Africa has faced ten years of unfettered liberalisation that, argues Cheikh Tidiane Dièye, has left the continent on its knees. Women, more than any other group, suffer the weight of the constraints of poverty largely brought about by the world trade system. It is women that must play a crucial role in winning the struggle for a better trading system.
Even though over the last twenty years many African nations have adopted sometimes draconian economic reforms, the benefits of trade liberalisation that were promised have not materialised. On the other hand, developed nations have enjoyed 70% of the wealth generated by trade liberalisation. In some respects, world trade regulations, defined for the most part by industrialised countries during the Uruguay Round agreements between 1986 and 1994, have only increased Africa’s economic problems.
Before an “ambiguous consensus” [1] was reached at Doha, which was at the heart of the launch of the round of multilateral negotiations that tool place at the World Trade Organisation (WTO), the “battle of Seattle” or “Seattle showdown” [2] revealed to the world the growing dissatisfaction of developing countries with regard to the WTO, whose way of working did not appear to respond to their profound desire for economic progress and development.
With the support of powerful groups of NGOs, they then put into practice their power to block negotiations by refusing to submit to a potential consensus. With this action that was previously unheard of, developing countries, and particularly those in Africa, managed to draw the attention of the international community and the representatives of multilateral institutions to the stark inequalities brought about by inequitable globalisation, whose consequences have been hundreds of millions of human beings being reduced to near total destitution and the almost irreversible destruction of the environment.
This is why in Seattle, while the United Nations and Europe were seeking to enter into a “Millennium Round” of large-scale negotiations concerning new and complex issues, particularly in relation to investment policy, competition, electronic commerce and standards in the areas of labour rights and the environment, a large number of African countries advocated a “Development Round” which would allow interlocutors to discuss the implementation of regulations from the Uruguay Round directly concerning developing countries and to urge industrialised countries to honour their commitments. In this way, these nations hoped finally to succeed in opening developed countries’ markets to their exports, eliminating other structural imbalances that were unfavourable to developing nations, removing tariff, non-tariff and technical barriers imposed on the exports of less developed countries, and developing and making official WTO technical aid and capacity building programmes.
From this perspective, the group of African countries proposed to renew and apply the “special and preferential” measures from the Uruguay agreements, which aimed to facilitate the integration of developing countries into the world trading system.
After Seattle failed, the fourth WTO ministerial conference was held in November 2001 at Doha, Qatar, and the members had a common desire to correct the malfunctioning of the multilateral trading system. The developed countries made promises, among which were to reduce or remove subsidies causing imbalances in global markets, to remove obstacles blocking developing countries’ products entering their markets, to recognise and make effective special and differential treatment, to facilitate poor countries’ access to essential drugs and to create the conditions necessary for the greater participation of these nations in trade negotiations through technical aid and capacity building.
On the other hand, the dogged will of the developed countries to defend the interests of some of their privileged citizens and their multinationals straight away took priority over ethical considerations and concerns for the survival of African populations: access to essential drugs for millions of sick Africans is still being blocked due to market interests; millions of farmers sink into poverty each day as a result of the North’s illegal subsidies [3]; and the pressure to increase the liberalisation of basic social services such as water, education, energy and healthcare is about to destroy what remains of African economies.
One of the most tangible characteristics of African poverty is its “femininity”. Statistics show that African women, more so than any other category, suffer the damaging effects of poverty and all the constraints brought about by the current structure of global economic and trade relations. In healthcare as well as education, access to land and economic resources, etc., African women have remained well below world averages.
In such a context, it is not difficult to establish a link between the situation of women in Africa and the world trade system, which, even if it is not the only explaining factor, is at the very least an important factor. The financial collapse of agriculture and African industries, caused by the combined effect of liberal policies imposed by international financial institutions and WTO rules, affects both rural and urban women, as it subjects them to chronic food insecurity, begging and the dangers of the informal economy in African towns and cities.
Greater liberalisation does not give rise to human development
Many studies have tried to establish a correlation between the level of openness to trade and increased economic growth and human development. In effect, there is no proof that the liberalisation of exchanges leads automatically to economic growth and human development. In a study [4] looking at the relationship between trade and sustainable human development, the UNDP drew an interesting comparison between two countries, in relation to their level of openness to world trade, to demonstrate such an assertion. These countries are Vietnam and Haiti.
Since the beginning of the 1980s, Vietnam has undertaken a progressive approach to reform. It is not a member country of the WTO. It has organised world trade at the level of the state, has maintained a monopoly over imports, and has preserved quantitative restrictions and high customs duties (30 to 50%) on imports of agricultural and industrial products. However, despite these measures being contrary to the “formulas” often advocated by those who hold neo-liberal doctrines, Vietnam has had spectacular success by achieving a growth rate higher than 8% per annum since the mid-1980s, which has earned the country a 12% increase in trade, a considerably reduced level of poverty, including in rural areas and in vulnerable groups (women and young people), and has attracted high levels of foreign direct investment.
Haiti, on the other hand, has become involved in an ambitious road to liberalisation and total openness since 1994/1995. The country has brought its customs tariffs down to a maximum of 15% and has removed all quantitative restrictions. For all this, Haiti’s economy has not evolved. Social indicators have even deteriorated and poverty has, in places, reached worrying levels. Although a member of the WTO, Haiti is one of the most marginal countries in terms of integration into world trade.
Looking at Africa, an analysis of the evolution of world trade over the last twenty years shows that the continent has unfortunately not profited from the benefits [5] that were granted and that, despite all the agreements and preferential schemes, Africa’s share of world trade has dropped significantly from 6% in 1980 to 2% in 2004. In effect, since 1980, African exports have increased at the average annual rate of 1.5%, whereas for the world as whole this increased by 5.8% per year.
The social consequences of such economic decline no longer need to be explained. In sub-Saharan Africa, women in certain areas produce up to 80% of basic food products and therefore play a decisive role in food security at the level of both the family and the nation. And in areas where cash crops predominate, reduced earnings resulting from reduced tariff protections and the large-scale entry of imported goods into national markets has exacerbated the vulnerability of women insofar as they have no other option other than to add to the swelling populations of shanty towns to work in order to survive in informal jobs and small trade.
In the industrial sector, WTO agreements concerning rules for market access for non-agricultural goods have imposed drastic cuts in customs duties, which was the only instrument there to protect African industries. This subjects a growing, and consequently vulnerable, African industry to direct confrontation with big corporations from the developed countries, which has quickly worked to the advantage of the latter. The most edifying example today is the African textile industry, in which countries with a definite relative advantage were obliged to cut hundreds of thousands of jobs even before the agreement on quotas was reached in December 2004. And since 2005, China’s powerful entry into the world textile market has heightened the pressure in this sector. Nigeria, Tunisia, Morocco, Ghana, Senegal and other countries are today experiencing the full force of the crisis in this industry, which has a high potential for employment, including a female workforce.
Even if the liberalisation of the textile industry has increased and diversified the supply of goods in African markets, where prices have also tended to drop, such an outcome cannot compensate for the long-term losses that the de-industrialisation of Africa will bring about. This de-industrialisation has only increased the informalisation of the economy by developing trade around goods produced elsewhere.
The WTO ten years on: economic opportunities or fresh risks?
The ten years of liberalisation under the aegis of the WTO needs to be assessed. Disregarding doctrine and squabbles between different schools of thought, it has been widely accepted that for African countries, trade liberalisation has not produced the results one hoped for.
Even if one has to admit that it is often difficult to measure the real impact of WTO rules on the situation of women in Africa, specific studies, of which there is a real shortage in this area, have concluded that this impact is most worrying when compared with the overall assessment of WTO rules on African populations.
Studies conducted into the liberalisation of the water sector in many African countries have shown that it is mainly women who carry the burden of the fresh constraints brought about by the privatisation of these strategic sectors. In the field of work, liberalisation has certainly increased the opportunities available to women in certain countries, but this usually takes place in very poor conditions and often pays much less.
It is remarkable that the mediocre results achieved for African nations after ten years of liberalisation under the aegis of the WTO has not led developed countries to reassess their positions and objectives. If the negotiations have today become bogged down in differences of opinion such that they have been indefinitely “suspended” by the Director of the WTO, this is not because the organisation is trying to take better account of the interests of developing nations, and Africans in particular. The present crisis is mainly down to the battle between the United States and the European Union on the one side, and the G20 [6] on the other. The battle is over the issue of parallelism [7] of forms. The developed countries are calling for the developing countries to impose drastic cuts in customs duties on industrial goods and to commit to the liberalisation of the trade in services, whereas the developing countries are calling for the other nations to reduce their agricultural subsidies.
Given the present crisis and the gloomy prospects at the WTO, the logical conclusion of an evaluation of its ten years of action should be “mission unaccomplished”.
And the question to ask now is what should be the alternative to the WTO? And what would the consequences of a long-term crisis at the WTO be for African people, and women in particular?
It is extremely tempting to respond in a simplistic way by saying that the failure of negotiations at the WTO could only be to the advantage of African countries due to the unfairness of the current rules. However, if one looks at the power relations at the WTO and in the system of world governance, it shows that such a stance does not stand up easily to clear analysis. The failure of trade negotiations would allow the status quo to gain acceptance once and for all, and would reinforce current trade relations, which are mostly to the detriment of African nations.
Therefore, on the contrary, we must relaunch multilateral negotiations and fight, so that the principle of special and differential treatment for African nations is put in place, made effective and made obligatory, in accordance with the Doha mandate in all areas of the negotiations.
Even if the negotiations have still not really advanced the cause of Africa, they at least allow African populations to hold an interest in them, place more popular pressure on governments and negotiators, provide a platform for African states and civil society organisations (NGOs, producer organisations, trade unions, women’s organisations, etc.) to denounce current trade rules and schemes, and reduce the pressure of governments in the North and multilateral institutions who advocate liberalisation in the interests of the rich.
Conclusion
The way in which trade is governed in today’s world leads to necessarily unfair results. But could it be otherwise in a game whose players are not equal?
Whilst the rules that have been set do not allow African nations to develop the means to compensate those who have been damaged by international trade, developed nations have implemented mechanisms to protect themselves from the dangers brought about by liberalisation.
In such a context, the Doha development agenda could only really achieve its goal of creating a framework for development if it allowed the creation of an international environment that guarantees African countries enough flexibility to implement national standards and policies. This would have the effect of helping these nations protect their populations, markets and institutions from the effects of the market.
Such an approach calls upon African leaders to act responsibly. If it is understood that the system governing world trade should take greater account of the opinions of vulnerable populations, one also needs to recognise that this task must first be carried out at the national level. Greater participation of various types of stakeholder, including politicians, NGOs, producer organisations, women, consumers, the private sector, etc., in the development of trade policy is without doubt a pre-requisite in order to make national interests known at WTO negotiations. From the perspective of gender [8], however, even though efforts have been made for years, there remains a serious shortfall that is holding back African negotiation strategies.
* Cheikh Tidiane Dieye is a socio-anthropologist who has been involved in trade and multilateral negotiations on behalf of Enda Tiers-monde, a member of the Africa Trade Network (ATN). He is co-editor of "Footbridges between trade and durable development", a news bulletin on the trade negotiations.
* This is a shortened version of the original French article, which was translated by Timothy Cleary. Please send comments to or comment online at www.pambazuka.org
Notes
[1] See Passerelles n° 2 vol 3, November 2001 – January 2002
[2] From a book by Maude Barlow and Tony Clarke (“Global Showdown: How the New Activists are Fighting global corporate rule”, 2002), recounting the demonstrations of global citizens’ movements which prevented the launch of the WTO’s “Millenium Round”.
[3] Interesting studies conducted by NGOs such as Enda Third World, Oxfam and the ICSTD have shown the disastrous impact of American subsidies on the African cotton trade. On this, read the “White Paper on Cotton”, Enda Diapol, 2005.
[4] “Making Global Trade Work for People”, UNDP, 2003
[5] Among these relative benefits, one can cite in particular the unreciprocal trade preferences between the EU and the ACP which characterised the Lomé Convention, the flexibility offered to LDCs at the WTO and, more generally, to the generalised system of preferences.
[6] The G20 is a large group of negotiators based around the big developing countries exporting agricultural goods, such as India, Brazil, Argentina, China and South Africa. The group emerged just before the Cancun Confernece in 2003 and is fighting against subsidies in the North.
[7] This is a concept defended by the EU in particular in its commitments. Each group stands firm and asks the other groups to make the first commitments.
[8] Few African delegations at the WTO ministerial conference in Hong Kong included women.
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