Madagascar: The 2009 crisis and outside interests

Historians and political analysts will probably look at Madagascar’s two-year crisis from the standpoint of internal factors: a cyclical crisis characterised by power struggles between various political and economic interest groups obsessed with the conquest of power and its privileges. On top of this, there is the incapacity of successive governments to define and build a model of sustainable development that would free people from poverty and chronic under-development.

The other major aspect of this crisis was the role of the international community,[1] divided between adherents of a principled position – which meant a formal isolation of the putschist regime – and those who continued to back the regime either on principle or because of political expediency. There are those who openly back or backed the former ruler Marc Ravalomanana and others who don’t bother to conceal their support for the High Transitional Authority (HAT) that resulted from a universally recognised coup d’état.

This is not an ordinary clash. It is also a reflection of the conflict between external interests, between one set of geopolitical interests and another – interests which are so strong that the main protagonists of the Malagasy drama, the ousted president Marc Ravalomanana and the leader of the High Transitional Authority have been unable to extricate themselves from their backers or from their entrenched positions in order to reach some kind of consensus. So even if a solution to the crisis should be purely Malagasy, determined by the people of Madagascar, it is impossible to ignore outside influences and the varying interests of external actors.

France is in the forefront of this crisis. Even if its direct role in the coup d’état cannot be proved, there is enough material for researchers and political analysts to have a field day.[2][3] Paris never officially extended backing for the regime that grabbed power in March 2009, but the constant interference by the French presidency and Foreign Ministry leaves little doubt about their involvement and is regularly denounced in Madagascar and elsewhere.

France’s relaxed attitude towards the coup and its aftermath, which irritated the US State Department[4] and other European governments and roundly condemned by the African bloc[5], as well as international concern over the seemingly interminable Malagasy crisis, are an indication of the stakes of the crisis, which are not just economic but have wider geopolitical and geostrategic underpinnings that are perhaps not sufficiently appreciated by the vast majority of the Malagasy.

Its reluctant condemnation[6] of the illegal power grab notwithstanding, the facts on the ground paint a totally different picture of French involvement in Malagasy politics: a new French ambassador shaking hands with Andry Rajoelina on the day after his coup d’état; the presence of the French military attaché on 26 June, which ruffled feathers in many capitals; the declarations of Joyandet in the French parliament or foreign minister Kouchner’s support for elections which got no international backing; the trouble-shooting trips by Bourgi, the French Presidency’s African emissary; the welcome extended to Rajoelina before he appeared before the commission in Brussels; the frantic attempts by the Foreign Ministry to win African support after the clash at the United Nations; the diplomatic manoeuvrings in Maputo and Addis to kick start the Malagasy economy and attract foreign investment despite the illegality of the government in place and so on. France may not have been the direct instigator of the coup d’état that brought the current regime to power in March 2009, but it is clearly not dissatisfied with the status quo in place. Certainly, it has not condemned the power grab as it did in 2002[7] when Marc Ravalomanana took power in less ambiguous circumstances insofar as he did have substantial popular support.

In light of all this, France’s condemnation of Laurent Gbagbo’s hold-up in Côte d’Ivoire cannot but raise questions about double standards. It is true that the stakes are much higher in Côte d’Ivoire, which is France’s top trading partner in the franc zone and fourth in sub-Saharan Africa. (8)

DITCHING RAVALOMANANA

France has never hidden its interest in and attachment to Madagascar. While there is a solid economic bedrock to Franco-Malagasy relations, there is also an ambiguous affective duality in the ties[9] – even the Malagasy refer to France as the ‘reny malala’ (dear mother). Conversely, the calibre of the French ambassadors selected to serve in Madagascar reveals the importance of the ‘Grande Ile’ (‘Big Island’) in France’s geopolitical strategy: from Maurice Delaunay (1972–75) to Gildas Le Lidec (2008), the French embassy in Antananarivo seems to be a must stint for those with diplomatic ambitions. The sheer numbers of people working in the French embassy in Antananarivo (10) make it the 8th biggest (11) French diplomatic mission in the world. It is not necessary to go through the entire history of bilateral relations from colonisation to independence to the neocolonial epoch which followed to understand the strength of Franco-Malagasy ties. A glimpse at the 2006–10 Framework of Partnership says it all. The agreement reset the main thrust of French cooperation and France’s expectation of development in Madagascar. In the document, France clearly recognised, when not praising, like other international institutions, the achievements of the Ravalomanana government. That was in 2006.

2007 saw a new government take power in France. There was a break with the past but not necessarily what one had hoped after hearing President Sarkozy’s pledge when elected that he would implement a different policy towards Africa. Since then a real politik drenched in neoliberalism has replaced those noble declarations of intention. And so, after Jean-Marie Bockel, who claimed he had ‘signed the death certificate of Françafrique’, was removed from office at the behest of Gabonese leader Bongo, his successor at the Ministry of Cooperation and Francophonie Alain Joyandet proclaimed publicly on 19 June 2008 that ‘France must defends its share of the market and reclaim its role in Africa’.

Having bought into the official position, it was only natural that the French economic players installed in Madagascar – who were fed up with what they considered disloyal competition from an entrepreneur–president – should want an end to his rule. This group, united in their demand for ‘anyone but Ravalomanana’, was a natural ally of the president’s political opponents, descendants of the Malagasy elite, and together they diabolised the head of state. The hate campaign, amplified by the French presidential network, probably laid the basis of the ‘position’ of the French government, only too willing to be convinced of the legitimacy of the coup and its leaders.

Franco-Malagasy relations took a turn for the worse in 2002, when France dragged its feet before finally recognising the Ravalomanana government. The mutual distrust and suspicion deepened after what Paris called the unjustifiable expulsion of one of its most brilliant emissaries, Ambassador Gildas le Lidec. Given the mistakes and demands of one side and the approximate analyses of the other, the situation could only end in total rupture. As President Sarkozy put it after Rajoelina’s power grab, ‘It is a coup d’état … but the former president was also to blame.’

The question remains therefore: Why did France abandon Ravalomanana? Why is Paris involved in the Malagasy crisis? Is it to satisfy some obscure geopolitical strategy? Or is to guarantee its future resources? Is it to safeguard the local economic interests of some French nationals and those with dual citizenship? Is it due to the actions of the ‘Françafrique’ lobby? Is it to keep the opportunists of the High Transitional Authority happy? Or is it because of the demands of the economic war being waged by transnational companies involved in the globalisation game? The answer is a combination of all this.

* Patrick Rakotomalala’s (alias Lalatiana Pitchboule) blog is madagoravox.wordpress.com.
* This article was first published by Pambazuka News’s French-language edition.
* Please send comments to [email protected] or comment online at Pambazuka News.

NOTES

[1] The international community means here the members of the International Contact Group (GIC) for Madagascar: the African Union, the Indian Ocean Commission, the Community for the development of Southern Africa, the United Nations, the International Organisation of the Francophonie, the European Union, the permanent members of the Security Council and a non-permanent member, Japan. International recognition means recognition by all these groups. Those who tried to extend diplomatic recognition to the regime that followed the coup did so outside the international community – this refers to Syria, Pakistan or Turkey – even if the last country is a non-permanent member of the Security Council until 31 December 2010.
[2] France was directly implicated by Ravalomanana himself in May 2009 in South Africa, a position shared by the majority of Malagasy intellectuals. For example, Professor Adolphe Rakotomanga was invited to a discussion to ‘clarify’ things by the French ambassador Jean-Marc Chataignier. The ambassador was upset about his criticism of France in a communiqué published on 27 April 2010 in ‘Les Nouvelles’: it is very clear to us that French authorities want at all costs that the ‘Grande Ile’ remain French and that the future president (that they are trying to put in power by forced elections) be a ‘friend of France’. The same ambassador refused to admit in a private discussion in February that anti-French feelings were rising amongst the Malagasy.
[3] Source WikiLeaks : (Remi) Marechaux (French presidential advisor) denied rumours indicating that France was providing a military plane to the HAT; he said that bilateral relations were in a ‘grey zone’, with the new French ambassador not yet having presented his credentials. Marechaux said that France was abiding by the EU’s strictures against ‘no new non-humanitarian assistance’ which the EU was enforcing strictly. The GOF is trying its best not to embroil itself in the dispute over control over Madagascar’s embassy in Paris.
[4] ‘We know that other countries are reviewing their relations with Madagascar on the basis of the amount of aid they give. We think military aid is a big problem and cannot understand why anyone would want to provide such help to an unconstitutional regime’ (interview with the Under-Secretary of State for African Affairs Karl Wycoff, 15 January 2010 in