ANGOLA: Interview with Humanitarian Coordinator, Eric de Mul

U N I T E D N A T I O N S
Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA)
Integrated Regional Information Network (IRIN)

ANGOLA: Interview with Humanitarian Coordinator, Eric de Mul

JOHANNESBURG, 10 May (IRIN) - Angola's peace process has entered a critical
phase. While the government anounced on Thursday with some satisfaction that
close to 42,000 UNITA troops had been quartered - corresponding to about 78
percent of the former rebel group's military force - the international
community warned that all was not well.

Humanitarian Coordinator and UNDP Representative in Angola, Eric de Mul,
told IRIN in an interview that although there was real concern over
conditions in the quartering areas, the government was yet to meet with the
international community to draw up a plan that would enable them to provide
assistance.

Without that, donors would find it difficult to help with the US $70-75
million demobilisation process, and UNITA troops could start leaving their
quartering areas.

QUESTION: Donors have voiced concern over the demobilisation process - that
there are a lack of humanitarian supplies for the quartering areas and the
UNITA troops and their families.

ANSWER: Yes we share that concern. The process to bring UNITA fighters to
the quartering points started several weeks ago. We haven't been able to
have a look at any of the places, the only thing is we hear that the process
is on the one hand going fairly slowly, and secondly there seems to be a
lack of almost everything - at least at the beginning. The whole process
seems to be very slow - which is not surprising because its a very big
operation ... We are talking about 50-55,000 soldiers and about 300-350,000
family members of UNITA. So it's large numbers.

The idea that we heard from the start was that the military wanted to take
care of it and said they could handle it. And that's fine ... If the process
is as Angolan as it can be, the better. And the first steps were totally
Angolan ... The point is the concern we have is that it will be very, very
difficult to find the required means and required set-up to do it properly.
There was very little time to prepare for it [the April ceasefire and
demobilisation]. If you look at other peace processes there's normally a
kind of lead up time to start doing this. In this case there wasn't. So
everybody was kind of taken by surprise and have had to go into an extra
second or third gear without having the benefit of being able to prepare for
it properly.

There was mention of assistance from the United Nations and international
community in the whole process but it's not defined. So right from the start
we were expecting, somehow, that we would be approached by the authorities
to say: OK now we're going to try and clarify what we think the
international community and United Nations should do, and that hasn't
happened.

Q: How bad is the health condition of the UNITA troops and their family
members?

A: If you compare it to people who are in the areas we couldn't go to before
[the April ceasefire], the situation is pretty grim. People are extremely
weak, especially the children, and are often sick, they're ill. The many
years of non-availability of any type of assistance and the total lack of
medicines, drugs and medical attention has taken its toll.

Q: If the kind of assistance the government needs is not defined, it must be
difficult to know how to operate?

A: Yes, its extremely difficult. What we've done is to try and prepare
ourselves as best we can so we've made a kind of contingency plan, but based
on very flimsy, very scanty data. We know the total number [of UNITA
beneficiaries], we know the quartering areas, more or less, and we know the
people are in bad shape. These are the three things we are sure of, all the
rest is kind of guess work. As long as it's not clear what the government is
going to do, it's also difficult to know how we can compliment and deliver.
That's why I'm saying we've been waiting for a couple of weeks to get this
possibility to discuss, to sit down and work out something, but it hasn't
happened. I expect that it will, but when I don't know. Some say maybe next
week or the coming days, but that's been the story for the last couple of
weeks, so I'm a bit hesitant to try and predict anything.

Q: The UN has an unfortunate history in Angola. Do you think there is some
reticence in the Angolan government to ask the UN for assistance?

A: I think it's a mixture. On the one hand is the issue of trying to keep it
in their hands, and as I said before there is nothing wrong with that. If
the Angolan authorities themselves can handle it - so much the better. There
is certainly the kind of feeling that if you start working with the UN you
may get into trouble because the UN is slow, it takes time, so the
experience hasn't been that fantastic ... But I think gradually these things
will move a little bit to the background when it becomes clear that it would
be useful to have an extra hand to help. As I said, maybe that's coming.

Q: Do you see the UN role as purely being in terms of humanitarian
assistance?

A: Yes, that's the problem with the agreement. On the one hand it's good
because it's short - it's not one of these lengthy documents that takes a
couple of lawyers a couple of weeks to figure out exactly what it means. So
from that point of view it's OK. On the other hand, it's extremely vague. On
three or four occasions it refers to the UN but in very vague terms, like an
observation role and assistance with quartering and demobilisation and
reintegration and there's also a reference to organisation of a donor
conference later in the year. These are the points where the UN and
international community are referred to - and again, so far we haven't had
any further clarification since we had discussions with the ministry of
planning on the donor conference. But since that is a bit further away,
there's time for that and it is something that is somewhat easier to handle.
The other issues on the political side that refers to the role of the UN in
terms of observing the process, I think that is still not clearly defined.
And on the humanitarian side for [providing for] the UNITA soldiers and
family members, that is also still not defined.

And this is heavy stuff, it's not simple. It requires a lot of money in the
first place, but in order to get money you have to present something that is
fundable. And, as I said, we've been trying with the little information we
have to try to imagine what it could be and put it on paper. We've shared it
with the donors but at the end of the day they keep saying yes, that's fine
and we'll try to help, but the first step is we have to have a clear answer
from the authorities as to what they really want the international community
to do.

The other thing that I've picked up is that the idea that they [Angolan
government] want to avoid problems that occurred in the past - [i.e.] to try
and move very quickly and then be disappointed when the whole thing falls
apart. So the whole idea of making sure that what has been agreed sticks,
that is very important. So they are looking very carefully to see whether
UNITA keeps its promises. Second, in the past too many things were being
done at the same time and that was not good - so it looks like they're
interested in a step by step approach.

Then there is the donor conference which they see as two phases. First to
alert or make the donor community again aware of the enormous humanitarian
problems. That will be later in the year, sometime in October, followed by a
heavier one that will deal with reconstruction, rehabilitation and that
would be towards the end of 2003 early 2004. So that's the kind of outline
they are looking at, which is fine. The point is that all of that will come
later depending on how well you do the first steps. And that's where the
main concern is. Are we going to be able to make the first step stick, make
it solid? That means we have to make sure that the [UNITA] soldiers have the
feeling that they are taken seriously, they are being attended to, and have
a chance to eventually move to a situation where they can start a normal
life.

Q: What should be the international community's bottom line and what are
your real concerns, what could really go wrong in this process?

A: If UNITA soldiers are moving to areas that are indicated as quartering
areas - they go there and find that nothing is there or very little, that
might make them turn their backs and go back, to what I don't know. I don't
think they'll go back to fighting because I think they're extremely weak and
I think what has happened over the last couple of years, particularly
sanctions, has really hit hard ... So from that point of view I'm not too
worried about the war starting again, I don't think that's a realistic
possibility, but of course they could become a nuisance. They could start
roaming the countryside out of desperation and start creating a hell of a
lot of problems in the countryside, a countryside that is already riddled
with problems - add this to it and it really becomes dramatic.

Q: Are there any indications that this is happening already?

A: Not really ... I think there is a bit more control over the soldiers.
What we have heard is that the other group, the 300-350,000 family that also
expected to receive some assistance, [those that don't find it could] just
move off to let's say existing supply points, areas where normally
internally displaced persons (IDPs) are being helped and just move into
there, becoming part and parcel of that group which in a way is confusing
the whole thing. That's the problem, because on the one hand it means that
the supplies for the established number of displaced will not be sufficient
because that number will grow and then you get this confusion between
basically two different groups which are mingled and mixed and could also
create a kind of unhealthy and awkward situation.

Q: On the wider humanitarian front, as these inaccessible places open up how
many people are we looking at?

A: We only have an estimate. We were estimating around 500,000. I still hope
its not going to be less - the assessment process is going to be finished at
the end of next week, so we'll have a better idea. The issue is just that -
we keep accumulating. So we have already an existing IDP caseload, add to
that the people from the now accessible areas, and add to that the soldiers
that are demobilising, and the numbers become rather frightening. And add to
that a group of donors that are still fairly reluctant to increase, or
really come out to say they'll be in a position to increase their
contributions substantially, and we're looking at a situation that - to say
difficult is an understatement - could be extremely difficult.

Q: What is behind the donor reticence, because on the one hand we have a
peace process that hangs in the balance, and we have this extra caseload to
feed, but as you suggest the donors haven't come forward yet - what is
behind that?

A: There are a number of things behind that. One is certainly in the case of
Angola a kind of donor fatigue in the extreme, because this has been going
on for so many years and after so many attempts and failures donors have
become rather disappointed with the whole situation. Secondly, the number of
donors for Angola is smaller than you see in other countries. On the one
hand that may be positive because it makes it easier for donors to get
together and move in a more coordinated, comprehensive fashion.

On the other hand, the more donors you have the more possibilities for
funds. The second point is that donors have had, especially in the last
couple of years, rising expectations of what the government should be able
to do in reaching out to its own population. So far they have been very
disappointed. There have been quite a number of instances where the
government has made very substantive and clear promises that have not really
been met. And this time around I think the donors are really waiting for
clear signals, and you can almost say proof, that the government is really
going to make more of its resources available to the Angolan population.

Q: What sort of figures are we looking at?

A: If we start with the consolidated appeal that was prepared late last
year, that is about US $240 million. That was before this whole new
situation evolved. We are now in May and I think we have about 30 percent of
that covered, which is reasonable. Now all of a sudden we have an additional
caseload. The contingency plan we have estimated - it's a real ballpark
figure because there are no clear elements to our calculations - that stands
at about US $70-75 million. That would be for the quartering and the
beginning of the demobilisation. We haven't added the people in the now
accessible areas.

We don't have a complete figure yet because we don't know what the needs are
going to be. We have had an assessment which had some positive surprises -
there were areas where we found there was more food than we had thought
there would be. But the negative surprises was that the condition of the
people was really very troublesome, and that is general. Maybe that's even a
bit worse than we expected. So I would say the vulnerability, the weakness
of the people is really dramatic. Altogether, we are looking at quite a
substantial amount of money, and we're up against time. And that's why we,
hopefully sooner than later, get the opportunity to sit down with the
authorities and figure out what should we do to complement what they are
doing.

Q: What kind of financial commitments have the Angolan authorities made?

A: Earlier in the year there was a promise of about US $57 million to be
made available to IDPs but that is still on the books. The information we
have is that so far not much of that has been allocated or been spent. For
the quartering and demobilisation effort I understand that US $50 million
was set aside from the defence budget to do that. These are the two figures
we know about. What exactly is being done with it or how much has been
spent, that is not very clear.

Q: How optimistic are you that this is going to work?

A: I think in the end it's going to work, but it's going to take much more
time than everybody thinks at this point, and ... hopes. I guess that's
almost unavoidable because the problems are so huge, there are no quick
fixes. I think the possibility of the war beginning again are close to zero.
I am concerned and worried that we may have a couple of months of a
deepening crisis, deepening misery ... Later on, gradually, we will get out
of that situation and it is going to be very important for the government
and the international community to be tenacious, to not stop before the job
is really finished.

[ENDS]

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