Kenya is entering a protracted crisis. No one really knows who actually won the presidential elections. Given the overwhelming number of parliamentary seats won by the ODM and the dismissal of some 20 former ministers who lost their seats, it seems likely that the presidential results probably followed suit. But it is no longer really a matter of who won or lost. For one thing is certain: it is the Kenyan people who have lost in these elections.

That the elections results were rigged – of that there is little doubt. The hasty inauguration, the blanket banning on the broadcast media, the dispersal of security forces to deal with expected protests – all these have given the post election period the flavour of a coup d’etat. What was not expected was the speed with which the whole thing would unravel. The declaration of the members of the Electoral Commission that the results were indeed rigged only added to the growing realisation that a coup had indeed taken place.

People across the country took to the streets to protest and were met with disproportionate use of force by the police and GSU. Emotions ran high. And there is evidence that politicians from all sides used the occasion to instigate violent attacks against their opponents constituencies. There have been rapes, forced circumcision and forced female genital mutilation. The western media has been quick to describe these as ‘ethnic clashes’ – but then they appear only to be able to see tribes whenever there are conflicts in Africa. What is ignored by them is that the security forces have been responsible for the majority of killings.

What we have in Kenya is a political crisis that could, descend into civil war if the political crisis is not resolved soon. And therein lies the problem.

There is no coherent political direction from the ODM. First Raila Odinga declares he’s the ‘people’s president’ (shades of Blair’s ‘people’s princess’ speech – the first time as tragedy, the second time as farce, some might say – and says he is going to arrange to be inaugurated. What happened?

Then he says that he is not willing to meet with Kibaki, then says he will meet provided there is an international mediator. He says he will form his own government, and then takes that no further.

Then he calls for a million person march into Nairobi, and when faced with a banning order and massive police attacks, backs down and calls for another demonstration the following day.

But what is this demonstration seeking to achieve? Such events are usually a means of showing the size of popular support: but ODM has already demonstrated its popular support in the stolen elections. There are no coherent political demands for this event that would bring the support of the many who, though they may not have voted for ODM, would feel that they would nevertheless want to express their support. There is no real strategy for enabling PNU’s own political base to be won over.

The election results were rigged, sure. But the failure to demand that an independent judicial inquiry be established to investigate only leads to suspicions that even the ODM were not keen to have the results investigated. It is now probably too late to conduct a satisfactory investigation since original records may have been tampered with – which might explain the Attorney General’s sudden willingness announced today to allow the ECK records to be inspected without recourse to use of the courts.

The mass demonstrations could have been used to call for such an investigation and to protest against the media ban imposed by Kibaki and to challenge constitutionality of the ban. Instead, it served no purpose other than what some see as an infantile response to the theft of the elections.

Why has there been no public appeal to the armed forces and police – whose families have no doubt suffered in the violent upheavals – to refuse to fire on citizens, or to defend and protect citizens from the violence that has been unleashe?. Kibaki can retain power only through the use of force – and so long as the armed forces and the police remain loyal, he will be able to retain his hold on power.

ODM has failed to challenge the existing government by encouraging all sections of society to create a viable alternative to the present government.

But the real tragedy of Kenya is that the political conflict is not about alternative political programmes that could address the long standing grievances of the majority over landlessness, low wages, unemployment, lack of shelter, inadequate incomes, homelessness, etc. It is not about such heady aspirations.

No, it boils down to a fight over who has access to the honey pot that is the state. For those in control of the state machinery are free to fill their pockets. So the battle lines are reduced to which group of people are going to be chosen to fill their pockets – and citizens are left to decide perhaps that a few crumbs might fall off the table in their direction.

And the electorate – the mass of citizens who have borne the brunt of the recent violence and decades of prolonged disenfranchisement from accessing the fruits of independence – are reduced to being just being fodder for the pigs fighting over the trough.

The Kibaki regime seems unlikely to concede any space – for to do so would confirm the suspicions of election theft. And the longer that the current impasse continues, the more likely it is that people will seek to vent their anger and frustration in senseless violence – energy that could so easily be turned towards organising to building a new world.

So what is going to be the way forward? Will there be an independent inquiry into the election results? Into the violence that has taken place? Will the contending parties agree to the formation of an interim government that would oversee the re-run of the elections?

Whatever happens, the present crisis has demonstrated that there is a serious lack of any formations that can articulate a coherent political programme for social transformation. Politics will remain forever about who gets access to the trough so long as there is no alternative.

This issue of Pambazuka News is dedicated to those who have paid with their lives in this period of crisis.

* Firoze Manji is co-editor of Pambazuka News and executive director of Fahamu.

* Please send comments to or comment online at www.pambazuka.org

Firoze Manji looks behind the mask of remittances and suggests that there are grounds for questioning the overall value of remittances as a vehicle for development or social progress.

How often do we hear the phrase “remittances to Africa are a key source of development funding”? The volume of funds being remitted to Africa are certainly impressive. In 2005, we are told, “they totalled $188 billion—twice the amount of official assistance developing countries received. Moreover, there is evidence that such flows are underreported. Indeed, remittances through informal channels could add at least 50 percent to global recorded flows. Most of the reported flows go to regions other than sub-Saharan Africa (SSA), but SSA has still been part of the overall rising global trend. Between 2000 and 2005, remittances to the region increased by more than 55 percent, to nearly $7 billion, whereas they increased for developing countries as a group by 81 percent.” (Gupta et al 2007).

Can such remittances be equated with ‘development funding’? What is the evidence that this contributes significantly to the elimination of poverty? And if remittances of funds from workers in the North to their families in the South be considered as part of the infrastructure of ‘development’, then should not remittances of funds from the South to the North be also be considered as part of the equation?

The overwhelming majority of studies demonstrate that remittances are primarily used by households and families to help them survive the inadequate incomes that they already have. In times of crises, such supplementary income is used to “smooth household consumption and welfare”. For the most part, these funds are used for consumption and payments for education, healthcare needs and food for subsistence. In other words, remittances are primarily used to supplement income because wages or income from agricultural production, petty-commodity production or ‘jua kali’ trade, or whatever activity people are engaged in to ‘make a living’ is inadequate. Remittances are not primarily used to create employment or develop new initiatives.

The reality is that the majority of rural families in Africa have long been dependent on the ability of members of their families who have jobs in urban centres to be able to remit a portion of their wages to help their families cope with impoverishment. This lies at the very heart of the system of underdevelopment that is characteristic of neo-colonial / post-apartheid economies as it was in the colonial and apartheid economies.

There is a close association between remittances and the maintenance of prevalence of low wages in Africa. One of the crucial determinants of low wages is the social cost of the reproduction of labour: from the employers point of view, the less it costs to enable the wage earner to survive and reproduce, the lower the wage needs to be. And the more people there are that are unemployed – the larger the ‘reserve army of labour’ – the harder it is for the worker to demand better wages, especially if they are unable to organise to put pressure on employers. If the families of workers are eking out an existence on marginalised land, a few pennies in the form of remittances from the employed worker makes all the difference.

When migrant workers (either transiently away from home or with more permanent residency in countries where wages are better) are able to supplement the cost of maintaining their families through remittances, then what they are doing is not only helping their families survive: they are also ensuring the maintenance of their families at no additional cost to their employer or the state. For the recipient, of course, these remittances are a lifeline since they have no other means of surviving – especially in the lean times.

But is this development? Surely not. Surely it is subsistence, barely enabling people keeping their head above the water. It is ‘development’ only if we were to consider that development is not about social progress but about providing charitable support to the poor. Remittances are essentially an individualised social support mechanism without which there would be even greater misery.

Now supposing the same funds were used, instead, to support people to organise for better living wages, for better social services, for better housing and healthcare. Such a use of remittances would certainly contribute to social progress, to real development. So long as remittances play only the role of providing charitable support, they perform the role of shoring up an existing unjust system that keeps people poor. Worse still, there is a potential for disabling Africa's people from becoming organised actors who can determine their own future.

As Paulo Freire (1970) put it: “… charity constrains the fearful and subdued, the ‘rejects of life’, to extend their trembling hands. True generosity lies in striving so these hands – whether of individuals or entire people – need be extended less and less in supplication, so that more and more they become human hands which work and, working, transform the world." Do remittances really help human hands transform the world?

But even if we were to accept that remittances may be legitimately considered as ‘development funding’ or as part of the infrastructure of development, then surely movements of funds in the opposite direction – from South to the North – should also be taken into account. It is surprising this aspect is systematically ignored by those obsessed with promoting the apparent benefits of remittances. When Africans send funds from the North to the South, this is called remittances. When multinationals remit profits to the North, or when countries in the South are made to remit a part of their gross domestic product to the banks in the North, somehow this is not considered as (negative) remittances. If movements of funds in one direction are to be taken into account in the process of development, then surely movements in the opposite direction also need to be taken into account.

Surely, what is sauce for the goose is good for the gander?

Third World repayments of $340 billion each year flow northwards to service a $2.2 trillion debt, more than five times the G8's development aid budget (Dembele 2006). At more than $10 billion/year since the early 1970s, collectively, the citizens of Nigeria, the Ivory Coast, the DRC, Angola and Zambia have been especially vulnerable to the overseas drain of their national wealth. As Brussels-based debt campaigner Eric Toussaint concludes, 'Since 1980, over 50 Marshall Plans worth over $4.6 trillion have been sent by the peoples of the Periphery to their creditors in the Centre' (quoted by Patrick Bond 2005).

Research by the Tax Justice Network estimates that a staggering $11.5 trillion has been siphoned 'offshore' by wealthy individuals, held in tax havens where they are shielded from contributing to government revenues. “Around 30% of sub-Saharan Africa's GDP is moved offshore”, writes John Christensen (2006) of TJN, “As several studies have suggested, this rate of capital flight means that Africa - a continent we are continually told is irrevocably indebted - may actually be a net creditor to the rest of the world.”

In comparison, then, to the the wealth that is sucked out of Africa - which far exceeds the total amount of aid that comes from the North into Africa - the net value of 'remittances' (movements in both direction) is negative.

There are grounds, therefore, for questioning the overall value of remittances in development. That is not to say that sending money home doesn't help our families survive. Remittances remain essential for enabling the impoverished to cope with an unjust world that keeps them poor. But as a vehicle for social development and progress? I have my doubts.

* Firoze Manji is co-editor of Pambazuka News and executive director of Fahamu.

* Please send comments to or comment online at www.pambazuka.org

References

Patrick Bond (2005): Dispossessing Africa's Wealth. Pambazuka News
Demba Moussa Dembele (2005), Aid dependence and the MDGs, Pambazuka News http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/fandd/2007/06/gupta.htm

We are pleased to inform you that, for the third consecutive year, Pambazuka News has been voted by subscribers and voters around the world to be amongst "The Top 10 Who Are Changing the World of Internet and Politics" in an award organised by PoliticsOnline and World E-Gov Forum.

The judges stated: "This prestigious award seeks to recognize the innovators and pioneers, the dreamers and doers who bring democracy online. This year marked the toughest year ever in choosing the 20 finalists."

Thank you to all of you who voted for Pambazuka News, our readers, writers and contributors. This is your award. Congratulations to you all.

It was as if my CD player had developed a heart, a passion, a resonant emotion of its own. How, I thought to myself, can an instrument such as the double bass, usually lost as the background in the orchestra, so rarely heard as an instrument in its own right, play with such passion and meaning? And how was it that it has such meaning for me, largely unschooled in Western classical music? I don’t pretend to have even heard of the Italian romantic composer Bottesini, so I can’t say whether it was just the music that touched me. But I also sensed that it was the player, the South African musician Leon Bosch, who was reaching out to me, across years of experience of repression and suffering – that was what made listening to this an extraordinary experience.

‘I have no doubt that the double bass and I were made for each other,’ writes Bosch on the CD sleeve. ‘- we’re completely inseparable and the music we make together brings me unbridled joy! It has always been my mission in life to defend the cause of the underdog and my passion for the double bass, the ‘Cinderella’ of instruments, will never die.

‘Every note I play on the instrument embraces my life experiences, both in Europe and in my South African homeland. I’ve known love and comradeship, but also witnessed the epitome of hatred. I’ve felt both shining optimism and deep despair. I’ve benefited from the pleasures of civilised society, but also seen the destructive impact of poverty and ignorance. I’ve been privileged to stand side by side with people who’ve lost their lives in the defence of their principles.’

As a 15-year-old protestor in Cape Town Bosch was arrested, detained and tortured by the apartheid regime. After a trial at which he was found not-guilty as a result of being defended by Abdullah Omar (subsequently Minister of Justice in the new dispensation), Bosch wanted to study law, but was denied a place at University as a consequence of his political activities. And that made him turn to music, first at the South African College of Music and then the Royal Northern College of Music in the UK.

There is a long tradition of music as a place for protest and politics. We are used to hearing jazz, reggae, hip-hop, and similar forms of music expressing the struggle against oppression. To hear the same through classical music is rare, and even rarer was to hear the soul of the double bass sing of the struggle and of love. This is something to be experienced. Add this one to your collection.

We hope to feature extracts of this music in future Pambazuka News podcasts. Look out for these!

* Virtuoso Double Bass: Giovanni Bottesini 1821-1889 is published by Meridian Records, 2007 (www.meridian-records.co.uk)

* Firoze Manji is editor of Pambazuka News and director of Fahamu

* Please send comments to or comment online at http://www.pambazuka.org/

This week, to coincide with civil society meetings being launched in Accra, Ghana, in the run up to the African Union (AU) Summit on Continental Government, we publish a special issue of Pambazuka News. Given the large number of articles and issues addressed, we will be sending out Pambazuka News in three parts. Part 1 and Part 2 will contain the main articles on the topic, and will be sent out, respectively, today (Thursday), and tomorrow (Friday). Part 3, the Links and Resources section, will contain some of your usual favourites, letters to the editor, as well as the summaries of useful websites. Thanks for your understanding.

It is with an angry sadness that we learned of this giant's death over the weekend. If there was one book that I could name that had such a profound effect on my thinking, it was God's Bits of Woods. We named our son after Sembene Ousmane. We have long wanted to interview Sembene Ousmane in these pages, but somehow didn't manage to work up the courage to speak with such a giant. His contribution to our understanding of the struggle for emancipation in Africa is unmeasurable. His memory lives on in his films and his writing. It is for us to make certain that future generations in Africa will study his works, and by studying them, find the pathway to freedom.

The following select list may help those less familiar with his work:

Selected filmography:
Borom Sarret (1963)
Niaye (1964)
La Noire de...(1966)
Mandabi (1968)
Xala (1974)
Ceddo (1977)
Camp de Thiaroye (1988)
Guelwaar (1992)
Faat Kiné (2000)
Moolaadé (2004)

Books:
Le docker noir, 1956, Paris: Debresse, novel, new edition: Présence
Africaine, Paris, 2002,
- engl. The Black Docker, London: Heinemann, 1987.
O pays, mon beau peuple! 1957.
Les bouts de bois de Dieu, 1962.
- engl. God's Bits of Wood, London: Heinemann, 1995.
Voltaïque, Paris: Présence Africaine, 1962, short stories.
L'Harmattan, Paris: Présence Africaine, 1964, novel.
Le mandat, précédé de Vehi-Ciosane, Paris: Presence Africaine, 1966,
- engl. The money-order: with, White genesis, London: Heinemann, 1987
Xala, Paris: Présence africaine, 1973.
Le dernier de l'Empire, L'Harmattan 1981, - 'a key to Senegalese
politics', Werner Glinga, engl. The last of the Empire: A Senegalese
Novel, London: Heinemann, 1983.
Niiwam, Paris: Presence Africaine, 1987, engl. Niiwam and Taaw: Two
Novellas, Oxford and Portsmouth, N. H.: Heinemann, 1992.

Pambazuka News is 300 issues old today. Starting life in December 2000 as a service to a limited group of human rights organisations in eastern and southern Africa, the weekly newsletter has grown into an important platform for analysis, discussion, debate, and information about the struggle for social justice in Africa with an estimated readership in the region of 500,000.

Pambazuka News grew out of the recognition for the need to nurture the re-emergence of a progressive pan-African movement. We wanted to break the isolation that was apparent, whereby those in one country knew little of what was happening elsewhere on the continent. We wanted to find a way of linking struggles across national boundaries, and between different sectors. We wanted to challenge Northern constructs of division between civil and political rights on the one hand, and economic, social and cultural rights on the other. We wanted to provide a platform for those whose views rarely get aired in the mainstream media.

And we wanted to challenge parochial visions of what ‘Africa’ means: break with divisive Northern constructs of ‘sub-Saharan Africa’ that attempt to disarticulate the history and heritage of most of North Africa from being a part of our own history.

Africa cannot be adequately defined merely geographically: it must be understood in terms of the history of its struggles. That history has involved the dispersal of its people into a diaspora, as a result of forced and voluntary migrations, and the absorption of peoples from other continents into a rich web of struggles. A definition of Africa based on the history of the struggles of its people is an embracing not an exclusionist history.

Above all, our ambition was to catch history on its wings. To enable people across the continent to be inspired by the spirit and work of other Africans who are influencing, making and changing history. We wanted to establish a platform that reflected the aspirations of the many who believe that a better world is possible. By engaging with one another, we wanted to build an alternative to the dominant, destructive, get-rich-quick, beggar-thy-neighbour ideologies that predominate today. We had to avoid dogmatism and sectarianism that has so seriously undermined our movements in the past, and instead encourage constructive debate and enable diverse viewpoints to be expressed.

Central to the strategy for developing Pambazuka News was the need to move beyond commentary and analysis. We wanted to put Pambazuka News at the service of movements for social change; as a tool in the armory of the movements for social justice, to be used by them as part of their day-to-day work.

How far have we achieved these lofty ambitions? I think we have made some progress. We believe we have contributed in a small way to the emergence of a progressive pan-African movement. Much remains to be done. Our connections with social movements and with the trade union movement could be stronger. We still only publish in two imperial languages – English and French, and not yet in any African languages.

As an electronic publication, we reach but a tiny minority - and only those with access to email or the web. If we are to extend our reach to those who are increasingly disenfranchised in today’s technologically driven world, I believe that we need consider making Pambazuka News available in printed format, perhaps in the form of a newspaper available on the streets. To make that happen will take time and resources.

Over the last year, we have published more than 300 articles from African intellectuals, activists, academics, writers, thinkers and movements across the continent. Some of these have been compiled into special issues and books. Our French-language edition, produced from Senegal, was launched in January 2006. In September, we began producing audiovisual materials (‘podcasts’), making the voices of those in the frontline of struggles heard across the continent.

Pambazuka News continues to be used by social movements and coalitions, such as the Solidarity for African Women's Rights coalition on the AU Protocol on the Rights of Women in Africa, as a vehicle for campaigns. Pambazuka News has nurtured the establishment of the African Union monitor initiative which aims to strengthen the ability of CSOs to engage constructively with the AU in the interests of promoting justice, equity and accountability.

All of this has been done with few resources. While there are many individuals involved in the production of Pambazuka News, it is - believe it or not - produced by the equivalent of about three full-time staff only.

But if Pambazuka News is considered a ‘success’ - whatever that means, it is because of you - our readers and contributors. It is you who have kept us going through your generosity in submitting articles, letters, commentaries and information. A few of you have even been able to give us a little bit of cash! It is you who have let others know about our work. You, who have enabled us to show fidelity in the struggle for a better world.

So, thank you, readers and contributors alike. Come, celebrate with us this 300th birthday.

If you would like to send a message on our 300th birthday, please send it to We hope to publish a selection of such messages next week.

* Firoze Manji is Editor, Pambazuka News and Director of Fahamu

* Please send comments to

The World Social Forum, which took place in Nairobi, Kenya for the first time in Africa, was supposed to be a forum for the voices of the grassroots. But Firoze Manji writes that, despite the diversity of voices at the event, not everyone was equally represented.

As one would expect, WSF was highly heterogeneous. There was a lot going on. At one level no one can deny the diversity of people from all parts of the world. WSF seemingly reflected the heterogeneity of civil society internationally: there were initiatives from grassroots women’s organisations, from feminists, social movements, small and large African organisations, international (or is it ‘multinational’?) organisations, donors and funders, grantees, activists, hustlers and the hassled. There were vociferous anti-capitalists and anti-(capitalist) globalisation meetings and discussions, as one would expect of an event that evolved out of the need to assert an alternative to imperialist globalisations of the Davos kind. And there were those whose politics could reasonably be viewed as part of the civil society infrastructure of modern-day imperial expansion.

But to describe only the diversity would be to miss the real, and perhaps more disturbing, picture. The problem was that not everyone was equally represented. Not everyone had equal voices. This event had all the features of a trade fair – those with greater wealth had more events in the calendar, larger (and more comfortable) spaces, more propaganda – and therefore a larger voice. Thus the usual gaggle of quasi donor/International NGOs claimed a greater presence than national organisations – not because what they had to say was more important or more relevant to the theme of the WSF, but because, essentially, they had greater budgets at their command. Thus the WSF was not immune from the laws of (neoliberal) market forces. There was no levelling of the playing field. This was more a World NGO Forum than an anti-capitalist mobilisation, lightly peppered with social activists and grassroots movements.

And the sense of the predominance of neoliberalism was given further weight by the ubiquity of the CelTel Logo – the Kuwaiti owned telecommunications company that had exclusive rights at the WSF; a virtual monopoly provided to a hotel that provided food at extortionate prices that most Kenyans, if they were allowed in, could hardly afford. And rumours were rife that the business of catering involved people in high places winning exclusive contracts. Hawkers, on whom most of Nariobians depend for providing everything from phone cards to food and refreshment were for a while excluded physically (as well as financially) from entering the China-built Moi Sports Stadium in Kasarani, the venue for the WSF. And it was only when frustrated activists took direct action to occupy the offices of the organisers that a more liberal policy for entry was implemented.

This was the first full WSF held in Africa (Mali was host to one of the polycentric WSF’s last year). But the forum was marked by the under-representation of social activists from Africa – or indeed from the global south. Inevitably this reflected on how debates and discussions were framed. Pambazuka News staff had hoped that this space would be the basis for forging a broader radical pan-Africanism. But that was, sadly, not to be. The white North, with it hegemonic parochialism, was over-represented. Social movements from the South were conspicuous by their numerically small presence at the forum.

Probably the most consistently heavily attended forum throughout the week was that organised by the Human Dignity and Human Rights Network which had the largest tent, and held meeting after meeting throughout most of the week, with a caste of well known speakers. But like most of the events at WSF, the set-up of the meetings was of a traditional platform of speakers with the audience being talked at rather than being engaged in discussion. While we heard the experience of both survivors of human rights abuses and human rights defenders, there was little political analysis.

And that probably catches the sense of most, thankfully not all, of the WSF events: there was lots of talking and sloganeering. There was much discussion about policies and alternatives to existing policies. But one couldn’t help feel the absence of politics. It’s as if many believe that nice policies (or human rights legislations) get made by nice people. But the reality is that what ends up as policy is the outcome of struggles in the political domain – fundamentally between the haves and the have-nots. But in a week in which the voices of the have-nots were under-represented, I guess we should not be surprised by the absence of politics.

I think everyone was disappointed by the surprisingly low turn-out: estimates of 30,000 to 50,000 people attended, compared with an expected crowd of 150,000. What made so many keep away in droves? Despite asking many this question, I have found no satisfactory reasons offered.

* Firoze Manji is director of Fahamu and editor of Pambazuka News

* Please send comments to or comment online at www.pambazuka.org

2006 was the 50th anniversary of the establishment of the first diplomatic ties between China and African countries and saw an increased focus on the relationship between China and Africa. In June 2006, Chinese President Hu Jintao and Premier Wen Jiabao visited ten African countries to promote China–Africa relations. In November, African heads of state met in Beijing to learn of a massive Chinese package of aid and assistance, including preferential loans, cancellation of debts, and numerous other initiatives.

Chinese engagement with Africa has become the topic of serious analysis and debate. In the field of governance, natural resources and markets, China’s presence is everywhere. Suddenly, Chinese influence in Africa has begun to top the foreign policy agenda of African governments. Chinese involvement in Africa has raised concerns about China's commitment to human rights issues and its policy on arms sales to African governments, while in the areas of textiles and natural resource exploitation, Chinese competition has generated some adverse consequences for African industry and the environment. China has been pronounced the new imperial power in Africa, usurping the influence of Western governments. However, a more nuanced approach and understanding of China–Africa relations might be more helpful.

Historically, China has played a different role in Africa from Africa's colonial powers, supporting African countries in various liberation struggles, providing educational opportunities and assisting in healthcare. Moreover, the rise of China in Africa does not just make problems for the continent, it also creates opportunities. As Stephen Marks pointed out in a recent editorial in Pambazuka News , Western corporations and governments now face competition – there is an alternative to the dictates of the international financial institutions – and this can give African states more room for manoeuvre. The African Union as well as civil society need to consider how to react to China's challenge while avoiding ’uncritical acceptance on the one hand or mere rejectionism on the other’.

Despite the clear influence of China, research, policy, debate and analysis on China’s present and future role in Africa remains limited. All too often, the influence of Western policy towards Africa dominates development discourse. What is missing is an integrated overview of Africa’s own response, especially by researchers and activists on the ground and an ongoing forum through which such an integrated response can be developed and sustained.

With the support of Christian Aid and TrustAfrica, Fahamu undertook a work in progress to identify leading institutions, activists and academics within Africa who were working on China. In the course of this review, we commissioned a number of researchers to write papers on the key issues for both this special issue of Pambazuka News (issue 282 of 14 December 2006) and for a book, which we plan to launch at the World Social Forum. Given the relatively short deadlines available to ensure that the book would be available at the World Social Forum, not everyone we approached was able to respond. The articles in this special edition provide, therefore, only a taste of the richness of research and reflection on the subject of China’s emerging role in Africa.

This special issue contains shortened versions of the articles that appear in the book 'African Perpectives on China in Africa', edited by Firoze Manji and Stephen Marks, and published by Fahamu in 2007. To save on space, we have not included references here. The full articles will appear in the book as will the references. We will also make the full texts of the articles available for download in PDF format at Pambazuka News website at http://www.pambazuka.org/en/publications/index.php.

As we have several long articles, this special issue is published in two parts, the second part going out tomorrow in place of the usual Links and Resources.

Our intention in publishing this special edition is both to reflect the current thinking on the subject as well as to help nurture further research and engagement. But in so doing, we know that we are only beginning to understand the shifts in the balance of forces in Africa that are emerging as a result of what some refer to as ‘South–South cooperation’. There are four other players whose role needs further attention: India, Venezuela, Brazil and South Africa. We hope to turn our attention to these ‘new’ players in the coming year.

• Firoze Manji is director of Fahamu and editor of Pambazuka News.