Reform of South Africa requires coordinated approach

South Africa’s extraordinary high levels of mass poverty, unemployment and inequality, are pegged at levels that were seen in many countries only during the Great Depression of the 1930s, or during or immediately following the aftermath of debilitating wars.

This means that ordinary measures won’t do to tackle the perilous mountain of problems South Africa is stuck with. The successes of most East Asian and other developmental states – many who had to rebuilt after humiliating defeats in wars, occupation or colonialism, was driven by a singular focused national development effort which presupposed that unless they were successful, their countries would be in peril, either from external or internal threats. Failing to do so, these countries faced being annihilated by powerful external enemies, ready to pounce on their vulnerability.

At the heart of successful developmental states not only are there relevant policies, particularly industrial policy, but also specific institutional arrangements, both formal and informal, and public and private, which interface to provide the optimum conditions for economic growth and development. Most successful developing countries since the Second World War, especially the East Asian tigers, have had a central structure, such as a national planning unit, managing economic development. They did so around a well-thought out long-term development plan.

In many countries these planning structures were set up after governments, society and citizens realised that their countries were in deep economic crisis and they had to do something very drastically and very quickly to lift their economies out of the morass.

The task of these central planning units was to synchronise the collective effort to raise economic growth, spread prosperity to the largest amount of people in the shortest possible time, and industrialise in the quickest possible time. These economic planning structures had the political backing from top leaders, most political parties, civil society and the wider population. Everything was given to them to make their work possible. The best talent in the country, combining technical, administrative and professional skills was recruited – this helped foster cross-societal legitimacy.

These institutions were generally backed up by extremely competent public services, resolutely focused on public service, led by the best talents also appointments to the public service were often through strict entrance examinations. In fact, successful East Asian developmental states as the first priority got their civil service in shape, because without a proper, honest and smart public service, whatever the smart policies, implementation just won’t happen. In these countries an efficient, motivated public sector implemented the reforms.

Central planning institutions were at the centre of these public services, and marshalled them behind a common goal: To secure industrialisation in the quickest possible time, according to clear delivery time-lines, and targets. These organisations were extremely accountable: They had to account for every cent, in circumstances where resources were scarce that the country could not afford to waste the littlest of resources.

Such central planning units make detailed assessments of the state of the economy, then draw up plans to improve their economies to specific time-lines, closely monitoring these plans to see implementation remains on schedule, if not, or if the policies appear to be inappropriate, make suitable interventions early on. They task individuals with responsibility and hold them accountable for every facet of the delivery chain.

Furthermore, the public service and the economic bureaucracy are generally ring-faced from patronage systems. The public service is generally above opportunistic capture, whether from political, business or ethnic groups, yet it is ‘embedded’ in society, through reciprocal engagement with civil society, social partners and communities. This ‘embeddedness’ with society, makes the public service not only in tune with its problems, but also helps make it more responsive to policy changes needed.

This ‘embeddedness’ is crucial in forging a developmental coalition between the state, civil society, social partners and communities, which is a negotiated partnership, where either groups can take policy initiatives, but the state takes a guiding role, either by exercising leadership directly, or by delegation to social partners.

In successful developmental states, not only are the formal rules of engagement in politics across society focused on national development, but also the informal rules. This ‘embeddedness’ is also crucial to secure a consensus on both the formal and informal rules of engagements that binds all actors in society, whether individuals, groups or governments, to a common project of national development, rather than self-enrichment. In South Africa’s case the informal rules of engagement, must, like the formal rules, be based on democratic ones.

What would be the appropriate operational model for South Africa’s National Planning Commission, given the country’s specific administrative culture, capacity and institutional arrangements? Having had an effective public service has always been on decisive difference between the successful East Asian developmental states and other mostly failing or mediocre developing countries.

On current form the South African public service will not be able to deliver a successful developmental state along the East Asian developmental states. South Africa’s public service is politicised, riddled with corruption and inefficiency, and appointing the most competent individual for the job is certainly not the norm. In fact, any national planning commission may see the implementation of its policy stymied by an inefficient public service.

South Africa has two choices. In the first option it would spend time fixing the public service, and then focus on full-scale implementation. A focused reform, with a clear time-line, say at the end of the 2014 term, will tackle the public service, starting by filling the 40 per cent vacancies, and firing the most obviously corrupt and inefficient. New appointments will be made truly on merit, to get the best people into the already vacant positions, at a minimum. Importantly, a serious attempt will be made to orientate the public service to a genuine public service ethos.

Implementation would focus on getting the basics right, which means mostly implementing current policies, rather than introducing any new ones. The only new policies that would be implemented would be essential economic ones.

The second option would be fixing the public service and implementing new policies, particularly necessary economic reforms at the same time – all before 2014. This would mean a kind of shock therapy, filling the 40 per cent empty posts with quality incumbents, while firing the most corrupt, and changing the administrative culture of the public service, while at the same time implementing necessary economic reforms. This may not be practical.

In our first option, a strategy for the end of the 2014 term must be centred on the economic cluster of ministries (including the Public Administration Ministry), the South African Reserve Bank and South African Revenue Services, and key Development Finance Institutions (DFIs), such as the Industrial Development Corporation and Development Bank of Southern Africa (DBSA); and state-owned enterprises (SOEs), such Eskom and Transnet, crucial in building physical and social infrastructure. This core group will have to function as centres of excellence that should drive economic transformation in the short term (up to 2014).

As a first strategy, co-ordination and synergy within the economic cluster must be a priority in the first term; to prevent economic policy being pulled in all directions, which will only cause more overlaps, confusion and paralysis. Currently not only is there mandate creep between different government departments, ministries and state-owned companies, but also a silo mentality in operational work, with little co-ordination of core functions.

For the past few years’ government, organised labour and business and community organisations have failed to cobble together a national social pact. Perhaps in the short term it would be best to structure sector based social pacts. In May 2010, the Congress of South African Trade Unions, Federation of Unions of South Africa, the National Council of Trade Unions and eleven manufacturers of car parts, electronics, glass, petroleum and steel got together to come up with joint strategies to support the industry.

But government may also have to delegate certain policy initiatives to business, civil society and labour. For example, in May 2010, South Africa’s two largest business organisations, Business Leadership South Africa and Business Unity South Africa pledged to come up with self-generated initiatives to help government lift electricity capacity. Or Business Leadership South Africa’s initiative to double or triple the size of South Africa’s economy within a generation; or their initiative to get company CEOs to commit to skills development or more responsible corporate behaviour.

How should the national planning commission respond? Firstly, as it set up its structure from anew, it has the opportunity to recruit only the best brains, to give them a clear mandate, with targets and deliverables, and a long-term development plan to pursue.

The national planning commission may possibly have to circumvent the public service, at least in the short-term, when the service is being transformed into a more efficient and accountable one. There are some lessons to be learned from South Africa’s 2010 World Cup Local Organising Committee, in terms of pursuing targets and meeting deadlines, for a new national planning commission. South Africa’s 2010 World Cup Local Organising Committee’s task was to plan, implement, and deliver a successful World Cup for South Africa. If they did not deliver on time, South Africa would be deeply embarrassed. This kind of urgency and resolve, where failure is not an option, and delivery must happen on time, must be the driving force for any new planning commission. Furthermore, to implement the World Cup successfully, national, provincial and local government spheres unprecedentedly work in unison, rather than as separate silos, to achieve a common task.

Political will from the leaders of the governing African National Congress (ANC) to make reform trade-offs that are in the widest interest of a collective national transformation is going to be absolutely crucial. A national planning commission that has the backing of the president, can circumvent lethargic parts of the civil service, and which has the power to get individual departments and officials to actually do something to deliver, could be an option for South Africa. Finally, in addition to an extraordinary sense of accountability, transparency and internal democracy, any national planning commission must also allow for maximum citizen participation.

BROUGHT TO YOU BY PAMBAZUKA NEWS

* This article first appeared in the Sunday Independent, 19 September 2010.
* William Gumede is co-editor of the recently released ‘The Poverty of Ideas: South African Democracy and the Retreat of the Intellectuals’(Jacana).
* Please send comments to [email protected] or comment online at Pambazuka News.