, on the activities of the Union; 


r) appoint the staff of the Commission in accordance with the provisions of Article 14 of these Statutes; 


s) assume overall responsibility for the administration and finances of the Commission; 


t) prepare an Annual Report on the activities of the Union and its organs; 


u) carry out diplomatic representations of the Union; 


v) liaise closely with the organs of the Union to guide, support and monitor the performance of the Union in the various areas to ensure conformity and harmony with agreed policies, strategies, programmes and projects; 


w) carry out such other functions as may be determined by the Assembly or the Executive Council; 


x) supervise the functioning of the Headquarters and other offices of the Union; 


y) coordinate all activities and programmes of the Commission related to gender issues. With such a variety of tasks, the Chair of the Commission has power. However, how much and what kind of power is questionable. No doubt the chair has an important role to play vis-à-vis states and their relationship with the AU, but the Commission and its Chair have been accused of lacking capacity as an institution, thus ‘…enabling powerful leaders and regimes to wield disproportionate influence…’ over it on occasion.[18] This is contrary to their obligations as provided for in Article 4 of the Commission’s Statutes:

1.  In the performance of their duties, the Members of the Commission and the other staff shall not seek or receive instructions from any government or from any other authority external to the Union.

Further, it has been noted that the AU Commission’s secretariat ‘…has struggled to establish its independence.’[19] These concerns will be explored further in the next section, wherein just how previous chairs have managed their commission will be explored.

2. Past chairs of the African Union Commission: A wholesome legacy?

As mentioned above, the function of the Chair of the African Union (AU) Commission was articulated. The Commission as the organisation’s administrative arm needs to act independently of states and, the position of its Chair, an important one, requires the incumbent to manage the organisation and guide its work to ensure that programmes are realised. A powerful position, it requires an individual capable of balancing the needs of the states, that is their national interests against the needs of the organisation (the culminated interests of all the states). This careful balancing act requires individuals who are independent, resilient and resourceful.

Since inception the position has been filled by three men and one woman. The first Chair was Amara Essy from the Ivory Coast, from 9 July 2002 to 16 September 2003. He was followed by Alpha Oumar Konaré from Mali. His term in office was from 16 September 2003 to 28 April 2008. Jean Ping from Gabon took office thereafter until 16 October 2012. The next Chair, Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma from South Africa, the first woman, is currently the Chair, and her term ends July this year. Just how independent, resolute, resilient and resourceful have they been, and if they have failed to be, is that failure a reflection on their capability or the flawed set up of the organisation?

As mentioned prior the crucial importance for the AU is to ‘…move away from the overly state-centric character of the OAU and its concomitant lack of civil participation…’,[20] This is ‘achievable by having a ‘…strong AU Commission or Authority, endowed with the necessary political clout, capacities and resources…’ to enable it to ‘…to assume a driving role in the continental integration process…’,[21] and indeed, to help the organisation meet the needs of the African people. Arguably, the Commission is only as strong as its Chair. Although a mere senior civil servant,[22] is it possible for the Chair to act independently of states so as to influence the course of policy and events? Powerful leaders and regimes have purportedly wielded ‘…disproportionate influence…’ over the Commission and its Chair on occasion,[23] with some chairs displaying bias towards national interests.[24]

According to the AU Audit of 2007, under the leadership of Alpha Konaré between 2003 and 2008, the Commissioners acted as if they were accountable to the national leaders who had elected them rather than to the Commission’s Chair.[25] Thus it is arguable that as a Commissioner Konaré failed to retain control and maintain independence of the AUC.[26]

In contrast, however, it is arguable that Ping as a Chair showed a certain level of independence in that he was quoted as saying that he felt ‘…free to condemn coups and state violence against protesters, as in Tunisia, without feeling obliged first to consult Africa's leaders.’[27] This shows a level of independence that is encouraging. Not consulting African leaders before acting is truly a show of utmost independence and strength of character.

Using these two chairs as examples it can be asked: Why would one be more resolute and independent then the other? Surprisingly, Konaré was a head of state. It can be assumed that as an African head of state he acted independently in that role and that such experience would translate to his conduct whilst Chair of the AUC. Ping was never a president. Both operated under the same structural constraints.

Perhaps the answer lies in the peculiar nature of the chairs – their personal traits. Strength of character that displays resoluteness, resiliency, resourcefulness and independence must be a requisite requirement when a chair is sought. Individual lacking such character will not assist the AU achieve its goals, especially where Commissioners act in their nations interest. Thus the selection process for new chairs must be scrutinized.

Heads of state and government elect the Chair by way of a secret ballot. Before getting to this stage, nominations of suitable individuals from member states go through a ministerial panel, the Executive Council. In the Assembly, seven rounds of votes see nominees with fewer votes eliminated until only one remains where a two-thirds majority is required for that single nominee to be elected. Nominees are initially put forward by member states.

The question thus arises: How are they selected nationally? Who is considered suitable? Is demonstrated strength of character a prerequisite? Irrespective of the fact that the nominees are vetted by a team of independent experts taken on as consultants by the Legal Counsel for the task, it is contended that the initial nominations by states taints the entire process. States select their candidates without recourse to a continental-wide criteria that articulates education, work experience, skills and personal attributes (which should include demonstrated strength of character) required.

All previous chairs have been involved in politics and/or government in their countries prior to becoming chairs.[28] Perhaps this is where the lack of independence, resoluteness, resourcefulness and impartiality has its roots. Perhaps the continental-wide criteria should specifically exclude anyone who has worked in government. This will perhaps reduce the influence that states have over chairs. 

However, it has been noted irrespective of how independent the Chair is the current structural set-up of the AU creates a powerless Chair who is a ‘…largely irrelevant bureaucrat…’. A key structural hindrance is the fact that:

‘…the AU Assembly … picks the Deputy Chair and eight Commissioners that complete the secretariat. These officials’ roles are to support the Chair, yet the Chair is not permitted to nominate or assign portfolios to them. This remains a function of the Assembly, and the Chair has no official power to reassign, reshuffle, or fire any of the Commissioners.[30]

Thus it can be concluded that the selection criteria and some structural issues must be addressed in order to strengthen the position of the Chair of the Commission, to give the individual sourced by way of a more defined and transparent criteria, power to act for the benefit of the organisation and the people. 

3.  The African Union Chair of the Commission: A woman in charge

The first woman Chair of the African Union Commission (AUC) was appointed in 2012 by way of what has been described as a ‘…bruising election…’ [31] and ‘…acrimonious contest…’.[32] It took several rounds of voting after the first round ended in a stalemate.[33] In the final tally 17 countries voted against her. Given that heads of states have the ultimate say in the AU, her success as Chair was dependent on ‘…circumstances, context and personal flexibility.’[34] These three factors must considered when one weighs up the requirements of the job to manage the organisation and guide its work to ensure that its programmes are realised. In so doing he or she must be independent, resolute, resilient and resourceful. With a discordant election, contrary to the usual diplomatic agreements that previous elections have been,[35] Dlamini-Zuma faced, at the onset, a challenging time at the helm. Just how will her tenure be judged? Will she be seen as a success or a failure?

It would appear that at the onset expectations ran high, given her success handling what has been described as ‘…a notoriously bureaucratic…’ Home Affairs Department of South Africa her home country.[36] She has been credited with turning ‘…a corrupt and constantly derided department into one of the country's most efficient.’[37] She has been described as a ‘…can-do…’ politician.[38] It was hoped that her appointment would lead to ‘…greater co-operation and ability to speak with one voice.’[39]

In her handing over speech Dlamini-Zuma noted:

‘For our part as the Commission, I would like to assure you that we will take proactive steps as has been done before to support member states and regional bodies in their efforts to promote, consolidate and expand citizen-centred, developmental and democratic governance.’[40]

In that statement she assured Africans that she would be active and hands-on in her approach to managing the Commission.

Success must be measured against the structural constraints that exist within the AU, circumstances and context. Some circumstances and context are easy to change to ensure the effective management of the organisation. Indeed, an assessment of her first year praised her for ‘…organising exemplary summits…’ with events starting ‘…on time with better agenda management for leaders who in the past spoke far beyond allocated times.’[41] Further, she has been praised for fostering ‘…better interdepartmental cooperation and coordination…’ that appeared to create ‘…a new sense of purpose within the Commission…’.[42] It has been noted that officials adapted her method and purportedly bought such purpose into the administrative strategy and vision that she set for the AUC.[43] Indeed she has managed to push forward certain agendas she found important for the betterment of the organisation. She has been credited with making gender issues an integral part of the AU, addressed in almost every summit and included in AU documents.[44] Under her leadership, Agenda 2063, a vision and plan towards Africa’s accelerated development and technological advancement, was launched.[45] Hence within 4 years, this ‘can do’ leader seems to have paved the way for an illustrious legacy, especially with regards to gender issues.

However, there are some circumstances and contexts that are near impossible to amend; financing of the organisation being a significant one. Credited with efficiently using the organisation’s ‘…scarce resources…’ within her first year as Chair, under her tenure, nevertheless (as was the case in her predecessors’), delay in the submission of funds by either member states or donors was a particularly challenging issue. Tasked with implementing programmes, such a task becomes even more onerous where ‘…only programmes that have secured funds from partners…’ are ‘…included in the Union’s budget…’ as was decided by the AU’s subcommittee on audit matters in a meeting in June 2015.[46] The AUC was urged by that subcommittee to ‘…ensure compliance with the signed contribution agreements entered with the partners.’[47] Just how the AUC can really ensure compliance without adequate enforcement measures is a good question that is, however, beyond the scope of this paper. Suffice to state that under Dlamini-Zuma’s leadership some countries agreed to increase their assessed contributions, whether or not they actually paid on time, the agreement to increase payment is a success for her. The countries that agreed are:

·     Angola, 8%;

·     Ivory Coast, 3%;

·     Ethiopia, 4%;

·     Kenya, 4.1%;

Chad agreed to increase its contributions to $1.6 Million.[48]

This agreed increase perhaps reflects her desire to resolve another financial issue, that is tied to delayed payment, that she faced, that is, sources of funding. Upon election she ‘…raised concerns about the organisation’s heavy dependence on funding from the West…’ pointing out that such dependency ‘…posed the risk of those countries dictating the AU’s activities…’.[49] In an interview in April 2016, when asked about the need for the AU to be more financially independent, she stated:

‘It's coming, because Angola has moved [to pay more]. Other countries have been volunteering to pay more: Kenya, Ethiopia, Chad. It's beginning to dawn on them that if we are not self-reliant in terms of our organisation, then it's going to be difficult. The discussion about alternate sources of funding is still on the table. There is a decision to have a retreat of heads of state, foreign ministers and finance ministers to discuss [the financing issue] because they really want to see movement in this area. The matter has been debated and discussed for about 14 years without any conclusion.

Now there's even a commitment to say [member states] must gradually increase their payment of programmes to a level of 75% from Africa and 25% from donors. And there's a commitment to contributing 25% [of funds for] the Peace and Security Commission and 100% of [the AU's] operational costs. We are going to be working with countries, together with the Economic Commission for Africa, to see what alternate sources of funding we can get. It was interesting during Ebola that the telecoms companies and regulators agreed to have these SMSs where, by sending SMSs, people made a contribution towards [stopping] Ebola.’[50]

It would appear that the problem of donor dependency was something that she was keen to tackle.[51] Prior to her election, AU budget funding sources were primarily member states and international partners. However, towards the end of her tenure, an additional source appears; solicited partners. The AU budget for 2015 was as follows:

Total Amount in USD	522,121,602
Member states contribution	131,471,086
International partners	225,536,171
Solicited partners	149,266,824

The introduction of another source of funding, vague though the term ‘solicited partners’ may be, is a triumph for Dlamini-Zuma.

Perhaps Dlamini-Zuma’s real legacy lies in the AUC’s Strategic Plan for 2014-2017.[52] In this plan, a major component is resource mobilization, with special emphasis on alternative sources of funding. Her plan will guide the AUC long after she has gone.

Near impossible challenges notwithstanding, has she in handling her tasks as Chair shown personal flexibility, that is, independence, resoluteness, resilience and resourcefulness? Her actions as Chair have been described as skilful and ‘…laudable initiatives…’ that instilled  ‘… a new sense of urgency and attention to potentially divisive issues in continental governance.’[53] She was also credited in that review with having handled the ‘…potentially contentious…’ issue of international jurisdiction, justice and the International Criminal Court…’ that threatened the withdrawal of African states from the Rome Statute.[54]

However, she has been criticized for ‘…not spending enough time in Addis Ababa, for alienating Western donors and for not promoting transparency in the organisation…’,[55] and, further, for doing ‘…little to build the institution’s image...’ and not communicating ‘…effectively about what she has been doing in the AU.’[56] Dlamini-Zuma is seen by some as less visible and active in her efforts to try and stop conflicts on the ground, the deteriorating situation in Burundi and the civil war in South Sudan being examples.[57] In an April 2016 interview, she stated the following on Burundi:

‘The idea was that a high-level panel should go and sit down with them [President Pierre Nkurunziza's government] to discuss with them. The end is peace and security and stability in Burundi. So if there is peace and stability [...] then it's fine. But if it doesn't happen, there should be an opportunity for the AU to go to Burundi to try and persuade them to allow the AU to assist them. At the moment, it's not on the table [...] in terms of going in without [the government's] permission. But it's on the table to have a dialogue so that you can keep monitoring the situation. If the situation improves without it, then we are all saved. But if it deteriorates, then we have to do something.’[58]

Hampered by the structural constraint of AU heads of state and government being the primary decision-makers Dlamini-Zuma’s hands appeared to be tied, given that after ‘…debating the ongoing conflict in member state Burundi, the AU leaders dropped their plan to send 5,000 peacekeepers to stop the country from spiralling into anarchy after the strife-torn nation's government declared it too early for a military intervention on its soil.’[59] Prior to the heads’ decision she was recorded as having contacted Burundi President Nkurunziza to impress upon him to accept AU peacekeepers with ‘…discussions with the government of Burundi to devise the best ways and means of facilitating the deployment of the mission, in a spirit of mutual understanding and cooperation…’.[60]

As her interview showed, she was following the decision of the Assembly. However, in the past, efforts to stop the conflict in Darfur saw the then Chair, Konaré, periodically requesting the Sudanese government to make every effort to halt the bombing that was taking place and asking the militia to desist from military action.[61] He seemed to take a more direct approach, and it has been noted that such action ‘…was symbolic in terms of the AU’s initiating and implementing its commitment to promoting peace and protecting civilians across the continent.’[62] Thus, arguably, Konare’s more direct approach was more in line with his role as Chair to assist the organization meet the needs of the African people.[63] He was, however, not requesting from the Sudanese government more than what the Assembly had requested.[64]

Neither was Dlamini-Zuma with Burundi, nor indeed with regard to South Sudan. Through a spokesperson, Dlamini-Zuma implored ‘…the parties to immediately cease hostilities, in the interest of the whole nation…’ urging ‘…them to ensure continued access for humanitarian relief materials, personnel and other forms of assistance to reach the affected populations in all parts of South Sudan.’[65] Thus it would appear that as Chair, she was capable of being direct, but the structural constraints hampered any independence to voice what is obviously required even if it is contrary to what the Assembly articulates.

Dlamini-Zuma is a politician, an extremely experienced politician,[66] arguably capable of strategic political manoeuvring.[67] As Chair, like her predecessors, she was bound to relay what the Assembly decided, however, given her supposedly institutional reforming skill, it would have been impressive to see her display personal flexibility, to see her feel empowered enough to voice the obvious. It is contended that this was and is not possible given the political backgrounds of the chairs to date. Being politicians, it is suggested that they are held back from complete independent expression by the very nature of their experience. Being in government, and it is proposed in particular African governments, the culture of obedience to the party/strongman is prevalent and this culture is transferred to the regional body when politicians assume the post of Chair of the AUC. It is further suggested that politicians, and in particular African politicians, may bring to the chairmanship baggage in the way of allegations of corruption.

In early 2016 Dlamini-Zuma was accused of ‘…receiving instructions from Pretoria in exchange for benefits the DRC government gave to the family of the South African President Jacob Zuma.’[68] That accusation hinges on Zuma’s nephew, Khulubuse Zuma’s actions. In 2010, through a company that was registered in the British Virgin Islands in his name, he fronted a 100-billion South African Rand oil deal in the DRC.[69] In DRC, it is claimed that Dlamini-Zuma is perceived to be biased towards the incumbent head of state.[70] Her political ties appear to hamper her appearance of independence. She has been implicated in other scandals during her time in government in her home country.[71]

The DRC bias allegation has the potential to undermine whatever achievements she may have made in her short tenure as Chair of the AUC. People tend to remember the bad more than the good, and especially allegations of corruption. Certainly the taint of corruption and illicit money flow has the tendency to tarnish reputations.  It is suggested that such accusations may be minimized if not eliminated if the selection for chairs excluded politicians or those connected to government. As concluded in a previous article, a transparent and criteria-based selection process in which the role of politics is reduced, in that candidates have no political affiliations, will help create a strong independent and resourceful chairmanship, structural deficiencies notwithstanding.

4. Conclusion

 

With the July 2016 election for a new AUC Chair upon us, we are reminded that the Commission’s mission is to be an ‘…efficient and value-adding institution…’.[72] We are also reminded of the fact that the Chair of this value-adding and efficient organ of the AU must be an individual capable of balancing the needs of the states, that is their national interests against the needs of the organisation (the culminated interests of all the states). Further, it is a time to consider that heads of states have the ultimate say in the AU, thus the success of a Chair is dependent on ‘…circumstances, context and personal flexibility.’[73]

Factors for success as AUC Chair are difficult to gauge, it can be said that a Chair has had a successful tenure when he/she has been robust in their activities: Troubleshooting where needs be, quelling potential conflicts, resolving full-blown conflicts and making sure that gender issues are streamlined in all aspects of the AU’s activities. Not to mention, managing resources well, making sure that all meetings are well organizing, start on time and speakers keep to time, not to mention being a consummate diplomat and not alienate potential donor countries, be physically in the AU for a considerable amount of time and ensure the organization is well run. In doing all this a Chair must at all times keep, sometimes difficult, African head of states happy and contented, and remain above suspicion vis-à-vis corruption, national party politics and any scandals that might tarnish his or her reputation. It all seems near impossible but this is, in a nutshell, what is expected, inter alia, for a Chair to be deemed almost successful.

The candidate that will fill this position in the future must be an exceptional individual, given the requirements for success. Such an individual exists but it is suggested not in the political sphere. Citizens of Africa have a vested interest in the AU and ought to take a keen interest in who will manage the organisation for the next four years. Failure to do so will leave the organisation in the hands of politicians who may not always act in the best interest of the people. Taking an interest does not mean simply following the procedure; a critical mass of Africans must decide that it is time that the organisation’s management be wrestled from the hands of politicians, and take proactive, decisive measures to change the election process.

* Yitiha Simbeye is an independent international law expert.

Endnotes

[1] For more detail on the Commission’s tasks see: Statutes of the Commission of the African Union, (2002) ASS/AU/2(I) – d. Article 7 of the Statutes:

1.        The functions and responsibilities of the Chairperson shall be:

a)  the Chief Executive Officer;

b)  the legal representative of the Union;

c)  the Accounting Officer of the Commission;

2.        The Chairperson of the Commission shall be directly responsible to the Executive Council for the effective discharge of his/her duties.

[2] Article 20, AU Constitutive Act.

.           There shall be established a Commission of the Union, which shall be the Secretariat of the Union. 


.           The Commission shall be composed of the Chairman, his or her deputy or deputies and the Commissioners. They shall be assisted by the necessary staff for the smooth functioning of the Commission. 


.           The structure, functions and regulations of the Commission shall be determined by the Assembly. 


[3] Peace and Security; Political Affairs; Trade and Industry; Infrastructure and Energy; Social Affairs; Rural Economy and Agriculture; Human Resources, Science and Technology; and Economic Affairs

[4] http://www.au.int/en/commission (visited 16 May 2016)

[5] http://www.au.int/en/AUC/leadership, ibid

[6] http://www.au.int/en/commission, ibid

[7] Ibid

[8] Article 7, OAU Treaty

[9] Economic and Social Commission, 
Educational, Scientific, Cultural and Health Commission and Defence Commission.

[10] Sirte Declaration, EAHG/Draft/Decl. (IV) Rev.1 (1999) http://www.au2002.gov.za/docs/key_oau/sirte.pdf (visited 17 May 2016)

[11] Other objectives include: Eliminating the scourge of conflicts; Effectively addressing the new social, political and economic realities in Africa and the world; Fulfilling the peoples' aspirations for greater unity in conforming with the objectives of the OAU Charter and the Treaty Establishing the African Economic Community; Meeting global challenges; and
Harnessing the human and natural resources of the continent to improve living conditions

[12] Edo & Olanrewaju An Assessment of the Transformation of the Organisation of African Unity (O.A.U.) to the African Union (A.U.) 1963 - 2007 (2012) Vol. 21 Journal of the Historical Society of Nigeria 41, 62

[13] Edo & Olanrewaju An Assessment of the Transformation of the Organisation of African Unity (O.A.U.) to the African Union (A.U.) 1963 - 2007 (2012) Vol. 21 Journal of the Historical Society of Nigeria 41, 62

[14] Laporte & Mackie Eds, Building the African Union. An Assessment of Past Progress and Future Prospects for the African Union’s Institutional Architecture (2010) 18 Policy and Management Report, p.10 www.ecdpm.org/pmr18 (visited 16 May 2016)

[15] Thabo Mbeki, The African Union at 10 Years Old. A Dream Deferred! http://www.unisa.ac.za/contents/colleges/docs/THE%20AFRICAN%20UNION%20A… (visited 17 May 2016)

[16] Thabo Mbeki, The African Union at 10 Years Old. A Dream Deferred! http://www.unisa.ac.za/contents/colleges/docs/THE%20AFRICAN%20UNION%20A… (visited 17 May 2016)

[17] Thabo Mbeki, The African Union at 10 Years Old. A Dream Deferred! http://www.unisa.ac.za/contents/colleges/docs/THE%20AFRICAN%20UNION%20A… (visited 17 May 2016)

[18] The African Union at Ten: Problems, Progress, and Prospects, International Colloquium Report, Berlin, Germany (30-31 August 2012) Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, p.15. According to this report, this is not a problem unique to the AU, but appears to be a problem for other African organisations.

[19] The African Union at Ten: Problems, Progress, and Prospects, International Colloquium Report, Berlin, Germany (30-31 August 2012) Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, p.15.

[20] Edo & Olanrewaju An Assessment of the Transformation of the Organisation of African Unity (O.A.U.) to the African Union (A.U.) 1963 - 2007 (2012) Vol. 21 Journal of the Historical Society of Nigeria 41, 62

[21] Laporte & Mackie Eds, Building the African Union. An Assessment of Past Progress and Future Prospects for the African Union’s Institutional Architecture (2010) 18 Policy and Management Report, p.10 www.ecdpm.org/pmr18 (visited 16 May 2016)

[22] Thabo Mbeki, The African Union at 10 Years Old. A Dream Deferred! http://www.unisa.ac.za/contents/colleges/docs/THE%20AFRICAN%20UNION%20A… (visited 17 May 2016)

[23] The African Union at Ten: Problems, Progress, and Prospects, International Colloquium Report, Berlin, Germany (30-31 August 2012) Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, p.15. According to this report, this is not a problem unique to the AU, but appears to be a problem for other African organisations.

[24] AU Audit 2007

[25] AU Audit 2007

[26] He was an instrumental in his country’s removal of the army from power and the first leader in that country to relinquish power. Perhaps a consummate democrat he was unable to wield dictatorial authority over his commissioners? See his profile on: http://www.worldpress.org/Africa/1515.cfm (visited 16 June 2016)

[27] http://www.economist.com/node/18014076 (Visited 15 June 2016)

[28] Essy – Minister of Foreign Affairs, 1990-1999

Konaré- Minister of Youth, Sports and Culture ,1978-1980

Ping - Minister of Information, Posts and Telecommunications, Tourism and Recreation, and Reform of the Parastatal Sector 1990, Minister of Mines, Energy, and Hydraulic Resources 1990-1991, Minister of Mines, Energy, and Hydraulic Resources 1992, 1994, Minister of Foreign Affairs, Cooperation, and La Francophonie 1994- 1994, Minister Delegate to the Minister of Finance, the Economy, the Budget, and Privatisation 1994- 1997, Minister of Planning, the Environment and Tourism 1997-1999, Minister of State for Foreign Affairs, Cooperation, La Francophonie, and Regional Integration 1999-2008.

Dlamini-Zuma - Minister of Health 1994 -1999, Minister of Foreign Affairs 1999 - 2009, Minister of Home Affairs 2009 - 2012.

[29] Babatunde Fagbayibo, Why it doesn’t matter who the next chair of the African Union Commission is Posted May 23, 2016, http://africanarguments.org/2016/05/23/why-it-doesnt-matter-who-the-nex… (Visited 16 June 2016)

[30] Babatunde Fagbayibo, Why it doesn’t matter who the next chair of the African Union Commission is Posted May 23, 2016, http://africanarguments.org/2016/05/23/why-it-doesnt-matter-who-the-nex… (Visited 16 June 2016).

[31] ISS, Replacing Dlamini Zuma Won't be Business as Usual, 9 May 2016,https://www.issafrica.org/iss-today/replacing-dlamini-zuma-wont-be-busi… (visited 20 June 2016)

[32] Adekeye Adebajo ,AU Chairwoman Dlamini-Zuma Failing to Lead, 01 December 2014, Business Day http://www.bdlive.co.za/opinion/columnists/2014/12/01/au-chairwoman-dla… (Visited 20 June 2016). The election was considered to have been conducted admirably by Solidarity of African Women’s Rights (SOAWR) Coalition, http://www.soawr.org/sites/default/files/statement_appt_AUchair.pdf (visited 20 June 2016)

[33] Ibid

[34] ISS, op cit, Emphasis writer’s own.

[35] Ibid

[36] Ibid

[37] Justice Malala, The African Union has elected a star in Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2012/jul/18/african-union-nkos…, p. 6 (visited 20 June 2016)

[38] Ibid

[39] Ibid

[40] Address by the African Union Commission Chairperson Dr. Nkosazana Dlamini Zuma; African Union Headquarters, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia Monday 15 October 2012, http://ccpau.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/10/Chairperson-Dlamini-Zuma-Ha… , p. (visited 20 June 2016)

[41] Alfredo Tjiurimo Hengari, A year in office: Dlamini-Zuma at the African Union, South African 30 October 2013, Institute of International Affairs, http://www.saiia.org.za/opinion-analysis/a-year-in-office-dlamini-zuma-… (visited 20 June 2016)

[42] Ibid

[43] Ibid

[44] Liesl Louw-Vaudran, African Union Hobbled by Vested Interests, 29 January 2016, Mail & Guardian, http://mg.co.za/article/2016-01-28-african-union-hobbled-by-vested-inte… (visited 20 June 2016)

[45] Agenda 2063 is both a Vision and an Action Plan. It is a call for action to all segments of African society to work together to build a prosperous and united Africa based on shared values and a common destiny. In their 50th Anniversary Solemn Declaration, the Heads of State and Government of the African Union (AU), while acknowledging past successes and challenges, rededicated themselves to the continent’s accelerated development and technological progress. They laid down vision and eight ideals to serve as pillars for the continent in the foreseeable future, which Agenda 2063 will translate into concrete objectives, milestones, goals, targets and actions/measures. Agenda 2063 strives to enable Africa remain focused and committed to the ideals envisaged in the context of a rapidly changing world. http://agenda2063.au.int/en/about (visited 20 June 2016)

[46] Mmanaledi Mataboge, op cit

[47] Ibid

[48] Assembly Decision, 26th Ordinary Session, 30 - 31 January 2016, Assembly/AU/Dec.588-604 (XXVI)

[49] Mmanaledi Mataboge, AU's Dependence on Cash from the West Still Rankles, 12 Jun 2015, Mail & Guardian, http://mg.co.za/article/2015-06-11-aus-dependence-on-cash-from-the-west… (visited 29 June 2016)

[50] Africa Unions’ Dlamini-Zuma on Security and Her Political Future in South Africa, 7 April 2016 The Africa Report, http://www.theafricareport.com/East-Horn-Africa/african-unions-dlamini-… (visited 29 June 2016)

[51] For a more insightful review of donor funding at the AU up to 2012, see; Janah Ncube and Achieng Maureen Akena, A Stream Cannot Rise Above its Source: Financing of Africa’s Regional Integration, www.ccpau.org

[52] AUC Strategic Plan 2014-2017, www.au.int

[53] Alfredo Tjiurimo Hengari, op cit.

[54] Ibid

[55] Louw-Vaudran, op cit.

[56] Mmanaledi Mataboge

[57] Louw-Vaudran, op cit.

[58] Africa Unions’ Dlamini-Zuma on Security and Her Political Future in South Africa, 7 April 2016 The Africa Report, http://www.theafricareport.com/East-Horn-Africa/african-unions-dlamini-… (visited 29 June 2016)

[59] Elsa Buchanan, African Union Summit: Conflicts Plaguing the Continent High on the Agenda, February 2016, http://www.ibtimes.co.uk/african-union-summit-conflicts-plaguing-contin…

[60] Burundi Urged to Accept African Union Peacekeepers, 25 December, http://allafrica.com/stories/201512260008.html (visited 29 June 2016)

[61] Tim Murithi, The Responsibility to Protect, as Enshrined in Article 4 of the Constitutive Act of the African Union, African Security Review 16.3 Institute for Security Studies, https://www.issafrica.org/uploads/asr16no3murithi.pdf (visited 29 June 2016), p 9

[62] Tim Murithi, ibid

[63] Research failed to find a single instance where she directly called for the cessation of attacks on civilians.

[64] The Assembly: ‘URGES the parties to strictly respect the provisions of the Cease-fire agreement….’, 3rd Ordinary Session, July 2004. (Emphasis in bold writer’s own.

[65] Dlamini Zuma calls for South Sudan ceasefire, http://www.sanews.gov.za/africa/dlamini-zuma-calls-south-sudan-ceasefire (visited 29 June 2016)

[66] Rebecca Davis, 13 October 2015, http://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2015-10-13-analysis-is-nkosazana… (visited 29 June 2016)

[67] Dlamini-Zuma’s tenure in the AU has been referred to as a vehicle to rehabilitate her for the presidency. See; Rebecca Davis, ibid

[68] Carien du Plessis, Congolese Point Accusing Fingers at Zuma and Dlamini-Zuma, 17 May 2016, Mail & Guardian (visited 20 June 2016)

[69] Ibid

[70] Ibid

[71] For more on Dlamini-Zuma’s corruption allegations see; Rebecca Davis, 13 October 2015, http://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2015-10-13-analysis-is-nkosazana… (visited 29 June 2016)

[72] http://www.au.int/en/commission (visited 16 May 2016)

[73] ISS, Replacing Dlamini Zuma Won't be Business as Usual, 9 May 2016,https://www.issafrica.org/iss-today/replacing-dlamini-zuma-wont-be-busi… (visited 20 June 2016)

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