Ethiopia's struggle for democracy and the rule of law

Ethiopia is a country with over 3,000 years of recorded and oral history, and African civilisation. It is one of the few ancient civilisations that has its own scripts and indigenous culture. The obelisks at Axum, the castles at Gondar, the rock-hewn churches at Lalibela in the north of the country, and the Gadda democratic system among Ethiopia’s southern people, are some of the examples of this indigenous culture. The country has been at the crossroads of ancient world culture, and near eastern religions such as Islam, Judaism, and Christianity are prominent within Ethiopian society.

During the late 19th century, Ethiopia avoided European colonialism by defeating the invading Italian army at Adowa in 1896. Forty years later, the Italian fascist army returned and managed to occupy the country for approximately five years, engulfing the nation with guerrilla warfare to gain control. The modern Ethiopian polity was built like any other polity through invasion and counter-invasion, commerce, and inter-marriage. The residue of these historical factors created major contradictions among Ethiopia’s elite, the consequence of which appears to have sparked the separation of Eritrea from Ethiopia in 1991 (de facto), and in 1993 (de jure), to form a separate government.

Opposition among the elite was exacerbated with the rise of a brutal military regime following the Ethiopian revolution of 1974. The revolution culminated in the overthrow of the Ethiopian monarchy and its last emperor, Emperor Haile Selassie. The military regime over-centralised an administration that was already centralised under the emperor, and triggered or perpetuated secessionist movements in some parts of the country. This belated attempt to implement a system of regional autonomy by loosening its centralist grip was disregarded, and more importantly, unaccompanied with the democratisation of the Ethiopian polity.

The failure of the Derg – military rulers of Ethiopia in power from 1975–1991 – to democratise Ethiopia and allow opposition parties to peacefully and legally operate in the country, was the major impediment that eventually caused the military group’s defeat, and which continues to wreak havoc on contemporary Ethiopia. Not only is the country suffering from a democracy deficit, but also the historic famines that intermittently attack the country continue to claim innocent victims.

The military rulers’ primary target was the leftist intellectual movement in Ethiopia. By brutally suppressing the Left – students, teachers, workers, youth and women – the Derg narrowed the political space to a confrontation between itself and ethno-nationalist forces, a confrontation that resulted in the Derg’s demise. One of the larger leftist parties, the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Party (EPRP), has now shed its Marxist ideology and operates among the opposition as a social democratic party.

The core group that was instrumental in the overthrow of the military rulers was the Tigrean People’s Liberation Front (TPLF), a group representing the third or fourth most populous indigenous group in Ethiopia (after the Oromo, Amhara and Somali). Drawing tremendous support from their Eritrean counterpart, the Eritrean People’s Liberation Front – with whom they have since fallen out and fought two wars against after becoming separate governments – the TPLF did not have trouble routing and defeating a beleaguered military regime challenged from all directions.

The TPLF, a partisan force purportedly established to struggle for four million people among Ethiopia’s 76 million people on the one hand, while subscribing to an Albanian brand of Marxism–Leninism on the other, has been operating between these bounds and the greater demand of the Ethiopian people for fundamental fairness, the rule of law, and democracy. To improve its image as an Ethiopianist force, the TPLF and other opposition groups created the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Force (EPRDF), an umbrella organisation consisting of former prisoners of war, among others. However, the main engine in this amalgam of sorts was the TPLF. Even 18 years after it assumed power, the regime still has not shed its partisan name of Tigrean People's Liberation Front, despite masquerading as an Ethiopianist force under the guise of the EPRDF.

Within Ethiopia today, the TPLF owns and operates several party businesses in key economic sectors. Construction, agri-business, printing presses and transportation are some of the key sectors the party dominates. Even some foreign non-governmental organisations have reported that they have been unduly pressured to operate in Tigrai (the region the ruling party hails from) in an unabashed partisan move. Unfortunately though not surprisingly, the people of the Tigrai region are not the beneficiaries of this corruption and nepotism. Those affiliated with the TPLF party – members, supporters and their families – are the only beneficiaries.

Although the cabinet of ministers under the TPLF reflects the indigenous backgrounds of Ethiopia in terms of representation, there have been increasing complaints that the TPLF has constructed a parallel government system in which its party and supporters wield all power behind the scenes in almost every ministry, board, department, office, and foreign embassy. In order to protect itself and its principles of corruption and exclusion, the TPLF has, since its inception, embarked upon implementing a dictatorial-state and terrorist path using state machinery. The army, security, police and mass media are employed to harass, jail, kill and assist in the disappearance of hundreds of thousands of Ethiopians in flagrant defiance of international norms of behaviour, and its own constitution.

At the root of the problems in Ethiopia is a constitution drafted and ratified without following democratic norms. Independent scholars such as Professor Theodore M. Vestal of Oklahoma State University in the US, suggest that ‘the constitution is both nominal and fictive. Its provisions describe but do not limit government behavior and they do not correspond to actual government practice. There is no commitment to constitutionalism.'[1]

The TPLF itself has grossly failed to respect its own deficient constitution; the struggle during the past few years has been for the regime to respect the provisions in its own constitution rather than to initiate the re-drafting and ratification necessary to form a democratic constitution. To that effect, the regime has run four major national elections since it came to power: in 1992, 1995, 2000, and 2005. In each and every one of the elections, the regime has defrauded citizens, something acknowledged by foreign observers and citizens alike. The 2005 election was a bit more promising than all the others; this election will be discussed in detail later.

International observers, invited by the TPLF, declared that the 1992 elections had major irregularities. However, the US and other donors were quite content to continue with business, ignoring any profound discrepancies. The National Election Board, formed by individuals carefully selected by the TPLF, similarly certified the 1995 and 2000 elections to be ‘free and fair’, thus assuring a TPLF majority in parliament.

In the meantime, the Ethiopian population continued to gain momentum in its democratic struggle. Opposition political parties, including those both legal and banned, civic organisations, the Ethiopian diaspora, and other supporters strived for the country’s democratisation and the establishment of the rule of law. The TPLF, aided and abetted by the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund for its ‘privatisation’ efforts and for allegedly breaking the centralist and commandist control of the Derg economy, saw no reason to compromise.

Finally, the struggle for democracy appeared fruitful following the eve of the 2005 national election, which showed some modest democratic openings. The TPLF agreed for the opposition to ‘use’ the state-dominated mass media for a designated period of time to introduce their election platforms, the regime notables agreed to debate in public with heads of the opposition parties, and peaceful demonstrations were allowed. The opposition’s call for a peaceful demonstration in support of democratisation in the capital city, Addis Ababa, was able to draw over two million citizens. By contrast, the TPLF tried to cajole and bribe citizens to express support for the regime, but the turnout was embarrassingly low. Similarly, during the debates, citizens were exposed to the faults of the regime’s policies on political and socio-economic matters. Because the TPLF sensed danger around losing power, the regime quickly returned to enforcing its old dictatorial habits through harassing opposition supporters.

This action prompted the major opposition parties to hold a joint press conference just 10 days before polling day, followed by another emergency press release a day before the polls opened. They warned the regime that the election process would be derailed unless it took immediate action to control the blatantly illegal actions of its cadres and armed militia. On election night, the TPLF tried to pre-empt opposition victory by declaring victory for itself while simultaneously issuing an emergency order to prohibit protests or celebrations. Foreign observers soon declared that the opposition had completely taken over and won the capital’s administration, and indicated an overwhelming victory throughout the rest of the country. The regime realised its days were numbered, and that minimal time remained to reverse the Ethiopian population’s gains. The TPLF grudgingly accepted its defeat in Addis Ababa, but started disputing and overturning results in outlying areas. Attempts at mediation by foreign observers failed, and the regime admitted to killing nearly 200 protesters who challenged its illegal acts and violence. Hundreds of thousands of Ethiopians were thrown in jail. The leaders of the opposition were also incarcerated and charged with alleged treason, thus eliminating any sentiment of promise and hope permeating through Ethiopia during the opening of the election.

Later, the regime slowly released its political prisoners, albeit one of the young leaders of the opposition, Ms Birtukan Mideksa, a former judge, was re-arrested over laughable pardon language. Perhaps the real reason for Ms Mideksa’s arrest was the regime’s fear of her leadership potential, and capacity to topple the regime in the forthcoming election in 2010.

Thus Ethiopia remains at a crossroads, and the nation’s democratic struggle must be supported by all progressive and peace-loving peoples.

The regime is strategically using the West’s preoccupation with the ‘war on terror’ to garner support from the international community, especially with the US which continues to turn a blind eye to human rights violations in Ethiopia. Against the will of the Ethiopian people, the Ethiopian regime sent its army into Somalia in 2006 and withdrew in 2008, failing to demonstrate any justification for its involvement. The war-on-terror fight should not be a fig leaf for small dictators like Meles Zenawi.

Two US senators have been tirelessly working on a bill in the US Senate titled ‘Support for Democracy and Human Rights in Ethiopia Act of 2008’. The preamble of their bill states that ‘the security threats in Ethiopia are real but, unfortunately, the Bush administration’s approach to addressing these threats and strengthening this alliance remains short-sighted and narrow-focusing predominately on short-term ways to address insecurity while overlooking the need for long-term measures that are needed to achieve the same goal, such as desperately needed governance reform, the rule of law, and increased accountability. Genuine democratic progress in Ethiopia is essential if we are to have a healthy and positive bilateral relationship. It is also essential if we are going to successfully combat extremism, thereby bolstering our own national security here at home.’[2]

Ethiopian democratic forces hope that the new Obama administration will heed the words of the esteemed senators. Ethiopians will continue to struggle for the rule of law and social justice, inspired by the struggles their forefathers waged centuries ago for independence and freedom.

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NOTES
1 Vestal, T. (1994) 'An analysis of the new constitution of Ethiopia and the process of its adoption', 4 November.
2 SB 3457 (2008) ‘Support for Democracy and Human Rights in Ethiopia Act of 2008’.