Kung Fu Diplomacy

Such reasoning baffled many, as did the contradictory statements about the timing of the visit by the Dalai Lama being ‘inappropriate’ and ‘not in the national interest’ of South Africa. What is clear, though, is that the decision-makers had committed a diplomatic faux pas, which has resulted in the South African government actually attracting more attention to the Tibetan issue. All of which has led to speculation about China’s apparent role in shaping this decision - reinforced by reports that the PRC Embassy had advised the South African government that inviting the Dalai Lama would affect bilateral economic ties between the two countries.

Whatever the motivations for this decision, the issue has certainly brought into focus the question of whether China’s policy of non-interference and respect for the sovereignty of other countries is contradictory and perhaps puts Beijing’s own sovereignty ahead of others: “All countries should respect China's sovereignty and territorial integrity and oppose Tibetan independence. We appreciate relevant countries' measures," according to foreign ministry spokesman Qin Gang

While it is true that each country should defend its own sovereignty and territorial integrity, which must be respected by others, the concern that the Dalai Lama issue has unleashed is not being interpreted in this way. And the outcry surrounding it has raised several issues that are relevant not only for South Africa’s relationship with China but also for the broader African engagement.

First, the vagueness as to why the Dalai Lama’s visit was considered not in South Africa’s best national interest provided an opening for all kinds of ‘smoke and mirror’ explanations. A recent radio debate on the issue revealed that domestic public perceptions are definitely leaning towards the impression that China’s economic largesse is preventing the South African government from implementing independent foreign policy choices. This was reinforced by irate callers’ outbursts that ‘China is Africa’s new coloniser’, ‘The one who pays the Piper calls the tune’ and the more famous one ‘The South African government has sold out to the Chinese’.

It is unclear whether there is any causal link with the agreement signed between the ANC and the Chinese Communist Party in late 2008. But there are insinuations that Beijing has provided financial support for the ANC’s election campaign. Some commentators have also seen the launch of the South African branch of the China-Africa Development Fund as an ANC-led deal Such ‘coincidences’ have not done much to reassure the South Africa public that the government exercised its independent judgement in making this decision.

This leads to a second consideration; who are the actual decision-makers on these kinds of issues and especially in determining what is in South Africa’s national interest? Already there is confusion as whether this decision was made with the full approval of the South African cabinet. Barbara Hogan, the current Health Minister, has publicly disapproved of the decision and argued that ‘the very fact that this government has refused entry to the Dalai Lama is an example of a government [that] is dismissive of human rights’ and ‘needs to a 21st-century version of its ancient tributary system’.

Here the debate on Africa’s China engagement enters uncharted waters: does Africa have a China policy? Or is it being made up along the way? Who are the real winners in this relationship? Whose interests are being entrenched? And what about the social justice struggles of ordinary citizens in this engagement?

Such questions reinforce perceptions that the Africa-China engagement is elite driven, thereby crowding out the voice of ordinary African people and communities where the impact is felt most.

So what lessons can be drawn from this situation?

There are obvious implications concerning the geopolitical direction of South Africa’s foreign policy, transparency in political party funding, and the relative weight of economics as against questions of human rights. But leaving these aside, the fundamental lesson is that the Africa-China engagement needs to be recast so as to counter the impression that it does not offer a viable alternative (as most African governments and Beijing would like us think), but rather ends up being more of the same.

This means that respect for national sovereignty is as much a right for China as it is for African governments. Second, that exercising this right does not have to mean going to extremes and compromising the rights of ordinary African citizens who may have different opinions around certain issues; but rather realizing that there can be unity in diversity. Third, and most significant is understanding that consequences arising from other country’s actions (for example the Chinese freezing of relations with France following President Sarkozy’s meeting with the Dalai Lama), should not viewed as a precedent. Depending on how policy choices are interpreted and pragmatically implemented by both sides, diplomatic relations can survive public differences on this and other issues. A case in point is British Prime Minister Gordon Brown’s meeting with the Dalai Lama, who was in Britain as a guest of the Archbishop of Canterbury. Brown visited him at the Archbishop’s place, but did not receive him at the Prime Minister’s official residence in Downing Street – thus making the diplomatic point that he was meeting him as a religious, not a political figure. There was no rupture in relations with Beijing.

But the greatest challenge in recasting the Africa-China engagement is to remember the ordinary African people in this relationship. If, as Mr. Chen Yuan, Chairman of the Board of the China Development Bank, said at the opening of the Bank’s South Africa office, the China-Africa Development Fund ‘will encourage Chinese companies to invest in multiple industries, leading to an improved quality of life for residents throughout Africa’, then the first step towards this should definitely not be Kung Fu diplomacy.

* Sanusha Naidu is Research Director with Fahamu’s China in Africa Project
*Stephen Marks is Research Associate and Project Co-ordinator with Fahamu’s China in Africa Project
* Please send comments to [email protected] or comment online at http://www.pambazuka.org/