The June 16 uprising unshackled: A black perspective

In an interview wherein he was asked to demonstrate the potency of black consciousness, Steve Biko answered in one word, ‘Soweto’. That bold statement was an unequivocal reference to the June 16 uprising. Biko, the founding father of the Black Consciousness Movement (BCM), makes it clear by this statement that June 16 was no fluke or accident of history. It was a reflection of the determination of a people to fight till the last person – till the last drop of blood of that last person – against all forces of oppression emanating from the theft of their land by the white colonial settlers. This was the unflinching resolve of a heroic people who would no longer endure the raping of their women; the massacre of their activists; the killing and mass imprisonment of their leaders; the treatment of their fathers and mothers like slaves.

June 16 was not just an isolated spontaneous revolt. It was a volcanic eruption that was preceded by years of mass mobilisation of the masses under the tight grip of the radical philosophy of Black Consciousness (BC). Unlike the African National Congress (ANC) that was inclined to run with their tails between their legs to the British Queen complaining about the mischief of the Boers, the BCM grabbed the approach that no amount of moral lecturing would change the attitudes of the stone-hearted white settlers. The only available option was to fight. Isn’t it ironic that the ANC-chosen mediator was the same Britain that excluded the rightful owners of the land and decided to place the rule of the land on the greedy lap of the white minority? This they did not do before they had ‘laid their sponges flat on the ground to suck the wealth of Africa my beginning, Africa my ending’. Those of us that have been forced to drink the poison of Bantu education cannot forget the narrations of the so-called Anglo-Boer War, which led to the so-called Union of South Africa in 1910. Does it imply any political bankruptcy that the ANC-led government recently celebrated a 100th anniversary of the union of foreigners to plunder our resources?

The BC message was simple, ‘Black man you are on your own’. We had nothing to beg from our oppressors. Another message had come: ‘There is no struggle without casualties’. This was a clear call to war with the awareness of what it took to wage a war of liberation. Biko even introduced a practical disincentive: ‘Any black man who calls a white man “baas” is a non-white’. This was nothing but preparation for war. Another message for emphasis had followed: ‘We are our own liberators’. With this message it was to be expected that white liberals were to be kicked out of the window and restore the ownership and leadership of the liberation struggle to the land-dispossessed and oppressed black people. The emphasis had been on conscientisation – the psychological liberation that was supposed to precede physical liberation. This was the basis for slogans like ‘Free the Mind! Free the land!’ As part of preparation for war all symbols of whiteness were rejected and symbols of blackness embraced. Skin lighteners like Ambi Special and He-Man, which left our parents condemned for life with crocodile skins were rejected. In an angry response to toxic hair relaxing chemicals, a spirit of rebellion was induced where the people would not comb their hair resulting in a hairstyle called ama-Azania. Then the slogan followed: ‘Black is Beautiful’.

Addressing the Second Congress of Black Writers and Artists in 1959, Sékou Touré is cited by Frantz Fanon (2001: 166):

‘To take part in the African revolution it is not enough to write a revolutionary song; you must fashion the revolution with the people. And if you fashion it with the people, the songs will come by themselves, and of themselves.’

Inspired by BC, this was the revolutionary spirit that prevailed in 1976. Unlike today’s pussyfooting by some sections of the liberation movement, there was no need for a committee to compose revolutionary songs because they ‘came by themselves, and of themselves’. In the same way they were not the property of certain leaders; no court of law could tell us what songs to sing and how to sing them!

Those who resent the fact that it was not them but the BCM that provided mass mobilisation and political leadership of the June 16 uprising have continuously claimed that there was a ‘political vacuum’ during that era of struggle. Historians rubbish claims like these. There is no such thing as a vacuum in history. Acceptable parlance would be that of phases. The Concise Oxford Dictionary defines ‘vacuum’ as a ‘space entirely devoid of matter’: and its figurative application implies the ‘absence of normal or previous content of a place, environment, etc.’

What our detractors seek to suggest by this vacuum is that with the banning of the ANC (and the PAC) the struggle was somehow interrupted and punctuated waiting for the unbanning of the ANC. What this means is that all the heroic struggles of our people waged under a ‘wrong’ political influence and guidance was not ‘recognised by the sole authentic representatives of the people’. When it became clear that they could not wipe June 16 out of the retentive minds of our people, the plot was changed to June 16 being their brainchild.

Not to be left behind, the PAC has also tried some dangerous stunts claiming that through their late Zephania Mothopeng, they were the main architects of June 16. Searching in vain for evidence to keep their white lie afloat, they desperately point to the 1978 Bethal Trial, where Mothopeng was charged alongside BC cadres like the Azanian People's Organisation’s (AZAPO) late political commissar, Molatlhegi Tlhale. As a non-sectarian movement, the BCM did provide political home to some people that had affinity to the older sections of the liberation movement. To be sure, a guerilla-starved PAC did have some individuals around Kagiso who, like the ANC, saw an opportunity to try and recruit cadres for the PAC. But that did not turn June 16 into a PAC-initiated movement. They just did not have the capacity. If they had, they would not be busy recruiting during fighting but would have fought with their guns alongside the masses. They simply did not.

Strini Moodley[1] exposes the lingering attitude by the older sections of the liberation movement to either undermine or lay claim to the political fortunes of the BCM:

‘In 1974, Fatima Meer was behind an endeavour to down-play the Black Consciousness Movement when she and a whole lot of ANC- supporting people called a Black renaissance conference in Pretoria, I think, in which they wanted the Black Consciousness Movement to redefine itself. And I think it is from that point on that you began to see that the ANC was not going to take kindly to the Black Consciousness Movement. So that by the time 1976 came – because up until then the ANC and the PAC only existed in name. They had nobody in their Umkhonto we Sizwe or APLA, or whatever it was. It is only after 1976, which had been organised by the Black Consciousness Movement, through the South African Students Movement, and when a large number of young people go into exile, that the ANC and the PAC suddenly become strong enough…’

Many academics seem to have had their palms greased to lend credence to the lies that June 16 ‘belongs’ to the ANC. Thus this writer has had to rebut ludicrous claims by Raymond Suttner (2008) in his ‘The ANC Underground in South Africa’. I critiqued his work as follows:

‘What gives his work an ugly countenance is not that it is political propaganda, but that it pretends to be a scholarly project whose authority should be taken for granted! He tries very hard to depict the ANC/BCM relationship as a parent/child one. Respected comrades like Joe Gqabi and Albertina Sisulu are credited as architects of the “BC absorption into the ANC”. Apparently, Gqabi’s superhuman powers position him to “influence some developments during the 1976 uprising”. He pulls a political stunt by manipulating one spineless Nat Serache to go and “present[ed"> Gqabi’s arguments to his BC comrades as his own” in order to change a national position of the BCM. Gqabi’s ventriloquism induces the whole BCM to “accept[ed"> that their position was counterproductive”. How absurd! The question is not to ask what this says about the leadership integrity of Steve Biko and his comrades, but what does it suggest about the intellectual integrity of Suttner.’

No matter how painful it might be, it is a fact of history that the June 16 uprising transpired under the auspices of the BCM, its ideology and its leadership. It is a fact of history that on 28 May 1976 the South African Students’ Movement (SASM) held its General Students’ Council in Roodepoort where the vexing issue of the imposition of Afrikaans as a medium of instruction was discussed. SASM was a student component of the BCM. In ‘The Youth struggle: The 1976 Students’ Revolts’[2] (p25) a passed resolution against the imposition of Afrikaans and support for students who had already been boycotting classes is recorded as moved by V Ngema and seconded by T Motapanyane. The minutes of the General Students’ Council capture the spirit as follows:

‘The recent strikes by schools against the use of Afrikaans as a medium of instruction is a sign of demonstration against schools’ systematised to producing “good industrial boys” for the powers that be… We therefore resolved to totally reject the use of Afrikaans as a medium of instruction, to fully support the students who took the stand in the rejection of this dialect (and) also condemn the racially separated education system.’

The role of the BCM through SASM and the Black People’s Convention (BPC) is so well documented that it baffles the mind how some people could try and turn black into white. The historical record keeps protecting the factual truth:

‘After the May 1976 conference, SASM contacted Seth Mazibuko and other leaders from junior secondary and higher primary schools. This group, with help from SASM, called a meeting at Orlando East on the 13 June 1976.’ (Ibid: 25)

It is important to take note of the fact that Seth Mazibuko is one of those that subsequently defected to the ANC; and who would probably have conveniently forgotten the factual role of the BCM in the June 16 uprising. While the truth still found good company in him, Mazibuko gave this testimony in his 1977 trial:

‘On the 13.6.76 I was attending this meeting: therefore there was a large attendance of the meeting. The main speaker was a man called Aubrey [not to be confused with Aubrey Mokoena who was not present"> who explained to us what the aims and objectives of SASM were. He also discussed the use of Afrikaans as a means of tuition or language and called upon the prefects of our schools to come forward and to explain what the position was there. I stood up and told the congregation that the Phefeni [Junior Secondary"> School refused to use Afrikaans and they had boycotted classes during May 1976. Aubrey then enquired how could other schools support us in our stand as they were writing exams and Phefeni was not… Don [Tsietsi"> Mashinini suggested that a mass demonstration should be held on 16.6.76 by all black schools… The election for the new [Soweto region"> committee for SASM was then held. The following members were then elected to the committee: President, Don Mashinini of Morris Isaacson; Vice President, Seth Malibu; myself, Secretary, a female student from Naledi High School – I do not know what her name is [Sibongile Mkhabela">… Aubrey also explained that all prefects and the monitors be formed into an Action Committee.’

Though the late Muntu Myeza has warned that ‘renegades are seldom the best advocates of a cause they have deserted’, it helps to lean on the statements made by these sources before they could take leave of their political senses. Murphy Morobe who has since defected to the ANC makes this recollection about the role of the BCM through SASM:

‘Now this Orlando West Junior Secondary School [Phefeni Junior Secondary School"> was on boycott at the time, in 1976, I think early 1976. I think even with Belle Higher Primary School in Orlando West there had been some disturbances there… We were walking at Orlando, just past Orlando West High School – neighbouring the junior secondary school, and we met one comrade there, who… had just started teaching at Phefeni Junior secondary School, Nozipho Mxakathi, Joyce… Joyce Nozipho Diseko [her married surname">… then said to us: “What are you guys doing about this?” I can’t remember who I was walking with, whether it was Zweli or Super… We decided to take this issue and introduce it onto the SASM agenda for discussion. And once it got into the agenda, things then started happening from there… With the first meeting that we called, we did not even have to preach a lot to get people to come to attend the meeting where we were going to discuss the response to this problem that was taking at Orlando West [Phefeni Junior"> Secondary school.’ (Ibid: 26)

Sending kids to school and paying for their education is a responsibility of parents. That is why parents could not stand idle while the future of their children was being undermined. They had their own organisations like the Black Parents Association. Mpotseng Kgokong[3] observes that:

‘The first group to respond to [the Deputy Minister[4] of Bantu Education’s Memorandum to School Boards, Inspectors and Principals instructing them to use Afrikaans as a medium of instruction"> was the Tswana School Board. As early as January 1976, these schools boards in Meadowlands, Dobsonville and other areas under the Tswana School Boards had taken an [active opposing"> attitude towards this instruction.’

Then the role of the Black People's Convention (BPC) is painted in bright colours:

‘The weekend before the march, a meeting was held between students and some BPC members to finalise strategy. The students action committee plan was to stage a peaceful march – with students from all over Soweto congregating at Orlando Stadium and then proceeding to the regional offices of the Department of Bantu Education to deliver a memorandum reflecting student grievances. The principal route passed through the Orlando West precinct because of the symbolic role of Phefeni Junior Secondary School. The students had decided at their meeting on 13 June that they would march by “any route leading to Phefeni Junior Secondary School” to demonstrate their solidarity with students on strike. Once gathered at Phefeni Junior Secondary School, on their way to the Orlando Stadium, Tsietsi Mashinini would address the students.’ (Ibid: 27)

Some people do not take kindly to arguments that show that organisations like the ANC and their military wings were in fact resuscitated by the eruption of the June 16 uprising that saw many young people deciding to skip the country in search of military training and arms. The questions that kept being asked was why the ANC did not take advantage of the uprising despite its much vaunted military presence and might. In 1985 Oliver Tambo, the ANC president in exile, laid this ghost to rest:

‘This uprising of 1976-77 was, of course, the historic watershed… Within a short period of time it propelled into the forefront of our struggle millions of young people… It brought to midst comrades many of whom had very little contact with the ANC, if any… Organisationally, in political and military terms, we were too weak to take advantage of the situation that crystallised from the first events of 16 June 1976. We had very few active units inside the country. We had no military presence to speak of. The communication links between ourselves outside the country and the masses of our people were still too slow and weak to meet such (a challenge) as was posed by the Soweto uprising’. (Ibid: 22)

In the BCM we keep arguing that Afrikaans was merely a trigger-mechanism that ignited an already volatile situation. The arrival of the BCM in the political front with its radical approach to political transformation struck a raw nerve in the organisation and mobilisation of the masses. The build-up of this mobilisation over a period of time caused a paradigm shift from the civil rights orientation instilled by the ANC. As Biko noted: ‘Blacks no longer seek to reform the system because so doing implies acceptance of the major points around which the system revolves. Blacks are out to completely transform the system and make of it what they wish’. This new attitude coupled with the rough socio-political conditions provided a perfect mix that proved handy for the fermentation of an uprising on an unprecedented scale. Here is a picture of the thorny socio-political circumstances:

‘Bowing to business and economic pressure and creating a volatile situation, in 1972 the government reversed its policy of building no new schools in the townships like Soweto and introduced the concept of Junior Secondary Schools. There was a phenomenal increase in attendance at secondary school level for Africans in general. The enrolment of 178 959 in 1974 increased to 389 066 in 1976, a 140% increase in two years. Between 1972 and 1974, as many as 40 new schools were built in Soweto alone and secondary school enrolments grew from 12 656 to 34 656, a jump of nearly 300%. All this vastly contributed to a school-going youth consciousness and solidarity.’

Massive increases in oil prices, due to Arab-Israel conflict, in 1973-74, combined with rapid inflation, pushed the world economy into deep depression. In 1974 only 0.53 per cent of the gross national product was expended on so-called ‘Bantu’ education. This meant an amount of R102 million out of a gross of over R19,000 million. In 1975 a sharp drop in the gold price aggravated South Africa’s economic difficulties. During the economic downturn of 1975, African schools were starved of funds. For every R644 the government spent on a white student, R42 was spent on an African student. A cash-strapped government attempted to save money by reducing its expenditure on the African majority, and above all on the residents of the African townships. All township services and amenities suffered, including the schools. (Ibid: 7-8)

In responding to the economic downturn, the apartheid ideology made it easier to cut on the already non-existent budget catered for Africans. This was not enough, so in the march of time they reduced the schooling tears from 13 to 12. This meant dropping Standard 6 (Grade 8) with the catastrophic effect that ‘at the beginning of 1976 pupils completing Standard 5 were able to proceed directly to secondary school’. This unplanned convergence of classes had the result that:

‘In 1976, 257 505 pupils enrolled in Form 1 (Standard Seven), the first year of secondary school, but only 38 000 students could be accommodated. Overcrowding reached new heights. Educational standards declined further. The injustices of Bantu Education were becoming increasingly intolerable.’ (Ibid. 8)

On the labour front, the Black Allied Workers’ Union (BAWU) had already imbued workers with BC and a general strike in 1973 aggravated the condition of the economy. On the international front the Cold War seemed to be in favour of the Socialist Bloc and anti-colonial liberation struggles in the Continent. The internal political strife in the colonial Portugal saw it relinquishing power in 1975 to the Frelimo in Mozambique and the MPLA in Angola. The BCM took advantage of the situation and organised the Viva Frelimo Rallies that led to the acclaimed SASO/BPC Trial. Meanwhile, the armed struggle in the then Rhodesia (now Zimbabwe) was at its advanced stage. During the same period the Black Power movement in the USA was red-hot with tremendous influence on the home front. The charismatic revolutionary leader of the people, Steve Biko, was continually banned such that he could not be elected president at the inaugural congress of BPC. The people demonstrated their confidence in their leader by conferring upon him the position of honorary president. The BCM had stepped up its community development projects to give effect to the value of self-reliance. The whole country was engulfed in flames initiated and fanned by the BCM.

Granted this background, you will have to agree that it was playing with fire for ‘Punt’ Johnson, the deputy minister of Bantu education, to answer a parliamentary question on 6 May 1976 as follows:

‘[B]etween 60% and 65% of the White population are Afrikaans-speaking, we agreed to give full recognition to the official languages. A Black man may be trained to work on a farm or in a factory. He may work for an employer who is either English-speaking or Afrikaans-speaking and the man who has to give him instructions may be either English-speaking or Afrikaans-speaking. Why should we now start quarrelling about the medium of instruction among the Black people as well?... No, I have not consulted them and I am not going to consult them. I have consulted the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa… The leaders of the various homelands can in due course decide what they want in their homelands where they are the masters. However, as far as the white areas are concerned this is a decision that has been taken and I am going to stand by it. (Ibid: 18)

It should now not be difficult to see how the international, regional and local factors combined to brew the June 16 uprising. Within the local sphere, BC provided a sharp antithetical response to white racism and apartheid that was distinct from the erstwhile turn-the-other-cheek and cap-in-hand approach under the Congress Movement. If anything, the racist arrogance and intransigence of the white settler minority doubled the courage and determination of the struggling masses under the leadership of the BCM. The response of the apartheid regime was to kill thousands of black people and ban about 17 BC organisations on 19 October 1977. Why did they have to do this if ‘we had no organisations in 1976’? Having characterised the overwhelming black hurricane that was obstinately blowing change as swart gevaar, they decided it was safer for apartheid to kill BC leaders in their numbers; and it was in that light that they murdered our beacon of hope, Steve Biko, on 12 September 1977. The leaders like Biko that were killed did not belong to any organisation other than the BCM. The SASO/BPC Trialists that were accused by the state of having been behind the June 16 uprising were obviously nothing else but BCM cadres. The leading defence witness was of course the founding father of the BCM, Steve Biko.

Where were all these other organisations and leaders during these trying times? They sometimes venture a flimsy excuse and claim they were operating underground. The June 16 uprising was waged aboveground by the masses and the BCM, and how anybody could go underground during an overt rebellion is a mystery of the 20th century! When the underground claim was put to the late Muntu Myeza, his vicious tongue spat like a cobra. He retorted that they must have gone six feet underground, which was why they could not resurface during the June 16 uprising!

With the banning of the ‘Swart Gevaar’ Movement in 1977, six months later on 28 April 1978 the BC cadres that had managed to escape jail had regrouped and formed a formidable organisation from the ashes of the banned organisations. This organisation was the Azanian People’s Organisation (AZAPO) that was now the ‘unbanned’ BPC. It was to provide leadership of the struggle as the flag bearer of the BC philosophy and the leading organisation of the BCM. This is the organisation that kept the name of Biko alive by commemorating his death every year without fail. This is the organisation that kept the memory of June 16 alive, for it was the rightful heir of the uprising plotters.

That is why it is a tragedy of truth and history that when June 16 is commemorated there is no mention of the critical role of the BCM and its cadres in AZAPO. June 16 services should have been used to develop a national consciousness rather than parochial interests of making it a property of an organisation that played very little role (if any at all) in its orchestration. Part of the objectives of the struggle was to rewrite history. It is difficult to see how the present rewriting of history differs from his-story. It is part and parcel of the Cultural Revolution to struggle against the distortion and contamination of the Liberation Struggle memory.

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* Nelvis Qekema is the AZAPO’s head of youth affairs. He has served in many capacities in the BCM, including president for the Azanian Students' Movement (AZASM) and Azanian Students' Convention (AZASCO).
* Please send comments to [email protected] or comment online at Pambazuka News.

NOTES

[1] This is part of the interview conducted on 24 July 2002 by the University of Durban-Westville Documentation Centre for Oral History. Moodley is a cofounder of the BCM and served AZAPO in different capacities on his return from Robben Island.
[2] In writing this piece I have drawn generously from The Youth Struggle: The 1976 Students’ Revolts that is published online with the permission of UNISA Press as an extract from The Road to Democracy in South Africa (Volume 2: 1970-1980).
[3] An article by Kgokong titled June 16 Uprising, Background and Aftermath. He is the former Secretary General of the exiled Black Consciousness Movement of Azania (BCMA) and the incumbent Secretary General of AZAPO.
[4] There were two Deputy Ministers, Andries Treurnicht and Punt Johnson. Here Kgokong is referring to Treurnicht.