DRC/RWANDA: KABILA AND KGAME SIGN PEACE DEAL TO END WAR

Pambazuka News
(The full text of the Pretoria Memo of Understanding, distributed by IRIN News, is available at the end of the story.)

Without rapid progress towards achieving a comprehensive power-sharing agreement that includes Congolese civil society, the climate of mistrust and uncertainty prevailing in the DRC may undercut the political momentum generated by the peace deal Tuesday between the DRC and Rwanda, an NGO grouping has warned.
The warning follows the signing of a peace agreement between Rwanda and the DRC in Pretoria, South Africa.
The NGOs, in a letter to U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell, urged the US to play a greater diplomatic role in the region to boost the peace process.
US diplomacy could be focused on seeking to end conflicts and extensive human rights abuses in the eastern Congo.
The US could also press the DRC government to end all support for groups and individuals clearly implicated in the 1994 Rwandan genocide, and ensure that the Rwandan government did not exploit loopholes in the peace accord to undermine its implementation.
Religious groups, human rights and advocacy organizations, community-based groups and support civil society programs in the DRC were signatories to the letter, released by the Africa Faith and Justice Network.
In signing the deal to end one of Africa’s bloodiest wars, Presidents Paul Kagame of Rwanda and Joseph Kabila of the DRC agreed to a 90-day programme for the implementation of their agreement.
But doubts emerged about the future of the peace deal almost immediately after it was signed when a rebel grouping rejected the deal.
The BBC reported (http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/africa/2163294.stm) that the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR), an organisation representing Rwandan Hutu rebels in the DRC, had said that they would not return voluntarily to Rwanda and would resist any attempt to "trample" on their rights.
The peace agreement commits the DRC to locating and disarming Rwandan Interahamwe Hutu militias and ex-FAR forces – those responsible for the 1994 genocide in Rwanda who remain active in the DRC.
The DRC will also collaborate with the UN Mission in the country (MONUC) to dismantle these forces and repatriate all Rwandan ex-combatants to Rwanda, including some 2,000 presently at a UN base in Kamina, Katanga Province, southeastern DRC.
For its part, Rwanda has agreed to withdraw its troops from the DRC as soon as effective measures have been taken to address security concerns in the DRC, in particular the dismantling of the Interahamwe and ex-FAR.
The BBC quoted the FDLR as saying in a statement that it had “voluntarily agreed to stop fighting, to demobilise and disarm its fighters" in Kamina in eastern DR Congo.
But the statement rejected the peace deal and described it as a "delaying manoeuvre" and said that the movement would retain a "legitimate right to self-defence".
Two million people have died in the four-year war between Rwanda and neighbouring Democratic Republic of Congo. The conflict was dubbed Africa’s ‘world war’ in some quarters because at its height it dragged in Angola, Chad, Namibia and Zimbabwe on the side of the DRC government, while Uganda and Burundi also became embroiled.
The war began when Rwandan Hutu rebels involved in the 1994 genocide of up to one million Tutsis fled to what was then Zaire and is now DRC.
The peace deal comes hot-on-the-heels of the launch of the African Union in July, which aims to stabilise the African continent. The deal has been welcomed in most quarters, although concerns have been raised about implementation.
“There is a question of the capacity on the part of particularly President Kabila and Congo to disarm, demobilise and even identify the Interhamwe,” says Chris Landsberg, an international affairs analyst at the University of the Witwatersrand.
Speaking on South African radio, Landsberg warned that if the Interhamwe felt there was a witch hunt after them, it should not be taken for granted that they would cooperate with the peace deal.
The role of the MONUC force was also an area of concern. “It’s not clear what the UN’s role will be, but I get the sense that MONUC is now expected to change its mission, particularly in terms of managing the neutral zone, but you can only manage the zone once you have cleared the zone from Rwanda-backed rebels and the Interhamwe.”
South Africans should also be aware that their country may be called on to play a broader role in enforcing the peace deal because of President Thabo Mbeki’s declared intention of playing an ‘activist’ role as AU chair.
“We might be called into more action beyond just making sure that a deal is signed,” said Landsberg. – ENDS

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DRC-RWANDA: Text of the Pretoria Memorandum of Understanding

NAIROBI, 31 July (IRIN) - Text of the Memorandum of Understanding signed on 30 July 2002 by Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) President Joseph Kabila and Republic of Rwanda President Paul Kagame in Pretoria, South Africa, on the withdrawal of Rwandan troops from the territory of the DRC and the dismantling of the ex-FAR (Rwandan Armed Forces) and Interahamwe (Rwandan Hutu militia) forces in the DRC, as republished by South African Press Association (SAPA) website:

1. The Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement of 1999 sets out modalities for the tracking down and disarmament of ex-FAR and Interahamwe forces in the territory of the DRC. To date, it has not been possible to effectively implement the decisions relating to these armed groups.

2. The governments of the DRC and the Republic of Rwanda have sought to find an expeditious manner of implementing these decisions.

3. The parties acknowledge that there have been numerous attempts to implement agreements reached between them with regard to this matter. The parties also acknowledge that the launch of the African Union, recent UN resolutions and the involvement of a third party present a window of opportunity to urgently resolve this matter.

By third party, both parties understand this to refer to the
secretary-general of the United Nations and South Africa, in its dual capacity as chairperson of the African Union and facilitator of this process.

The parties further acknowledge that the resolution of this matter will be a process and not an event.

4. The government of the DRC reaffirms its stated legitimate right that the forces of the government of Rwanda withdraw from the territory of the DRC without delay.

5. The government of Rwanda reaffirms its readiness to withdraw from the territory of the DRC as soon as effective measures that address its security concerns, in particular the dismantling of the ex-FAR and Interahamwe forces, have been agreed to. Withdrawal should start simultaneously with the implementation of the measures, both of which will be verified by MONUC [UN Organization Mission to the DRC], JMC [Joint Military Commission] and the third party.

6. The Interahamwe and ex-FAR armed groups fled to various countries, including the DRC, after participating in the 1994 genocide in Rwanda. The DRC government states that it does not wish to have these armed groups present in the territory of the DRC. The DRC government does not want its territory to be used as a base for attacks against its neighbouring countries.

7. The DRC government is ready to collaborate with MONUC, the JMC and any other Force constituted by the third party, to assemble and disarm the ex-FAR and Interahamwe in the whole of the territory of the DRC.

Text of agreement

8. In this regard, the parties agree as follows:

8.1 The DRC government will continue with the process of tracking down and disarming the Interahamwe and ex-FAR within the territory of the DRC under its control.

8.2 The DRC government will collaborate with MONUC and the JMC in the dismantling of the ex-FAR and Interahamwe forces in the DRC.

8.3 The Rwandan government undertakes to withdraw its troops from the DRC territory, following the process outlined in paragraph 5. This will be according to measures as detailed in the implementation programme.

8.4 That MONUC, acting together with all relevant UN agencies, should be requested to immediately set up processes to repatriate all Rwandese, ex-FAR and Interahamwe to Rwanda, including those in Kamina, in co-ordination with the governments of Rwanda and the DRC.

8.5 The governments of the DRC and Rwanda would provide the facilitator of this meeting and the UN secretary-general with all the information in their possession relating to these armed groups.

8.6 The third party will take responsibility for verifying whatever information received, through whatever measures deemed necessary.

8.7 The parties agree to accept the verification report from the third party.

8.8 That the UN considers changing the mandate of MONUC into a peace-keeping mission.

8.9 MONUC should immediately proceed to implement Phase 3 of its DDRR and finalise its deployment in the DRC, especially in the eastern part of the territory.

8.10 The Parties agree that their respective governments would put into place a mechanism for the normalisation of the security situation along their common border. This mechanism may include the presence of an International force to cooperate with the two countries, in the short term, to secure their common border.

8.11 That a bilateral team, facilitated by South Africa and the UN secretary-general, work on a detailed calendar to implement this agreement.

8.12 Both parties commit themselves to accepting the role and findings of the third party in the process of implementing this agreement, and further accept that the commitments and agreements reached in this peace agreement are binding.

[ENDS]

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