Party militias and election-related violence in Tanzania

All three major political parties in Tanzania today have militias. For the ruling party, CCM [Chama cha Mapinduzi, Party of the Revolution), that phenomenon isn`t new. But for opposition parties, notably CUF [Civic United Front"> and CHADEMA [Chama cha Demokrasia na Maendeleo, Party for Democracy and Development">, that initiative is relatively nascent. I intend to argue in this article that the decision by opposition political parties to institute their own militias isn`t an act of mere emulation. Rather, it is a protest against how the ruling party and government have been handling democratic transition in the country, at least, and a failure of the establishment to uphold the constitution, at most.

In early 1970s, the then ruling party, Tanganyika African National Union (TANU), commissioned the establishment of a militia known in Swahili as Mgambo. To understand the context that led to the establishment of the people’s militia and its role in stabilizing the country soon after independence, one has to revisit the 1960s decade and its worrying events.

INDEPENDENCE IN A TUMULTUOUS DECADE

Tanzania`s achievement of independence in 1961 coincided with the advent of the cold war on the one hand and peaking of the liberation efforts, on the other. Moreover, civil-military relations were fragile and the political leadership wasn`t in full control of the army.[1] The establishment of the Organization of African Unity in 1963 and the subsequent decision to locate the Liberation Committee in Dar es Salaam translated into a more systematic involvement of the country in liberation struggles across the continent. That involvement increased the risk of external attack from embattled colonial powers especially in sub-Saharan Africa.[2] At this point, it was clear to the ruling party that the country had to revamp its security system since the weak army inherited from the colonial powers could neither properly defend the country nor support the liberation of other countries. To initiate such a change, there had to be a trigger.

The trigger came in January 1964 in the form of army mutiny, which lasted for three days. The mutineers protested against their difficult living and working conditions, demanded promotions and a complete takeover of the army leadership by African and Tanzanian commanders (complete Africanization of the army).[3] Barely a week before the mutiny, a revolution had taken place in Zanzibar ousting a sultanate and replacing it with an Afro-Shirazi Party government. In April of the same year, Tanganyika and Zanzibar united to form the United Republic of Tanzania. While a debate about the forces behind the union remains open, it was very clear then and now that the union was important for the security of Zanzibar and Tanzania, in general.[4] Although it is widely argued that the 1964 munity wasn`t a coup attempt as it did not question the legitimacy of the government, it raised questions about the place of the military in an independent Tanzania and the consequences of its monopoly of military training and warfare skills. The need to end this monopoly is understood to be one of the reasons for forming the people’s militia.[5]

Nevertheless, the munity provided an opportunity to rebuild the army, `almost from scratch`, as Nyerere was once quoted remarking.[6] More important is the fact that all new recruits had to be obtained through the TANU youth wing, a mechanism devised to ensure the party exerted influence and control over the new military. The party played a role of indoctrinating new recruits and equipping them with a liberation ideology. At this time, late 1964, the country was already a de facto single party state. That arrangement was formalized in 1965 when an interim constitution was enacted. Under it, Zanzibar was allowed to keep ASP for a little longer until when a merger took place in 1977 to form CCM.[7]

Another important event towards the establishment of the people’s militia was the adoption of the Arusha Declaration in 1967, which laid the ideological foundation upon which the creation of the party militia was based. The Declaration under `The People and Agriculture` section bears the following quotation: ` And for the defense of our nation, it is necessary for us to be on guard against internal stooges who could be used by external enemies who aim to destroy us. The people should always be ready to defend their nation when they are called upon to do so`.

FORMATION OF THE PEOPLE’S MILITIA

The role played by civilian militias in repelling the Portuguese invasion of Guinea in 1970, though contested, was keenly observed by the ruling party, TANU, to the extent that it was reflected in the party guidelines of 1971 which sought to establish similar militia in the country.[8] In this period, external threats in the region included those from Uganda especially after the government of Milton Obote was overthrown by Id Amin in January of that year. Such party guidelines referred in here were adopted by an emergency National Executive Committee (NEC) meeting which convened in Dar es Salaam in February.[9] The people`s militia received military training from the army and proceeded to form a pool of reservists ready to reinforce the army in times of war.[10] The militia played a key role along with the army during the Kagera War in 1978-79. However, the evolution of its roles came to mean involvement in other tasks such as mobilizing participation in national development programs, for instance villagization, and performing some policing roles.

Following the winds of change that blew across Africa in 1990s, just like in other parts of the world, Tanzania experienced the pressure to change accordingly. As a result, then President Ali Hassan Mwinyi appointed a commission headed by Judge Francis Nyalali and tasked it with looking into whether the nation should stick to the single party rule or adopt a multi-party political dispensation.[11] Among other findings, the commission recommended the adoption of a multiparty system and identified 40 laws which had to either be repealed or reformed to suit the new political arrangement. At this juncture, it is important to note that the establishment of the people`s militia had been commissioned by the ruling party (TANU) and there wasn`t a specific law in that respect. This didn`t sound legally awkward at the time possibly due to supremacy of the party but the Nyalali Commision Report (1992) hinted that, although the people`s militia was recognized by law, it was not legally established.[12]

Sungusungu was another type of a community militia which fell into this category. Sungusungu emerged in early 1980s in the lake (Victoria) zone of Tanzania especially in Kahama as a community vigilante group in response to high levels of cattle rustling and armed robbery.[13] As such, it was established by citizens themselves.

The Nyalali report further revealed that by the manner of their establishment, Sungusungu and Mgambo, violated Article 147 of the constitution (1977), sub-section 1, of the 2005 version which states, ‘It is hereby prohibited for any person or any organization or any group of persons except the government to raise or maintain in Tanzania an armed force of any kind’. Sub-section 2 states that, `The Government of the United Republic may, in accordance with law, raise and maintain in Tanzania an armed force of various types for the purposes of the defence and security of the territory and the people of Tanzania’. The current practice whereby political parties own and maintain militias, as this article will show in the coming sections, may amount to a breach of the constitution.

The recommendations of the commission were also central to the civil-military relations reforms which took place in the 1990s decade. The entrenched party-state structure that had characterized the political platform for more than three decades was considered inappropriate under the multi-party system.[14] Also, the direct influence exerted by the ruling party onto the security forces had to be reversed.[15] It is worth noting that, despite the obvious need for thorough reforms, it is the ruling party control of the armed forces, militia and national police service that partly facilitated its grip on power. As such, reform in terms of separating the party from state to pave the way for smooth operation of the multi-party system wasn`t and hasn`t been easy.

PARTIES’ MILITIA IN POST-1992

Strong ties between the ruling party and security forces have continued and partly helped CCM to remain in power. Although the people`s militia still exists today, participation is mainly voluntary and the number restricted.[16] It is not uncommon to see the people`s militia (Mgambo) collaborating with the police in providing security at political rallies held by opposition parties. Ironically, the ruling party has sought to augment its dwindling control of the security forces through a different party outfit referred to as the Green Guard.

Analyses of previous elections in Tanzania (2005, 2009 and 2010) indicate that election related violence and cases of electoral misconduct have been increasing in tandem with the increase in political competition especially in the mainland. Several scholars have postulated that the 2010 general election experienced increased competition and unprecedented levels of violence in that part of the country.[17] Apart from the clashes between the state especially through its police and citizens, a clearly unique pattern of violence related to political rivalry is emerging in the mainland in the form of the clashes between ruling party militia (Green Guard) and opposition parties militia ; Red Brigade for CHADEMA and Blue Guard for Civic United Front (CUF).

While it is not exactly clear when the ruling party started the green guards initiative taking into consideration the fact that the party`s constitution does not bear a provision establishing it, circumstantial evidence indicates their existence as early as 2000. Besides, their deployment gained momentum in 2010 elections and subsequent by-elections in 2011 and 2012. It is in this period that records of clashes with similar militia from other political parties especially CHADEMA emerged.[18]

To highlight the intensity of the violence and its consequences, three cases are worth revisiting. One happened in Kalenga by-election (Iringa region) in March 2014 whereby the ruling party guards allegedly kidnapped CHADEMA special seats parliamentarian, Rose Kamili, from an internal party meeting and whisked her into the ruling party offices where she claimed to have been tortured and sexually harassed.[19] The ruling party guards claimed to have arrested her because she was distributing bribe money. Police initiated two cases, one regarding the bribe and another torture. The progress has since then faltered.[20]

Other two cases involved the Igunga (Tabora) and Arumeru (Manyara) by-elections. The latter was so tense to the extent that the then Deputy Commissioner of Police, Issaya Mungulu, announced publicly that he had `banned` political parties` militia. He was quoted saying, ‘I admit we have realized this rather too late in the ongoing campaigns in Meru District, but after this, the police will not allow CCM's Green Guards or CHADEMA's Red Brigades because these unofficial armies have been causing chaos, conflicts and other election-related inconveniences’. [21] Issaya Mungulu is now the Director of Criminal Investigation (DCI). There is evidence already that violence prior to elections is affecting turn out.[22]

Green guards receive tailor-made training which involves weapon-use skills and are used to guard party contestants during campaigns and ensure security in political rallies. The ruling party claimed that its green guard youth only received entrepreneurship trainings.[23] Such claims were vehemently rejected by CHADEMA. It is normal for high ranking ruling party officials, including the president, to inspect a guard of honour staged by green guards in their various visits across the country. Research shows that the ruling party prefers them because they are card-holding members and thus more likely to keep party secrets.[24]

In contrast to CCM`s discreet approach to party`s militia, CHADEMA included a clause that establishes Red Brigade in its 2006 constitution, which, according to the party officials, was approved by the registrar of political parties.[25] Records show that in 2004, CHADEMA wrote to the registrar of political parties requesting for permission to establish self-defence training camps for its Red Brigade members but the registrar replied that doing so would be going against the law.[26] The registrar went a step further by challenging such a leading opposition party to present evidence that backed the claims that even the ruling party was doing the same.

WHY PARTIES MILITIA?

For the ruling party, CCM, whose approach to the subject under discussion has been very discreet, one can only discern the reasons for establishing a party militia from its supremacy during the single party days and recent occasional and symbolic words from its leaders. As the background detailed in this article shows, CCM`s grip on power partly depended on its influence and control of the security forces. That advantage is waning and proves difficult to let go since competing on equal footing with opposition parties may lead to total defeat. Highlighting a concern and possibly fear that emanates from the declining party influence on the security forces, the party`s Youth wing (UVCCM) secretary responsible for youth mobilization, Paul Makonda, once remarked, ‘If you come to our party, we do not have police, we do not have army, we have the Green Guard whose task is to protect leaders’.[27] The fact that the ruling party owns party guards despite the influence it still wields on state security organs through the incumbent government shows the extent to which it is not ready to play by the standard rules.

CHADEMA has always made its reasons for establishing the militia open and public. From the party`s constitution (2006 version, Section 7, Subsection 7.7.5), it states: `There shall be a security system for the party`s assets, leaders and interests which shall be known as Red Brigade`.[28"> On top of that, CHADEMA has repeatedly blamed the police for acting unprofessionally by using excessive force, causing the death of opposition members especially in a series of demonstrations over the years and of favouring the ruling party.[29"> As such, the party acts on the basis of the argument that, both the state and its security organs have failed to guarantee their security, and that the constitution gives each and every citizen the right to act in ways that ensure their own security.[30"> Section 16 of the constitution (1977) confers the right to personal security while Article 20 provides the right to associate freely and peaceably.

In this election year, the main role of the party guards, according to CHADEMA, will be protecting its share of votes against usual thievery from the ruling party. Several thousand youths took their oaths early this year.[31"> The police force was keen enough to notice and promise action.[32"> It is hard to tell how many youths CCM has mobilized, again because of their discreet approach.

CONTRADICTION AND CONFUSION

It is a principle that in all liberal democracies, the state exercises monopoly over the use of force through its exclusive right to raise and maintain armed forces. Tanzania is no exception. As a country in transition that monopoly is very important since any deviation, as the evidence in this article has shown, is likely to ruin the whole process. Unfortunately, the response from the government in terms of addressing this worrying development has been fraught with contradictions and confusion.

After chaotic by-elections in Igunga (2011) and Arumeru (2012) in which political party militias played a central role, CHADEMA resolved to strengthen its Red Brigade.[33"> In 2013, CHADEMA announced that intention at various public meetings to the extent of attracting a response from the Registrar of Political Parties. But that response was contradictory and confusing. The registrar responded that CHADEMA was never allowed to establish self-defence training camps but security groups.[34"> This statement meant that the party could keep the group so long as it didn`t establish training camps. As it has been shown elsewhere in this article, the then registrar challenged the opposition party to provide evidence that the ruling party was running training camps to enable his office to take appropriate measures. In response CHADEMA commented, ‘Why is it that when it is CHADEMA doing what the ruling party CCM has done for years, it has suddenly become illegal?’[35">

There is no doubt that all three leading political parties in the country maintain party guards. However, the mock ignorance invoked by the then registrar of political parties (John Tendwa) in regard to the ruling party as evidenced is a testimony of the lack of impartiality that opposition parties constantly complain about. Double standard has repeatedly manifested itself in all attempts by the ruling party and government (police and Registrar of Political Parties) to address this matter.

The current registrar, Judge Francis Mutungi, who took over in 2013 after his predecessor John Tendwa retired, seems not to mince words. He is on record saying that, the Political Parties Act (1992) does not allow parties to form security groups but politicians have been misinterpreting it. He remarked ‘this matter is sensitive...but politicians are taking it lightly without considering its consequences’. He added, ‘There must come a time when political parties follow the dictates of the law because it is the law that governs the country, without doing so we will be breaking the law everyday’.[36"> But judge Mutungi has been in that position for more than a year now and there is no sign that he will muster the courage to confront the ruling party, let alone the opposition.

Failing to uphold the constitution

Nobody knows when the time referred above by the current Registrar of Political Parties will come but as things stand, it is clear that the ruling party and its government are not ready to abandon their old ways of organizing without witnessing serious repercussions. Analysts forecast the 2015 general election to be very competitive.[37"> It is expected that political party militias will play a central role in that competition and perhaps the repercussions will bring about a turning point.

The level of mobilization and training of party guards currently exercised by the leading political parties in Tanzania especially in the mainland amounts to the breach of the constitution. The ruling party and government jointly shoulder the responsibility for failing to uphold the constitution. One sees an institutional weakness of a high degree in this matter.

* Dastan Kweka is a researcher based in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania. He is grateful to Shangwe Juma Beria for reading and commenting on the draft.

END NOTES

[1] Lupogo H (2001) Tanzania : Civil-Military relations and Political Stability, http://www.issafrica.org/pubs/ASR/10No1/Lupogo.html
[2] Ibid
[3] The Citizen Reporter (2014) How the 1964 Tanzania Rifles Mutiny gave birth to TPDF http://tinyurl.com/qd6vslp Accessed on 10th March, 2015.
[4] Othman H (2009) Tanzania: Beyond Sectarian Interests, Pambazuka, http://www.pambazuka.net/en/category/comment/55984 Accessed on 28th Feb, 2015.
[5] Brennan J.R (2006) Youth, The TANU Youth League and Managed Vigilantism in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania quoted in Cross C (2013) Community Policing through Local Collective Action in Tanzania: Sungusungu to Ulinzi Shirikishi.
[6] Lupogo H (2001) Tanganyika Rifles Mutiny section in the same article quoted elsewhere in this paper.
[7] The Interim Constitution of Tanzania (1965), http://tinyurl.com/ouc3yvh Accessed on 5th Feb, 2015.
[8] International Crisis Group (2010) Guinea : Reforming the Army, http://tinyurl.com/ppqqp5x Accessed on 2nd March, 2015.
[9] Shivji I, et al (2013) Miongozo Miwili, Kupaa na Kutunguliwa kwa Azimio la Arusha, http://tinyurl.com/ph45voc Accessed on 8th March, 2015.
[10] Cross C (2013) Community Policing Through Local Collective Action in Tanzania : Sungusungu to Ulinzi Shirikishi. http://tinyurl.com/oncp4q4 Accessed on 9th March, 2015.
[11] Rupiya M.R () The Nyalali Commission and Security Sector Reform, 1995-2005
[12] The Law Reform Commission of Tanzania (1994) Final Report on Designated Legislation in the Nyalali Commission Report, Available online. Accessed on 20th Feb, 2015.
[13] Heald S (2002) Domesticating Leviathan : Sungusungu Groups in Tanzania, Available online and accessed on 20th March, 2015, http://tinyurl.com/okwobdq Accessed on 20th March, 2015.
[14] Ibid
[15] Luanda N () A Changing Conception of Defence : A Historical Perspective of the Military in Tanzania, Institute of Security Studies, http://tinyurl.com/nd3fewz Accessed on 17th Feb, 2015.
[16] Cross C (2013) ibid, Page 58 on Peoples Militia (Jeshi la Mgambo).
[17] Heilman B and William J (2012) countries at the Crossroads: Tanzania, Freedom House, https://freedomhouse.org/report/countries-crossroads/2012/tanzania#.VPl_e0nxt7E See also See also Overseas Development Institute (2014) East African Prospects Report, An Update on the Political Economy of Kenya, Rwanda, Tanzania and Uganda. Accessed on 6th March, 2015 at http://tinyurl.com/nhdcz5u
[18] Makore R (2012) Nipashe Newspaper : NEC – Arumeru kumechafuka, http://www.ippmedia.com/frontend/?l=39692 Accessed on 4th March, 2015.
[19] Meena N (2014) Mbunge wa CHADEMA alia (Mwanachi), http://www.mwananchi.co.tz/habari/Kitaifa/Mbunge-wa-Chadema-alia/-/1597296/2247158/-/item/1/-/mseokq/-/index.html, Accessed on 21st March, 2015
[20] Mwafongo H (2014) Majalada Kesi ya Rose Kamili (Mwanchi newspaper), http://tinyurl.com/ojafned Accessed on 21st March, 2015.
[21] Nkwame Marc (2012) Police ban Political Party Armies (Dailynews), http://dailynews.co.tz/archive/index.php/local-news/3453-police-ban-political-party-armies Accessed online on 18th March, 2015.
[22] Saiboko Abdulwakil (2012) Daily News paper - Study Reveals Reasons for Low turn Out in 2010 Elections. Acccessed on 20th March, 2015.
[23] Mwananchi Newspaper (2013) Vita Kali Chadema,CCM http://tinyurl.com/pp27l6w Accessed on 20th March, 2015.
[24] Mwaikenda R (2010) Mabaunsa Marufuku Kulinda Wagombea, http://richard-mwaikenda.blogspot.com/2010_10_01_archive.html Accessed on 6th March, 2015.
[25] CHADEMA (2006) Katiba ya CHADEMA, Available online, http://tinyurl.com/oxj6sqf, Accessed on 7th March, 2015.
[26] The Citizen Newspaper (2013) Tendwa`s No to CHADEMA Red Brigade, http://tinyurl.com/onw3dpu Accessed on 6th March, 2015.
[27] Mwananchi Newspaper (2014) UVCCM: Green Guard Iwashighulikie UKAWA ikiwa…, April 22nd,http://tinyurl.com/ohqoeev. Accessed on 6th March, 2015.
[28"> Author's translation. The original text is in Swahili.
[29"> IPP Media (2012) CHADEMA wants JK to act on Killings, Chaos, http://www.ippmedia.com/frontend/?l=45682 Accessed on 7th March, 2015.
[30"> The Citizen (2013) Why Tanzanians Turn to Private Security, http://tinyurl.com/ntlvcr7 Accessed on 8th March, 2015.
[31"> Jambo Leo (2015) Nape awajia juu walinzi wa Chadema , http://jamboleo.co.tz/nape-awajia-juu-walinzi-chadema/ Accessed on 7th March, 2015.
[32"> Mwananchi (2015) Polisi Kuchunguza vyama vya Siasa, http://mtanzania.co.tz/?p=2579 Accessed online on 15th March, 2015.
[33"> CHADEMA (2013) RED BRIGADE, Available online, http://tinyurl.com/nz3ex7l Accessed on 9th March, 2015.
[34"> The Citizen (2013) Registrar warns CHADEMA, http://tinyurl.com/pxdk8b9 Accessed on 10th March, 2015.
[35"> The Citizen (2013) CHADEMA, CCM Rivalry rages on over party guards.
[36"> Mwananchi (2015) Polisi Kuchunguza vyama vya Siasa, ibid.
[37"> Mbaku J, et al (2014) African Elections in 2015: A Snapshot for Cote d`ivoire, Tanzania, Burkina Faso and Sudan. Brookings Institution, http://tinyurl.com/o7ntmdw, Accessed on 7th March, 2015.

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