Zimbabwe’s March: The struggle continues
Zimbabwe’s recent history has fascinated the pundits, academics and analysts who study the stunted development of democracy in a post-liberation state. On the ground it has not been so engaging, as one round of voting after another comes and goes, and every aspect of life – economic, political, moral, social, even spiritual – loses quality.
Democratic elections are supposed to give a nation an opportunity to reflect and choose – to continue with the current policies and leadership or to give others a chance. When an economy falters and people’s lives become more difficult, sitting governments normally pay the price, whether or not they are responsible for the problems. But in Zimbabwe, when a government wilfully destroys an entire economy, and leads the whole nation into catastrophic collapse, misery and even starvation, elections have failed to provide opportunities to punish those responsible by removing them from power. As far as their democratic role is concerned – to hold governments responsible and bring them to account – elections have been exercises in futility. Will the 2005 Parliamentary elections be any different?
In February 2000, ZANU PF discovered, in a rare moment of truth, that they were unpopular enough to be defeated at the polls, in spite of all the advantages they had in controlling most of the media, the electoral machinery and all the state security apparatus. They immediately began the process of ensuring that no matter what the people wanted, never again would ZANU PF lose a vote. The electoral process would be turned into a stage-managed spectacle.
Within a few weeks of their unexpected defeat, ZANU PF had begun to put in place a new strategy. They pulled out their trump card of land seizures, accompanied by violence and intimidation. They added to it a manipulation of the electoral process which went just far enough to secure them a continued lien on state power. However, the legitimacy of the process was already under question. The legal challenges mounted against the results were never allowed to reach their conclusion, but the evidence is convincing that the declared results of the June 2000 parliamentary elections did not reflect the people’s will.
By 2002 when Presidential elections were held, ZANU PF had added more weapons to their arsenal: subversion of an independent judiciary, strangulation of the media and the withdrawal of civil liberties. With these essential underpinnings of any democracy gone, it is hardly surprising that the “democratic” elections produced a result similar to that in 2000: a disputed outcome, condemned by most of the observers who had not pre-judged it, but with ZANU PF remaining in control. Since then, they have perfected their manipulation to such an extent that they are now not afraid to reduce the level of overt violence and claim to the world that they have put in place a fair system. But the proof is in the guest list – only those who are friends of ZANU PF and gave previously disputed elections a clean bill of health will be allowed to observe in 2005.
Faced with this clearly biased situation, the opposition MDC appealed to the international community to save themselves and Zimbabwe from another charade. Europe and North America had already condemned the electoral process as fatally flawed and had begun to withhold aid; Zimbabwe had quit the Commonwealth when her suspension was upheld. What remained was Africa, and specifically the Southern African regional grouping of SADC, where all eyes fell on President Mbeki to offer a solution. In 2004, the SADC nations signed a Protocol which set election standards for the members, holding out a promise that the region might indeed insist on fair elections in Zimbabwe. Doubting Mugabe’s commitment, the MDC suspended participation in any elections until ZANU PF adhered to these standards. ZANU PF felt obligated to make a few changes – some meaningful and others quite prejudicial, and the debate raged about whether or not the SADC standards were being met. Mugabe obviously believes he will be able to get away with cosmetic changes, reducing the overt violence while keeping the essential mechanics of control in place.
The MDC recognised the uneven playing field when they suspended their participation in elections last August. The pressures on ZANU PF which they hoped to provoke did not materialise. The new electoral legislation is worse than what went before. Overt violence has decreased, but is no longer needed as the intimidation remains. So why is the MDC contesting? Have they learned nothing in the past five years? Don’t they know that ZANU PF will not give up power through the ballot? Haven’t they understood that the international community will not save them from a faulty election?
It was a difficult decision. International players, friendly and otherwise, put on the pressure to contest. The majority within the party structures wanted to contest, so how could a democratic party do otherwise than fulfil the wishes of the membership? Underlying the decision to participate was a deeper reality: MDC was formed as a political party with a mandate to remove ZANU PF through elections. Not to contest would have implied they had another plan, which they didn’t, and would have almost certainly led to a split in the party. Tsvangirai’s “damned if we do, damned if we don’t” is true in many senses – suicide or murder – which would you choose?
Until a few weeks ago, with Mbeki insisting that the role of SADC was to help Zimbabwe produce a fair election, there was still a hope that he pressurise President Mugabe to postpone the election until an independent electoral machinery could be put in place, the voters roll up dated, and repressive legislation repealed. But no positive steps were taken. In the final weeks before the election, Mbeki exposed his commitment to Mugabe by announcing that he saw no reason why the election should not be free and fair. Then President Mwanawasa of Zambia said he would never intervene in Zimbabwe.
The observer factor turned into something of a circus as ZANU PF changed the rules at will, making up excuses why they shouldn’t invite anyone who disagreed with them, excluding the SADC Parliamentary Forum, EISA, and even shortening the visas of individual members of South African delegations. As the observers arrive it has become even worse: the head of the South African Government delegation announced on arrival that the election would be free and fair. MDC then refused to talk to them and said they would deal with the ANC delegation only. Some opposition members of the South African Parliamentary delegation have already left for home. It appears that the lion has gobbled up his tamer, but the show goes on, a complete farce, with no credibility whatsoever. Too bad about the lion tamer. But has anyone noticed?
Zimbabwe and the whole region desperately need a resolution of the current multi-faceted crisis. But since it is essentially one of legitimacy, the election must produce a result which is accepted as genuine by the Zimbabwean people, the region and the international community as a whole. The chance for this has now been pre-empted by ZANU PF’s tightening rather than loosening of undemocratic controls, and the region’s apparent endorsements. What is the likely outcome?
ZANU PF has very little to offer Zimbabweans which would attract voters. In the five years since the last Parliamentary election, the country has lurched from one disaster to another; even the President has admitted that the land redistribution has largely failed, and the country can no longer feed itself; agricultural exports have collapsed, industry has shrunk, mining is under threat, and the human development index has dropped below what it was in 1975.
Just how all these problems will end if we vote “against Blair” is not revealed. A frenzy of election teasers has been showered on the doubtful – huge salary increases for civil servants, vehicles and electricity for chiefs, pensions for pre-independence ex-detainees previously ignored, fiats from on high prohibiting price increases on critical commodities. But few are fooled. Elections are Christmases in Zimbabwe; Father Christmas visits with his bag of goodies and then retreats to the North Pole to play with his elves. Why should Zimbabweans be any different from people around the world, who recognize when their governments have failed and show them the door? It is clear that, given a free choice, Zimbabweans would not wish to continue with leaders who appropriate to themselves the little remaining wealth and resources and ruthlessly crush those who would dare to complain.
There will of course be some who willingly vote for ZANU PF. Those who benefit from the plunder; those whose crimes are ignored by a police and judiciary partial to the ruling party; those whose lives have been intertwined with a political party of liberation, and like their leader, do not wish to face the reality that the past is history; the misguided who have fallen for the propaganda bait; and most significantly those who are afraid, who want to ensure a food supply, who do not want the “trouble” which would ensue if their communities were to be seen to be voting against a powerful establishment.
But there is disunity within the party. In previous elections, when disputes rocked the ruling party, they papered over the cracks and pulled together against a common enemy. But can the spectacular eruption which blew apart the party congress in December be overcome? Will the losers in the succession stakes be content to bide their time, and support the winners through the election? Is Jonathan Moyo now an irrelevant maverick, or do he and ZANU PF still have a hidden agenda? Observers have been surprised by the lack of energy in the ZANU PF campaign, the uninspiring campaign materials. Is it possible that the open rift has affected their capacity? Or is there a lack of funds, with known funders expelled, bankers on the run and enormous amounts of money required to pay reluctant campaigners?
The MDC, on the other hand, seems confident. ZANU PF’s desire to make this seem like a fair campaign means that the violence is reduced, and it has been necessary to allow opposition campaign meetings. Violence and fear are still factors, of course, especially in Mashonaland, with many already targeted while others are threatened; but meetings are being held, some of them huge. The mood is exuberant, joyous, relaxed, in contrast to ZANU PF’s threatening diatribes addressed to obviously bemused school children and resentful adults.
Given the decision to participate, what has MDC to offer the electorate? They promise to free the country from the oppressive rule of ZANU PF, restore the rule of law, rebuild the economy, provide jobs, make agriculture productive again, make primary education free and health care available. Some MDC operatives are convinced that in spite of the tilted playing field, there is such disaffection in the country that they can still win the election. They are right about the disaffection - the people are seething with anger - but whether they can translate that into MDC ballots in the box is another question. Already many hundreds of thousands, especially of young people, have not bothered to register as voters. Many of the most committed party activists from 2000 and 2002 are no longer around, having fled from violence or simply concluded that Zimbabwe is not a good place to make a life any more. Some are disgruntled over the results of primary elections, and there is a lack of money for campaigning. Yet, in spite of the bleak realities, the mood is up-beat, optimistic, reinforced daily as reports of successful rallies and ZANU PF defections flood in from rural areas. Many of the rank and file are euphoric, convinced that this time they will march to victory.
But the number of people who actually vote for ZANU PF is only part of the equation. Can MDC win the count as well as the vote? As members of MDC become aware that a solitary election agent in each polling station will bear the responsibility for ensuring that no cheating takes place, they are realising how unreliable the process is, even if they do manage to attract a huge majority of the voters. Transforming a majority of ballots in the boxes into counted and recorded opposition votes is another challenge altogether. Even the official monitor whose task is to ensure that procedures are followed fairly, will be government appointed. And the foreign observers upon whom some were counting, will all be friends of ZANU PF. The faulty voters roll, and the manipulation of the voting process as well as the counting should provide success for the ZANU PF plan.
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But there are other imponderables. The rigging depends on compliant electoral officials. To make sure that a discontented civil service does not upset the plan, the new Electoral Act provides for uniformed and non-uniformed services to man the polling stations and the entire electoral machinery. Uniformed personnel act under orders, and we have ample sworn testimony from previous elections that even when voting they were instructed to display their votes for ZANU PF. Can the party rely on these soldiers to do the job? Just in case they can’t, the brainwashed, mbanje-smoking National Youth Service, otherwise known as militia or green bombers have also been drafted in. While this time it will be more difficult to stuff ballot boxes or replace genuine boxes with fake ones, the system still allows ample opportunity for falsification of results by those who are so inclined.
What is the likely scenario? The election is held. Most people vote for MDC. The results are announced declaring a win for ZANU PF – with an increased majority. It will not be exactly a replay of 2000 or 2002, because this time there will probably be protests. Civic groups and some MDC members mount street demonstrations. Militia backed up by riot police and soldiers break them up, with casualties. Many are arrested. It’s over. After a week or two, compromised observer groups make mild criticisms of some aspects of the election, but endorse the result and call for restraint on all sides. ZANU PF is still in power; we have expended enormous amounts of time, energy and money, and we have achieved nothing.
Civil society organisations in South Africa and elsewhere will protest, but in the short term they are not likely to have a decisive effect. What will be the future of a government with a lukewarm endorsement from its friendly neighbours and the cold shoulder from much of the rest of the world? The economic problems, unemployment, collapsed services, will still be there, shouting for attention. Instead of economic recovery; government will move more rapidly towards a completely controlled, command economy. “New farmers” who have no title to their land may be instructed what to grow, will have prices fixed by the state and inputs erratically and preferentially supplied. War veterans, now joined by ex-detainees, will remain a huge drain on the economy, drawing a pension larger than the majority of those who work for a living. With a government considered illegitimate by most of those who have the means to invest, and policies becoming ever more irrational, the government will not attract investment from anywhere. Inflation will take off again due to the effects of stalled production and massive borrowing to finance expenditure.
Suggestions that at that point both ZANU PF and MDC will be persuaded to “talk” are surely misplaced. Why would ZANU PF want to talk in 2005 when they have not been willing to talk for the past three years? They have shown no sign whatsoever that they understand or care about the dire situation of the majority of Zimbabweans. Repression against civil society groups is more likely to be intensified. As the succession battle resumes, ZANU PF itself may continue with further infighting, which could even involve different factions of the army. The suggestion of a peaceful transition to a new-look ZANU PF which will restore the economy is surely fanciful, and any such government would have to eventually face the electorate, no more willing to hand over the reins of power than the present leadership is. The future looks bleak and dangerous.
But could it be different? Could street protests be strong enough to face down the police of army? Not likely. Could an MDC win actually be announced? Possibly. It will depend on the effectiveness of the rigging, the competence of the MDC election agents, and the commitment of ZANU PF to announce a win at all costs, whatever the results reported. Here’s another scenario: As the counting proceeds, and some results are announced, it becomes clear that ZANU PF has lost; a delay might occur as they argue about what to do. In the meantime, the people begin to demand a genuine result. MDC announces their own count, which gives them a win. Government calls in the army and riot police, dispersing any groups which have gathered. Arrests are made, and we arrive at the same point at which we reached in the first scenario, but this time no official results have yet been announced; government quickly announces their victory, observers dilly dally and the repression begins. Would regional governments then act? Why should they? If they weren’t prepared to talk tough up to now, why should they in 2005?
Then we could look at another scenario, less likely perhaps, but in some views not impossible. As results are announced, MDC seats tally more than last time, reaching 65, or even an outright majority. This would certainly expose ZANU PF’s legitimacy and Robert Mugabe’s right to rule as President; but the constitution gives him the Presidency until 2008, no matter what happens in Parliament. Unless MDC wins 75 seats, he will still have a majority in Parliament by virtue of his right to appoint 20 MPs outright, and the chiefs’ right to elect 10, generally government supporters. He can appoint a Cabinet from among the ZANU PF members of Parliament. But if MDC has 75 seats, the ability to pass legislation would be strangled; this might lead him to dissolve Parliament and try for another more congenial result. Gaining less than half of the elected seats in a clearly flawed poll would put ZANU PF’s mandate to govern in serious question, even for friendly neighbouring governments. ZANU PF would doubtless attempt to soldier on, perhaps literally, with support from the army, but would it finally turn Mbeki’s loyalty? Not likely, unless South African civil society continued to pressurise effectively, and desperate Zimbabweans poured in ever greater numbers across the borders.
We cannot today see through the dark glass; what Zimbabwe will look like even one month from now cannot be known by anyone. But several issues have become clear:
- The people of Zimbabwe are palpably angry and unwilling to tolerate ZANU PF’s continued rule.
- Their ability to translate their wishes into a valid election result are seriously hampered by the prejudicial electoral legislation and machinery, but they have found no alternative course.
- If ZANU PF seizes another victory against the will of Zimbabweans, disaster in many forms lies ahead, including total economic collapse and possibly even civil conflict or war, with dire consequences for the region.
- SADC governments’ unwillingness to insist on the electoral standards they themselves agreed in Mauritius appears to signal that they are not prepared to implement them for their own countries either.
- Democrats in the whole region should now be awake to the reality that whether Independence or the end of apartheid was won through armed struggle or otherwise, governments cannot be trusted with the task of defending democracy, in their own countries or anywhere else.
- Whatever occurs in Zimbabwe in the next few weeks, there is a long road ahead for the building of democracy in Southern Africa, from the bottom up, with much struggle to claim rights against the autocratic tendencies of all the governments and ruling parties of the region.
“March 31st, Freedom Day” shout the enthusiasts of the MDC. Even in the unlikely event that they celebrate on April 1, the lesson for the whole region should be clear: freedom and democracy remain the first item on the agenda for the next generation. The struggle continues.
* Mary Ndlovu is a Zimbabwean human rights activist.
* Please send comments to
* Previous editorials from Mary Ndlovu in Pambazuka News:
- Zimbabwe in March 2004: Four years from the beginning of the plunge
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- March, Zimbabwe’s month of destiny: Pambazuka News 55, 2002
- Amnesty International report on the run-up to elections
http://hrw.org/backgrounder/africa/zimbabwe0305/
- Essential news and events on the elections from Kubatana
www.kubatana.net
- No solution to the Zimbabwe crisis by Brian Raftopoulos
http://www.theindependent.co.zw/news/2005/March/Friday18/1892.html
- Pre-election analysis from the South African Institute of
International Affairs (SAIIA)
http://www.sarpn.org.za/documents/d0001143/index.php
- Labour and union issues in the Zimbabwean agriculture sector
http://www.sarpn.org.za/documents/d0001159/index.php
- Zvakwana - Enough is Enough: A must visit website for activists
http://www.zvakwana.org/
- Report by social movement observer delegation to Zimbabwe
- Media Monitoring Project Zimbabwe