Zimbabwe: three strikes - not out
Mary Ndlovu argues that the MDC missed an opportunity to once and for all get rid of Mugabe and return democracy to the people. The likely outcome she argues is an agreement between Zimbabwean elites.
Zimbabwe’s opposition Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) has done it again – won an election but failed to dislodge the incumbent from power. Ever since 2000, when they first experienced the dismay of seeing a victory turn to defeat in the hands of authorities, the MDC has been wandering in the wilderness, looking for a policy that can bring success in the face of repression, open violence and electoral fraud. They have vacillated between taking to the courts, calling people onto the streets to protest, and boycotting outright. They have appealed to every international body, both legal and political, but nothing has brought the desired displacement from power of the aged “liberation” leader, Robert Mugabe.
What is wrong? Why has the MDC failed? Could they have succeeded with a different strategy? Should they have boycotted this election as they threatened to do?
CONDITIONS THAT MADE AN MDC VICTORY POSSIBLE
Many commentators warned that MDC could not win the recent election. They said that in spite of the people’s desperation and anger caused by the imploded economy, in the repressive situation where ZANU PF controlled everything, this could not translate into an election victory. Some were insisting until the announcement of the election date that the opposition should boycott the election. But it turned out that no one, including those who had boycotted senate elections, wanted to boycott, at least no one in the MDC party structures. They wanted to stand for office; maybe they would be “lucky” this time. Furthermore, many of the people wanted to vote.
And this time was different. The fated “mediation” by Thabo Mbeki established two important changes: there must be a minimum of visible pre-election violence perpetrated by ZANU PF; and the legislation which had been previously ignored must be adhered to – all results must be posted outside the stations when they had been counted - including the presidential vote. Probably Mbeki assured Mugabe that if these conditions were observed, then he would back the result. All other shenanigans such as a partisan electoral commission, gerrymandering of constituencies, tampering with the voters’ roll, inadequacy of the “indelible” ink, complete manipulation of postal votes would be forgiven in the interests of obtaining another ZANU PF win.
But these two conditions proved fatal to Mugabe and ZANU PF. By mid-morning of the day after the voting it was known that Mugabe had lost – not just the parliament but also the Presidential vote. ZESN observers had the results, MDC had them through their polling agents and through photographs, and it would be next to impossible to deny.
The second condition loosened up the rural vote. No longer intimidated, beaten tortured and burned out of their homes, the disaffected rural voters of Midlands, Mashonaland, Manicaland and Masvingo, who had previously voted for ZANU PF, took courage. Disappointed by the failure of the land reform and the deteriorating standards of living, they voted against Mugabe. They voted out his Ministers, they voted out the old man as President. Faced with a choice of opponents, they opted for Tsvangirai as the man they knew over Makoni, who had no structures on the ground and was tainted by his refusal to make a clean break with ZANU PF.
A ZIMBABWEAN HOUDINI
Since the 29 March elections Zimbabweans dared to hope that Mugabe would concede defeat.
And then what happened? MDC did not count on the Houdini they confronted. Mugabe still had tricks up his sleeves. He really didn’t care what the truth on the ground demonstrated or whether anyone believed the excuses and prevarications. While still in a state of shock, and divided about how to respond to the losses, ZANU PF released the House of Assembly results in a carefully crafted slow drip to keep people in suspense. But it was all a charade – the results were known by anyone who cared to ask.
The MDC were taken in by the “negotiations for a solution” which proceeded parallel to the release of results. Were they genuine or were they a deliberate delaying tactic? Or was it the agenda of one section of a divided ZANU PF? Probably the latter, but Tsvangirai now admits he agreed to many compromises to achieve a negotiated transfer of power. Mugabe rallied his troops at a Politburo meeting on April 4, and then it became clear that no deal would be made. ZANU PF would use all sorts of trickery, even dismantling the Electoral Commission command centre without releasing the presidential results.
The MDC then followed a double-barrelled strategy to get the results released: appeal to the court, and appeal to the SADC Presidents. The court was owned by Mugabe and the statement wrung from a reluctant and divided SADC a week later on April 12 was too little and too late. By then Mugabe had time to muster his shock troops and the retribution was taking place in the villages – burnings of homes, torture, forced meetings to witness atrocities, and a few killings. All of this would render both the results and a run-off second round of presidential voting irrelevant to MDC, as the people would this time be intimidated into either not voting or voting “correctly” to ensure the continuation of Mugabe’s Presidency.
THE INADEQUACY OF THE BALLOT BOX
The MDC have once again been taught a hard lesson: the ballot box is necessary, but is not enough. Where was the “Plan B”, the “defend your vote” campaign? Where is it now, as Tsvangirai shunts from one regional capital to another? Mugabe’s regime is tottering, even as they cling to power. What was needed in order to make it collapse, to deprive it immediately of the support of the police, the army and the civil service, was popular action. MDC had to show its people power outside the ballot box in order to dissolve the feet of sand.
But it did not. Why? Since at least 2002, the MDC has known it has been necessary to have a Plan B. At each election they have insisted that they had one but it has never been implemented.
Were the MDC afraid to get the people out to visibly demonstrate that they had the power in their hands? Were they incompetent to mobilise mass action? Probably a little of both. In the first few days, while people were still waiting for the results, MDC was saying privately and publicly that they could not call for mass action because ZANU-PF wanted to provoke them so that they could declare a state of emergency. They did not want people to suffer. That position looked less and less tenable as Mugabe’s terror began to spread through the countryside, targeting supporters and lower level organisers. It is a tough leadership decision to call the people to action which may put many in danger, but it has to be taken at critical moments. Tsvangirai has confirmed to his critics that he does not have the toughness to rise to the moment. MDC had neither organised the people on the ground nor were they prepared to lead them into the final push.
That last push could not just be taken by elites behind closed doors; nor could it be forced by an international midwife; that last push had to come from a disciplined, organised, people acting together. That action has to be understood by the people, it has to be worked for – it does not just happen. It should have been an integral part of the election campaign strategy, that the people would know what to do when the moment to act came. When the call finally did come, through foreign media, text messages, and some fliers in Harare, it barely reached a disheartened, frightened and confused people. The moment to act was not when elite deal-making had failed, but the minute the result was known and ZANU PF was in shock. The people could have spoken immediately, ZANU PF was divided, and might well have fallen. But the MDC leadership was afraid to call for the required sacrifices, and the moment was missed.
Progress has of course in some way been made. The world has seen, that Mugabe is not wanted by the people of this country; his hypocrisy, deceit and nakedness have been exposed; ZANU PF is further divided in spite of its façade of unity; the SADC establishment has been forced into an open split. But the opportunity to bring a popular party to power through their own struggle using democratic processes has been missed. The transition is now likely to come – and come it must – through the collapse by implosion of ZANU PF and its law enforcement agencies, possibly some open skirmishes and some type of negotiated agreement between elites. It is doubtful whether we have moved much towards any genuine democracy or achievement of social justice for the people. All we can hope is that lessons have been learned by the people and by their leaders and when the next opportunity knocks on the door they will be more ready.
*Mary Ndlovu is a Zimbabwean socialist. This article first appeared at
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