Security Externalization as a New Frontier of Imperialism in Africa: A Case Study From Niger
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At the intersections of migration control, securitization, and neo-imperialism, this piece unpacks how Niger has become a testing ground for Europe's externalized border policies.
In November 2023, I got in touch with a support group for freedom of movement to share information about a protest taking place in a refugee camp near Agadez, Niger. The residents of the camp were mobilizing against the lack of basic services and, most critically, the absence of relocation opportunities. They appealed to international organizations and governments – particularly those in wealthier countries of the Global North – to provide answers to their unbearable condition[i].
This situation exemplifies a broader issue of migration governance, revealing itself as one of the most blatant manifestations of European imperialism in contemporary Africa. In our specific case, a first notable aspect is the official denomination of the structure: “Humanitarian Center of Agadez”. As denounced by Refugees in Libya (a social movement that emerged in 2021 to address the plight of thousands of displaced migrants in the North African country), the use of the term "humanitarian" to describe such a facility is paradoxical at best[ii]. The material conditions and services provided scarcely meet the basic criteria of what is generally considered humanitarian aid (i.e. assistance to the support of human life, the alleviation of suffering, and the maintenance of dignity in emergency contexts).
But beyond common sense, humanitarianism has actually been deeply entwined with colonialism. As Aoife O’Leary McNeice observes, “humanitarian interventions throughout the modern period have sought to protect or improve the lives of those living under colonial rule. These attempts served to consolidate colonial rule and set the parameters for colonial violence, exploitation, and ultimately modern North-South global inequality”[iii]. Today, humanitarian paradigms continue to operate on moral assumptions that uphold inequitable power dynamics. Those who are supposedly benefiting from these interventionsare instrumentalized to sustain a specific vision of international relations and cooperation, defined by a rigid division between those in need and those in power, who claim to be helping.
The issue of asylum further complicates the humanitarian narrative. European governments have sought to externalize asylum processes, shifting a practice born in a specific context outside the continent. It is worth recalling that the concept of asylum was initially conceived as an emergency response to European refugees after World War II. In Humanitarian Reason, Didier Fassin highlights that individuals seeking refuge are required to justify their right to stay through demonstrations of their suffering[iv]. Even when deemed worthy of asylum, many find themselves in precarious conditions and denied access to citizenship rights. The condition of subalternity created by selective movement rights keeps people exposed to exploitation and challenges in basic needs such as housing and health.
The establishment of camps along migration routes in Africa exemplifies how the logic of asylum has transformed into a mechanism of constraint. Refugees in places like Agadez, isolated and ill-equipped to meet even their basic needs, have not chosen to be there. Similar dynamics play out in other contexts, where such camps primarily arise due to pushbacks, criminalization, and border control.
The broader aim appears to be creating conditions that compel African countries, such as Niger, to absorb migration flows consistently. Humanitarianism becomes a permanent condition, with no structural solutions offered. A structural phenomenon like cross-border movement is recast as a humanitarian crisis that requires emergency solutions. This approach has seen the practice of the "humanitarian border"[v] exported from Europe to Africa, pushing migration control further south.
Humanitarian critique inevitably calls into question the issue of funding. Niger is the largest recipient of funds of the Emergency Trust Fund for Africa, launched in 2015 by the EU[vi]. The use of this 5-billion fund is surrounded by a mix of humanitarian and developmental language, combining expressions such as “economic opportunities”, “vulnerable migrants”, and “improved governance”[vii]. In institutional discourse, humanitarianism frequently intersects with the idea of development within a shared framework of normative (liberal) values. While language has evolved to better fit contemporary concerns, the scheme of a foreign authority directing policymaking in the name of improved efficiency and results is nothing new in the Europe-African relationship. In the case of the “Humanitarian Center of Agadez”, the Italian government appears to be the main contributor through the Regional Development and Protection Programme (RDPP) North Africa, also launched in 2015 and managed by the Italian Ministry of Interior. The RDPP is supported by EU institutions and member states and is explicitly aimed at enforcing reception systems in African countries. This further reveals a neo-colonial agenda where foreign institutions contribute to create the very emergency conditions they claim to address.
To some extent, cooperation for the externalization of European borders mirrors the logic of modernization that has long shaped economic relations between the Global North and South. Just as the introduction of policies and expertise in the governance of newly-independent countries was framed as the only way possible to reduce the ‘development gap’, the replication of European-style reception systems in Africa perpetuates a single normative model for regulating the movement of people. European systems often concentrate migrants in state-run or NGO-managed centers, bureaucratizing their existence and infantilizing them as mere recipients, incapable of self-determination. These practices are now being imposed on African nations, where the need for such systems is essentially driven by external policies rather than local needs.
Multilateral organizations like UNHCR, IOM, and the various NGOs involved are fundamental in supporting this system. Criticism of their operations has grown, as scholars stress the colonial nature of permanent refugee camps on African soil[viii]. The establishment of multilateral programs or common guidelines, such as the 2018 Global Compact for Migration, favors the enforcement of a global migration management framework under the guise of shared humanitarian and social values. Ultimately, this hegemonic model tends to “reproduce social hierarchies and structures of exploitation in the service of capital”[ix]. In other words, it expands reliance on foreign funds in the global South, enforces arbitrary power by states and international organizations on migrants and displaced persons, and provides an exploitable labor force with scarce access to basic rights.
Material interests are the core question that shape the globalized system of controlled mobility and border security. With the expansion of closed-border politics, migration management has become an increasingly lucrative industry, driving significant funding not only for humanitarian organizations but also for a variety of fields such as military, logistic, and technology sectors that find in border management a fertile market and ground for implementation[x]. It is well-established that companies in the technology and defense industries reap significant profits through state contracts to supply surveillance tools for border security. Without adequately addressing this material dimension, we will not be able to advance a credible counter-narrative on the current approach of border securitization. The privatization of migration management, among other adverse consequences, often circumvents human rights oversight, leading to a broader erosion of accountability[xi].
The necessity to respond to such interests while maintaining a façade of rights-based approach has led to a system continuously contradicting itself. The institutions allegedly committed to protect human rights - i.e. states and international organizations - are the same facilitating violations and repression because of profit and power. Those governments that fund increased border control in Libya, Algeria, and Tunisia, contributing to the expansion of illegal detention and pushbacks, pay the authorities of Niger to build a permanent, but flawed, reception system. Over the past decade, Niger has emerged as one of the key “transit” countries, a designation that has helped it secure international funding[xii]. In 2015, the Nigerien government approved the so-called “anti-smuggling law”, which prohibits non-Nigerien citizens from traveling north of Agadez. This violated the principles of free movement previously established by the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). Nonetheless, Niger has been portrayed by the IOM and UNHCR as a positive example of a country that, despite its economic challenges, provides international protection to needy refugees.
It is known how the securitization of migration has disrupted local economies, particularly in the Agadez region, where many livelihoods depended on the migration industry. The criminalization of migration risks fostering social unrest and political instability in the long term. While reducing migration flows to Europe, externalization policies risk increasing local instability, which could ultimately lead to more migration and conflict[xiii]. Furthermore, this pattern reinforces racial divides in Africa, exporting European rhetoric and practices. Alarmingly, in North African countries there is an increasing diffusion of openly racist discourses towards other African migrants, sometimes embraced by officials themselves. A recent, well-known episode involved Tunisian President Kais Saied, who in February, 2023 delivered a speech against migrants that are supposedly threatening the country’s demographic balance. His words sparked the reaction of various institutional actors, most notably the African Union[xiv]. While historical research is increasingly unfolding pan-African solidarity and shared struggles in the second half of the 20th century[xv], contemporary African politics is plagued by fragmentation and a lack of common claims to subvert the rules of international order, which were a powerful instrument mobilized in the post-independence era[xvi].
The Sahel is undergoing important changes, with a resurgence of anti-imperialist sentiment in the region. Shortly after Niger’s regime change in July 2023, concerns spread across Europe about the stability of the migration control system, amidst shifting cooperation paradigms that began aligning with anti-Western principles. A few months later, in November 2023, the government abrogated the anti-smuggling law, claiming that managing migrants should not be a burden for transit countries. The abrogation did not amount to regulation, which is expected to revive the pre-2015 informal economy around migration[xvii]. Shortly after, talks with the Algerian authorities to limit the practice of pushback were launched.
It is undeniable that reducing European and Western influence in the region would lead to significant changes in the current refugee reception system. However, simply claiming local empowerment over international interference is not enough to eliminate oppression within migration management systems. The main concern of state authorities remains with security, and the control of movement is treated as one of the aspects to be addressed within this framework. Even among activists who look favorably at current political developments in Niger, there is concern for the persisting criminalization of solidarity, with a new provision establishing that “any person who hosts, receives or accommodates persons qualified as foreigners, without notification or other formality, could be sanctioned”[xviii].
Finding more effective responses to mobility that do not criminalize people on the move or solidarity remains a key challenge for reversing oppressive practices in the area. So far, changes in migration legislation have not structurally dismantled the pre-existing mechanisms targeting third-countries refugees. The humanitarian system persists with its entrenched power structures, with a central role still played by the UNHCR, the IOM, and a wide set of national and international NGOs that operate in refugee camps. A clear gap remains between those who set reception policies, those who implement them, and the refugees who are directly affected - whose voices are systematically excluded from the process. While the Alliance of Sahel States (AES) is promoting an integration process through the launch of a regional passport, the legal status of refugees from other countries is not a current priority, remaining in the hands of arbitrary decisions by national authorities and international organizations. Many of the refugees in Agadez are Sudanese or come from other Eastern and Central African countries. They are stuck within a state-of-exception regime, with fewer access to rights, making it easier to ignore their needs and voices. The suspension of international protection application reviews by Nigerien authorities since late 2022 has left thousands in legal limbo, with limited opportunities for resettlement or integration into the local labor market.
We must support the claims of grassroots movements and solidarity networks precisely because of their capacity to envision alternative futures, beyond the approach currently embraced by institutional politics. Refugees’ calls for action from international organizations and wealthy nations are not an acknowledgment of their moral superiority in respecting human rights standards. On the contrary, they directly confront these actors with their historical responsibilities and call for redistributive justice. Indeed, it is in order to defend the privileges of a minority that freedom of movement is an increasingly selective right, inseparably tied to citizenship and income.
It is therefore not an overstatement claiming that these self-organized movements carry out real contemporary liberation struggles. They have the power to spread and entrench an anti-racist consciousness capable of exposing the hypocrisy of humanitarianism and challenging the securitarian approach to movement regulation. They do not limit themselves to denouncing the discrepancy between stated goals and the actual management of reception devices, but they confront the very imperialist and extractivist logic at the heart of current migration policies.
End notes
[i] “Stuck in Niger: the unheard cry of refugees from a camp funded by Italy and the EU”, Melting Pot Europa, 28 November 2024, https://www.meltingpot.org/en/2024/11/stuck-in-niger-the-unheard-cry-of-refugees-from-a-camp-funded-by-italy-and-the-eu/, accessed 4 December 2024.
[ii] “Is the humanitarian shelter in Agadez, Niger, humanitarian? Refugees stuck there for 7 years asks & writes a letter to the UNHCR & the international communities”, Refugees in Libya, 23 November 2024, https://www.refugeesinlibya.org/post/is-the-humanitarian-shelter-in-agadez-niger-humanitarian-refugees-stuck-there-for-7-years-asks , accessed 4 December 2024.
[iii] Aoife O’Leary McNeice, “Humanitarianism and Colonialism”, in Tobias Denskus, Bandana Purkayastha, Silke Roth (eds.), Handbook on Humanitarianism and Inequalities, Edward Elgar Publishing, 2024, 21.
[iv] Didier Fassin, Humanitarian Reason: A Moral History of the Present, University of California Press, 2012, 84-85.
[v] Antonio De Lauri, “A Critique of the Humanitarian (B)order of Things”, Journal of Identity and Migration Studies 13, no. 2 (2019): 148-166.
[vi] Silvia Pitzalis and Fabio De Blasis,“Externalising Migration Control in Niger: The Humanitarian-Security Nexus and the International Organization for Migration (IOM)”, The Journal of Modern African Studies 61, no. 3 (2023): 367–87.
[vii] European Union Emergency Trust Fund for Africa (EUTF), https://international-partnerships.ec.europa.eu/document/download/3184ff44-b2d6-4a49-b3d2-aaeb83448db9_en
[viii] Bosco Opi, Refugee Coloniality: An Afrocentric Analysis of Prolonged Encampment in Kenya, Palgrave-Macmillan, 2024
[ix] Hannah Cross, “Imperialism and Labour: Why Global Migration Governance Is Unnecessary And Why It Works”, Review of African Political Economy 51, no. 181 (2024): 491-508.
[x] Thomas Gammeltoft-Hansen and Ninna Nyberg Sørensen (eds.), The Migration Industry and the Commercialization of International Migration, Routledge, 2013.
[xi] Thomas Gammeltoft-Hansen, Access to Asylum. International Refugee Law and the Globalisation of Migration Control, Cambridge University Press, 2011.
[xii] Philip M. Frowd, “Producing the “transit” migration state: international security intervention in Niger”. Third World Quarterly (2019), 1–19
[xiii] Morten Bøås, “EU Migration Management in the Sahel: Unintended Consequences on the Ground in Niger?” Third World Quarterly 42, no. 1 (2020): 52–67
[xiv] African Union criticises Tunisia over 'racialised hate speech' against migrants, Reuters, 25 February 2023, https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/african-union-criticises-tunisia-over-racialised-hate-speech-against-migrants-2023-02-25/ , accessed 5 December 2024.
[xv] Paraska Tolan-Szkilnik, Maghreb Noir: The Militant-Artists of North Africa and the Struggle for a Pan-African, Postcolonial Future, Stanford University Press 2023; Matteo Grilli and Frank Gerits (eds.), Visions of African Unity: New Perspectives on the History of Pan-Africanism and African Unification Projects, Palgrave Macmillan, 2021.
[xvi] Herb Addo, ed., Transforming the World Economy? Nine Critical Essays on the New International Economic Order (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1984).
[xvii] Niger after the Coup: new migration patterns in the Sahel?, Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, 8 May 2024, last access 16 February 2025.
[xviii] «Le gouvernement du Niger vise à préserver la souveraineté de l’État contre les ingérences des pays occidentaux». Entretien avec Moctar Dan Yayé, Alarme Phone Sahara, Melting Pot Europa, 7 February 2025, https://www.meltingpot.org/fr/2025/02/le-gouvernement-du-niger-vise-a-preserver-la-souverainete-de-letat-contre-les-ingerences-des-pays-occidentaux/, last accessed 17 February 2025.
Laura Morreale is a PhD candidate in History and institutions of Africa at the University of Perugia, Italy. Her research interests include development aid, North-South relations and South-South cooperation, particularly in the African and Arab region.