Business as usual for China in Africa?

Besides promoting confidence during the current economic meltdown, President Hu’s visit is also aimed at expanding trade, aid and investment in Africa as well as assessing the implementation of the eight FOCAC measures announced at the 2006 FOCAC summit. Already since January, several Chinese projects and agreements have been announced across the continent. These include:

• A $280 million deal with Mauritania to extend the port at Nouakchott
• Construction of a hospital in Nairobi
• A $77 million econiomic development package in Uganda
• Installation of government internet in Senegal
• A US$11.5 billion aid package to Senegal for sports, cultural and sanitation projects
• An aid and cooperation agreement to further ties with Rwanda
• A US$2.6 billion agreement to develop Liberia's iron ore mine -- the biggest ever investment in the West African nation
• A new agreement with Nigerian Communications Satellite Limited to replace the nation's first communications satellite, which failed in orbit in November 2008.
• US$1 billion to revamp national stadiums in Angola for 2010 Africa Cup of Nations.

All this signals that an immediate Chinese withdrawal from Africa is not on the cards in the short term as some analysts, like Mills and Herbst have predicted might be a consequence of the impact of the decline in global commodity prices. China’s Africa strategy may however undergo some revision in terms of focus areas and priority projects. A recent example was seen when the Gabonese government urged the Chinese government to accelerate development of the iron-ore project .

As part of the media spin to President Hu’s visit China has indicated that Beijing will double development aid to African countries . But this commitment is not new.. It was actually one of the measures committed to at the 2006 FOCAC Summit. And as the Chinese media and African governments commend China for actually fulfilling these aid commitments to Africa, especially as there is uncertainty about the donor commitments from the West, civil society actors should be asking the awkward questions and shining light in the dark corners as to what impact this aid has actually had on our societies and our daily struggles for justice. In short we should be asking our governments who benefited from this aid.

This leads to another set of strategic questions that civil society should be considering, namely monitoring and evaluating the 2006 FOCAC pledges. Already China has indicated that the eight FOCAC measures are almost completed and African governments are sure to follow suit. But, should we be satisfied with just accepting the official rhetoric? African CSOs now have an ideal opportunity seriously to consider initiating a shadow CSO FOCAC peer review process. This should not be confined to the FOCAC process but extend more broadly to China’s engagement in Africa as it relates to other external actors.

While China has remained committed to remitting the debt of more than 30 African countries, Angola has recently acknowledged that it is very close to securing a loan of US$1 billion or more from China, aimed at assisting the Dos Santos government in fulfilling its development commitments. As much as it is problematic that the details of the loan will be fine tuned by Beijing, it also disconcerting that this loan comes on top of the US2billion + oil-backed loan signed in 2003, especially for country whose HDI score ranks 157 out 179 and whose capital is considered to be one of the most expensive cities in the world. The obvious question is whether Angola can afford these loans when the backbone of its economic growth, oil, has fallen to less than US$50 a barrel. Here is a critical space for CSOs engaged in social justice struggles to raise the uncomfortable questions as to what will be the long-term impact of these loans on Angola’s society and at what cost.

But at the same time African CSOs should get not caught in the futile trap of vilifying China while being complacent when it comes to other external actors in Africa. A case in point is the recent pressure from western donors on the Laurent Kabila government in the DRC to renegotiate the mineral backed infrastructure loan. While it is important for CSOs to interrogate the nature of the US$9 billion contract, it also imperative that we do not allow Western financial institutions and donors to continue to determine Africa’s external relations. This is particularly relevant when we consider that the West cannot afford to act as judge and jury regarding the continent’s development needs, especially when the West’s own track record in Africa is chequered.

So as Mali, Senegal, Tanzania and Mauritius get ready to roll out the red carpet for President Hu, CSO actors in these countries should also be ready and alert in ensuring that it does not become a one-sided talk shop. One way they can push ahead is by hosting events, roundtables and other fora, which focus on the impact of China’s largesse. Such dialogues are important as they become the source for primary data as opposed to having outside researchers coming in and providing their own interpretation of the impact. But this should not be the only measure of the visit.

Already governments of the respective countries are expecting that the visit by President Hu is going to expand trade and investment ties. This expectation should also encourage more trilateral engagements between African governments, CSOs and President Hu’s delegation where possible. It should not be business as usual for China’s engagement in Africa. Instead, the only set of actors who can determine whether China’s engagements in Africa are having a positive impact is African CSOs and communities. It is these peoples’ daily struggles that determine the measure of how successful the doubling of aid has been, the provision of infrastructure in connecting to markets and social services, and whether trade and investment increases the prospects of a better livelihood.

Therefore, President Hu’s visit marks a significant juncture for African CSOs to capture an opportunity to make their voices heard. Even though it will pose difficult challenges along the way, it is nevertheless an important opening that must be considered, not least because the 2009 FOCAC Summit should not become business as usual for China and African governments.

* Sanusha Naidu is the research director of Fahamu's China-Africa programme.
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