Back Issues

Featured this week

2005-02-24

http://pambazuka.org/en/category/highlights/27051

* EDITORIAL: HIV/AIDS messages need to be communicated in a language that is understandable so that efforts to save lives are not wasted
* COMMENT&ANALYSIS: Darfur and the struggles of a resilient people against all odds
- Might makes right in refugee camps – and it is women who suffer the most as a result of this power structure
* AFRICAN UNION WATCH: A summary of decisions from the recent AU meeting in Abuja
* CONFLICT AND EMERGENCIES: Tough weeks lie ahead if peace is to be secured in northern Uganda
* ELECTIONS AND GOVERNANCE: As elections loom in Zimbabwe, are MPs representatives or godfathers?
* DEVELOPMENT: The skeptics doubt whether spending more money on aid will reduce poverty
* HEALTH AND HIV AIDS: Global Health Watch 2005 is set for release soon
* ENVIRONMENT: A Durban landfill site is a prime example of how the poor will suffer from carbon trading
* MEDIA AND FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION: A new IFEX report expresses concern for press freedom in Tunisia
* BOOKS AND ART: Two books by African women published in France

HIV/AIDS - The dilemma of the inevitable

Kiiza Ngonzi

2005-02-24

http://pambazuka.org/en/category/features/27041

I officially became an African when l visited Nigeria two weeks ago, so I was told. No one is ever considered one until you make this pilgrimage and you have to go there to understand what they mean. So it is in this same spirit that I defend Nigerians, although l never thought that it would ever come to this. The most shocking discovery was that it is the Nigerians who leave the country to pursue greener pastures that give it a bad name with their survival antics. Nigerians on the whole are actually very honest people, with a few rough edges, but honest and very hospitable people. Hard to believe if you have met and dealt with their representatives on the continent.

All this l discovered after chain locking my suitcases with all forms of intricate locks that it would have needed a seminar to unlock. As l tightly clutched my limited hand luggage whilst checking in at the airport l was taken aback by the politeness yet in your face approach. But l was certain l was not going to fall for the famous sleek tongues they use to ensnare their victims…l knew them! I had read up on them! Be aware and be very afraid! But you can only go on for so long until you make up your mind to remember to relax as long as you have your passport and return ticket, which I had to check on so very often to ensure that it was still there. I had spent the better part of the earlier days going through a morning ritual of leaving my room with everything secured back into its cases. But to be honest l came back with everything l was supposed to come back with and very safe and sane and with a deep respect for a people who are unique in their own right, very unique.

But this is not about extolling the virtues of Nigerians but a gaining of an in depth understanding of the impact of HIV/AIDS on this nation and how people relate it to their daily life. To date Africa is the region worst affected by HIV/AIDS, with 70% of the world’s 42 million infected people (29.4 million people).An estimated 25 million people are living with HIV in sub-Saharan Africa, despite the apparent stabilization in HIV prevalence rates, with a yearly infection rate of 3.2 million Africans – 8,700 Africans every minute! This means that it will take 250 years to wipe out 10% of the world’s population and the “dark continent” will be riddled with bush and veld! Breaking it down further in southern Africa all seven countries have prevalence rates above 17% with Botswana and Swaziland having prevalence above 35%. In West Africa, HIV prevalence is much lower with no country having prevalence above 10% and most having prevalence between 1% and 5%. Adult prevalence in countries in Central and East Africa falls between 4% and 13%. With such figures is there any hope? How come they seem so accurate and so scary yet people seem unmoved?

With this as the backdrop, my visit was to the University of Abuja, to explore young minds and educate them on HIV/AIDS and its impact on their lives directly and indirectly. I also wanted to demystify the raging misconception about the spread of the disease, where they believed that it is those south of the equator that are dying and they were still safe.

I came at them double barrelled and used my experience as an example to give them a visual perception of how a person directly affected by the disease dealt with the emotional as well as financial challenges that go with HIV/AIDS. Personally I had come to the conclusion that the issue of HIV/AIDS is not in its entirety all about death. People die and will continue to die for one reason or the other. But it seems like l have been around AIDS all my adult life. I have watched my friends die, schoolmates wither and disappear for some concocted reason, and my friends’ parents fall sick, become incapacitated, die and be buried. I have played my role in fighting AIDS, worked with organizations with strong HIV/AIDS policies and community HIV/AIDS interventions programs. I have attended HIV/AIDS seminars, workshops on AIDS andlistened to the most moving experiences by victims and activists.

In spite of all this preparation there is nothing that prepares you when AIDS comes home. All l can say is that there’s an aura of hopelessness that settles around your entire being. You know that no matter what you do and will try to do the certainty of losing this person “soon” is written in stone and whatever you do is to just allay the inevitable. I have lost five members of my family within a space of 5 years; siblings aged between 30-45 years who have left behind 12 orphans between them and a series of financial dilemmas in their wake. To top it all,, our mother, who had parents’ worst nightmare of burying their own children, died of it too. If I did not know better I would think it is in the family genes but l will not go into that.

Without going into the details l believed my story represented all the facets of the impact of HIV/AIDS on an individual, a family and a community - both in the short term and the long term. In addition to being a woman, I represent the quota of HIV/AIDS that is affected and afflicted quantitatively and qualitatively by the epidemic. I played and provided the palliative care and in the end lost 5 key people in the family, all in their prime, and was left with the responsibility of looking after orphans. I highlighted the frustrations, accessibility to treatment and services, and this was in Uganda where the level of awareness and palliative care is quite high and l was well placed and privileged.

I then went ahead to create a picture of what the 5% prevalence rate attributed to Nigeria represented. Every time HIV/AIDS was discussed it was in the context of East, Central and Southern Africa, the sub Sahara Africa, which from their understanding, had to a certain extent created a belief that West Africa, the ECOWAS region, was safer. After all they only had to deal with 5% prevalence rates while “sub Saharan Africa” was dealing with 30-40% in the cases of South Africa and Botswana and 10-20 % in the cases of East and Central Africa.

Suffice to say that when it came to unpacking the 5% of 120 million Nigerian people we discovered that these 6 millionHIV positive cases were 5 times more than the 40% HIV/ADS cases attributed to Botswana who according to their total population represented about 400,000.

The aim of my story was to create a wider thinking and the need for a concerted effort and understanding of what the epidemic meant. I wanted these young people to understand that HIV/AIDS is not an issue of promiscuity or homosexuality, or who is sleeping with whom, but an issue that is affecting the very nature of societal progression. I needed them to visualise what would happen in Nigeria in relation to what had happened in South Africa. This was not very far off if they continued to assume and adhere to the current line of interpretation of the information at hand. What l had not counted on was the empathy that resulted from the talk, which was appreciated - but then it defeats the purposes because when people start pitying you they forget that the message was for them.

But my hope was not daunted and I decided to explore the environment of this august academic institution and see where these academic giants resided. What met me were mountainous rubbish heaps teeming with flies, broken sanitation systems and living conditions that defied definition. When it comes to HIV/AIDS, its heterosexually transmittal implications and disproportionate impact on women, the direct association to their living conditions was unfathomable.

It was after this that I realised that we are dealing with a situation beyond our comprehension. We came with pre-packaged information and hoped that these backward people would be grateful that “sons and daughters of the soil” had returned to save them from their lot in life. Here the priorities were very different and way beyond what HIV/AIDS connoted. They believed that it was the duty of the “government” to ensure that they had what they needed. The concept of harnessing their environment and seeing how they could survive with what they had was something they had not considered because they could not do anything about it and after all it was up to the “government” to sort these things out.

This experience informed my next visit to Funtua, Katsina State, Northern Nigeria, it very hot and with a very high Islamic influence. This time l was addressing 14-16 year old high school students and instead of talking at them I decided to have an open discussion. My message was that HIV/AIDS kills and devastates family livelihoods. We looked at its impact on an individual and how it affects his/her ability to do their work and provide for their families and how this translates to the family, the community and the region and the country as well. I kept away from the percentages and the regional subdivisions.

It yielded the same very practical results and intervention methods. In terms of content these children knew that HIV/AIDS was out there and in their communities and they were aware of the rumours. What they wanted to know then was what were they to do in the case of rape, or underage marriages, or access to preventive measures and counselling. All in all what was apparent was lack of access to information about personal hygiene, sexual reproductive health and its relationship with HIV/AIDS, sexual negotiation skills and the power relations within communities imbued with religious beliefs that promotes silence and considers certain topics taboo.

What is the problem? How are we sending out the message and is it getting to the right people? How do we create community ownership so as to overcome highly religious and cultural bottlenecks? How are we developing our communication strategies so as to identify target audiences that would have the ability and capacity to access information and respond to it effectively? One of the challenges has always been the language of communication particularly the use of statistics to explain the gravity of the situation and then using this same format to pass on this information to the affected target audiences. This is one feature that has resulted in the ineffective responses to HIV/AIDS programs. As you read the UNAIDS 2004 report it sounds like a research paper for an academic institution who are being asked to think through their parameters and see how “they” can come up with a course of action.

The dilemma we are finding ourselves in is where outsiders seem to be more concerned about our survival than we are. They seem to set the agenda and communicate it in a language comprehensible to only them. We, the so-called alleviators, are finding ourselves in places conceptually and geographically in our communities where HIV/AIDS is not considered an issue. The information is there, preventive methods there and primary curative remedies there that need to reach the people in need. We need to communicate in a language that is understandable to all so that our effort to save lives and give hope to the young is not wasted.

* Kiiza Ngonzi is HIV/AIDS Program Coordinator for Justice Africa. Justice Africa produces the Governance and AIDS Initiative Bimonthly Issues Brief, an
update on developments relevant to the issues of HIV/AIDS, democracy and
governance in Africa. Visit http://www.justiceafrica.org/gain_brief.htm for more information.

* Please send comments to editor@pambazuka.org

Tragedy in Darfur

Alex de Waal

2005-02-24

http://pambazuka.org/en/category/comment/27043

Every genocide is hideous, each in its own grotesque way. Searching for the origins and distinctiveness of the genocidal violence that has convulsed the Sudanese region of Darfur in the last year—leaving tens of thousands dead and perhaps a million people displaced and in danger—we must go to the remotest desert-edge settlements in Northern Darfur near the border with Chad, to the basalt stubs of mountains that march southward until they fuse in the 10,000-foot Jebel Marra massif in the center of Darfur, and to Sudan’s capital in Khartoum, far to the east.

Geography helps to explain much. Darfur is huge and distant from the capital, and events in neighboring Chad and Libya have often exerted more influence over it than the national government, whose ignorance of its western region and indifference to the welfare of its inhabitants spurred a rebellion in 2003, organized by the Sudanese Liberation Army (SLA) and the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM).

This journey will introduce us to these Darfur rebels, including members of the Fur, Zaghawa, Masalit, and Tunjur ethnic groups, who have been the primary victims of the violence; to their neighbors, the Darfurian Arabs—including the branches of the northern Rizeigat (Jalul, Mahariya, and Ereigat), Beni Halba, and Salamat—some of whom have been recruited to the infamous Janjawiid militia, the perpetrator of the worst massacres in the conflict; and to the Sudanese Government itself, which has suppressed the rebellion with brutal tactics rehearsed in the recently concluded 21-year civil war with southern Sudan.

We will see that the story is not as simple as the conventional rendering in the news, which depicts a conflict between “Arabs” and “Africans.” The Zaghawa—one of the groups victimized by the violence and described in the mainstream press as “indigenous African”—are certainly indigenous, black and African: they share distant origins with the Berbers of Morocco and other ancient Saharan peoples. But the name of the “Bedeyat,” the Zaghawa’s close kin, should alert us to their true origins: pluralize in the more traditional Arab manner and we have “Bedeyiin” or Bedouins. Similarly, the Zaghawa’s adversaries in this war, the Darfurian Arabs, are “Arabs” in the ancient sense of “Bedouin,” meaning desert nomad, a sense that has only in the last few decades been used to describe the Arabs of the river Nile and the Fertile Crescent. Darfurian Arabs, too, are indigenous, black, and African. In fact there are no discernible racial or religious differences between the two: all have lived there for centuries; all are Muslims (Darfur’s non-Arabs are arguably more devout than the Arabs); and until very recently, conflict between these different groups was a matter of disputes over camel theft or grazing rights, not the systematic and ideological slaughter of one group by the other.

As we dig through the layers of causation of this complicated war, we will come to see it as a deeply sad story about the struggles of resilient people, poor even by Sudanese standards, who have been pitted against each other by a forbidding environment, a long history of political neglect, and a ruthless national government.

>>>>Please click on the link below for the full article.
Every genocide is hideous, each in its own grotesque way. Searching for the origins and distinctiveness of the genocidal violence that has convulsed the Sudanese region of Darfur in the last year—leaving tens of thousands dead and perhaps a million people displaced and in danger—we must go to the remotest desert-edge settlements in Northern Darfur near the border with Chad, to the basalt stubs of mountains that march southward until they fuse in the 10,000-foot Jebel Marra massif in the center of Darfur, and to Sudan’s capital in Khartoum, far to the east.

Geography helps to explain much. Darfur is huge and distant from the capital, and events in neighboring Chad and Libya have often exerted more influence over it than the national government, whose ignorance of its western region and indifference to the welfare of its inhabitants spurred a rebellion in 2003, organized by the Sudanese Liberation Army (SLA) and the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM).

This journey will introduce us to these Darfur rebels, including members of the Fur, Zaghawa, Masalit, and Tunjur ethnic groups, who have been the primary victims of the violence; to their neighbors, the Darfurian Arabs—including the branches of the northern Rizeigat (Jalul, Mahariya, and Ereigat), Beni Halba, and Salamat—some of whom have been recruited to the infamous Janjawiid militia, the perpetrator of the worst massacres in the conflict; and to the Sudanese Government itself, which has suppressed the rebellion with brutal tactics rehearsed in the recently concluded 21-year civil war with southern Sudan.

We will see that the story is not as simple as the conventional rendering in the news, which depicts a conflict between “Arabs” and “Africans.” The Zaghawa—one of the groups victimized by the violence and described in the mainstream press as “indigenous African”—are certainly indigenous, black and African: they share distant origins with the Berbers of Morocco and other ancient Saharan peoples. But the name of the “Bedeyat,” the Zaghawa’s close kin, should alert us to their true origins: pluralize in the more traditional Arab manner and we have “Bedeyiin” or Bedouins. Similarly, the Zaghawa’s adversaries in this war, the Darfurian Arabs, are “Arabs” in the ancient sense of “Bedouin,” meaning desert nomad, a sense that has only in the last few decades been used to describe the Arabs of the river Nile and the Fertile Crescent. Darfurian Arabs, too, are indigenous, black, and African. In fact there are no discernible racial or religious differences between the two: all have lived there for centuries; all are Muslims (Darfur’s non-Arabs are arguably more devout than the Arabs); and until very recently, conflict between these different groups was a matter of disputes over camel theft or grazing rights, not the systematic and ideological slaughter of one group by the other.

As we dig through the layers of causation of this complicated war, we will come to see it as a deeply sad story about the struggles of resilient people, poor even by Sudanese standards, who have been pitted against each other by a forbidding environment, a long history of political neglect, and a ruthless national government.

Furawiya

Furawiya, the “valley of the shepherds,” is a Zaghawa village that used to be the last permanently inhabited settlement before the vastness of the Sahara. North of Furawiya, a water course called Wadi Howar flows for just a few days every few years. But when it does flow, the grasses that grow there are so lush that camels can feed on them for 40 days without needing water.

For such a tiny and remote place Furawiya has had some remarkable progeny. Two leading figures in the Darfurian drama grew up there: the president of Chad, Idris Deby, and the spokesman for the Darfurian opposition movements, Professor Sharif Harir, who lives in Eritrea, far away on Sudan’s eastern border. The military commander of the biggest rebel movement, the Sudanese Liberation Army, is Mini Arkoy Minawi, a Zaghawa from nearby.

Furawiya is now burned to the ground, many of its men murdered and its women raped. It was attacked within weeks of the outbreak of war in Darfur in February 2003, when the Sudanese government dispatched helicopter gunships to the rebel headquarters at Karnoi, 30 miles to the south. A band of villages from there to the Chadian border at Tine were destroyed in the first wave of scorched earth, which has become a distinctive feature of Sudanese counterinsurgency. The survivors have fled to refugee camps in Chad. The devastation of the village with its remarkable way of life is only one terrible casualty of the current conflict in Dafur.

But to understand the demise of Furawiya, we must go back to the last humanitarian disaster to strike the area, the drought and famine of 1984–1985. When that famine was drawing to a close, I spoke with a young woman in Furawiya called Amina. The widowed mother of three children, she harvested barely a basketful of millet in September 1984, when the third successive year of drought was devastating crops. Rather than eating her pitiful supply of food, she buried it in her yard, mixing the grains with sand and gravel to stop her hungry children from digging it up and eating it. Then she began an epic eight-month migration, not atypical of the journeys that ordinary Zaghawa rural people make. Amina started by scouring the open wildernesses of the Zaghawa plateau for wild grasses, whose tiny grains can be pounded into flour. Together with her mother (who was, like most older rural women, something of a specialist in wild foods), she spent almost two months living off wild grass and the berries of a small tree, known locally as mukheit and to botanists as boscia senegaliensis. Mukheit is toxic and needs to be soaked in water for three days before it is edible; although it has a sour taste, it contains about a third of the calories of grain.

Having lived solely on wild foods for eight weeks, and having stored enough provisions for a week’s journey, Amina left her eldest daughter in the care of her mother and walked southward. She found work on farms in better-watered areas, collected firewood for sale in towns, and sold a couple of her goats (for a meager return, since the market was flooded with distressed rural people selling animals). She finally made it to a relief camp in June, just before the rains were due, and collected one set of rations. (The USAID sorghum was known as “reagan,” giving rise to much speculation among the less-well-informed villagers as to the identity of this generous man. “Who is this Reagan?” one farmer asked me. “He ought to be promoted!’) With a couple of kilos of sorghum on her back, Amina and her two other children promptly left the camp and walked home (it took one week), dug up the seed Amina had buried the previous fall, planted it, and watched it grow for another three hungry months (again living off wild foods plus the milk from the herds of camels and goats that the Furawiya residents were bringing back from southern Darfur). Finally she harvested her first post-famine crop, which she was threshing the day I arrived.

A remarkable story of sheer toughness and survival skill, Amina’s story brought home to me just how marginal we outsider agents of relief are to the survival of ordinary Darfurian villagers. We provide little help and even littler understanding. A Zaghawa refugee in Chad today, looking across the border to the small town of Tine, with its gracious mosque, sees not a desert but a land in which she can survive, if only given the chance.

The Zaghawa showed extraordinary tenacity and skill in surviving the famine, but by the late 1980s they were poorer and more desperate. Over the previous decade, Zaghawa had been fanning out across Darfur, Chad, and Sudan in search of land and economic niches in towns where they could start kiosks. They cannot simply be described—as they often are—as “nomads” or “farmers”: they are both, and more besides. For sheer business acumen, the Zaghawa surpassed all contenders in Darfur, making spare but impressive profits in an economy that seemed to have no surplus. After 1985, these networks swelled with another outflow of migrants from the desert-edge villages seeking livelihoods elsewhere. By then, the reserves of fertile land in southern Darfur had been claimed by waves of settlers, Khartoum’s economic neglect of the region meant that trade was declining, and conflicts were breaking out across the central farming belt of Darfur, principally between impoverished former nomads seeking land to farm and established villagers who sought to keep the best land for themselves.

The current crisis has roots in those conflicts over resources. As communities armed themselves in their struggle for survival, Khartoum withdrew from governing Darfur, resorting solely to divide-and-rule—and chiefly siding with the Arab nomads. Today’s famine is man-made and will push the Zaghawa and other groups to their limits. In some cases, people are being deliberately starved; in others, they are being prevented from moving freely about to find the plentiful wild foods or from returning to their farms to cultivate. In addition to the killings, then, we can expect pockets of extreme suffering (estimates of 100,000–350,000 more deaths seem credible), along with widespread hunger and impoverishment across Darfur. But understanding how these things have come to pass will a require a shift in geography.

Aamo

When I first visited Furawiya in the fall of 1985, I found the herds of the Zaghawa and the Jalul Rizeigat Arabs grazing side by side. I was in search of the camels of a famous paramount chief of the Jalul, a man of notable charisma and unbending pride known as Sheikh Hilal Musa. For most of his 80 years, Hilal had herded camels from the desert edge near Furawiya to the massif of Jebel Marra in the center of Darfur. Without any place to call home, he had set up his camps on the pastures that separate villages, exchanging meat, milk, and transport with the farmers, who in turn sold grain and ironwork. Only in his final years, too old to travel on the back of a camel, did this aging Bedouin agree to settle, setting up court in a big black tent in a place called Aamo, where he entertained visitors with his limitless hospitality.

Aamo is about 200 miles south of Furawiya, in a grim plain surrounded by basalt volcanic cores that stick up like broken teeth. When the history of the today’s convulsions is written, Aamo may perhaps rank as its epicenter. The sheikh’s son, Musa, is the leader of the Janjawiid, and ranks first on the State Department’s list of suspected war criminals. The first notable Janjawiid massacre took place just a few miles from Aamo on August 3, 2003, when several dozen villagers were murdered by Musa Hilal’s forces in the wake of an attack by the Darfurian rebel movements, the SLA and the JEM, on the district headquarters at Kutum. Seeking a cheap and effective proxy force, Khartoum began organizing the armed nomads into a paramilitary force as soon as the conflict broke out, elevating Musa Hilal to command one of its most ruthless brigades.

When we met, the old Sheikh already seemed a ghost from a past age. His lifetime included the entire history of imperial rule in Darfur. The independent Fur Sultanate, founded in the 17th century, was overthrown by a British expeditionary force in 1916, and the last Sultan, Ali Dinar, was killed. The British ruled this vast and remote region of no appreciable natural resources with just twelve district officers. That now seems extraordinary, especially since their first decade was studded with uprisings by messianic preachers and the dead Sultan’s loyalists.

To rule Darfur, the British sought to co-opt the traditional leadership one ethnic group at a time. One of their favored means of doing this was to award a tribal “dar” or homeland to each group and to give the paramount chief jurisdiction over the civil affairs within that territory. Paid a pittance but given considerable executive and judicial powers, the paramount chiefs’ most important tasks were allocation of land and settlement of civil disputes. It was administration on the cheap, with only minimal health and education services provided.

The old social order, in which the Fur had been politically dominant and in which an array of more than 30 other groups (many Arabic-speaking and semi-nomadic, many speakers of Sudanic languages and mostly farmers) were tributary subjects, was swept away. The fluidity of social relations and ethnic boundaries, whereby both individuals and entire groups could move between and among ethnic categories, was replaced by a fossilizing “native administration.” But the imperial hand was light. A characteristic Darfurian flexibility and knack for innovation meant that people moved at will, and many mixed communities grew up, especially as people moved south to settle the frontiers of the forest zone.

While almost all of Darfur’s 35-odd groups were awarded “dars,” half a dozen nomadic groups were not, including Sheikh Hilal’s Jalul Rizeigat. As true nomads, they moved vast distances with their herds and never settled.

Sudan’s independence came just 40 years later, in 1956. The agitators for independence were from the ruling elites of Khartoum, and Darfur was again neglected. Its chief role was as a labor reserve for the lower ranks of the army and the irrigated cotton schemes along the Nile. In 1964, a young Fur politician called Ahmed Diraige—the son of a Shartai who used to host Hilal’s clan at the southernmost end of its annual migration—founded the Darfur Development Front to campaign for the region’s interests. But although Darfur is a formidable electoral bloc (its votes have decided the outcomes of Sudan’s general elections in the periods of civilian rule in the 1960s and 1980s), Diraige never succeeded in forming a consolidated political front, to lay claim to its rightful share of Sudan’s national wealth.

For most Darfurians, life under independence continued as before. Sheikh Hilal laughed when he described how the socialist government tried to abolish native administration in 1970. Although they gave the Jalul some territory for the first time, his people blithely ignored the decree and continued to follow their Sheikh, using the little administrative centre established at Fata Borno—an hour’s drive from Aamo—solely as a post office and a place to meet junior government officials. The government had intruded briefly in Darfur in the 1970s, but salaries were no longer paid, the clinics were abandoned, and the police had neither fuel for their Land Rovers nor bullets for their decrepit rifles. If there was a serious crime, the district police chief would come to Sheikh Hilal’s tent, sit humbly on a Persian carpet on the sand, and ask the Sheikh to find the culprit.

Hilal’s tent was pitched in a barren waste. He could have had a comfortable if modest house in Fata Borno, or persuaded the local Tunjur farmers to provide him a farm next to the seasonal water course, Wadi Kutum, lined with date palms and vegetable gardens. But instead he chose stony Aamo; he insisted that the only respectable way of life for a Jalul was camel nomadism, and he and his people would never stoop to cultivation. He waved at his young grandson, saying, “Even he has camels!” But the reality was different. Over the brow of the hill was a small village of Jalul whose camels and goats had died in the drought, who were trying to farm a sandy hillside. And Sheikh Hilal must have known the reality. He brooded on the disturbances brought about by drought, and how the familiar landscapes were turning into dying forests and spreading sand drifts. Most of all he regretted how the villagers—Zaghawa in the north, Tunjur around Aamo, and Fur further to the south, no longer readily accepted their nomadic guests, who without a “dar” relied on their customary rights to migrate and pasture their animals. The Fur villagers had taken to enclosing their grazing areas with thorn fences or even burning grasses to stop the herders passing their way. “The world is coming to an end,” he said darkly, before rousing himself to present me with a fly whisk made from a giraffe tail and sending me on my way to seek his sons and their camels.

Musa Hilal, now in his 40s, became known as a ruthless leader of armed nomads even before the current conflict. He thrived on the lawlessness in Darfur since the drought of 1984, when local disputes were rendered more deadly by the proliferation of light weapons. With no effective police force, all of Darfur’s communities armed themselves. In the past, intercommunal conflicts were settled by tribal conferences, but the last of these—held in 1990—showed glimmerings of a Darfurian united front to challenge Khartoum’s neglect. That conference called for the disarming of both the Arab Janjawiid (the first time the name appears in an official document) and the Fur militia. It also demanded a much stronger administrative presence and social and economic development. But these and other recommendations from the conference were never implemented. Cynically, the central government played the politics of divide-and-rule, usually supporting Darfur’s Arab tribes.

In April 2002, the young men of one village in central Darfur complained to the district authorities that they were being harassed by an Arab militia group; the authorities responded by confiscating the men’s weapons and jailing them. A young Fur lawyer, Abdel Wahid Nour, took up their case; he was imprisoned too. From his prison cell he wrote a passionate letter documenting the invisible sufferings of his Fur kinsmen. On his release, community elders asked Abdel Wahid to represent them; he became the chairman of the Darfur Liberation Front, which set up camps in Jebel Marra and, from there, attacked a police station on February 26, 2003, to take back the lost weapons. This was the spark that set Darfur afire.

At first the local authorities tried to contain the insurrection, but without funds or arms, it was a lost cause. Abdel Wahid is Fur, from Darfur’s largest ethnic group. He teamed up with young leaders from the other two large communities—Zaghawa and Masalit. Senior posts in the movement are distributed among these groups. The organization was renamed the Sudanese Liberation Army. The government’s first major counterattack was on Karnoi and Furawiya; the rebels responded by mounting a daring attack on the regional capital, el Fasher, on April 25, destroying half a dozen military aircraft and taking a general as a hostage. The same day, together with the newly created Justice and Equality Movement, they also attacked Kutum.

At the time of the attacks. Musa Hilal was in prison and had been accused of murder. Like many Janjawiid leaders, he has a criminal record. But senior leaders in Khartoum intervened and had him released and flown back to Darfur, where he was given leadership of a Janjawiid brigade, armed and supplied by the government. Musa Hilal’s murderous campaigns over the last 12 months make it hard to look at the Darfurian Arab communities, sinned against as well as sinning, and recognize that they too are historic victims of neglect and the gradual squeezing of a nomadic, pastoral way of life. Tragically, this way of life has died abruptly.

A month after leaving Aamo, I reached Wadi Howar, but I couldn’t find Musa Hilal or his father’s camels. The desert was too huge, and my companions and I were warned not to stray too far from the villages. Libyan trucks were bringing arms and mercenaries across the desert into Darfur to establish a staging post for Colonel Muammar Qaddafi’s irredentist ambitions in Chad. We saw their tracks in the sand; when we saw their silhouettes in the distance, we turned back to Furawiya.

This was the first augur of Darfur’s descent into violence. Poverty, desertification, and the collapse of the police force all contributed, but the first war in Darfur erupted in 1987 because Libya was using the region as a back door into Chad. Fighters from the “Islamic Legion,” recruited from Darfurian and Chadian Arabs, Tuaregs, and others, set up camp close to the border. They brought guns, which they also distributed to their kinsmen in Darfur, and most disturbing of all, they brought a new racial ideology, Arabism. Qaddafi’s designs went beyond annexing northern Chad: he dreamed of carving an Arab homeland out of the Sahel.

The 1987 war also provided the first glimmerings of the new racism that has rent Darfur’s social fabric. There were fights before, but never organized along “Arab” versus “non-Arab” lines. In exile in Libya, Darfur’s black African Bedouins had imbibed notions of Arab solidarity; in 1987 a group of them wrote an “Arab letter” to the prime minister in Khartoum, demanding recognition and support. This prompted a response from other Darfurians. Sharif Harir, then a professor of social anthropology at the University of Khartoum, began to document the “Arab belt” ideology.

In Chad, resistance to Libya was mounted by force of arms, with Zaghawa commanders in the front line. The Chadians pioneered a form of mobile warfare using Toyota land cruisers mounted with machine guns, striking with stunning speed and running rings around the ponderous tanks of the Libyan army and its mercenaries. In 1988, at the Chadian oasis of Ouadi Doum, Qaddafi’s expansionist dreams were destroyed by just such a Chadian force. Its deputy commander and, ultimately, the nemesis of Chadian Arab supremacism was Idris Deby. After this defeat, the mercurial Libyan leader turned his attention elsewhere. But in Darfur, collateral damage had been done. For the black Arabs of Darfur, who were among the most disadvantaged of all Darfur’s communities, the Islamic Legion offered a heady promise of emancipation: it linked them to the Arabs of the Nile and the Mediterranean littoral.

Most of Sudan’s political elite have never visited Darfur and certainly have no awareness of the complexities of the region. But for them, too, the “Arab” label provided a comforting feeling of familiarity. Darfur’s “Arab Alliance” was established in 1987 and served as the vanguard of an Arab supremacism defined by an ideology and political language that we would call “racial” if the concept were not so alien and inappropriate to Darfur. For Darfur, “Arabism” is nothing more than an ideologically constructed political label. But it began to stick as Darfur’s communities became militarized along these lines.

In reaction, Darfur’s non-Arab communities sought a common label. There were two candidates. One was “African,” in alliance with the Southern Sudanese, who under the leadership of Dr John Garang, the commander in chief of the Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA), were seeking allies in their protracted war against Khartoum. This is the label—also unknown 20 years ago—that sticks today.

The other option was “Muslim.” Until the 1980s, political Islam in Sudan was dominated by an Arabized elite, hailing from the river Nile, with strong links to Egypt and Saudi Arabia. Theirs is the Arabism of Cairo and Damascus: for them, the Darfur Bedouins were illiterate nomads, not fellow Muslims. And there was no love lost between Libya and Sudan’s Islamists. But the leader of Sudan’s Islamists, Dr. Hassan al Turabi, was a political innovator who broadened the agenda and constituency of the Islamist movement. Of most immediate relevance, he recognized the authenticity of western Sudanese and West African Islam. This is embodied in his treatment of the Sudanese of West African origin, the Fellata. This group, several million strong, consists of ethnic Hausa and Fulani whose ancestors migrated to Sudan from Nigeria, Mali, and Niger, either on their way to Mecca or as labor migrants for the colonial-era cotton schemes. Devoutly Muslim, they follow variants of the West African Mahdist tradition. Until the National Islamic Front took power in 1989 they were not recognized as Sudanese citizens. Turabi granted them citizenship and increased the status of their sheikhs, thereby correcting a longstanding anomaly and creating a strong electoral constituency.

In Darfur, too, Turabi reached out to the religious leaders of the Fur, Masalit, and other groups. The military governor of Darfur in 1991–1992, Colonel Tayeb Ibrahim “Sikha” (“the iron rod,” so known for his skill in wielding reinforcing rods at student demonstrations), made a point of praising the Fur for their piety and taking lessons in the Fur language. The concept of common citizenship through common Islamic faith was attractive to many Darfurians, and the Islamist embrace neutralized the Darfurian critique of the region’s neglect by Khartoum and its marginalization. In practical terms, little changed. A handful of Darfurians were elevated to high positions in the party and government. But the Islamism of the “westerners” was not accepted on its own terms: the government’s “civilization project” focused on the elevation of Arabic values and culture so that some non-Arab groups even began to identify themselves politically as “Arabs.” One example is the Gimir, a small group whose “dar” lies on the Chad–Sudan border, but who also have local diaspora settlements in southern Darfur. They lost their native language, adopted Arabic, and took to calling themselves “Arabs.” Even some Fellata leaders did the same. This wasn’t a coercive Arabization: non-Arab Darfurians continue to aspire to learn the Arab language, adopt Arab cultural traits, and live peaceably with their Arab neighbors.

Why, then, did the Muslim option ultimately not prevail? The answer lies in Khartoum.

Khartoum

The third place to look for the roots of today’s crisis is Sudan’s national capital. The real power in Khartoum is not President Bashir, who is a pious, tough soldier, but a cabal of security officers who have run both the Sudanese Islamist movement and the Sudanese state as a private but collegial enterprise for the last 15 years. Around this core is a fissiparous coalition, in which all civilian politicians are ultimately dispensable—including, as it turned out, their own Sheikh, Dr. Turabi. And the members of this cabal are serial war criminals.

Before Darfur, we can identify three separate episodes in the Sudanese civil war, each of which can arguably be counted as genocidal. The first was in the late 1980s, when the government mobilized militias from the cattle-herding Arabs of southern Kordofan and southern Darfur as a militia to attack the Southern communities that were identified as supporting the SPLA. Three seasons of vicious raiding by these militias, abetted by military intelligence, not only massacred tens of thousands of Dinka villagers but created a uniquely horrible famine in which camps of displaced people were deliberated starved to death en masse. This was Khartoum’s first large-scale use of the “militia strategy,” a counterinsurgency taken to extremes by using the cheap tactics of starvation and robbery.

The second episode followed the 1992 declaration of Jihad in Kordofan. The occasion for this was the rebellion in the Nuba Mountains led by the SPLA. The Nuba are a collection of non-Arab peoples, distinct from their Sudanese Arab neighbors in appearance, culture, and way of life. Like the Darfurians they have suffered neglect and exploitation, and in the 1980s young Nuba rose in revolt. Central to their rebellion was an assertion of Nuba cultural distinctiveness. Kordofan, unlike Darfur, is marked by a cultural and racial polarity. Khartoum’s response was more than the repression of revolt; it was an attempt to create an Islamic state by force of arms. The aim was to relocate the entire Nuba population away from their ancestral lands into what were called, with Orwellian aptness, “peace camps.” The Jihad failed: SPLA resistance was too strong, and Khartoum’s resolve faltered.

The distinctive Islamist color of the Nuba Jihad showed a government at the height of its ideological ambition. In retrospect, there were clear fissures in the ruling coalition that fatally compromised the plan and ultimately brought about a schism in the Islamist movement itself. While the regime’s ideologues in Turabi’s Arab and Islamic Bureau were intent on radical social re-engineering, the generals just wanted a ruthless military campaign. Vice President Zubeir Mohamed Saleh, who commanded the offensive, tried to stop the wholesale ethnic removals policy. Turabi himself stayed aloof from this contest, travelling abroad at the critical moment.

The third example is the clearance of the oilfield zones of the Upper Nile province in Southern Sudan after 1998, when the army was dispatched to remove any obstacles to oil drilling. Again, militias were used as an adjunct to the regular army and air force, and again, deliberate starvation was a favored tactic. This time, however, there was no pretense to an Islamist program: it was just about money and power. The split within the Islamist movement had become irreparable, and in 1999 President Bashir moved decisively against Turabi, removing him from his position as the speaker of the National Assembly in December 1999 and later imprisoning him.

Key to Bashir’s triumph was Vice President Ali Osman Taha’s shift from the Turabi to the Bashir camp. While Turabi was the charismatic mentor to the young Islamists, commanding the loyalty of most of the rank and file, Ali Osman was the operator who turned philosophy into policy. The split rent the Islamist coalition down the middle. The security elite, controlling the military and various off-budget security agencies, stayed with Bashir. The students and the regional party cells mostly went into opposition with Turabi. Among other things, the dismissal of Turabi gave Bashir the cover for making an opening to the United States and sending Ali Osman, the real power in Khartoum, to negotiate with John Garang in a serious peace process—which finally led to the signing of a peace agreement in Kenya in June. It is almost unbearably ironic that just as southern Sudan is on the brink of peace, Darfur—and with it the entire north—is convulsed by another war.

The linkage is not accidental. The Islamist split quickly took on regional and ethnic dimensions. The west Africans and Darfurians who had come into the Islamist movement under Turabi’s leadership left with him. The opening to Darfur, which had dampened if not neutralized Darfurian critiques of Khartoum for a decade, was over. In May 2000, Darfurian Islamists produced the “Black Book” in which they detailed the region’s systematic underrepresentation in national governments throughout Sudan’s independent history. It caused a stir throughout Sudan. In essence, it condemned the Islamist promise to Darfur as a sham. The Black Book was a key step in the polarization of the country along politically constructed “racial” rather than religious lines, and it laid the basis for a coalition between Darfur’s radicals, who formed the SLA, and its Islamists, who formed the other rebel organization, the Justice and Equality Movement. The JEM has a smaller military presence but more educated leaders and an abler public-relations machine.

And when Vice President Ali Osman was finalizing the peace agreement with the SPLA, the security clique made it clear that they felt he had given away too much power. Their message was, thus far and no further. They rejected out of hand the mediators’ suggestion that Khartoum grant regional autonomy. To the contrary, they urged a ruthless response, not only to wipe out the Darfur rebels but also to deter other insurgencies. Khartoum’s security chiefs in particular have their eye on eastern Sudan, where the Beja ethnic group are also discontented and armed, and neighboring Eritrea is ready to foment a war. Sharif Harir lives in Eritrea and has worked closely with the Beja opposition for the last ten years; some suspect that he sees a two-front war closing on Khartoum from both the west and the east. The government’s overreaction to opposition in Darfur is fueling such bitter ambitions.

What we now see, then, is a regime bereft of its legitimating ideology, run by a security clique that is concerned solely with power and its associated riches. There is no longer a recognizable Islamist ideology at work (and in fact the rebels, especially the JEM, have stronger Islamic credentials than the government). And one of the reasons for the reliance on the Janjawiid is that the national army, which includes many foot soldiers and noncommissioned officers from Darfur, cannot be counted upon to fight the rebels. In fact, as more and more Sudanese pierce the veil of secrecy that the government has draped around Darfur, the level of popular outrage deepens. The Darfur crisis represents a more profound challenge to the government’s legitimacy than the war in the south ever did.

Genocide?

This past July, the U.S. Congress voted unanimously to condemn the events in Darfur as “genocide.” Thus far, the Bush administration and the United Nations have stopped short of taking that step formally, although Secretary of State Colin Powell used the term in testimony to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on September 9. Human-rights groups have been less coy. But, as I have tried to show, the simplistic characterization—used, for example, by Human Rights Watch—of “Arabs” killing “Africans” doesn’t fit. Let’s examine some key questions that bear on the issue of genocide.

First, is the killing in Dafur bad enough to be genocide? Darfur doesn’t look like the Nazi Holocaust or Rwanda, and it is different in important ways from the Nuba Jihad. But “genocide” is a legal term of art, and the actions covered by the 1948 Genocide Convention are considerably wider than the lay definition of “genocide,” dominated as it is by the Holocaust. Article II of the Convention defines a genocide as
acts committed with the intent to destroy, in whole or part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such: (a) Killing members of the group; (b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group; (c) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part; (d) Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group; (e) Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group.

Extreme manifestations are not legally necessary for a crime to count as genocide: the Genocide Convention does not distinguish “ethnic cleansing”—which Darfur certainly is—from “genocide.” Darfur doesn’t fit the lay definition, and there are legitimate concerns about lowering the bar for what counts as “genocide,” but the Genocide Convention’s definition is what counts in law.

Second, are the groups that have been targeted sufficiently clear and distinct to warrant the name “ethnic groups”? The Arab–African dichotomy is historically and anthropologically bogus. But that doesn’t make the distinction unreal, as long as the perpetrators subscribe to it. A comparable problem was faced by the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda in prosecuting Jean-Paul Akayesu for genocide. In that case, the tribunal concluded that “a stable and permanent group, whose membership is determined largely by birth” was a sufficient criterion, along with the fact that Rwandese subjectively identified individuals as belonging to the categories “Hutu” and “Tutsi.” A similar argument will work in Darfur, with the additional factor that most of the targeted communities speak non-Arabic languages.

And, sadly, the violence itself is creating newly polarized identities. The relaxed reciprocity of earlier decades is gone, and the sharp divisions of a contrived racism are being nurtured by bitterness and fear. Darfur’s social fabric cannot be stitched back together quickly or easily.

Third, what about intent? Perpetrators are unlikely to admit genocidal intent, so how is it to be ascertained? Again, the ICTR decision on the Akayesu case is helpful. It found that intent could be inferred from a number of presumptions of fact: namely, a general context in which other culpable acts are systematically directed against a group. Again, the events in Darfur appear, prima facie, to meet the conditions. The International Criminal Court certainly has sufficient evidence to mount an investigation.

The perpetrators’ motives are hazy and mixed. For the Janjawiid leaders: power, loot, and land. For their backers in Khartoum: counterinsurgency taken to its annihilatory limit and a demonstration of ruthlessness intended to deter any further resistance in Darfur and elsewhere. At the end of the day, however, this is genocide by habit alone. The security cabal lives in a decades-old ethics-free zone, dispatching its officers with impunity to do whatever is necessary to preserve its power.

The United States and the United Nations are frightened that if they utter the word “genocide” they can no longer do business with the Sudanese government, that the peace deal for the south (a massive achievement) will unravel, and that they will be obliged to send troops. But does a diagnosis of genocide really imply military intervention? The Genocide Convention is silent on this issue. This silence implies intervention as one option, but not the only one. Stopping the killing in Darfur, and reconstituting its social fabric, will be a slow and complicated business. An international military presence is needed, but that doesn’t imply a foreign occupation. The key is a strategy that combines humanitarian action, security, and a political settlement.

On July 30, the UN Security Council gave Khartoum 30 days to disarm the Janjawiid. But how? There are many different militia groups, ranging from entire nomadic clans that have armed themselves to protect their herds, to the brigades of trained fighters headed by Musa Hilal and some of his Chadian Arab comrades in arms. The Janjawiid paramilitaries are the direct responsibility of Khartoum and can be demobilized, but the armed nomads will be more difficult. In a region where every community has armed itself, confiscating all arms is frankly impossible: what can be done is community-based regulation of arms, gradually marginalizing criminal elements through a process of political reconstruction.

The Genocide Convention requires punishment for the architects and perpetrators of massacres. Darfur could be a first case for the International Criminal Court; a prosecutor could be appointed, and then the law could do its work and remove some of the most undesirable individuals from Sudan’s political scene—not only the Janjawiid leaders but their mentors in the security cabal as well. But preventing a repetition of today’s horrors will require more than legal deterrence; it will require painstaking social and economic development.

Where Next?

Foreign correspondents have done a fine job of putting the Darfur genocide in our newspapers and on our television screens. As we seek to understand the massacre and famine, and put a stop to it, we need to remove the lenses of Rwanda and Southern Sudan and come to understand the uniqueness of Darfur and the constellation of circumstance and criminality that has led its long-suffering people into their current tragedy.

The finding of genocide is a half-truth. But it must not come in full armor. The security cabal that controls Khartoum has repeatedly shown that it will stop its violations only when it is given no other option. But that is only a beginning: 20 years of decay and militarization cannot be undone in a few weeks.

* Alex de Waal is a fellow of the Global Equity Initiative at Harvard University and the author of ‘Islamism and Its Enemies in the Horn of Africa’ and ‘Famine that Kills: Darfur, Sudan, 1984–1985’. This article, initially from http://www.bostonreview.net/BR29.5/dewaal.html, is reproduced with permission of the author.

* Please send comments to editor@pambazuka.org

Women Refugees and Displaced Persons

Françoise Nduwimana

2005-02-24

http://pambazuka.org/en/category/comment/27042

The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) estimates that women and children make up between 75% and 80% of war refugees and displaced persons. The concentration of women in refugee and displaced persons camps is a two-pronged issue. In the beginning, the need for security was the impetus for the women to group together. But in the absence of a peace-keeping force with a firm mandate regarding protection of civilians, as is usually the case in Africa, protection is transformed into insecurity.

Even though the majority of people in refugee and displaced persons camps are women, a patriarchal model is replicated in them and has become radicalized. In such a situation, the women are completely defenceless and deprived of all decision-making power. The social, economic and cultural bases that structure negotiations with a modicum of balance of power between men and women are totally destroyed by war. Most often, the camps reflect the disintegration of familial and social structures. The erosion of normalcy, the disappearance of the notion of parental authority, specifically maternal authority, all explain how socio-ethical codes are replaced with the only law that prevails in the camps: might makes right.

A patriarchal hegemony thrives much more easily in refugee and displaced persons camps, so that women, primarily single women (who are also referred to as “unaccompanied women” as if they were minors), are like welfare recipients in many respects. No longer producers of food, they depend on food aid, the distribution and control of which they know is based on formal and informal authority structures managed by men. Having no control of their physical safety, they must accept the conditions of those who control the camp.
The conditions of negotiation, as commonly imposed by those who control the camps (armed forces personnel, militiamen, child soldiers, UNHCR field staff and camp administrators), all contribute to the sexual exploitation of women and girls and thus to an increased risk of HIV/AIDS transmission.

The local staff of humanitarian agencies and peace-keeping forces are not innocent of this kind of abuse, as attested to by the investigation conducted by the UNHCR and Save the Children UK in the refugee camps in Liberia, Guinea and Sierra Leone. According to that investigation, which specifically pointed the finger at local male staff, the UNHCR and Save the Children denounced the widespread practice of bartering aid and humanitarian services intended for the refugees in exchange for sexual relations with girls under 18 years of age.
The poverty, promiscuity and insecurity in the camps promote prostitution and pose several challenges, namely, the extent of the women's awareness of the risks they run in having unprotected sex with several sexual partners, the very high risk of contracting sexually transmitted infections, which are also vectors of HIV/AIDS, and lastly, the need for the humanitarian agencies in the camps to view the fight against HIV/AIDS as a humanitarian response.

One study conducted in the Rwandan refugee camps in Tanzania, established that the presence of sexually transmitted infections (STI) during unprotected sex increased the risk of HIV/AIDS infection from 6 to 10 times. Only 16% of men admitted having used condoms during casual sex, which would explain the presence of STIs in 60% of pregnant women covered in the study.

To curtail the spread of HIV/AIDS in the camps it was recommended that the UNHCR and its partners identify the gender-based causes of crimes of violence against women and girls committed in the camps so that prevention strategies can be developed. According to the UNHCR, the strategies should have as a common objective the adjustment or implementation of local practices and traditions to international standards of protection of the rights of women and girls, reconstruction of family and community support networks, the building of infrastructures and development of appropriate services as well as the documentation of incidents of sexual violence. To ensure that these objectives are achieved, camp personnel must receive gender-based training that emphasizes the relationship between HIV/AIDS, women's rights and rights of refugees and displaced persons. The training would allow for the development of appropriate strategies in the given context. To be able to ensure that women with HIV/AIDS receive medical care, it is essential to ensure that women's health workers provide services in the camps and are equipped with antiretroviral drugs.

* This is an extract from a publication ‘The Right to Survive:
Sexual Violence, Women and HIV/AIDS’. The full article can be found on the website of the International Centre for Human Rights and Democratic Development (Rights and Democracy) at the following address http://www.womensrightscoalition.org/index_en.htm

* Please send comments to editor@pambazuka.org

Leaders guilty of stifling Africa's hope

Tajudeen Abdul-Raheem

2005-02-24

http://pambazuka.org/en/category/panafrican/27044

Former US president Bill Clinton is one of the most famous faces around the world. He is recognisable by many people who may not even be able to identify the location of the US on a map. But it was not always scripted like that from the beginning.

When he announced his intention to contest for the US presidency in 1989/1990, many Americans did not even know where he came from and much less, whom he was. Yet he had been governor of a small southern state of Arkansas, of which many Americans asked: Arkan...what? This bewilderment was the reverse of what happened to a previous Democratic president, Jimmy Carter, a peanut farmer from Georgia, of whom it was asked: Jimmy Who?

Clinton’s handicap was not just because of his relatively unknown and unprepossessing state, he also did not come from a rich family. His surname did not ring any bell like say a Kennedy or a Bush, Rockefeller or Ford.

In Arkansas itself, Clinton comes from a place called Hope. And what he had in abundance in addition to his charisma and confidence was great hope that he could achieve his ambition to be president of the most powerful country in the world against all odds!

One of the events that inspired him was an earlier encounter with an icon of American politics and probably the most revered US president, John F Kennedy. As a school kid, Clinton shook hands with the great Camelot and that fired him. And by sheer determination, luck and personality, Clinton became president and probably only second to his icon on the popularity stakes.

In spite of his many foibles, he remains a hugely popular former US president both within and beyond the country. His was a genuine triumph of hope over adversity. No wonder he remains the ‘Mr Feel Good’ and a loveable rogue by many.

The Clinton/Kennedy encounter came to my mind as I ruminated over the last AU Summit in Nigeria’s soulless federal capital city of Abuja at the end of January. The government in a country where ‘more money than sense’ is the official public spending policy, spared no expenses. No expenses were spared in making sure that the executive tourists to the city are impressed by Africa’s slumbering super power.

As it is customary on these occasions, head of state after head state who rose to speak, including the AU Commission chairperson and the UN Secretary-General, thanked ‘the people and government of Nigeria for their... generous hospitality...bla bla bla’!

What was not in doubt was the presence of the government of Nigeria, whose security and intelligence and other operatives were crawling all over the International Conference Centre. As for the people of Nigeria, perhaps they followed on their televisions, that is if the National Electric Power Authority (NEPA) or (is it Never Expect Power Always by long suffering Nigerians) stood to honour its role. I was not sure if any of those leaders thanking ‘the people’ bothered to look up at the huge public gallery of the conference centre as they spoke.

That is where most of ‘the people’ would have been if they had been given access to the function. Unfortunately, the place was largely empty. One would have thought that for the sake of PR, they would not have filled up the place only with the countless security operatives. If they did not want ‘the people,’ why could they not trust their under-employed security operatives? Or why could they not have packed the place with school children from the countless public and private schools in and around Abuja. Imagine the impact on young kids of being in the public gallery and seeing all these movers and shakers of Africa at work. Who knows how many little Clintons could have been inspired? Then the answer came to me like a revelation. It is not just that many of our leaders hate and have contempt for the people they rule, they also do not want us to have hope for a better tomorrow and that we may dream of a future without them. That is why they do not want little boys and girls to dream like that poor boy from Arkansas, that one day, they could be presidents.

To the extent that some of them contemplate succession, they think of it only in monarchical terms, that is even after they have long passed their sell-by-date. This murdering of hope by deliberate marginalisation of the youth and killing of their aspirations is a far worse crime by some of the leaders than their misrule. It is like someone slapping you and also denying you the right to cry or shed tears. So whether they like it or not we must ‘KEEP HOPE ALIVE’.

* Dr Tajudeen Abdul-Raheem is General-Secretary of the Pan African Movement, Kampala (Uganda) and Co-Director of Justice Africa

* Please send comments to editor@pambazuka.org

A Better World Is Under Construction

2005-02-24

http://pambazuka.org/en/category/advocacy/26986

This is a call for mass mobilization during the 2005 Spring Meetings of the World Bank and International Monetary Fund, April 15-17th, Washington DC. The main action will be April 16. The 2005 meetings of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank will represent the five year anniversary of the first major demonstrations against these institutions in the United States.
Call for a Mass Mobilization during the 2005 Spring Meetings of the World Bank and International Monetary Fund April 15-17th, Washington DC. The main action will be April 16.The 2005 meetings of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank will represent the five year anniversary of the first major demonstrations against these institutions in the United States. Again we will gather in the streets of D.C. on A16 to show that our resistance to these institutions and their greed only grows stronger, and that our dreams for a better world are not only possible, but under construction at this moment, in all corners of the globe. The IMF and World Bank, with all their efforts to demolish these dreams and actions, can never stop us.

The World Bank claims to combat world poverty. The IMF claims to promote global economic stability. For the 60 years of their existence, they have done neither. The World Bank has poured billions into dams, mining, and other projects that have caused immense social and environmental destruction, displacing poor, often indigenous, people from their lands and livelihoods, and destroying fragile ecosystems. The IMF has destabilized the economies of countries like Korea, Thailand, and Argentina, creating mass unemployment. Together, the IMF and World Bank have trapped poor countries in a cycle of unpayable debt. To extract debt repayment from them, they have imposed conditions such as budget caps, user fees for health care, and privatization of water. These policies have impoverished billions. They have also corroded self-determination and corrupted political systems, making governments accountable to foreign creditors rather than their own people.

Instead of building the world that they have promised, the World Bank and IMF have plunged it into a global crisis that is now more urgent than ever. The number of people in abject poverty worldwide is at an all-time high, and more and more people lack access to water, healthcare, and education.The world is headed for environmental disaster, while the World Bank pours17 times more funds into fossil fuel projects than for renewables and energy efficiency. The global AIDS epidemic takes 7,000 lives in Africa every day. According to the United Nations, 30,000 people worldwide die every day as a direct consequence of IMF and World Bank-imposed cuts in social services.

Today, South and Southeast Asia is facing an immense natural disaster, and the enormous debt burden of these countries, as well as restrictive conditions on World Bank loans for reconstruction, are going to prevent full recovery. Already, the Sri Lanka government and the World Bank are colluding to use this disaster as an opportunity to displace fishing communities and privatize the coastline for the benefit of the tourism industry.

Over the 60 years of their existence, the IMF and World Bank have systematically enriched multinational corporate interests at the expense of nature and of the rest of humanity. It's time to demolish these institutions and build a better world. Each day people around the world people are coming together to construct a better, more just world. Not only are they demonstrating in the streets, but they are actively reclaiming their communities. In South Africa, citizens too poor to afford the privatized water have dismantled water meters and learned plumbing to connect homes to water services.

In Argentina unemployed workers are taking over their former workplaces and running them as collectives. People throughout the Global South are working to take back their rights to water, health, land, a clean environment, and self-determination. Five years after thousands came to Washington DC in the first mass show in the U.S. of solidarity with the global struggle against the World Bank and IMF, the Mobilization for Global Justice is calling for people to come to Washington DC April 15-17th, to protest the institutions during their spring meetings and to celebrate the other, more just world that is under construction due to the resistance of millions worldwide!


For more Information: www.globalizethis.org <http://www.globalizethis.org> or mgj@riseup.net <mailto:mgj@riseup.net> The Mobilization for Global Justice is committed to making all events safe spaces that are open, accessible, and accepting of all. We welcome everyone to participate in making this happen. If you have any special needs, please let us know.

Documentary on reconciliation of Rwandan children

Mike Hawley

2005-02-24

http://pambazuka.org/en/category/letters/26983

Somalia: A delicate path to peace

Mahad Ahmed Elmi

2005-02-24

http://pambazuka.org/en/category/letters/27002

The topic of IGAD peacekeepers for Somalia is a controversial one here in Mogadishu. Many Somalis see this initiative as an attempt by Ethiopians to dominate in the Horn of Africa and form a renegade regime in Mogadishu. Recently Somalia’s government approved the deployment of at least 7500 troops to help restore law and order in a country shattered by years of civil war.

This plan was voted on at a cabinet meeting chaired by President Abdullahi Yusuf Ahmed in the Kenyan capital early this month, but it will have to be taken to the country’s parliament for final approval. The mission, which will be the first multinational force in Somalia since the end of a failed UN-mandated intervention in 1993, is expected to help install the country’s transitional government.

The International Crisis Group (ICG) has earlier early warned of the deployment of troops from frontline states, adding that the decision taken by regional organisations to send troops to Somalia risks destabilising Somalia's fragile transitional government and jeopardising the peace process.

President Yusuf, elected last October, and his government led by Prime Minister Ali Mohammed Gedi, have been based in Nairobi amid continued fears of instability in Somalia. However, early this month a delegation of parliamentarians and ministers of the Transitional Federal Government led by parliament speaker Shariif Hassan have visited Mogadishu to assess the security situation in the city.

On their return to Nairobi, Mr. Shariif told a parliament meeting that Mogadishu is where the government should settle. The decision will also depend upon a combination of political strategy and security calculations linked to the appointment of the cabinet and the possible deployment of African peace-keeping forces.

Mr. Yusuf and other officials have repeatedly said that they will one day return to Mogadishu since a number of foreign governments have flagged this as a key measure of the TFG. To disarm armed groups in Somalia will also be a hard task for the TFG to ensure, as leaders of all armed factions appear to be opposed to the recent call of Mr. Yusuf on disarmament.

The peace conference held in Kenya for Somalis has finally established a new government for the war-torn country. Somalia has been without central authority for nearly 14 years. Somalis at home and abroad are apparently tired of a ruthless 14 years of civil war, and have demonstrated their support for the new government.

Peaceful and impartial steps to campaign for national reconciliation in the entire country through broader participation from all areas of the Somali people must be a top priority of the government. It is required to do this by developing a reconciliation process to foster public support as the way forward.

Two books on African women and by African women published this month in France

2005-02-24

http://pambazuka.org/en/category/books/27005

Two books on African women and by African women published this month in France.

* Reines d’Afrique et héroïnes de la diaspora noire.
By Sylvia Serbin - Publishers: Editions Sépia, Paris, 2005

A journalist and historian, Sylvia Serbin lived for 30 years between Côte d’Ivoire and Senegal, where she was born.
In her book, 'Reines d'Afrique et héroïnes de la diaspora noire' she writes about the life, glory and predicament of 22 women, all Africans, whether they are from the African continent, from the West Indies or from America. Some of these women are authentic and legitimate queens, such as Zingha, Queen of Angola, Pokou, Queen of Cote d’Ivoire, Queen Ranavalona III of Madagascar while others have made history because of their heroic struggle against racism and discrimination such as the American Harriett Tubman or less known heroines like the Mulatto Solitude who fought the reinstatement of slavery by Napoleon, after it was abolished, and was killed while fighting.

Retracing the life of these African women and their contribution to Africa and to the Black Diaspora, Serbin succeeds in proving how extensive and sophisticated the African civilisations were much before the arrival of the Europeans and much before Africa was depicted as the “Dark Continent”.

Serbin admits that she has put “women” forward, because “women are never mentioned in history or text books” and also because universal history has yet to acknowledge a black female heroine. She reckons that because “in the history of black people, all great figures are men” time has come to know about the women who have contributed to Africa’s legacy.

* Safia
By Safia Otokoré - Autobiography – Publishers: Editions Robert Laffont, 2005

Safia Ibrahim Otokoré is a Somali woman, born in Djibouti in 1969 and married to the African football star Didier Otokoré (today they are divorced).

In 2004 Safia Otokoré, representing the Parti Socialiste (Socialist Party), is elected deputy mayor of the city of Auxerre in the Bourgogne region of France. She is also vice-president of the Regional Council in that region with a portfolio including youth, sports and discrimination. She is president of the European and International Commission for the decentralised cooperation of the Région Bourgogne

'Safia' is her life story as a poor child of a Somali refugee family in Djibouti. She retraces her long struggle to get out of the “misery” she would have been condemned to, if she had not pursued her studies and especially if she had not devoted all her energy to become a competitive sportsperson. In a poignant but lucid manner, she talks about Djibouti, about her family, about her sister Koltoum who was forced into marriage and about female genital mutilation, practised so widely in Djibouti and which she had to go through when only aged seven.

* With thanks to Eva Dadrian for submitting this information.

1. Summary of Decisions of the African Union Fourth Ordinary Summit, Abuja, Nigeria Jan 2005

Compiled by: Eve Odete, Pan Africa Policy Officer, Oxfam GB

2005-02-24

http://pambazuka.org/en/category/aumonitor/27023

This summary has been prepared for policy analysts working for Oxfam, international, continental and regional networks and allies to inform us on the key deliberations and decisions of the most important decision-making organ of the African Union. It captures key decisions, upcoming dates and opportunities for continental policy development.

The sequence of the Summits is as follows; one week of intense meetings starting with the Permanent Representatives Council (Addis based Ambassadors), Council of Ministers (National Ministers) and the Assembly itself (Heads of States). While the Assembly is the supreme decision making body, the discussions from Ambassador level are important to understand the issues being prioritized and deliberated.

The first briefing on health and HIV/AIDS is reproduced below. The rest of the briefings, including those on food security, refugees, trade and debt, are available through the link below.

1. Health and HIV/AIDS

Permanent Representatives Committee
Ninth Ordinary Session
PRC/Rpt (1X)

On HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, malaria and other related infectious diseases, the PRC observed;

The need for Africa to take the lead in Trade Related Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) negotiations to promote access to affordable generic drugs - Africa has to plan properly for dialogue at TRIPs negotiations and other fora;

Assembly of the Africa Union
Fourth Ordinary Session
Decisions and Declarations

Assembly/ AU /Dec. 55 (1V)

CALLS UPON the international community, especially the rich industrialized countries,
to fully fund the Global Fund in line with previous commitments made in this regard, and taking into account the magnitude of the health emergency presented by these diseases in Africa;

URGES Member States to:
Take the lead in TRIPs negotiations and in implementing measures identified for promoting access to affordable generic drugs;
Ensure that every child receives polio immunization in 2005;
Prepare inter-ministerial costed development and deployment plans to address the Human Resources for Health crisis;
Prepare health literacy strategies to achieve an energized continent-wide health promotion endeavour;

URGES Member States to intensify efforts towards more effective and well-coordinated implementation of national programmes to promote health systems development as well as improve access to prevention, treatment, care and support; along the “Three ones initiative”; the “3 by 5 Strategy” and Global “Child Survival Partnership”;

RESOLVES to take all the necessary measures to produce with the support of the international community, quality generic drugs in Africa, supporting industrial development and making full use of the flexibility in international trade law and; REQUESTS the AU Commission within the framework of NEPAD to lead the development of a Pharmaceutical Manufacturing Plan for Africa;

CALLS UPON the International Community to match the US$19 billion gap in health financing which the WHO has determined that Africa is not in a position to self finance.
Summary of Decisions of the African Union Fourth Ordinary Summit, Abuja, Nigeria Jan 2005
Compiled by: Eve Odete, Pan Africa Policy Officer, Oxfam GB.

Key Meetings

Assembly of the African Union, Fourth Ordinary Session
30-31 January 2005
Assembly /AU/Dec.55-72 (IV)
Assembly/ AU/ Dec. 1-2 (IV)
Decisions and Declarations

Executive Council
Sixth Ordinary Session, 24-28 January 2005
EX. CL/Dec. 165-191 (VI)
Decisions
EX. CL//Rapt/ Rpt (VI)
Rapporteur’s Report of the Sixth Ordinary Session
Of the Executive Council

Permanent Representatives Committee
Ninth Ordinary Session

PRC/Rpt (1X)
Report of the Ninth Ordinary Session of the Permanent Representatives’ Committee

Rationale for this compilation and the policy cycle it documents

This summary has been prepared for policy analysts working for Oxfam, international, continental and regional networks and allies to inform us on the key deliberations and decisions of the most important decision-making organ of the African Union. It captures key decisions, upcoming dates and opportunities for continental policy development.

The sequence of the Summits is as follows; one week of intense meetings starting with the Permanent Representatives Council (Addis based Ambassadors), Council of Ministers (National Ministers) and the Assembly itself (Heads of States). While the Assembly is the supreme decision making body, the discussions from Ambassador level are important to understand the issues being prioritized and deliberated. Opportunities for policy influencing decrease as the meetings go on. Indeed, even lobbying space becomes more difficult to secure particularly with the Commissioners.

1. Health and HIV/AIDS

Permanent Representatives Committee
Ninth Ordinary Session
PRC/Rpt (1X)


On HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, malaria and other related infectious diseases, the PRC observed;

The need for Africa to take the lead in Trade Related Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) negotiations to promote access to affordable generic drugs - Africa has to plan properly for dialogue at TRIPs negotiations and other fora;


Assembly of the Africa Union
Fourth Ordinary Session
Decisions and Declarations

Assembly/ AU /Dec. 55 (1V)

CALLS UPON the international community, especially the rich industrialized countries,
to fully fund the Global Fund in line with previous commitments made in this regard, and taking into account the magnitude of the health emergency presented by these diseases in Africa;

URGES Member States to:
Take the lead in TRIPs negotiations and in implementing measures identified for promoting access to affordable generic drugs;
Ensure that every child receives polio immunization in 2005;
Prepare inter-ministerial costed development and deployment plans to address the Human Resources for Health crisis;
Prepare health literacy strategies to achieve an energized continent-wide health promotion endeavour;

URGES Member States to intensify efforts towards more effective and well-coordinated implementation of national programmes to promote health systems development as well as improve access to prevention, treatment, care and support; along the “Three ones initiative”; the “3 by 5 Strategy” and Global “Child Survival Partnership”;

RESOLVES to take all the necessary measures to produce with the support of the international community, quality generic drugs in Africa, supporting industrial development and making full use of the flexibility in international trade law and; REQUESTS the AU Commission within the framework of NEPAD to lead the development of a Pharmaceutical Manufacturing Plan for Africa;

CALLS UPON the International Community to match the US$19 billion gap in health financing which the WHO has determined that Africa is not in a position to self finance;

2. Trade

Permanent Representatives Committee
Ninth Ordinary Session
PRC/Rpt (1X)

On on-going WTO negotiations the Commissioner for Trade and Industry

highlighted the need for Africa to send a strong political message to the international community to find a solution to the cotton initiative which affects more than 10 million African producers living below the poverty line. She further pointed out the issue of the unfair behaviour of the Northern countries with regard to agricultural subsidies and the need to lay emphasis in the political message on the importance for Africa to meet food security objectives, rural development and poverty reduction. In conclusion, she stressed the need for the African Group to maintain solidarity and unity with the G90 on issues of substance within the WTO.

The PRC recognized the importance of the WTO negotiations for the socio-economic development of Africa and emphasized the need for capacity building in Member States and RECs and for better coordination of efforts among New York, Geneva, Brussels, African Groups and the AU Commission in Addis Ababa. It agreed with the recommendation for a fast-track approach to the cotton issue while emphasizing the need to come up with a common position on cotton, springing from the outcome of the recently held Bamako meeting. It further called for the document to be enriched with more information on the roadmaps finalized in Geneva and the reaction of the RECs on the issue as well as with the outcome of the Bamako meeting on cotton. It highlighted the importance of coming out with concrete proposals on the issue of Special and Differential Treatment; on the possibility for African countries to have access to required drugs for public health inclusion in national legislations as decided by the WTO Council. The PRC also emphasized the need to pursue the proposal for support to cotton producers in their exports and for the creation of a fund to compensate losses. In this regard, the PRC also called for other commodities to be part of the list of tradable goods for negotiations at the WTO.
It also called for a meeting on services in order to deal with African concerns in that sector. It recommended that, in addition to other partners, the expertise of ECA should be tapped for capacity building purposes. The PRC recommended that the AU Commission take the necessary measures to implement the proposal to send a strong political message to the international community to fast track negotiations on the cotton issue.

On Negotiations of the Economic Partnership Agreements:

The Commissioner recalled the provisions of the Cotonou Partnership Agreement (CPA) which aim at making EPAs, instruments for the promotion of rapid and sustainable development, the eradication of poverty and the smooth and gradual integration of Africa into the global economy. She quoted in particular Article 37.3 which provides for the strengthening of capacity in the public and private sector during the preparatory phase through measures that increase competitiveness and support regional integration initiatives such as assistance to budgetary adjustment and reform, infrastructure development and investment promotion. She added that the first phase of negotiations was not sanctioned by a formal agreement and that all 48 ACP African countries had embarked on the second phase within four groupings without any country expressing desire to remain outside the process. She then drew the attention of the Committee on the major challenges involved in the negotiations for African countries as raised by the RECs during the first meeting of the coordination mechanism between the AU and the RECs. These are: (i) geographical configuration of the EPAs, (ii) the issue of compatibility between WTO and EPA Rules; (iii) the reciprocal relationship between the EU and ACP countries given the gap between their levels of development, (iv) the imbalance in the present multilateral trading system, (v) the heavy procedures of access to EDF resources and additional resources to African countries to face direct and indirect adjustment costs.

She stressed the fact that, although EPAs were about to enter into force in three years’ time, the provisions of Article 37.3 were still not implemented. In this regard, she highlighted the need for RECs to remain united and proposed that Council calls on the EU to allow the AU Commission as an integration Organisation to access EDF resources for the implementation of the NEPAD programme.

The PRC expressed concern about the geographical configuration for the negotiation of EPAs which does not coincide with the RECs as organised within the AU. It called for the AU to develop capacity for the coordination of EPA negotiations to ensure that Africa speaks with one voice although EPAs divide Africa into RECs/negotiating groups and that the North African countries are part of the Barcelona process.

On the issue of resources, the PRC pointed out that EU resources were categorised into programmable and non-programmable resources and that the AU not being a party to the CPA was not eligible under the first category but should be able to access the non-programmable resources. In conclusion, the PRC stressed the need for African countries to build capacity not only for market access but above all in order to face supply-side constraints so that they can make good use of whatever agreement they will enter into in 2007.

The Executive Council
Sixth Ordinary Session
Decisions

Doc. EX.CL/151 (VI)

Decision on WTO negotiations

RECALLS the Doha Ministerial Declaration in which the international community undertook to place the needs and interests of developing countries at the heart of the WTO Work Programme;

COMMENDS the African Group for its efforts aimed at bringing to the Doha Work Programme back on track and for remaining engaged in the WTO negotiations in accordance with the technical guidance and policy framework provided under the Kigali Declaration and Consensus on the post-Cancun Doha Work Programme ;

RECALLS ALSO the outcome of the Special WTO General Council session held in Geneva from 27 July to 1 August 2004;

TAKES NOTE of the July Package adopted by the WTO General Council on 1st August 2001;

RECOMMENDS the speedy adoption of an approach to resolve the cotton issue based on the results of the meeting held in Bamako from 12 to 13 January 2005;

ALSORECOMMENDS the early consideration of the issue of agricultural subsidies and the adoption of an Africa Common Position on commodities in general;

CALLS UPON the African Group in Geneva to continue to engage fully and actively in the negotiations with a view to achieving a pro-development outcome from the Doha Round;

ALSO CALLS UPON the same to finalise the Tunis roadmap and Work Plan in order to engage collaborative research and capacity building efforts from regional and international organizations on specific areas to enable Africa to positively contribute to the modalities stage of the negotiations leading up to the 6th Session of the WTO Ministerial Conference;

URGES Member States to continue to coordinate efforts both at the technical and political levels with like-minded groups, in particular, the G90;

WELCOMES Egypt’s invitation for a meeting to be held in Cairo, in May 2005, to discuss ways to deal with the challenges facing cotton producing countries in Africa;

REQUESTS the Commission to convene a Ministers of Trade meeting to chart the way forward as far as Africa’s Agenda is concerned.

FURTHER REQUESTS the Commission to report on progress to the 7th Ordinary Session of Council.


Executive Council-Rapporteur’s Report

With regard to the on-going WTO negotiations, Council recommended that special attention should be given by the AU to the crucial issues of agricultural subsidies and commodities, particularly cotton.


Decision on the negotiations of ACP-EU economic Partnership Agreements

COMMENDS the Commission and the RECs for concluding the establishment of an informal Coordination and Information Exchange Mechanism on EPA Negotiations with the European Union (EU) for which the Commission has been entrusted the coordinating role and also for holding the first meeting of the mechanism successfully;

ENDORSES the recommendations of the Commission/RECs meeting and URGES the Commission to:

Develop institutional capacity building programmes for the Commission and the RECs so as to make work synergies viable and reliable and accelerate the integration process in Africa;

Prepare, in close collaboration with the RECs, requests to the European Union and other development partners for financing of projects that will enhance continental integration;

Identify thecommon supporting programmes relative to implementation of EPAs at the level of the RECs;

Mobilize African research institutes, including the ECA, to appraise the adjustment and other costs of EPAs on African economies.

STRONGLY RECOMMENDS that efforts between the Commission and the RECs be further strengthened and coordinated in the second phase of negotiations, especially with regard to priorities and roadmaps set for negotiations so as to ensure that the process of continental integration in Africa is deepened in accordance with the Constitutive Act of the African Union;

WELCOMES the establishment of the Joint AU-EU Monitoring Mechanism whose objective is to ensure, through exchange of information and discussion of key issues, the consistency and coherence of the EPA process with Africa’s plans and aspirations for regional and continental integration and the establishment of a Pan-African Market and the promotion of synergies between the EPA process and ACP-EU cooperation, notably in the context of regional indicative programmes;

URGES the Commission and the EU to operationalise the mechanism in an effective manner so as to ensure that EPAs indeed enhance the regional integration process and development in Africa as well as the building of regional markets through the effective removal of production, supply and trade constraints;

ALSO URGES the EU to grant access to the Commission as an integration organization to EDF resources for projects of a continental nature;

REQUESTS the Commission to report on progress made on the EPA negotiations to the 7th Ordinary Session of Council in July 2005.

ENDORSES
Candidature of Hon. Jaya Krishna Cuttaree, Minister of Foreign Affairs, International Trade and Regional Co-operation of Mauritius, to the post of Director General of the World Trade Organization, at elections scheduled to be held in 2005.

3. Food Security

Permanent Representatives Committee
Ninth Ordinary Session
Report (1X)

Follow-up on Maputo, Sirte and Ouagadogou Declarations on Food Security:

The Commissioner concluded by proposing the creation of an African Food Security Committee to serve as a platform of exchange on matters of food security in the continent, and the establishment of an African Union representational office in Rome to coordinate Africa’s food security matters with relevant world bodies mandated with the issue.

Executive Council
Sixth Ordinary Session
Rapporteur’s Report

Follow-up of Maputo, Sirte and Ouagadogou Declarations on Food Security

On the status of food security in Africa, the following observations were made:

A reliable early warning system be established as it constitutes the preferential tool for combating food insecurity – the early warning system should be capable of anticipating the emergence of food crises, taking stock of production and available resources, and monitoring phenomena such as natural disasters (floods; droughts; invasion or outbreak of endemic diseases affecting animals, crops and plants);

Once established, the early warning system together with continued monitoring should be relied on to generate a steady flow of situation reports as this would facilitate the generation and communication of relevant information to Member States and all stakeholders in time for them to take appropriate measures;

Special attention should be given to the Southern Sahelian region as this area constitutes the main locust corridor between the Sahara and the countries further north;

Regional strategic desert control measures should be implemented by the concerned Member states;

There was need to strengthen the capacity of Member States in the area of fighting migratory pests and animal diseases that pose a threat to food security, and in so doing
to make use of recent technological methods in veterinary science and pest control.
Dakar-Agricultural Initiative

The Senegalese delegation informed Council of the holding in Dakar, Senegal from 4 to 5 February 2005, of the Dakar-Agricultural Initiative which would be a Forum at which agricultural issues would be discussed. It indicated that various key figures from Africa and the rest of the world would be taking part in this meeting and, in this regard, invited all countries of the African Union to participate in this Forum.

Meeting of Ministers of Agriculture
The Egyptian delegation highlighted the importance of agriculture for African economies and underscored the need for Africa to meet to discuss strategic issues such as cotton. It informed Council that Egypt was organizing in May 2005 a meeting of African Ministers of Agriculture with the participation of UNCTAD and other institutions to examine the situation and come up with a Common Position for the defence of African agricultural products.

Assembly of the Africa Union: Decisions and Declarations

Assembly /AU/Dec.59 (IV)

NOTES WITH GRAVE CONCERN the serious economic and social impacts of the 2004 desert locust invasion of the Northern, Western and Eastern regions of Africa;

REQUESTS the Commission and Member States to take all necessary measures to implement the Maputo, Sirte and Ouagadougou Declarations and their relevant Plans of Action;

agriculture

Decision on allocation of 10% national budgetary resources to agriculture and rural development over the next 5 years

REQUESTS the Chairperson of the Commission to define, in collaboration with Member States and the NEPAD Secretariat, the core areas of agriculture and rural development relevant to the 10% allocation adopted in the Maputo Declarations;
CALLS UPON Member States to implement the present Decision in order to improve the financing of agriculture;

4. Education

Executive Council
Sixth Ordinary Session
Rapporteur’s Report

EX.CL/155 (VI)

Meeting of African Ministers of Education

The Algerian delegation informed Council that its country would be holding in April 2005 a meeting of African Ministers of Education to be attended also by other partners such as UNESCO, NEPAD. It added that this meeting would be coinciding with the end of the Decade on Education and would prepare the next Heads of State Assembly whose theme would be Education. It took this opportunity to invite all Member States to take part in this meeting.

5. Millennium Development Goals

Permanent Representatives Committee
Ninth Ordinary Session
PRC/Rpt (1X)

Briefing on the review of the status of implementation of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs)

The Commissioner for Social Affairs informed the PRC that the Commission was already seized with the matter and that preparations for the mid-decade review of the MDGs had already started in earnest together with the AU’s partners. She added that it was intended to put an item on the MDGs on the agenda of the July Policy Organ meetings with a view to coming up with an African Common Position on the MDGs, and that in the meantime the Commission would prepare the necessary documentation

The African Common Position should be based on what is actually on the ground, and show both the progress made and the challenges remaining, so that it is clear what Africa needs to do in order to meet the agreed benchmarks. Some delegations suggested the setting up of a mechanism that would enable the AU to review the status of implementation of MDGs, so that Africa would be in a position to submit a common position to the UNGA Review Meeting in September 2005.

That a report should be submitted to the PRC for consideration as expeditiously as possible, taking into account the timelines connected to the various activities linked to the overall MDG review process, such as consideration of the African Common Position by the Executive Council and adoption by the Assembly prior to the September 2005 global meeting on the MDGs.

Executive Council
Sixth Ordinary Session
Decisions

EX.CL/Dec.166

The Executive Council:

WELCOMES the convening of the High-level Summit in September 2005 to consider the Report on the Review of the Millennium Declaration and the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs);

STRONGLY SUPPORTS the elaboration of an African Common Position as the Continent’s contribution to the Report on the Review of the Millennium Declaration and the MDGs based on the results and the progress accomplished, and in light of the commitments made by Africa’s partners;

REQUESTS the Commission to coordinate and lead in this process of developing an African Common Position in collaboration with Member States and in close consultation with NEPAD Secretariat, the Regional Economic Communities (RECs), the UN Economic Commission for Africa (ECA) and the African Development Bank (ADB);

FURTHER REQUESTS the Chairperson of the Commission to submit a finalised draft African Common Position to the 7th Ordinary Session of Council in July 2005.

6. Darfur

Assembly of the Africa Union
Fourth Ordinary Session
Decisions and Declarations

Assembly/AU/Dec.68 (1V)

Decision on the situation in the Darfur region of the Sudan.

SUPPORTS the convening in N’djamena, Chad, in February 2005, of a high-level meeting of the Joint Commission, provided for in the Humanitarian Ceasefire Agreement of 8 April 2004, to strengthen the implementation of the Humanitarian Ceasefire Agreement and therefore contribute to the creation of conditions conducive to the vigorous pursuit of the peace process;

STRESSES the need for urgent and adequate preparation for the resumption of the Inter-Sudanese Peace Talks on Darfur, as directed by the 23rd Meeting of the Peace and Security Council held in Libreville, on 10 January 2005. The Assembly URGES the Parties to attend these Talks at the highest level, without preconditions;


SUPPORTS the proposal of the Chairperson of the AU to be assisted in his efforts to facilitate the attainment of a speedy solution to the conflict in Darfur by a Committee comprising Chad, Egypt, Gabon, Libya, Nigeria and the AU Commission;

ENCOURAGES all the leaders and other stakeholders who have been supporting the Inter-Sudanese Peace Talks on Darfur to continue their efforts;

7. Refugees, Returnees and internally displaced persons

Permanent Representatives Committee
Ninth Ordinary Session
Report (1X)

Consideration of the report on the situation of refugees, returnees, and internally displaced persons in Africa- EX.CL/ 148 (VI)

The following proposals were made:

Holding of a Ministerial Conference on refugees, returnees and IDPs in 2005/2006;

Undertaking and strengthening regular field assessment missions to countries affected

Addressing the problem of donor fatigue and embarking on resource mobilization in favour of humanitarian issues in the spirit of burden sharing;

Strengthening the Early Warning System in the Conflict Management Division;

Harmonization of data on refugees.

Executive Council
Sixth Ordinary Session
Decisions

Ex.CL/148 (vi)

The Executive Council:

EXPRESSES CONCERN over the problems of refugees and displaced persons that have persisted in the Continent as well as the grave continued violations of human rights in conflict situations;

COMMENDS Member States that continue to host refugees and make available to them all the facilities and services in the spirit of African solidarity and hospitality and CALLS ON all Member States to mobilize resources in order to alleviate the burden on recipient Member States;

FURTHER COMMENDS Member States which have abided by the peace initiative and agreements that have created conducive conditions for the return of refugees and displaced persons to their communities and APPEALS to Member States concerned to promote voluntary return of their nationals;

CALLS UPON the International Community to support the on-going repatriation operations and post-conflict reconstruction programmes in various areas;

WELCOMES the appointment of a Special Representative on the Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict Situations in Africa and APPEALS to the donor community to extend moral, material and financial support to the Special Representative in the execution of her mandate;

URGES Member States as well as Non-State Actors to comply with the International Humanitarian Law;

REQUESTS the Commission to continue monitoring the situation of refugees, returnees and displaced persons in close collaboration with the AU Commission on Refugees; revitalize, as a matter of urgency, the Coordinating Committee on Assistance and Protection to Refugees and Internally Displaced Persons; and continue to implement the Comprehensive Implementation Plan in close collaboration with the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC);

FURTHER REQUESTS the Commission to convene a Ministerial Conference on refugees, returnees and displaced persons in 2006, in collaboration with the AU Commission on Refugees, UNHCR and other relevant partners;

URGES the Commission to launch a resource mobilization programme in close collaboration with all relevant partners for the purpose of ensuring the adequate well-being and protection for refugees and displaced persons and durable solution to the problem in Africa.

8. The African Union Protocol on the Rights of Women in Africa

Executive Council
Sixth Ordinary Session
Rapporteur ’s Report

Ex. CL /Rapt/Rpt (vi) P.8

On the ratification of the African Union Protocol to the African Charter on Human and People’s Rights relating to the Rights of Women in Africa

The Senegalese delegation informed Council that in a document which is not from the Commission, Senegal recalled that it had ratified this Protocol but was listed among the countries that had not ratified the said Protocol. Consequently, it requested that Senegal be withdrawn from the said list.

Executive Council
Sixth Ordinary Session
Decisions

URGES all Member States which have not yet done so to sign and ratify or accede to the Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights and the Protocol on the Court of Justice of the African Union.

9. Merger of the African Court on Human and People’s Rights and the Court of Justice of the African Union

Permanent Representatives Committee Ninth Ordinary Session PRC/Rpt (1X)

Consideration of the Draft Protocol on the Merger of the African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights and the Court of Justice of the African Union – EX.CL/162 (VI)
In presenting this item, the Representative of the Commission highlighted the context and effect of decision Assembly/AU/Dec.45 (III) adopted in July 2004 by the Assembly. He indicated the actions taken by the Commission in implementation of the decision including undertaking a study on the matter, elaborating a draft legal instrument to effect the merger, convening a consultative meeting with distinguished African scholars, judges and practitioners to consider the study and the draft legal instrument. He noted that a planned meeting of the PRC and government legal experts could not take place in Addis Ababa due to circumstances beyond the control of the Commission. He stated that the words ‘integrate into one’ and ‘merge’ are legally one and the same thing and that the draft legal instrument submitted to the PRC was short and simple and was intended to effect the merger whilst maintaining the integrity and specificities of the two courts. Thus, the draft legal instrument envisaged the African Court becoming a Specialized Judicial Division in the merged court which would implement the Protocol on the African Court. The combined Court would have 15 Judges and one President, assisted by one Registrar and two Deputy Registrars.

During the discussion, the following issues were raised:
i) The decision adopted by the Assembly in July 2004 on the merger of the two Courts into a single court should not unduly delay the establishment of the African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights (African Court) in view of fact that the Protocol on the establishment of the Court has already entered into force;
ii) There is need to convene a meeting of government legal experts to consider the recommendations and draft legal instrument and related issues to enable the policy organs make an informed decision on the matter ;
iii) Consideration be given to operationalizing the African Court in view of the importance of human rights issues in the continent while working out the modalities for the merger of the two courts. In this regard, the Assembly could consider reviewing its decision suspending the operationalization of the African Court;
iv) Operationalizing the African Court when only 19 Member States have ratified the Protocol would not be in conformity with the spirit of the Protocol, which requires representation of the principal legal traditions of the Continent;
v) In effecting the merger of the two courts, there is need to maintain the identity and integrity of the two courts;
vi) The role of States Parties vis-a-vis Member States should be clarified.

1. The Legal Counsel suggested that the proposal to establish the African Court pending the merger should also be referred to the proposed meeting of government legal experts in view of the serious legal and other implications involved.
2. At the end of the debate the PRC decided to submit all the issues to the Executive Council for further consideration.

10. Schedule of AU Summits

Assembly/AU /Dec. 63 (1v)

Decision on the framework for the organization of future summits.

2. RECALLS its previous decision in July 2004 on the convening of two ordinary sessions of the Assembly every year;

3. DECIDES that the January sessions of the Assembly shall henceforth be held in the last week of January at the Headquarters of the Union, during which the Chairperson of the Assembly shall be elected;

4. FURTHER DECIDES that the January Session could be convened, on an exceptional basis, outside the Headquarters, by decision of the Assembly upon the recommendation of the Executive Council. However, such hosting shall not be linked to the Chairmanship of the Union;

6. APPROVES the following calendar for hosting of future Summits:

2005 - July - Great Socialist People’s Libyan Arab Jamahiriya

2006 - January - The Sudan
July - The Gambia

2007 - January - Headquarters
- July - Ghana

2008 - January - Headquarters
- July - Angola

2009 - January - Headquarters
- July - Madagascar

2010 - January - Headquarters
- July - Egypt

11. Accreditation of Non Governmental Organisations

Permanent Representatives Committee
Ninth Ordinary Session
PRC/Rpt 1X

Consideration of the report on the Criteria for granting observer status and a system of accreditation within the AU-

Ex.cl/161 (V1)
The representative of the Commission recalled that the document was in three sections:

Section I dealing with the granting of Observer Status to Non-governmental Organizations, which had been considered and adopted by the PRC and experts in a meeting held in June 2004;

He said that the objective of the proposals relating to accreditation was to put in place a system for collaborative engagement with development partners, with the right to attend only the public sessions of AU meetings.

12. Reform of the United Nations

Executive Council
Sixth Ordinary Session
Rapporteur’s Report


Consideration of the Report of the High-Level panel on Threats, Challenges and Change relating to the Reform of the United Nations

Ambassador Diarra indicated that the report was presented to the General Assembly on 8 December 2004. It highlighted the following important areas: (1) collective security and the challenge of prevention, under which issues such as poverty, infectious diseases and environmental degradation and conflict within states, nuclear, radiological, chemical and biological weapons, terrorism and transnational organized crime would be addressed; (2) collective security; focusing on the use of force, peace enforcement and peacekeeping capability; and (3) effective United Nations in the twenty-first century, .highlighting the issues on the effectiveness of the General Assembly and the Security Council.

The issues of interest to Africa include the following; (1) the revitalization and reform of the existing organs of the United Nations, especially the General Assembly, the Economic and Social Council, the Security Council and General Secretariat (including the creation of one post of deputy Secretary General in charge of peace and security), the universalization of the Commission on Human Rights; (2) the creation of the structures of the Peace-building Commission and the issue of the initial operational fund of US$250 million, (3) the strengthening of the capacities of regional and sub-regional organizations.


He articulated the following events that should be anticipated from now on to the High-Level meeting at the United Nations, New York, in September 2005: (1) consultations on Prof. J. Sachs report on the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), up to March 2005, and (2) consultations on the consolidated report of the Secretary General.

Ambassador Diarra stated that one of the premises for the enlargement of the Security Council was the general acceptance of the need to apply democratic principles with respect to the composition and operations of this important organ of the United Nations. There was need to create more room for those countries contributing more to the operations of the United Nations. The Panel in this connection indicated that there should be increased involvement of those who contribute most to the United Nations financially, militarily and diplomatically, in particular in the context of
contributions to United Nations assessed budgets, participation in mandated peace operations, contributions to voluntary activities of the United Nations in the areas of security and development, and diplomatic activities in support of United Nations objectives and mandates. For the developed countries, achieving, or making substantial progress towards the internationally agreed level of 0.7 per cent of the GNP for ODA, should be considered as an important criterion of contribution.

Executive Council
Sixth Ordinary Session
Decisions

The Executive Council:

TAKES NOTE with appreciation of the quality and depth of analysis, of the Report and the briefing provided by the African Group Ambassadors in New York;

DECIDES to set up a Ministerial Committee of Fifteen (15) Members, which is open-ended, on the basis of the AU formula for equitable geographical distribution applied to the Peace and Security Council;

REQUESTS the various regions to urgently undertake consultations in conformity with their respective regional mechanisms and submit the names of the members of the Committee thereof to the Commission;

MANDATES the Committee of Fifteen (15) to consider all aspects of the recommendations made in the report of the High-Level Panel for the reform of the United Nations System;

MANDATES ALSO the Committee of Fifteen (15) to consider the two options relating to the reform of the UN Security Council, taking into account:

The African Common Position contained in the Harare Assembly Declaration of June 1997;

Developments on the international scene since the adoption of the Harare Declaration; and

the essence of the long debate held in this Session of Council on 28 January 2005 as summarised by the Chairperson.

DECIDES that the meeting of the Committee should be convened from 20 to 22 February 2005, followed by an Extraordinary Session of the Executive Council, to adopt Africa’s position which will be presented to the UN Secretary General for inclusion in his report to the UN General Assembly in March 2005;

DECIDES that the African Group of Ambassadors in New York and resource persons should be involved in the work of the Committee of Fifteen (15) on the Reform of the United Nations and in the Extraordinary Session of the Executive Council due to take plae
place in March 2005;

13. Debt, Aid and Trade

Assembly of the African Union
Fourth Ordinary Session
Decisions and Declarations

Assembly/AU/Dec. 70 (IV)
Decision on the report of the Heads of State and Government implementation Committee on NEPAD

WELCOMES the Africa Commission as an important step towards the mobilization of international assistance for the implementation of NEPAD and commends its efforts in this regard;

CALLS UPON the international community to support NEPAD and in particular calls on the G8 countries to:
a) cancel all debts of African countries and take practical steps to urgently implement such cancellation;
b) double development assistance to Africa and improve its quality inter alia by channeling such increase through multilateral development institutions and by augmenting the budgetary support component of it;
c) take the necessary steps to complete the Doha round of trade negotiations at the earliest possible time so as to provide free and non-reciprocal access to their markets for African countries and eliminate export subsides for agricultural products.

2. Newslinks to recent articles

2005-02-24

http://pambazuka.org/en/category/aumonitor/27024

* Africa's self assessment
http://allafrica.com/stories/200502150932.html
Declarations and decisions at the AU summit in Abuja are only a rehash of similar ones in the past.
* AU mission arrives in Somalia
http://www.voanews.com/english/2005-02-14-voa46.cfm
More than a dozen officials from the African Union, the Arab League, and the seven-nation Intergovernmental Authority on Development arrived in Mogadishu to begin their assessment of Somalia's security situation.
* Media groups slam AU
http://www.ijnet.org/FE_Article/newsarticle.asp?UILang=1
&CId=294582&CIdLang=1
The African Union is neglecting press freedom on several fronts, according to journalists’ groups monitoring its policies.
* Anger at African Sanctions in Togo
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/4290761.stm
The African Union meets on Thursday to decide if it will impose sanctions on the country.

Ghana: The struggle for equality

2005-02-24

http://www.eldis.org/cf/rdr/rdr.cfm?doc=DOC17739

This paper focuses on the importance of according traditional women leaders throughout Africa the same recognition as male chiefs who have been co-opted into new positions of power in their societies. The author, from the Social Science Research Network, explores how, in spite of Ghana's professed commitment to gender equality, pronounced in its domestic law and its international legal obligations, women in Ghana continue to suffer the burden of discrimination. Traditional practices and attitudes toward women throughout Africa have hampered their quality of life, and continue to impair their ability to change that fact by hindering their access to public life.

Tanzania: Women, Aids, health and human rights

2005-02-24

http://www.eldis.org/cf/rdr/rdr.cfm?doc=DOC17733

Widows, in Tanzania and many other parts of the world, face discrimination on a regular basis, which often condemns women to a life of poverty. In the face of this discrimination, says this research from the Social Science Research Network, there are no national or international consensuses on the importance of changing the customary legal rules relating to widows, and on the larger question of the proper place of customary law and harmful traditional, cultural, and religious practices in the changing African society.

Uganda: Ban on Vagina Monologues

2005-02-24

http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/4277063.stm

Uganda's authorities have banned the play The Vagina Monologues, due to open in the capital, Kampala this weekend. The Ugandan Media Council said the performance would not be put on as it promoted and glorified acts such as lesbianism and homosexuality. It said the production could go ahead if the organisers "expunge all the offending parts". But the organisers of the play say it raises awareness of sexual abuse against women.

Uganda: Examining the domestic relations bill

2005-02-24

http://www.eldis.org/cf/search/disp/DocDisplay.cfm?Doc=DOC17736&Resource=f1gender

This Social Science Research Network paper outlines many of the specifics of the Ugandan Domestic Relations Bill (DRB). The Bill addresses women's property rights in marriage and women's right to negotiate sex on the grounds of health, sets the minimum age of marriage at eighteen, prohibits FGM and criminalises widow inheritance. The authors uses a thorough explication of the particulars of the bill to exhort the Ugandan government to take responsibility for the discrimination and violence that many of its female citizens routinely suffer.

Egypt: Thousands Still Held Incommunicado, But Only Nine Suspects Named

2005-02-24

http://pambazuka.org/en/category/rights/27022

The Egyptian state security forces arbitrarily arrested thousands of people and tortured detainees in the wake of the Taba Hilton bombing in October, Human Rights Watch said in a report released this week. Four months later, as many as 2,400 detainees are still being held incommunicado. The 48 page report, ‘Mass Arrests and Torture in Sinai’ documents how, in the weeks and months after the bombing that killed 30 people in the resort town of Taba, the State Security Investigation agency conducted mass arrests in northern Sinai without a warrant or judicial order as required by Egyptian law.
Thousands Still Held Incommunicado, But Only Nine Suspects Named

(Cairo, February 22, 2005) The Egyptian state security forces arbitrarily
arrested thousands of people and tortured detainees in the wake of the
Taba Hilton bombing in October, Human Rights Watch said in a report
released today. Four months later, as many as 2,400 detainees are still
being held incommunicado.

The 48 page report, ?Mass Arrests and Torture in Sinai,? documents how, in
the weeks and months after the bombing that killed 30 people in the resort
town of Taba, the State Security Investigation agency conducted mass
arrests in northern Sinai without a warrant or judicial order as required
by Egyptian law.

The Egyptian authorities have identified only nine suspects as responsible
for the Taba attack, but the ministry of interior continues to hold an
estimated 2,400 detainees. The government has not released information on
the whereabouts of these detainees either to their families or lawyers
representing them, and has not indicated if any have been charged with
crimes.

?Egyptian security forces responded to the Taba atrocity by committing
mass human rights abuses themselves,? said Joe Stork, Washington director
of Human Rights Watch?s Middle East and North Africa Division. ?The
Mubarak government still hasn?t gotten the message that routine torture
and arbitrary arrests violate the law and fail to address real security
needs.?

Human Rights Watch conducted this investigation in northern Sinai with two
Egyptian human rights organizations, the Hisham Mubarak Law Center and the
Egyptian Association against Torture.

The authorities have not contested the claims of Egyptian human rights
organizations that security forces rounded up between 2,500 and 3,000
persons following the bombing. On February 4 the interior ministry
announced the release of some 90 detainees, adding that further releases
would follow.

Released detainees and families of those detained told Human Rights Watch
that those arrested were first held and interrogated at SSI headquarters
in el-Arish. The authorities then released some but transferred most to
prisons in Cairo and the Nile Delta.

On October 25, the interior ministry identified the alleged ringleader of
the Taba Hilton attack, who was killed in the blast, as a petty criminal
of Palestinian origin who had recently ?turned to religious extremism.? He
staged the bombing, the ministry said in a statement, because he was upset
by Israeli army actions against Palestinians in the Gaza Strip. Located on
the Israeli-Egyptian border, the Taba Hilton is especially popular with
Israeli vacationers.

?If Egypt won?t bring criminal charges against these detainees and give
them fair trials, it must promptly release them,? Stork said.

Human Rights Watch urged the Egyptian government to conduct a thorough and
impartial inquiry into allegations of torture and arbitrary arrest,
prosecute any officials found to have violated the law, and ensure that
persons arrested illegally and subjected to torture have access to prompt
and fair compensation.

Government officials in el-Arish and Cairo were unwilling to meet to
discuss the arbitrary arrests and torture allegations while it was
conducting its investigation, Human Rights Watch said. A subsequent letter
of inquiry to Egyptian Interior Minister Habib el-Adli has also gone
unanswered.

Human Rights Watch also called on the Egyptian People?s Assembly to
conduct an impartial public inquiry into charges of widespread arbitrary
arrests and detention and allegations of torture and ill-treatment in
connection with investigations into the Taba bombing.

"Egypt: Mass Arrests and Torture in Sinai" is available in English at
http://hrw.org/reports/2005/egypt0205/

Human Rights Watch Press release

Namibia: Call for political solution to Caprivi conflict

Press Release

2005-02-24

http://pambazuka.org/en/category/rights/26995

Namibia’s National Society for Human Rights (NSHR) has called upon the Namibian Government to opt for a comprehensive negotiated settlement of the Caprivi conflict. "The ongoing marathon high treason trial against the more than 130 alleged Caprivi secessionists is alone unlikely to bring about a sustainable resolution of the dispute. Rather, the trial is aimed at bringing about a judicial answer to what is unmistakably a political question. Moreover, the trial is likely to result in long-term imprisonment and martyrdom, as well as deepened hatred and trauma on the part of the alleged secessionists, their families and their tribesmen for many years to come."
February 21, 2005

 


PRESS RELEASE


 


CAPRIVI DISPUTE: CALL FOR A POLITICAL SOLUTION


 


Namibia’s National Society for Human Rights (NSHR) calls upon the Namibian Government to opt for a comprehensive negotiated settlement of the Caprivi conflict. The ongoing marathon high treason trial against the more than 130 alleged Caprivi secessionists is alone unlikely to bring about a sustainable resolution of the dispute. Rather, the trial is aimed at bringing about a judicial answer to what is unmistakably a political question. Moreover, the trial is likely to result in long-term imprisonment and martyrdom, as well as deepened hatred and trauma on the part of the alleged secessionists, their families and their tribesmen for many years to come. 


 


“It must be pointed out that what is being reaped now are the fruits of a conflict which has been sown at least 45 years ago and which has been simmering ever since. This conflict is real and has both deep-rooted structural and proximate causes. These causes include latent historical and ethno-cultural factors fueled by socio-economic commissions and omissions. What is happening at the moment are mere manifestations and symptoms of such conflict. This includes the current high treason trial itself. To ignore the existence of this conflict is to our own peril!


 


As this country’s leading human rights organization active in the field of conflict prevention and transformation, as well as peace building, we believe that a negotiated settlement is not only cost-effective, but also stands the best chance of bringing about restorative justice and hence, a durable resolution of the Caprivi dispute”, said NSHR executive director Phil ya Nangoloh.


 


Moreover, it should not be forgotten that the prime reason SWAPO launched an armed struggle in 1966 against apartheid South Africa’s occupation was because the apartheid regime was averse to a peaceful settlement of the Namibian dispute. It is therefore ironic that Namibia’s political leaders have apparently not learned from the past and approached the dispute peacefully.


 


Hence, as an organization dedicated to the sustainable and peaceful resolution of conflicts, NSHR is calling upon committed States, intergovernmental and non-state organizations, competent in the field of conflict prevention and resolution, to encourage both the Namibian Government and the Caprivi separatist movement to seek a negotiated settlement of the dispute.


 


Background Information:


 


The present stalemate was triggered by a heightened sense of human insecurity preceded by a series of unresolved charges of political injustices and socio-economic marginalization leveled at the Government.


 


Hence, the escalators of the present conflict include claims of socio-economic deprivation and divide-and-rule tactics characterized by increased inter-tribal and intra-tribal tensions. The Government responded to these tensions with the deployment of Namibian security forces to the Caprivi Region, which resulted in widespread human rights abuses and a subsequent refugee flight to neighboring countries. The conflict exploded into armed violence, which started on August 2, 1999, when Caprivi Liberation Army insurgents apparently retaliated with a daring attack on several Government installations. This attack prompted a swift reaction by Namibia security forces, followed by the imposition of a state of emergency, under which even more grave human rights violations were perpetrated. These abuses included mass arbitrary arrests and detentions, summary executions, torture, enforced disappearances and prolonged detention without trial.


 


Named after German Chancellor Count Georg Leo von Caprivi di Caprara di Montecuccoli, the some 20 000 square kilometer Strip, now with over 100 000 people, has a unique history. Up until the end of the 19th Century, the Region was known as Itenge (and sometimes Linyanti) and ruled by the Lozi Empire, as part of the Barotzeland Kingdom. The empire included parts of present-day Botswana, Namibia and Zambia. In the late 1800s, Britain ruled this Strip from the Federation of Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland (now Zambia and Malawi), Southern Rhodesia (now Zimbabwe) or the British Protectorate of Bechuanaland (now Botswana).


 


During the Second Berlin Conference the Strip became a Germany possession after the British exchanged it for the islands of Heligoland (North Sea) and Zanzibar (Indian Ocean) as part of the Heligoland-Zanzibar Treaty concluded on August 10, 1890. After World War I, Germany was stripped of its colonial possessions as stated in the Treaty of Versailles in 1919.  In 1920, South West Africa (now Namibia) was placed under the mandate of the League of Nations, while the Strip remained under South Africa as a separate entity.


 


Before Zambian independence in 1964, then Zambian Prime Minister Kenneth Kaunda and the Litunga (i.e. King) of Barotseland, Sir Mwanawina Lewanika, signed an agreement incorporating the autonomous Barotseland Kingdom into Zambia without the Caprivi Strip.


 


In 1972, Caprivi was given its own Legislative Council, which could make decisions concerning its development and also had its own national anthem and emblem. Nevertheless, the Strip was directly administered by a Commissioner-General from South Africa.


 


Until 1999, certain laws specific to South West Africa and subsequently Namibia were not applicable to the Caprivi Strip. The Application of Laws to the Eastern Caprivi Zipfel Act 1999 (Act 10 of 1999) was promulgated only on June 24, 1999, extending the laws of Namibia to the Strip.


 


According to Caprivi nationalist leader Mishake Muyongo, soon after Zambian independence, there was a merger agreement in November 1964 reached between SWAPO (under current Namibian President Sam Nujoma) and the Caprivi African National Union (CANU) (then led by Muyongo) that after Namibian independence, the Strip would be enabled to decide its own destiny. As a result of this merger, Muyongo became vice-president of SWAPO. However, Nujoma disputes this, maintaining that there was no such agreement.


 


In a nationally televised special address in the beginning November 1998, President Nujoma said that SWAPO found Muyongo guilty in 1980 of “planning the secession of the Caprivi Strip and proclamation of a so-called Republic of Itenge”. Nujoma branded Muyongo and his followers “terrorists” who are “guilty of treason and murder”.


 


Muyongo maintains inter alia that the people of Caprivi have suffered under the Nujoma government. Speaking from Denmark and referring to the armed attack on August 2, 1999, Muyongo stated in August 1999 that Caprivians have been “left with no choice” but to fight for independence.  Muyongo was also quoted as saying: “Sam Nujoma does nothing for the Caprivians. He has nothing in common with us. Our history, our geography, our culture, our traditions are totally different”.


 
In case of further enquiries, please call P. ya Nangoloh at Tel: +264 61 236 183 or +264 61 253 447 (office hours) or Mobile: +264 811 299 886 or e-mail: nshr@iafrica.com.na

Sudan: UN should immediately refer Darfur to the ICC, urge human rights groups

2005-02-24

http://pambazuka.org/en/category/rights/27045

The Darfur Consortium, an umbrella group of more than forty mainly African civil society organizations, along with the Cairo Institute for Human Rights Studies and Human Rights First (formerly the Lawyers Committee for Human Rights), has urged the U.N. Security Council to refer the situation in the Darfur region of the Sudan to the International Criminal Court (ICC) without further delay. A Security Council resolution to refer the Darfur situation to the ICC would grant that court jurisdiction to investigate and prosecute the atrocities committed in the region. "The restoration of peace in Darfur is not possible unless those responsible for the grave crimes committed there are brought to justice and the damage done to the victims is satisfactorily repaired," said Magdi El Naim, Executive Director of the Cairo Institute for Human Rights Studies, which is a member of the Darfur Consortium.
CAIRO, 23 February 2005 ? The Darfur Consortium, an umbrella group of more
than forty mainly African civil society organizations, along with the
Cairo Institute for Human Rights Studies and Human Rights First (formerly
the Lawyers Committee for Human Rights), urge the U.N. Security Council to
refer the situation in the Darfur region of the Sudan to the International
Criminal Court (ICC) without further delay. A Security Council resolution
to refer the Darfur situation to the ICC would grant that court
jurisdiction to investigate and prosecute the atrocities committed in the
region.

?The restoration of peace in Darfur is not possible unless those
responsible for the grave crimes committed there are brought to justice
and the damage done to the victims is satisfactorily repaired,? said Magdi
El Na?im, Executive Director of the Cairo Institute for Human Rights
Studies, which is a member of the Darfur Consortium. ?As a first step,
the ICC must be permitted to investigate and prosecute those who bear the
greatest responsibility for these crimes.?

Last week, the report of the U.N.-appointed International Commission of
Inquiry on Darfur was presented to the Security Council. The Commission ?
a five-member panel that includes Mohammed Fayek, Secretary-General of the
Arab Organization for Human Rights ? found that crimes against humanity
and war crimes have been committed in Darfur. In particular, it found
that killing of civilians, torture, enforced disappearances, destruction
of villages, rape and other forms of sexual violence, pillaging, and
forced displacement have been committed on a widespread and systematic
basis. The Commission also provided to the U.N. Secretary-General a
sealed list of individuals suspected of criminal responsibility for these
violations and strongly recommended immediate referral of the Darfur
situation to the ICC.

Despite the Commission?s urgent recommendation, the current draft of a
Security Council resolution on Darfur, which is sponsored by the United
States, fails to refer the Darfur situation to the ICC ? or indeed to
provide for any acceptable mechanism for expeditiously holding accountable
those responsible for what the U.N. Secretary General has described as a
?hell on earth? for the people of Darfur.

?It is unacceptable to delay justice for victims in Darfur,? said John
Stompor, Senior Associate in the International Justice program of Human
Rights First. ?A vague promise of future accountability is an inadequate
substitute for immediate referral to the ICC.?

A recent mission by members of the Darfur Consortium observed firsthand
how Darfurians continue to suffer under Khartoum?s defiance of the
international community and the ineffectiveness of existing Security
Council resolutions. More than 2.1 million people have been cast out of
their homes and are living in fear in precarious conditions as internally
displaced persons in Sudan or as refugees in Chad. As many as 300,000
people may have already died as a result of the conflict.

?Darfurians who fled their homes are enduring a desperate lack of adequate
food and medical care,? said Ashraf Milad Ruxi, a representative of the
Darfur Consortium. ?They also express fear at returning to their villages
until there is a process for holding accountable those responsible for the
grave crimes committed in Darfur.?

?The people of Darfur must not struggle for justice alone. They should
have the support of all peace-loving people ? particularly their brothers
and sisters throughout Africa as well as the Arab and Muslim world,? said
Dismas Nkunda, also a representative of the Darfur Consortium. ?The
heinous crimes committed in Darfur demand international action. We
challenge the African Union and its member countries ? particularly
Algeria, Benin, and Tanzania, who have seats on the Security Council ? to
put their full support behind a referral of the Darfur situation to the
ICC.?

Sudan Has Failed to End Impunity.

The Sudanese government, whose army and proxy militia, the Janjaweed, are
responsible for much of the violence in Darfur, has failed to bring those
responsible for these crimes to justice.

?In July 2004 during the U.N. Secretary-General?s visit to Sudan, the
Sudanese government promised that it would investigate the grave crimes in
Darfur, but since then, there has been no serious action to end impunity,?
said Abdel Mon?im El Gak, Sudan Program Officer at the Cairo Institute for
Human Rights Studies. ?The Government of the Sudan has no one to blame
but itself for its lack of credibility when it talks about justice for
these crimes.?

Indeed, the International Commission of Inquiry on Darfur found that ?the
Sudanese judicial system has proved incapable, and the authorities
unwilling, of ensuring accountability for the crimes committed in Darfur.?

The ICC Is an Essential First Step for Justice.

The ICC is the only permanent international judicial institution with the
power to exercise jurisdiction over persons for the most serious crimes of
international concern ? genocide, other crimes against humanity, and war
crimes. Pursuant to article 13 of the Rome Statute, the Security Council
acting under Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter may immediately authorize the
ICC to exercise its jurisdiction over the serious crimes committed in
Darfur.

Because the ICC is now operating, it could rapidly begin investigating and
prosecuting those who bear the greatest responsibility for the serious
crimes committed in Darfur. The court has existing facilities and
infrastructure, its senior officials are in place, and there already is a
staff of over 250 people at work.

The U.S. Proposal for New Tribunal Has Many Drawbacks.

In recent weeks, U.S. officials have sought to derail a referral to the
ICC by advocating for a new, temporary international tribunal, mandated
and established by the Security Council, and jointly administered by the
U.N. and the African Union.

U.S. support for a new tribunal is based on its ideological opposition to
the ICC ? not practical reasons related to ensuring justice for the people
of Darfur. Indeed, the U.S.-proposed tribunal would be burdened by
unnecessary delay and expense.

?It is disheartening to see the United States undermine the leadership
role it has played in focusing the world?s attention on the human rights
emergency in Darfur,? said John Stompor.

Experiences with the temporary international criminal tribunals that were
created for the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda ? in the absence of the
permanent ICC ? suggest that it would take many months, if not years, to
get a new tribunal for Sudan up and running.

Such a tribunal would also require substantial and continuing financial
commitments of hundreds of millions of dollars. It seems highly unlikely
that any of the ninety-seven ICC member countries would support the
creation of a new court, when they are already paying for the ICC, which
is ready and able to take on the case of Darfur.

Another drawback of a new tribunal is that it likely would have problems
of non- cooperation similar to those that have plagued the other temporary
courts. Some of those who have been indicted by these tribunals are
successfully avoiding appearing in court, hoping to exploit the limited
time frame that such temporary tribunals have to finish their work. In
contrast, the ICC is a permanent tribunal whose continuing jurisdiction is
substantially more difficult for accused persons to avoid.

Africa Has a Large Stake in Peace in Darfur and Referral to the ICC.

The African Union and its member countries have played a pivotal role in
the pursuit of peace in Darfur ? brokering a ceasefire, hosting the
political process, and sending a monitoring force to Darfur. African
countries have also clearly expressed a commitment to the ICC ? a
commitment that is disregarded by the U.S. proposal for a new tribunal.

?The ICC is not only an international court ? it is also an African
court,? said Dismas Nkunda. ?The ICC has been identified by numerous
African countries as the most appropriate mechanism for pursuing
accountability for serious crimes under international law when domestic
courts are unwilling or unable to act.?

Forty-four African countries ? including Sudan and Egypt ? have signed the
Rome Statute, the treaty establishing the ICC. Twenty-six African
countries have ratified the Rome Statute and are full parties to the ICC.

In addition, many of the ICC?s key officials are African jurists. The ICC
also has the capacity to hold its proceedings in Africa, if desirable.

A Range of Additional Measures Are Needed.

A referral of the situation of Darfur to the ICC is just one of a number
of critical steps that must be taken in order to ensure peace, justice,
reconciliation and reparation for the people of the region.

The ICC would only be able to investigate and prosecute a small number of
persons for the serious crimes committed in Darfur.

For the thousands of rank and file members of the Janjaweed and others
suspected of committing atrocities in Darfur, justice must be sought and
achieved at the local level. Additional mechanisms should be developed
with the full and informed involvement of the people of Darfur, in
particular the victims of the recent violence. This is a huge but vital
task. It would necessitate not only support for reform of the justice
system within Sudan but also recognition of the important role that local,
traditional conflict resolution mechanisms could play in Darfur.

In addition, a scheme of reparations for the victims of the conflict,
educational programs that promote a culture of peace and human rights, and
at a later stage, a truth and reconciliation commission, need to be part
of a long-term strategy to promote a lasting peace.

?Side by side with a referral of the situation of Darfur to the ICC, the
international community must commit to providing substantial and sustained
support to the people of Darfur to pursue accountability and
reconciliation at the local level,? said Abdel Mon?im El Gak. ?This must
involve understanding the roots of the conflict and its effects on Darfur
communities. It also requires making available the additional resources
needed by Darfurians to rebuild the region?s social and material
infrastructure, which has been utterly decimated.?

FOR MORE INFORMATION, PLEASE CONTACT:

Cairo Institute for Human Rights Studies
Magdi El Na?im
Abdel Mon?im El Gak
Tel. +20 2 7946065, +20 2 7951112
www.cihrs.org

Darfur Consortium
Dismas Nkunda
Tel. +20 2 7946065, +20 2 7951112 (in Cairo); +256 78 310 404 (in Kampala)
Ashraf Milad Ruxi
Tel. +20 2 7924560, +20 12 2903425
www.DarfurConsortium.org

Human Rights First
(formerly the Lawyers Committee for Human Rights)
John Stompor
Tel. +20 2 7946065 (in Cairo); +1 212 845 5247 (in New York)
Ana Ayala
Tel. +1 212 845 5240
www.HumanRightsFirst.org

Africa: Will Rice Help Extend Freedom to the World's Refugees?

Press Release

2005-02-24

http://pambazuka.org/en/category/refugees/27003

US Secretary of State Condoleeza Rice testifies this week on the President's proposed budget before three congressional committees and will soon begin setting the Department's priorities. The U.S. Committee for Refugees and Immigrants (USCRI) urges her to set a strategic new direction in refugee assistance by applying the President's forward strategy of freedom to end the "warehousing" of refugees. "The President's budget requests increased spending on Migration and Refugee Assistance, which we applaud. But while we spend millions each year on the care and maintenance of refugee camps -- $147 million in 2003, for example -- we spend very little on programs to extend freedom so that refugees can enjoy their rights," said USCRI President Lavinia Limón. "Languishing refugees need more than subsistence rations; they need to enjoy their rights."

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE
For further information contact:

Steven Forester (202) 347-3507

Evenings: (202) 215-3183



Will Secretary Rice Help Extend Freedom to the World's Refugees?



WASHINGTON DC, February 16, 2005 Secretary of State Condoleeza Rice testifies this week on the President's proposed budget before three congressional committees and will soon begin setting the Department's priorities. The U.S. Committee for Refugees and Immigrants (USCRI) urges her to set a strategic new direction in refugee assistance by applying the President's forward strategy of freedom to end the "warehousing" of refugees.



"The President's budget requests increased spending on Migration and Refugee Assistance, which we applaud. But while we spend millions each year on the care and maintenance of refugee camps -- $147 million in 2003, for example -- we spend very little on programs to extend freedom so that refugees can enjoy their rights," said USCRI President Lavinia Limón. "Languishing refugees need more than subsistence rations; they need to enjoy their rights."



Most of the world's 12 million refugees do not enjoy the rights recognized in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the 1951 Refugee Convention, including those to work, practice professions, run businesses, own property, and move freely.



More than seven million refugees have been confined to camps or segregated settlements or otherwise deprived of these basic rights for 10 years or more, many for decades. UNHCR estimates the average length of major refugee situations actually increased from 9 years in 1993 to 17 years in 2003. This is illegal and immoral.



"Secretary Rice grew up in segregated Birmingham but made the most of her opportunities. Millions of warehoused refugees enjoy neither rights nor opportunities; they aren't even allowed to work," said Limón. "If refugees enjoyed basic rights, many could be free and self-sufficient, contribute to host country economies, and be less dependent on hefty assistance budgets. It is wrong to sentence them to enforced idleness, dependence, and despair."



Secretary Rice testifies on Wednesday before both the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and the House Foreign Operations Appropriations Subcommittee and on Thursday before the House International Relations Committee.



The President's budget request for the Migration and Refugee Assistance account, which provides funding for refugee assistance overseas and refugee admissions to the United States, is $893 million, about $129 million above what Congress appropriated for 2005. His request for the Emergency Refugee and Migration Assistance account, which funds unanticipated refugee crises such as the Sudanese outflow to Chad, is $40 million, about $13 million above its current level. And the Department of Health and Human Services' Office of Refugee Resettlement, which facilitates the resettlement and integration of refugees and others admitted on humanitarian grounds in the United States, received a $552 million request, a $68 million increase.



"Secretary Rice has a historic opportunity to further liberty, freedom, and opportunity for the world's warehoused refugees. We urge her to seize it," said Limón.



The U.S. Committee for Refugees and Immigrants (USCRI) is a non-profit, nongovernmental organization that has served refugees and immigrants and defended the rights of refugees, asylum seekers, and internally displaced persons worldwide since 1911. USCRI's resettlement program and network of community-based partner agencies help thousands of refugees build new lives in the United States each year. USCRI publishes the World Refugee Survey and Refugee Reports.

Eritrea: Herculean task for refugees returning home

2005-02-24

http://www.sudantribune.com/article.php3?id_article=8142

Sitting outside her kiosk in the western Eritrean village of Dressa, Frawine Abraham, who was born a refugee in Sudan, is glad to be back in her homeland but she struggles here to make ends meet. "I was born in a refugee camp in Sudan. I wanted to come and live in my country. Here, I can move about more easily, but I don't have enough money," said the 24-year-old. Frawine was repatriated in 2001, one of an estimated 120,000 refugees who have returned since then from neighbouring Sudan, according to the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) here.

Rwanda: Child survival and the fertility of refugees in Rwanda after the genocide

2005-02-24

http://www.sussex.ac.uk/Units/PRU/wps/wp26.pdf

In the 1960s and 1990s, internal strife in Rwanda has caused a mass flow of refugees into neighbouring countries. This paper explores the effect of violent conflict on the reproductive behaviour of affected populations, particularly on the cumulated fertility of Rwandan refugee women and the survival of their children. To this end, the authors use a national survey covering 6420 former refugee and non-refugee households conducted between 1999 and 2001.

Sudan: Longing for home as IDP camp life toughens

2005-02-24

http://www.irinnews.org/report.asp?ReportID=45670

At dawn every morning, a number of women leave Mayo-Madela internally displaced persons (IDPs) camp in search of odd jobs within the Sudanese capital, Khartoum. Those who clean houses earn 150 Sudanese dinars a day (US $0.50). The majority of the women are Dinka IDPs from the Nuba Mountains in South Kordofan state, some living in the camp for the past 20 years.

Uganda: "We are all stranded here together"

2005-02-24

http://www.refugeelawproject.org/Working%20papers/RLP.WP14.pdf

This paper examines the Government of Uganda's local settlement policy which requires refugees to live in formal camps, and examines its implications for refugees'livelihoods and their enjoyment of their legal rights in Uganda. Based on field research in Arua and Moyo districts, the findings explore the relative positions of refugees residing in settlements as well as those who have left or avoided the settlement system altogether.

Uganda: An Update on Night Commuters in Northern Uganda

2005-02-24

http://www.womenscommission.org/pdf/Ug_Resil.pdf

Among the Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) in Northern Uganda are an estimated 44,000 "night commuters" in Gulu, Kitgum and Pader districts. The night commuters are mostly children, adolescents and women who flee their villages or IDP centres each night for town centres seeking safety from LRA attack. These night commuters represent only a small portion of the IDP population, but their situation dramatically illustrates how inadequate protection has led to increasing violence against children and adolescents.

Uganda: Learning in a War Zone: Education in Northern Uganda

2005-02-24

http://www.womenscommission.org/pdf/Ed_Ug.pdf

In September 2004, staff from the Women's Commission for Refugee Women and Children went on a mission to northern Uganda. One focus of the mission was to look at the education situation in the north given that the region has been and is currently in a situation of violent conflict. With 1.6 million people displaced, learning systems and structures have been altered significantly, even with the Uganda government's pledge of Universal Primary Education (UPE).

Central Africa: Rwandan human rights group to monitor polls in Burundi, Congo

2005-02-24

http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2005-02/20/content_2597725.htm

Members of a Rwandan human rights watchdog, Kangurirwa, are due to travel to Burundi this month to join other electoral observers during the long-awaited Burundian referendum on the new constitution, set for February 28, an official said here Sunday. "We shall dispatch a delegation of about thirty six observers for the Burundi Referendum," said Frank Asiimwe, the director of Kangurirwa. He said the organization also plans to send another team of observers to Kinshasa, the capital of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, during the presidential elections scheduled for June this year.

Nigeria: Obasanjo opens constitutional debate, rules out secession

2005-02-24

http://www.irinnews.org/report.asp?ReportID=45695

President Olusegun Obasanjo opened a conference to draft changes to the constitution on Monday with a warning that delegates should not question the fundamental unity of Nigeria. “The National Political and Reform Conference is not designed to dismember or disintegrate Nigeria,” Obasanjo told the 400 delegates assembled in the federal capital Abuja. Obasanjo is a retired army general who fought as a military officer against the attempt by the Igbo people of southeastern Nigeria to form the breakaway state of Biafra in the 1967-1970 civil war.

Zimbabwe: Are MP's Representatives or Godfathers?

2005-02-24

http://pambazuka.org/en/category/elections/27004

It's election season, and candidates are at it again, promising voters the moon.  It happens all over the world and Zimbabwe is no exception.  It supplements our time-honoured campaign tradition of buying rounds of drinks and entertaining potential voters.  But in Zimbabwe in 2005, vote-buying has taken on a whole new dimension as ZANU (PF) aspirants vie with each other and with potential opponents to donate money and goods to their bemused constituents, long before the voting begins.  Rural schools have become prime targets for parliamentarians' largesse and computers one of the main items dispensed.  They are dumped here and there, with or without all the necessary components, in schools which may not even have the electricity required to operate them.
SOURCE:   Sokwanele.com

It's election season, and candidates are at it again, promising voters the moon.  It happens all over the world and Zimbabwe is no exception.  It supplements our time-honoured campaign tradition of buying rounds of drinks and entertaining potential voters.  But in Zimbabwe in 2005, vote-buying has taken on a whole new dimension as ZANU (PF) aspirants vie with each other and with potential opponents to donate money and goods to their bemused constituents, long before the voting begins.  Rural schools have become prime targets for parliamentarians' largesse and computers one of the main items dispensed.  They are dumped here and there, with or without all the necessary components, in schools which may not even have the electricity required to operate them. 

We hear of a retired general sponsoring a whole school, fees, buildings, books and doubtless much more.  Some candidates barred from the ZANU (PF) primaries complained that they had spent hundreds of millions of dollars in their chosen constituency, only to be eliminated before the contest.  Jonathan Moyo, even after being disbarred, ostensibly by the "Beijing Factor", boasts that he has donated $69 million for school fees in Tsholotsho because he is concerned about the people there, fuelling speculation that he will contest as an independent.  The sitting Minister of Agriculture distributes much needed maize from the GMB and is rewarded, we are told, with a huge vote which gives him the party nomination in his home area.

 With the exception of a few committed Christians, Zimbabwean individuals of the new "indigenous business" type have not been known for their public spirit or charitable works. They prefer to spend their newly acquired millions on themselves, to purchase luxury living, or on the Party, so purchase influence.  So what is all this sudden transformation into philanthropists?  Is it merely coincidence that an election is looming?  Could we expect to reap all this bounty after the election is over?  Not likely, for it is clearly campaigning:  trying to demonstrate to the electorate that the candidate can deliver development for the people.  But so what?  Even if it is done to garner popularity with the public, with electioneering in mind, is there anything wrong with it that?  Surely there is no harm in giving the beleaguered voters a few handouts?

Indeed there is - a great deal of potential harm.  Some of this spectacle of mouse-less computers at schools with no electricity might be amusing, or even entertaining, were it not so clearly destructive.  Not only does it fail to initiate genuine development, it is seriously subversive of the democratic process.  It betrays a complete misunderstanding of what democracy is all about, both by the aspiring candidates, and the constituents who fall for this type of inducement. 

Several questions might be raised:  First:  What is the role of an elected member of parliament in a democratic state? Second:  What kind of a person do we want in our parliament?  Third:  What is the role of an M.P. in promoting development?  Fourth:  Where does the wealth of such individuals come from? Fifth:  What is the effect on the democratic process of such "donations"?

One of the major principles of democracy is that government is conducted by the people.  In a modern society, this is not possible, so modern democracy requires that the people elect representatives who will voice their wishes and aspirations.  In Zimbabwe we elect members to parliament, which is the legislative body of government; those members enact laws which, because they are made by people who represent us, should reflect our interests.  It is the duty of members of parliament to express our wishes and to vote in a way that promotes our interests. Most voters, however, do not spend their time thinking about public policy.  It is the role of political parties to devise policies and strategies for government - for providing a legislative framework which maintain services and promote development for the people. When seeking election we would expect aspiring candidates to present the policies of their party and convince the voters that those policies will be the most beneficial for the people. Once elected, whether or not they are members of the governing party, they must interact and consult with the people of the constituency, inform the constituents of proposed legislation and learn their views. Only with this type of interaction can democracy be considered to be government by the people. 


For this work of representation, we need members of parliament who come from within the constituency, or if they do not live there, at least have a close connection and good understanding of the people they wish to represent.  They need to be prepared to spend time finding out the views of the constituents, grasping their problems and hearing their proposals for solutions.  They need to understand the policies of their party and be able to explain them to their people.  Since members of parliament are primarily law-makers, they need to be people who have some understanding of the law as well, and of the issues of importance in the nation.  They also need to be men and women of integrity and commitment to the welfare of the people.  Since M.P.s occupy a key position in public affairs, they are frequently the target of persuasion by special interest groups.  They come under pressure to pass or not pass certain laws, not because of the effect on the mass of the people, but because of the benefit to a few.  M.P.s have to be very much aware of this and have the clarity to perceive what will be in the interests of the people and what promotes only the interests of private individuals.  Furthermore they need to have the courage to follow what they know will benefit their people.

The candidate who seeks to ingratiate himself with the people by using private wealth to gain popularity is in fact showing contempt for the people.  He or she is deliberately avoiding a discussion of issues.  That candidate has no intention of finding out the views of the people or of representing them in parliament.  Policies of his party are not discussed except possibly at the level of sloganeering.  This politician is not promoting democratic participation.  Rather the people become pawns to be manipulated and manoeuvred.  He becomes, not their representative, but their godfather or godmother.


Candidates who present gifts to their constituents usually claim that they are promoting development.  School fees, equipment for schools will help to develop the community.  This raises the question of the role of the M.P. in development.  Government in a country such as Zimbabwe is to a large extent about the promotion of economic development.  In the 20th century, two choices seemed to be available to a developed economy:  capitalist or socialist.  For a time, ZANU (PF) verbally espoused a socialist route.  However, this commitment was never genuinely fulfilled, and with the failure of most socialist regimes to sustain development, and their collapse at the end of the 1980's, this option was abandoned and a capitalist route embraced.
 
A benign capitalist approach to development would hold that the government will simply provide the legal, fiscal and monetary policy framework in which private individuals will then create wealth.  Government may assist individuals and provide those essential services which require public support, but wealth will be created and spread to all sectors of the community by many individuals competing.  The more players, the more wealth will be created for more people, hence promoting development.   The role of the M.P. is to contribute to the legislation enacted, to ensure that the people understand how the laws work in their favour and help them to access any benefits provided which will spur the creation of private or community wealth.  And to listen to their views of how the laws are working for or against them so that they can be amended.  Political parties will adopt different views of how development can best be promoted and their members will seek to persuade the people that their programme will be more beneficial.

But ZANU (PF)'s form of capitalism is far from benign. It does not follow this model of wealth creation from the bottom, assisted by conducive legislation.  The consistent tactic of our new "wealth-creators" has been to make use of connections to occupy privileged, monopolistic positions.  Using corrupt means and intensely exploitative labour practices, they build up their own capital.  Then, in order to protect that position, consolidate it and expand it, they find it useful to seek political power.  That power is not to be used for the benefit of the constituents, but for their own economic enhancement.  The competition which would bring development is not desirable, because it would limit their own opportunities.  And so the new predator class emerges - political and economic power combine. When such people aspire to be elected to Parliament, they do not even consider policy issues.  What they want is the power to build themselves.  The easier way, they believe, to compete for the support of the people, is to give them gifts which might make them happy.  Like the auntie who showers gifts on her niece in order to be loved, but provides no guidance or bases for growth and maturation of the child.  The electorate may temporarily be cheated into believing they are being helped.

Many Zimbabweans admire people who have gained wealth and are tempted to see this as success.  The demonstration of such wealth by free distribution of goods entices them to vote for that person.  We need to begin to be sceptical of wealth, and question its origins.  While there are some very hard-working business people who build up legitimate businesses, more often than not, that wealth is derived from money that should have been used to develop the country.

 We see an individual who a few years ago was a scrawny salesman or salaried employee suddenly ballooning in size, flaunting wealth in the form of cars, designer clothes, foreign holidays and expensive foreign schools for their children.  There are many such examples in Zimbabwe.  And there are very few of these nouveaux riches who came by their money honestly.  They may have had good connections to get forex allocations at official rates and change them on the parallel market; they may have fraudulent contracts to supply government at many times the cost of the goods; they may have converted company or government money to their own use; they may have obtained loans from their friends working in banks, which they know they will never repay.  Hardly anyone uses legal methods to make money any more.  Most of it has come from the acquisition of public assets by private individuals.  So when these people offer donations to the voters, they are trying to get credit for being public-spirited, using money that was most likely misappropriated from public monies in the first place.  We cannot trust them.  Jonathan Moyo boasts that he donated $69 milllion for school fees.  Where does a minister get such funds from to give away?  Ministers may be well paid, but they are not that well paid.  Elliot Manyika says it was government money.  So how did Moyo get his hands on it?   Does it mean that government ministers can help themselves to government money to help them win re-election?

It is not surprising that ZANU PF does not want anyone except themselves to undertake education of the voters.  Civic educators from a variety of NGOs have been gaining some success in helping the electorate to analyse politicians who present themselves for election, to question their interests in becoming a member of parliament.  They have challenged voters to examine the effect of vote-buying, whether on a large or small scale, and many voters have become more sophisticated.  The rejection of the constitutional referendum in 2000 and the popularity of MDC in the June 2000 election was in large part a result of voters beginning to realise that they were being cheated by ZANU (PF), who were not really interested in what the people wanted.  Now ZANU (PF) candidates embark on this competition to see who can shower the most on the electorate, at the same time denying the voters their right to be helped to question, to analyse, and to formulate their own opinions. 

The final question is the most challenging.  What is the effect on the democratic process of such "donations"?  Clearly it subverts it.  There is no discussion of policy, no attempt to let the people's voices be heard, no concept of representation.  If someone is going to gain votes by offering "presents", the implication is obvious:  vote for me and you will get favours.  But the reverse is also true: don't vote for me and I will use all the wealth and power I have against you.  Development comes from me, from being associated with me.  If you work against me, you will not get any development. 

Furthermore, if I get into power by offering you "goodies", then you certainly cannot influence the way in which I conduct myself in parliament.  I do not represent your interests.  I represent my own, and I have used you to gain political power to add to my economic power.  In this period of famine, the "big man" can also get you food when there is none.  He may be able to get development benefits from government as well. As long as you continue to be docile, obedient voters, you will continue to get goodies, but if you stray, the benefits will stop. Development does not come from the efforts of the people within a conducive framework created by the government.  Development comes from outside, when people accept a "ruling" party without question.

But even more sinister, the man who can protect you will also punish you if you no longer support him.  He who can buy your vote can also buy the support of the law enforcement agents.  You can be dealt with by the party goons who will enjoy impunity - or even by the big man himself who will wield his gun to threaten anyone who dares to support an opposition figure.  In Chipinge South he is said to house the police in buildings he owns, making it obvious that they will not touch him if he breaks the law.  He is the "Godfather" protecting if you toe the line, but punishing cruelly if you attempt to leave the fold.

This is not democracy.  This rather resembles a feudal system of power relationships.  The powerful man or (occasionally) woman brings you benefits, protects you from the dangers of the world around you, but in return you must render servile obedience.  The politician simply manipulates you; he or she does not represent you.  You are used to serve his or her interests.  Parliament becomes a chamber of the wealthy whose aim is to make laws that favour their own interests in maintaining and expanding their own wealth.  Some development may be provided to the masses in order to keep them quiet, but they must have no share in policy-making.  If they demand it, they will be silenced.


No democracy is perfect, and every one has evolved through struggle over a lengthy period of time.  Even the oldest have their serious flaws, where government in the interest of the people is betrayed.  When we got Independence we thought we had achieved democracy.  It is now clear that we expected too much of ourselves and our leaders.  We didn't realise that they would subvert the electoral system to serve their own selfish interests instead of the development interests of the people.  We didn't realise that we had to carry the struggle further if we wanted our voices to be heard by our leaders.  Now we know.  If we want  representative democracy, we will have to resist the forked tongues of politicians who come bearing gifts but in the other hand carry knobkerries.  We have to learn to tell them that this fake democracy is not what we want. We have to learn to vote for those who will represent our interests not theirs.

The achievement of a smoothly functioning democracy is still a long way ahead, but if we walk down the right road we will get there in the end.  If we are capable of recognising some of the problems, of understanding how we are being manipulated, used and abused, then we will be able to again move forward.  A good starting place is to reject the ZANU (PF) idea of a legislator.  We need to fight against the concept of the politician as godfather, and replace it with the ideal of politician as representative and servant of the people, committed to their participation and development.
Ends

* Sokwanele.com does not endorse the editorial policy of any source or website except its own. It retains full copyright on its own articles, which may be reproduced or distributed but may not be materially altered in any way. Reproduced articles must clearly show the source and owner of copyright, together with any other notices originally contained therein, as well as the original date of publication. Sokwanele.com does not accept responsibility for any articles that have been distributed or amended by any other party, regardless of whether they have come from Sokwanele.com originally or not. Only articles which have been mailed directly from Sokwanele.com are representative of the policy and/or the opinion of Sokwanele.com. Sokwanele.com does not accept responsibility for any loss or damage arising in any way from receipt of this email or use thereof. This document, or any part thereof, may not be distributed for profit.

To subscribe to, or to unsubscribe from, this mailing list, please e-mail us at sokwanele_zim@yahoo.com

Zimbabwe: Doubt over extent of electoral reform ahead of poll

2005-02-24

http://www.irinnews.org/report.asp?ReportID=45746

Even before the ballots are cast in Zimbabwe's legislative elections next month, controversy has surfaced over the fairness of the poll. The opposition Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) has argued that recent reform of the country's electoral laws has been too little and too late. They contend that repressive legislation governing public assembly and free speech remain on the statute books, and together with growing political violence, will serve to undermine the poll's legitimacy.

Liberia: World Bank says tougher action needed to tackle corruption

2005-02-24

http://www.irinnews.org/report.asp?ReportID=45693

A World Bank mission visiting Liberia has said the country's transitional government must crack down harder on corruption and show greater transparency in its finances if it is to secure donor funding to help the country recover from 14 years of civil war. The mission, led by Shengman Zhang, the World Bank's managing director, also warned that there was no prospect of the World Bank lending more money to Liberia until the country's current loan arrears of almost US$450 million had been paid off.

Nigeria: Swiss supreme court orders return of assets linked to late Nigerian dictator

2005-02-24

http://admin.corisweb.org/index.php?fuseaction=news.view&id=116559&src=dcn

The Swiss supreme court last Wednesday ordered the handover to Nigeria of hundreds of millions of dollars tied to the African nation's late dictator General Sani Abacha. A week after rejecting attempts by Abacha's family and associates to halt the return of US$458 million, the Federal Tribunal gave Swiss authorities a green light to give the money back to Nigeria.

Africa: Can more aid be spent in Africa?

Paolo de Renzio

2005-02-24

http://pambazuka.org/en/category/development/27007

‘Double aid to halve poverty’ looks likely to be the catchphrase of 2005. We will hear it from Tony Blair’s Africa Commission, from the UN Millennium Project in New York, and from Gordon Brown and other advocates of an International Financing Facility. But can more aid be spent? More precisely, can more aid be spent successfully? Many think not.

The sceptics make five main points.

First, aid has diminishing returns. This is partly as a consequence of other points below. All countries are therefore bound to reach an ‘aid saturation point’ beyond which additional aid has less impact. The evidence is that this point could be reached around 25-30% of GDP, depending on estimates. At the moment, aid already represents 22% of national income in Ethiopia, and 47% in Sierra Leone.

Second, aid flows can cause macroeconomic imbalances. ‘Dutch disease’ is the main risk, where increased foreign exchange flows cause an appreciation of the exchange rate and harm the export sector. Aid can also cause interest and inflation rates to rise, which could have negative effects on private investment. Nigeria suffered from exactly these problems when its long oil boom began, with severe long-term consequences for the agricultural sector.

>>>>>Read the full article by clicking on the link below.
Can more aid be spent in Africa?

‘Double aid to halve poverty’ looks likely to be the catchphrase of 2005. We will hear it from Tony Blair’s Africa Commission, from the UN Millennium Project in New York, and from Gordon Brown and other advocates of an International Financing Facility. But can more aid be spent? More precisely, can more aid be spent successfully? Many think not.

The sceptics make five main points.

First, aid has diminishing returns. This is partly as a consequence of other points below. All countries are therefore bound to reach an ‘aid saturation point’ beyond which additional aid has less impact. The evidence is that this point could be reached around 25-30% of GDP, depending on estimates. At the moment, aid already represents 22% of national income in Ethiopia, and 47% in Sierra Leone.

Second, aid flows can cause macroeconomic imbalances. ‘Dutch disease’ is the main risk, where increased foreign exchange flows cause an appreciation of the exchange rate and harm the export sector. Aid can also cause interest and inflation rates to rise, which could have negative effects on private investment. Nigeria suffered from exactly these problems when its long oil boom began, with severe long-term consequences for the agricultural sector.

Third, poor institutions and policies in recipient countries may limit their capacity to use aid effectively. A government’s capacity to make good use of development assistance is greatly influenced by the level of transparency and efficiency of budget systems, by the degree of decentralisation of resources and responsibilities, and by the quality of existing accountability mechanisms. The key point here is that more aid can weaken institutions rather than strengthen them. In a country like Mozambique where more than 50% of the budget is provided by donors and only about 40% by taxpayers, politicians naturally look to the donors for patronage and support rather than to their voters. If aid were to double, such distortions could only worsen.

Fourth, lack of adequate infrastructure and sufficient administrative capacity represents a major obstacle for more effective service delivery. Both the hardware and the software of government machinery in poor countries are severely lacking in quantity and quality. More and better qualified managers, doctors and teachers are needed. HIV/AIDS makes the situation worse. In Malawi, for example, more teachers are dying each year of HIV/AIDS than can be trained.

Finally, the very nature of the aid system can be part of the problem. Uncoordinated and burdensome donor practices can prevent the effective use of aid. In most African countries, there is a plethora of donor agencies, often pursuing incoherent strategies and overlapping activities. On average, a country receiving aid has to deal with no fewer than 26 donor agencies and with hundreds of projects, each with their own specific procedures and reporting requirements.

Can these problems be solved? In the long term, they can: by supporting better and more democratic governance, by training more teachers and health workers, and by providing the infrastructure needed to improve investment returns. But the long term is too long. Africa’s crisis of poverty, ill-health and poor education needs immediate action: that is what the 2005 agenda is all about.

Here, then, is an action programme for the short-term:

First, recognise that the critical constraints have to do with institutions and policies. Donors need to understand the political systems of the countries they are working with and support accountable domestic institutions, from the national level all the way down to local structures for participation in the management of schools and clinics. This is the only way to tackle problems related to corruption, elite capture and unrepresentative government. They also need to back regional frameworks such as the NEPAD peer review mechanism and the African Union.

Second, act on the assumption that donors are often part of the problem, not of the solution. The current buzz-word in the donor community is harmonisation, simplifying procedures and finding ways to reduce the high transactions costs of aid. That’s a good start but it is not enough. Poor countries in Africa don’t need fifteen donors supporting health or agriculture, each sending missions, preparing plans and imposing administrative procedures - they need two or three. Donors should withdraw altogether from some countries, work through others in some, channel funds through budget support wherever feasible, and more generally provide a bigger share of aid through the multilateral agencies. The slogan for 2005 should be ‘don’t just harmonise, multilateralise’. Defining the way in which the IFF will function will be important in this respect. Broader reforms of the global aid architecture should also be considered.

Third, work sector by sector and country by country to overcome the key constraints to absorptive capacity, assisting governments in developing sound strategies for scaling up. Experience shows that enormous strides can be made in this area in a relatively short timeframe. Innovative approaches which harness the capacities of the private and voluntary sectors can contribute to such efforts. There aren’t enough teachers to staff the new primary schools needed to achieve universal primary education? Well, how about using radio or television to increase the reach of the teachers we do have? Or training ‘barefoot teachers’ to work as classroom assistants? Or even, as a last resort, importing teachers from another country. All this, of course, at the same time as major investments in teacher training colleges.

Fourth, manage the macro-economics sensibly. If aid in the form of money to fund budget support is forcing the exchange rate up and making exports uncompetitive, then the usual policy advice is to invest on the supply side to force costs down: in Uganda, for example, poor roads add to transport costs and amount to a 40% tax on farmers, so building more roads could offset the impact of currency appreciation on coffee or cotton producers. In other places, it might be appropriate to import commodities in kind: bringing in drugs to treat malaria or HIV/AIDS helps sick people without harming the exchange rate.

The key strategy is to combine the urgent response needed in the short-term with capacity-building for the longer term. Financial and institutional sustainability need to be the yardsticks for intervention. Bypassing governments to make sure that money gets spent is a viable option only for the short-sighted.

* A table associated with this article can be seen at http://www.odi.org.uk/publications/opinions/30_odi_opinions_aid_africa_jan05.pdf

* Used with permission of the author. Please send comments to editor@pambazuka.org

Africa: Debt relief - If not now, when?

2005-02-24

http://www.jubileedebtcampaign.org.uk/?lid=463&cc=1

The unpayable debts of Africa's impoverished countries should be cancelled immediately, in full, releasing funds for poverty reduction. Meanwhile, the HIPC Initiative should be urgently and radically reformed so that debt cancellation for all heavily indebted African countries can proceed rapidly under a fair and transparent process that reinforces democratic institutions and processes and counteracts corruption. This is according to the report of the UK All Party Parliamentary Group on Heavily Indebted Poor Countries, produced in partnership with Jubilee Debt Campaign, that makes urgent recommendations on debt cancellation for a strong and prosperous Africa.

Africa: Six Reasons to Oppose EPAs in their Current Form

2005-02-24

http://www.cafod.org.uk/var/storage/original/application/php55ua3C.pdf

"While there is general agreement that trade can be a powerful tool for development, a growing body of literature argues that rapid trade liberalisation does not on its own automatically lead to positive development outcomes. Countries should be able to choose the trade-policy option that best suits their development priorities and needs. Trade liberalisation should not be seen as a substitute for a sound development strategy. Moreover, it needs to be timed and sequenced carefully: there are different optimal degrees of openness at different stages of development, and it is generally agreed that, in order for an open trade regime to bring growth and development, countries must first have certain necessary conditions in place such as healthy economic sectors, potentially competitive producers, reasonably well-developed market institutions, and effective state capacity." This is according to a paper that is a response from leading ACP and EU civil society organisations to some of the key arguments put forward in support of Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs) as currently envisaged by the EU.

Chad: Following the oil money

2005-02-24

http://www.catholicrelief.org/get_involved/advocacy/policy_and_strategic_issues/oil_report.cfm

A coordinated monitoring and alert system to track the use of oil revenues should be developed by civil society groups in Chad, says a new report on the Chad-Cameroon oil pipeline by Catholic Relief Services.

The report recommends that civil society groups identify existing structures or networks at the regional and local levels that can help disseminate and collect information about project execution to and from the population at large. On an international level, civil society should continue to hold International Financial Institutions, oil companies, and Northern governments to account for their responsibilities with regards the project. The report says the project is "hanging by a thread" and cites "critical loopholes" with regards revenue transparency, accountability and management.

"It is too early to declare Chad's oil project a failure or a success. But, the experience to date confirms the danger of investing in the extractive industries before a country is shown to meet minimum conditions of respect for human rights, fiscal transparency, and demonstrated government capacity to implement pro-poor programs," says the report.

The World Bank financed Chad-Cameroon Petroleum Development and Pipeline Project transports oil from landlocked southern Chad to the Atlantic coast of Cameroon for export. It was billed as the first project to contain significant checks and balances to make sure that oil wealth translated into development.

Africa/Global: Global Health Watch 2005 set for release

2005-02-24

http://pambazuka.org/en/category/hivaids/27038

Under-nutrition seems to be inexplicable in a world where the food market ascends to the 11% of the global trade and food prices have declined over the last years. Nevertheless it is one of the most important causes of illness and death globally as well as a key factor in poverty reproduction. This is according to a chapter in the Global Health Watch 2005 report. The chapter looks at the underlying causes of under and over nourishment both in developing and developed countries as directly related to the globalisation and liberalisation processes that have been taken place in the last decades. You can read the newsletter of the Global Health Watch and find out how to subscribe through the link below.
Global Health Watch
Mobilising Civil Society around an Alternative World Health Report

GHW Update 7 - February 2005
Welcome to our February edition!!!

Please pass on this newsletter to anybody that might be interested in the
GHW
TO RECEIVE PERIODICAL UPDATES E-MAIL
GHWatch-newsletter-subscribe@yahoogroups.com


TURNING TO ADVOCACY
----------------------------------------------------------------------------

We are nearing the end of the first stage of our Global Health Watch
journey - the publication will go to press at the beginning of March. As it
does, we want to alert you to the next stage of our work - ADVOCACY.

In many respects this is the key component of the Watch. This is how the
publication will become noticed; this is also how we can expand and glue
together the individuals and movements who have contributed with those who
did not.

The last chapter will point at the areas that need to be looked at and
prioritise some recommendations. We will spend more time on honing our key
messages in the accompanying summary document that will be produced by
mid-May. The main book will link to this summary document.

We want to encourage a broad participation in the production of the summary
document - in the end we want this document to contain some strong
statements that as many health and health-related actors can campaign around
as possible; as well as containing key advocacy messages we want to project
to the world at the time of PHA 2

A draft will be available by the end of March, and then we will give a month
for consultation about the key messages with a wide range of interested
actors.

Yours sincerely,
GHW Secretariat


HIGHLIGHTS FROM THE GHW REPORT 2005 - THE RIGHT TO FOOD
----------------------------------------------------------------------------


Under-nutrition seems to be inexplicable in a world where the food market
ascends to the 11% of the global trade and food prices have decline over the
last years. Nevertheless it is one of the most important causes of illness
and death globally as well as a key factor in poverty reproduction.

This chapter looks at the underlying causes of under and over nourishment
both in developing and developed countries as directly related to the
globalisation and liberalisation processes that have been taken place in the
last decades. By implementing global marketing strategies and liberal
programmes such as NAFTA, small local producers have been displaced from the
market leaving the food system under the control of few global corporations
based in developed countries. Thus generating poverty and inequalities as
well as a decline in agricultural and rural investment in developing
countries, not mentioning the threat posed by the growing market of
genetically modified seeds.

Another dimension of the problem closely intertwined with the latter, is the
globalisation of diets around the globe. This process has been encouraged
to a great extend by international organisms such as the World Bank (which
offers loans in order to develop certain type of food industry) as well as
the entry of large food multinationals and retailers. The consequences are
manifold, there is a cultural impact in terms of the progressive shift from
diverse traditional local food towards a westernised homogeneous diet and on
the other hand problems of over-nutrition and obesity are becoming new
public health burdens. These are difficult to overcome not only because of
the complexity of the problem itself but because of the pressure exerted
from big food companies.

Towards the end of the chapter various strategies to tackle the problem are
proposed, such as the development of international standards and national
legislation in order to protect and promote national food security. Finally
there is a call civil society to take a more active role in restoring food
to the status of a human and cultural right.


GHW AT THE WORLD SOCIAL FORUM
----------------------------------------------------------------------------

The fifth edition of the World Social Forum was held between 26 and 31 last
month. This was the biggest ever edition of the Forum and congregated more
than 150,000 participants in the Brazilian City of Porto Alegre. The
enormous gathering of groups and movements from all corners of the world was
an inspiring opportunity to debate, share experiences and network.

One of the GHW Secretariat members, Claudia Lema, attended the WSF last
week. She facilitated a workshop organised by IFRHHO (International
Federation of Health and Human Rights Organisations) and chaired by the UN
Special Rapporteur for the Right to Health discussing strategies to use
Millennium Development Goals as tools for the achievement of the right to
health. She also had meetings to discuss the Global Health Watch initiative
with the representatives from ALAMES (Latin American Association of Social
Medicine), Action Aid and the European Network for the Right to Health, as
well as the members of the various chapters of the Peoples Health Movement.


Please pass on this newsletter to anybody that might be interested in the
GHW
TO RECEIVE PERIODICAL UPDATES E-MAIL
GHWatch-newsletter-subscribe@yahoogroups.com
If you do not wish to continue receiving this newsletter, please e-mail
ghw@medact.org with Unsubscribe in the subject box.

Africa: How important is the recent HIV resistance scare?

2005-02-24

http://www.aidsmap.com/en/news/F8E9CB59-B7B6-4144-B676-44CE7BF81CE7.asp?hp=1

Near hysterical media reports last week reported on a strain of HIV resistant to drugs from three main classes of antiretrovirals. But this article from HIV information site www.aidsmap.com says that perhaps the reason for the reaction to the case- reported in New York - and its reporting lies not in its medical significance, but in its importance to current US debates on comprehensive or abstinence-only HIV prevention. Visit the site to read the full article.

DRC: Pneumonic plague kills 43

2005-02-24

http://www.irinnews.org/report.asp?ReportID=45700

Some 43 people have died and 13 others infected following an outbreak of pneumonic plague in the mining area of Zobia, in the region of Bas-Uele in Oriental Province, eastern Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), an official in the Ministry of Health told IRIN on Monday. The ministry's director of epidemiology, Dr Benoit Kebele Ilunga, said the epidemic showed up three weeks ago in one of the mines in the diamond rich area.

South Africa: Aids stats controversy continues

2005-02-24

http://pambazuka.org/en/category/hivaids/27021

Between 1997 and 2002, according to a new report from Stats SA, South Africa's official statistics agency, the number of recorded deaths in the age group from 20 to 45 more than doubled, from a little over 100,000 to more than 200,000. Although most deaths likely to be linked to AIDS are officially recorded as due to associated diseases such as TB and pneumonia, the age and disease pattern provides strong evidence of the growing impact of AIDS. Other previous studies, such as those from South Africa's Medical Research Council, have provided similar indications. But the issue is still contentious, as AIDS denialists have used the relatively low numbers attributed directly to AIDS to claim that researchers are exaggerating the problem. The latest issue of the AfricaFocus Bulletin contains postings that examine the issues in detail.
South Africa: Mortality Statistics, AIDS Action

AfricaFocus Bulletin
Feb 22, 2005 (050222)
(Reposted from sources cited below)

Editor's Note

Between 1997 and 2002, according to a new report from Stats SA,
South Africa's official statistics agency, the number of recorded
deaths in the age group from 20 to 45 more than doubled, from a
little over 100,000 to more than 200,000. Although most deaths
likely to be linked to AIDS are officially recorded as due to
associated diseases such as TB and pneumonia, the age and disease
pattern provides strong evidence of the growing impact of AIDS.

Other previous studies, such as those from South Africa's Medical
Research Council, have provided similar indications. But the issue
is still contentious, as AIDS denialists have used the relatively
low numbers attributed directly to AIDS to claim that researchers
are exaggerating the problem. Activists, on the other hand, have
focused on the need to expand the government's treatment program to
save lives threatened by AIDS and other diseases clearly linked to
AIDS.

In a memorandum addressed to the government on February 16, the
Treatment Action Campaign (TAC) noted that the target of treating
53,000 through the public sector by March 2005 (originally set for
March 2004), is far behind schedule, with only 27,000 at the end of
December. Receiving the memorandum, Murphy Morobe, head of
communications in the South African president's office, praised the
activists as "our conscience," adding that "I bury my own cousins
every week and every month - six already in three years." In a
media briefing the next day, however, Minister of Health Manto
Tshabalala-Msimang outraged activists by claiming that she had no
data on the number dying of AIDS or the number receiving treatment.

This AfricaFocus Bulletin contains excerpts from the TAC newsletter
with comments on the most recent mortality report and their
memorandum to the South African government calling for more rapid
expansion of AIDS treatment programs.

The full text of the Stats SA report is available on
http://www.statssa.gov.za Additional background on research and
statistics on mortality and AIDS is available on the site of the
Burden of Disease Unit of the Medical Research Council of South
Africa (http://www.mrc.ac.za/bod). For more news on the Stats SA
report, see http://allafrica.com/stories/200502200002.html and
http://allafrica.com/stories/200502200001.html

Earlier AfricaFocus Bulletins with material on health and HIV/AIDS
are available at http://www.africafocus.org/healthexp.php

++++++++++++++++++++++end editor's note+++++++++++++++++++++++

Treatment Action Campaign Electronic Newsletter

21 February 2005

[excerpts: for full text see TAC website - ]http://www.tac.org.za]

Statistics South Africa mortality report confirms massive increase
in deaths due to AIDS

TAC Says: Treat 200,000 People by 2006

The TAC notes the publication of Statistics South Africa's report
"Mortality and Causes of Death in South Africa, 1997 - 2003." This
report, once more, confirms beyond reasonable doubt that South
Africa is in the midst of an HIV epidemic that is maturing into an
AIDS epidemic. It also provides useful information on the nature of
the epidemic.

Between 1997 and 2002, the total number of deaths increased by 57%.
Deaths of people aged 15 years and above increased by 62%. While
some of this increase is due to population growth (10%) and
improved death registration, most of the increase can be explained
only by an HIV epidemic. A number of studies, mostly conducted by
Medical Research Council scientists, have demonstrated the
increase in mortality in South Africa due to HIV, but the
Statistics South Africa report is noteworthy for having been
approved by Cabinet.

The tragic implication of the report - that hundreds of thousands
of South Africans have died of AIDS in the last few years without
access to life-saving treatment - must be used as an impetus to
speed up the delivery of treatment and prevention programmes. The
report has been honestly conducted despite an overly-cautious tone
with regard to causes of death due to HIV.

The report is based on an analysis of 2.9 million valid death
certificates collected from 1997 to 2003. The causes of death as
written on these certificates were processed using a computer
programme. Statistics South Africa makes it clear that
approximately 90% of deaths are now certified but that the quality
of certification remains a serious problem. ...

HIV is frequently not stated as the underlying cause of death.
Instead, an opportunistic infection associated with HIV is usually
indicated as the cause. Therefore, the number of AIDS deaths cannot
be determined by simply reading the report. This is why the report
states "This release covers mortality and causes of death broadly,
and hence does not focus specifically on HIV and AIDS. It does,
however, provide indirect evidence that HIV may be contributing to
the increase in the level of mortality for prime-aged adults,
given the increasing number of deaths due to associated diseases."
(p. 2)

Causes of death due to "tuberculosis" and "influenza and
pneumonia", which are frequently opportunistic infections
associated with HIV, more than doubled between 1997 and 2001. By
2001, these were the leading causes of death. Furthermore, the
report states "The proportion of deaths in the age group 20-49 is
increasing. While an increasing number of deaths are associated
with lifestyle diseases (such as heart disease and diabetes) as the
underlying cause, the dominant contributors to the growth in
mortality are deaths associated with tuberculosis, and influenza
and pneumonia." It therefore cannot be argued that the increase in
mortality is due primarily to better death registration data and
population growth, because neither of these would affect the
proportion of deaths recorded in the 20-49 category.

These facts, combined with all the other overwhelming evidence
that South Africa is experiencing an HIV epidemic (antenatal
surveys, HSRC study etc.), demonstrate beyond reasonable doubt
that HIV is causing a massive increase in mortality in South
Africa. ...

Key Findings of the Statistics South Africa Report

* Recorded Deaths in South Africa:

o 1997: 318,287
o 1998: 367,689
o 1999: 381,902
o 2000: 413,969
o 2001: 451,936
o 2002: 499,268

* The above table shows a 57% rise in recorded mortality from 1997
to 2002. The report estimates that 90% of adult deaths were
recorded in 2002 and that the population grew 10% during this
period. A report published by the MRC in the South African Medical
Journal last year analysed death registration data over a slightly
longer period, from 1996 to 2003, and found a 68% increase in
adult mortality. These consistent findings cannot be explained by
population growth or improved registration, but only by an
HIV/AIDS epidemic leading to unnecessary and premature death.

* Adult deaths increased by 62% from 1997 to 2002, from 272,221 to
441,029.

* Recorded deaths in the age-group 20 to 45 more than doubled
between 1997 to 2002, from 106,033 to 221,260. That mortality in
this age-group increased so much faster than mortality overall
falsifies the argument offered by some AIDS denialists that the
increase in mortality could be due solely to population growth and
improved death registration, because the latter two causes of
increased mortality would affect all adult age-groups in equal
proportions. HIV mainly affects people in the 20 to 45 age-group
and therefore the pattern of mortality is consistent with HIV.
The number of recorded deaths of people aged 20 to 55 in 2002 was
250,873, more than 50% of all deaths.

* In a population following normal mortality trends, a graph of the
number of deaths per age-group would gradually increase for adults
until the older age-groups. But in South Africa in 2002, this
graph increases swiftly among young adults peaking in the 30-34
age-group. This is an abnormal situation that can only be
explained by the HIV epidemic. This situation becomes steadily
more pronounced in the years 1997 to 2002. ... We recommend that
interested readers examine the graphs on pages 11 to 16 of the
Statistics South Africa report.

* Recorded tuberculosis deaths increased by 131% from 22,021 to
50,872 between 1997 and 2001. Influenza and pneumonia increased by
197% from 11,503 to 31,495 during this time. These two causes are
frequently associated with AIDS-related opportunistic infections.
While some people die of these diseases in the absence of HIV, the
enormous increase in mortality in these categories can only be
explained by HIV. ...

* Adding the largest causes of death most frequently associated
with AIDS (tuberculosis, influenza and pneumonia, intestinal
infections, HIV, immune disorders), the number of such deaths rose
by 244% from 45,978 in 1997 to 170,531 in 2002. Obviously not all
of these deaths are due to HIV. Likewise, these are not the only
HIV-related deaths. However, after correcting for population
growth and improved registration, most of the 244% increase can be
assigned to HIV.

...

For a further discussion on mortality due to HIV, see the TAC
newsletter of 31 January 2005:
http://www.tac.org.za/newsletter/2005/ns31_01_2005.htm

-----------

Time to treat and prevent - Time for clear public messages - Time
to end pseudo-science

The implication of the report is clear. We must step up treatment
and prevention efforts in South Africa to curtail the effects of
the HIV epidemic. The premature adult death rate also speaks to an
increase in the number of vulnerable children and orphans.

According to the Department of Health, as of the end of December,
27,000 people were on treatment in the public sector. This is not
good enough, especially when one considers that Western Cape and
Gauteng provinces accounted for more than 50% of those treated. In
the Operational Plan released on 19 November 2003, government
committed to treating 53,000 by March 2004. We are far behind this
target. The TAC calls for government to treat at least 200,000
people with antiretrovirals by the beginning of 2006. Of these, at
least 10% should be children.

Furthermore prevention efforts must be stepped up. Public
messaging by institutions such as LoveLife and Khomanani must be
more explicit on the need for safer sex and condom use. Condoms
must be introduced into all high schools, as well as
sex-education. President Mbeki, Deputy-President Zuma and the
Minister of Health must regularly, on television and radio, call
for people to get counselled and, if necessary, treated.

It is time to end the pseudo-science emanating from some senior
government officials about the HIV epidemic. In a question and
answer session in Parliament on Friday attended by TAC members,
the Minister of Health again expressed doubts about
antiretrovirals and again suggested that traditional medicines and
her nutritional recommendations offered a viable alternative to
antiretrovirals. TAC members noted that she stated that she does
not know how many people have HIV, how many AIDS deaths there are
or how many people are receiving antiretroviral treatment.
[However] some of the best statistics come from the Minister of
Health's department. These estimates should be the basis of
government policy.

The Department of Health estimates that 5.6 million people were
HIV-positive in 2003. The department also released on Friday the
number of people on antiretroviral treatment in the public sector.
The minister's incompetence, obstructionism and denialism are
hindering the response to the HIV /AIDS epidemic and the broader
health care crisis.

***********************************

Thousands march to parliament demanding "Treat 200,000 by 2006"

At least 5,000 people marched through the streets of Cape Town to
Parliament on 16 February, demanding that government treat at least
200,000 people with antiretrovirals in the public sector by 2006.
People living with HIV/AIDS, the South African Council of
Churches, Cosatu, nurses, doctors, TAC and other organisations
marched to address the need for HIV treatment, the crisis in the
public health system and the inequality between private and public
health. The rural-urban inequalities were also addressed during
the march.

...

A memorandum was handed over to Head of Communications in the
Presidency, Comrade Murphy Morobe. He was accompanied by the
chairperson of the Portfolio Committee on Health, Comrade Jame
Ngculu. Morobe praised the marchers, saying they are "our
conscience". He urged TAC to continue marching and stated that he
had personally lost six cousins over three years to HIV/AIDS. A
special thanks to everyone in the Western Cape who worked
phenomenally hard to mobilise and to ensure that marchers had
water, emergency care and transport. Below is the memorandum
handed over to Comrade Murphy Morobe:

Memorandum to President Thabo Mbeki, Deputy-President Jacob Zuma,
Minister of Health, Dr Manto Tshabalala-Msimang and all MECs for
Health

Parliament, Cape Town, 16 February 2005

Treat 200,000 People with Antiretrovirals by 2006!

Today, over 70,000 people in South Africa have had hope, life and
dignity restored. They have access to antiretroviral treatment. Not
long ago they faced almost certain death from HIV/AIDS. But now
people like Sindiswa Godwana, Gordon Mthembu and Vuyiseka Dubula,
who dedicate their lives to teaching people about the science,
treatment and prevention of HIV, can look forward to living longer,
healthier lives.

Yet hundreds of thousands of their compatriots cannot yet exercise
this right. And this is why, again, we are marching to Parliament
to demand that government meet its constitutional duties to
respect, protect and promote life and dignity by ensuring access to
health-care services. The TAC welcomed the Operational Plan
published on 19 November 2003. We chose not to march to Parliament
at this time last year because we were hopeful that a turning point
had been reached in government's response to the HIV epidemic.
Indeed, the response of some provincial governments, especially
Western Cape and Gauteng, in implementing the Operational Plan has
been encouraging.

Yet the National Department of Health continues to fail to show
leadership on HIV. According to the Actuarial Society of South
Africa, over 300,000 people died of AIDS last year. The Operational
Plan committed to treating 53,000 by the end of March 2004. But as
of end of December only 27,000 people were on treatment in the
public sector. Very few of these were children. Inexplicably, the
target for March 2004 was pushed to March 2005. This too will not
be met.

By the Department of Health's own admission, about half-a-million
people needed treatment in 2003. The pace of implementation is far
too slow and it is increasing inequity. 45,000 people are on
treatment in the private sector, substantially more than the
number in the public sector. The majority of people on treatment
in the public sector are from Gauteng and Western Cape meaning
that poorer provinces lag behind. People who have money can buy
their lives and people who live in wealthier provinces have access
to treatment.

This injustice exists because there is insufficient political
leadership to make the programme a success. President Mbeki said
in his State of the Nation address that we have one of the best
AIDS programmes in the world. We would like to agree: the
Operational Plan has the potential to be one of the best
programmes in the world, but currently its is far short of this
accolade. We need an honest assessment of the programme.

Lives depend on it. In 2005 TAC will campaign for the Operational
Plan to be implemented properly.

We urge you to treat 200,000 people with AIDS using antiretrovirals
in the public sector by the beginning of 2006, including at least
20,000 children.

The treatment targets of the Operational Plan have been missed for
the following reasons:

* Too few hospitals and clinics provide antiretroviral treatment,
especially in rural areas and at primary level in urban areas. For
example, hundreds of people with HIV/AIDS need to access treatment
in Acornhoek, Limpopo, the area served by Tintswalo Hospital. The
hospital staff are ready and willing to implement a treatment
programme, but have not received permission or medicines from the
Limpopo government. Residents of Orange Farm in Gauteng have to
travel dozens of kilometres to get treatment at Chris Hani
Baragwanath Hospital, a task that is unfeasible for many. Doctors
and nurses at Madwaleni in the Eastern Cape, who serve in the
public sector of this deep rural community with pride despite
difficult conditions, want to start providing treatment, but here
too they need the medicines, monitoring facilities and a state
pharmacist to dispense them.

* The drug supply is irregular and uncertain, largely because the
procurement process has not been finalised, despite a commitment
from the Department of Health to have done this by June 2004.
There is still no generic competition on essential antiretrovirals
such as efavirenz and lopinavir/ritonavir, resulting in stock
shortages in some areas, as well as a lost opportunity to purchase
these medicines at lower prices. There are not enough paediatric
antiretroviral formulations and the supply is irregular by the few
manufacturers producing these.

* Many health facilities remain short of health-care workers,
despite the promise of the Operational Plan to hire an additional
22,000 health-workers by 2008. The public sector is understaffed
because of uncompetitive salaries, poor working conditions, death
and illness due to HIV/AIDS, low morale caused by death and
illness among their patients due to HIV/AIDS and a lack of career
development opportunities. The Eastern Cape government has frozen
posts in the health sector because of its poor governance in other
areas of social delivery. As a result the national plan to treat
our people is undermined.

* Too many people are not getting tested for HIV and dying
unnecessarily, often in hospital wards. The opportunity to save
lives by actively offering HIV tests and treatment to people who
present at health facilities is being lost. This is especially the
case with those who present with symptoms of AIDS. Public
messaging on HIV/AIDS remains weak. Not enough is being done to
encourage people to get tested and, if necessary, get treated.

To overcome these problems the following must be done:

* The National Department of Health must direct provinces to make
treatment available wherever capacity exists at primary care
level. Where capacity does not yet exist, the resources, including
training and health-workers must be provided so that
antiretroviral treatment can commence. Treatment must be made
available in Tintswalo, Madwaleni and Orange Farm.

* The procurement process must be finalised. Government must also
put pressure on pharmaceutical companies such as MSD and Abbot,
the patent-holders of efavirenz and lopinavir/ritonavir
respectively, to allow generic competition to ensure a sustainable
supply of affordable medicines. If necessary, government must use
its powers to license generic competitors where companies like MSD
and Abbott refuse to co-operate. Pressure must also be exerted on
manufacturers to supply paediatric formulations of antiretrovirals.

* A human resource plan for the public health system must be
published. This plan must cater for improved conditions of
service, including higher salaries and real career growth
opportunities, as well as the recruitment of thousands more
workers to the public health-system immediately. Undoubtedly, this
will have budgetary implications, but the Freedom Charter and the
ANC's visions of health-care for all cannot be met unless we are
prepared to invest in the public sector.

* President Mbeki and Health-Minister Tshabalala-Msimang must lead
the struggle against the HIV epidemic by making regular calls on
television and radio for people to access testing and, where
necessary, to get treated. Nurses and doctors should routinely
offer access to HIV-tests to patients presenting at public
hospitals and clinics, regardless of their state of health.

TAC, on our part, will assist government with meeting its targets
by continuing to increase the scale of our treatment-literacy
programme, providing treatment to our volunteers and community
members through our treatment project and promoting prevention of
HIV transmission. We will continue to campaign for cheaper
medicines and more competition among pharmaceutical companies. We
will also campaign for a more effective antiretroviral regimen
than single-dose nevirapine to be introduced for the
mother-to-child transmission prevention programme, as has already
been done by the Western Cape government.

Yet again we are marching in the streets and using the courts to
safeguard our constitutionally entrenched rights to life, dignity
and access to health-care services from our government of
liberation. But if the above demands are met, there will be every
opportunity for us to work together productively and harmoniously.

We call on you to lead the struggle against HIV/AIDS. Save lives
and ensure that we treat 200,000 by 2006.

*************************************************************
AfricaFocus Bulletin is an independent electronic publication
providing reposted commentary and analysis on African issues, with
a particular focus on U.S. and international policies. AfricaFocus
Bulletin is edited by William Minter.

AfricaFocus Bulletin can be reached at africafocus@igc.org Please
write to this address to subscribe or unsubscribe to the bulletin,
or to suggest material for inclusion. For more information about
reposted material, please contact directly the original source
mentioned. For a full archive and other resources, see
http://www.africafocus.org

South Africa: TAC demands drug access

2005-02-24

http://www.kaisernetwork.org/daily_reports/rep_index.cfm?DR_ID=28238

The South African HIV/AIDS advocacy group Treatment Action Campaign last Wednesday led about 2,000 people in a march outside the South African Parliament in Cape Town to demand that the government provide antiretroviral drugs at no cost to 200,000 HIV-positive people in the country by 2006. The South African Cabinet in November 2003 approved an HIV/AIDS treatment plan that aims to provide antiretroviral drugs to 1.2 million people - or about 25% of the country's HIV-positive population - at low or no cost by 2008.

Southern Africa: Experts meet on reproductive health

2005-02-24

http://www.irinnews.org/report.asp?ReportID=45739

Experts from southern Africa have gathered in Namibia to discuss critical reproductive health challenges in the sub-region and formulate strategies to address them. About 200 delegates will carve out a comprehensive reproductive health component, to be incorporated into the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD) framework on related health issues.

West Africa: Severe complications during pregnancy impose high costs

2005-02-24

http://www.id21.org/health/h8jb2g2.html

Benin and Ghana have high maternal mortality rates. 'Near-misses', where mothers survive a potentially fatal crisis, are even more common. Research involving the London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine assesses the costs of such emergencies and reveals the important role played by households in financing obstetric services in both countries.

Africa: Education protects children in emergencies

2005-02-24

http://www.eldis.org/cf/search/disp/DocDisplay.cfm?Doc=DOC17793&Resource=f1educ

This Forced Migration Review paper explores the role that education can play as a protection mechanism in and after emergencies. The article notes that, based on work by Save the Children exploring the practical connections between education and protection in several conflict-affected countries, parents feel safer if children are in school rather than out. Education lessens the chance that the child will be recruited, exploited or exposed to other risks. In practical terms, education structures can play a more protective role in children’s lives.

Botswana: Academic freedom under threat

2005-02-24

http://allafrica.com/stories/200502221374.html

The University of Botswana Academic and Senior Support Staff Union (UBASSSU) has expressed outrage and dismay at the declaration of Professor Kenneth Good as a prohibited immigrant. Good, a political science professor and an independent minded critic of Botswana's democracy, was served with deportation papers on Friday evening and instructed to leave the country within 48 hours. He was granted an extension by the High Court following an urgent application lodged on Saturday.

Ivory Coast: Lost generation feared as schools in rebel north struggle to stay open

2005-02-24

http://www.irinnews.org/report.asp?ReportID=45564

It looks deceptively as if Cote d’Ivoire is at peace again. Many schools have reopened in the rebel-run north and noisy groups of children wearing black and white or gingham check uniforms kick up the dust on their way to class in the morning. But after two and a half years of armed confrontation, the war is far from over. And despite appearances, the schools are not running normally. Classes and exams have been disrupted for three years running and a generation of young Ivorians risks being left out in the cold.

South Africa: Campus violence continues

2005-02-24

http://www.iol.co.za/index.php?set_id=1&click_id=105&art_id=qw1109092862672B232

As student protests over various issues escalated in Johannesburg and Pretoria on Tuesday, education authorities strongly condemned campus violence. The unrest continued on Tuesday at branches of the University of Johannesburg, and at the Mamelodi campus of the University of Pretoria. In both cities, protesters were sceptical about efforts to resolve their grievances through talks.

Togo: Impoverished parents dig into own pockets to pay for untrained teachers

2005-02-24

http://www.irinnews.org/report.asp?ReportID=45738

Ahlimba has drawn the short straw at this crumbling Togolese school. While her teaching colleagues are on the somewhat unreliable state payroll, she depends entirely on what her pupils’ parents can scrape together for her monthly salary. “I do the same work as the others, but there are some months when I’m not paid at all,” the slender 25-year-old told IRIN.

South Africa: Durban's perfume rods, plastic covers and sweet-smelling toxic dump

Trusha Reddy

2005-02-24

http://pambazuka.org/en/category/environment/27039

Sajida Khan is a soft-spoken, dignified but intense Durban resident who opposes the World Bank's methane-to-electricity project at the Bisasar Road Landfill. Her passion is fighting - and almost palpably winning, now - against awesome forces, including environmental racism, global warming and international economic power.

It is a story that needs telling. But not before another - more personal - story, one which merges seamlessly with the history of the municipal dump whose closure Khan has been fighting for years.

In 1980, Bisasar Road Landfill in the Indian suburb of Clare Estate officially opened its gates to rubbish-dumping trucks. I was just three years old at the time and living in the suburb next door. During the course of my entire childhood, the Bisasar Road landfill was a regular topic of discussion, as my mother and I made trips to visit my grandmother nearby.

Clare Estate was the bridge between our familial residences. I vividly remember the preparations, as we hit that short stretch. Car windows had to be rolled up. Nostrils had to be squeezed tight with tiny, pincer-gripped fingers. Breaths needed to be held. The stench was reminiscent of my public school toilet on a really hot Durban day.

I would also marvel at the big houses on the hill lining the road on the opposite side of the dump (we lived in a block of flats). They stood majestically like something out of Fitzgerald's Great Gatsby, in sharp contrast to the huge stinking dump right in from of them. A few houses were owned by one of the wealthiest Indians in Durban, my mother used to boast, as if they were members of our own family.

I could never quite work out why rich people would live right across from a refuse dump. Little did my premature mind comprehend that everyone, including the rich Indian, could only live in an area designated under apartheid's Group Areas Act. Since Clare Estate had a large quarry, it was deemed unsuitable for white people. Indians were allocated that area.

A few years after the opening of the dump at the site of that quarry, I remember my mother excitedly telling me that the Bisaser Road facility would be shut and transformed into a park for the community. As a child whose life was spent riding a bike around our tar-covered parking lot the idea of a park in our vicinity was just too thrilling.

Perfume and toxics

It's now 2005 and I'm 27 years old. We live in a non-racial democratic South Africa today. But Clare Estate's notorious dump is still there, although approaching it, I notice something very different.

The stench has changed markedly, into a kind of 'mutant funk', as comedian Jerry Seinfeld describes the combination of body odour and perfume deodorant. Bisaser Road landfill now exudes the stink of dump rot mixed with an artificial sickly-sweet smell, emanating from long 'perfume rods' lining the road on the outer rim of the landfill. These rods were installed to merely mask the fumes arising from the dump; but the effect is quite nasty. Again I pinch my nose.

This time, instead of driving past, I enter one of the Gatsbyesque houses on the hill, Khan's residence. The city councilor in the area had just announced to the media that the landfill was, finally, to be closed. So again, as in my youth, I felt almost ecstatic at the thought of this old dream now coming true.

But there is more to the story than met the nose.

Khan welcomes me warmly into her home. Her lounge is framed by glass doors overlooking the entire landfill below, and beyond to the informal shacks and formal homes directly adjacent to the landfill, and a technikon campus at the bottom end of the dump. Just out of eyesight are two primary schools, a secondary school and a home for the safety of abandoned children, all in close proximity to the Bisaser Road dump.

>>>>>For the full article please click on the link below.
Durban's perfume rods, plastic covers and sweet-smelling toxic dump

Trusha Reddy

Sajida Khan is a soft-spoken, dignified but intense Durban resident who
opposes the World Bank's methane-to-electricity project at the Bisasar Road
Landfill. Her passion is fighting - and almost palpably winning, now -
against awesome forces, including environmental racism, global warming and
international economic power.

It is a story that needs telling. But not before another - more personal -
story, one which merges seamlessly with the history of the municipal dump
whose closure Khan has been fighting for years.

In 1980, Bisasar Road Landfill in the Indian suburb of Clare Estate
officially opened its gates to rubbish-dumping trucks. I was just three
years old at the time and living in the suburb next door. During the course
of my entire childhood, the Bisasar Road landfill was a regular topic of
discussion, as my mother and I made trips to visit my grandmother nearby.

Clare Estate was the bridge between our familial residences. I vividly
remember the preparations, as we hit that short stretch. Car windows had to
be rolled up. Nostrils had to be squeezed tight with tiny, pincer-gripped
fingers. Breaths needed to be held. The stench was reminiscent of my public
school toilet on a really hot Durban day.

I would also marvel at the big houses on the hill lining the road on the
opposite side of the dump (we lived in a block of flats). They stood
majestically like something out of Fitzgerald's Great Gatsby, in sharp
contrast to the huge stinking dump right in from of them. A few houses were
owned by one of the wealthiest Indians in Durban, my mother used to boast,
as if they were members of our own family.

I could never quite work out why rich people would live right across from a
refuse dump. Little did my premature mind comprehend that everyone,
including the rich Indian, could only live in an area designated under
apartheid's Group Areas Act. Since Clare Estate had a large quarry, it was
deemed unsuitable for white people. Indians were allocated that area.

A few years after the opening of the dump at the site of that quarry, I
remember my mother excitedly telling me that the Bisaser Road facility would
be shut and transformed into a park for the community. As a child whose life
was spent riding a bike around our tar-covered parking lot the idea of a
park in our vicinity was just too thrilling.

Perfume and toxics

It's now 2005 and I'm 27 years old. We live in a non-racial democratic South
Africa today. But Clare Estate's notorious dump is still there, although
approaching it, I notice something very different.

The stench has changed markedly, into a kind of 'mutant funk', as comedian
Jerry Seinfeld describes the combination of body odour and perfume
deodorant. Bisaser Road landfill now exudes the stink of dump rot mixed with
an artificial sickly-sweet smell, emanating from long 'perfume rods' lining
the road on the outer rim of the landfill. These rods were installed to
merely mask the fumes arising from the dump; but the effect is quite nasty.
Again I pinch my nose.

This time, instead of driving past, I enter one of the Gatsbyesque houses on
the hill, Khan's residence. The city councilor in the area had just
announced to the media that the landfill was, finally, to be closed. So
again, as in my youth, I felt almost ecstatic at the thought of this old
dream now coming true.

But there is more to the story than met the nose.

Khan welcomes me warmly into her home. Her lounge is framed by glass doors
overlooking the entire landfill below, and beyond to the informal shacks and
formal homes directly adjacent to the landfill, and a technikon campus at
the bottom end of the dump. Just out of eyesight are two primary schools, a
secondary school and a home for the safety of abandoned children, all in
close proximity to the Bisaser Road dump.

Apartheid's racist rationale for the location of the dump in an Indian
residential area, even one with nice homes like Khan's, was obvious enough.
But the location of dumps is a class issue as well: low-income, powerless
people ultimately bear the consequences of over-consumption by higher-income
groups.

'You should have come earlier', Khan tells me. 'They were dumping sewage.
Humph, the smell!' According to its original permit, Bisasar Road Landfill
was a domestic waste site. Yet Khan reports that the dumping of sewage
sludge is a daily occurrence, and is apparently included in Durban Solid
Waste's contract. This is a violation of water law, which requires sewage
sludge to be transported and disposed off in such a way as not to cause any
odour or health hazard.

It is not only sewage sludge that contravened the law and caused offence,
Khan argues. Medical supplies and industrial waste from Mondi (the paper
mill), Huletts (sugar factory) and other industries in the nearby industrial
area of Springfield are also regularly dumped there. In February 2001 a
large shipment of rotten eggs exceeding 22 000 tons was also dumped, Khan
recalls. 'When combined with the stink of the sewage sludge, this made life
extremely uncomfortable for the residents.'

To exacerbate the situation, according to Bryan Ashe of the NGO
EarthlifeAfrica, South Africa's dumps only became landfills in the 1990's
when new laws were being introduced. This meant, in effect, that rubbish was
never recycled, treated and extracted, because dumping was the cheapest
option for industries. That, in turn, has given rise to the challenge of
extracting the methane that is formed by the rot of decades' worth of
garbage.


Closure - or a new threat?


Most importantly from the perspective of Khan and her neighbours, I ask,
might Bisaser finally be closed? Khan ridicules the newspaper article I had
read. According to her, the source cited for the announcement, one Councilor
Bechoo, is the source of community outrage, because he refuses to support
efforts to win full closure of the dump. In fact, Bechoo was asked by the
community to retract his statement and they were expecting to see it in the
next edition of the newspaper.

Khan explains that the closure was officially declared a 'pro-forma closure'
or 'partial closure'. Raymond Rampersad, Head of eThekwini Cleansing and
Solid Waste, was quoted by the Daily News as saying the landfill was going
through 'various stages of closure. That means it will only be shut down in
about seven years, with a limited area remaining open for the recycling of
specific non-smelly wastes such as builder's rubble and garden refuse.' Khan
sees the council's move as 'playing for time', part of a deliberate attempt
to mislead the public.

A new dumpsite for the catchment area's waste is proposed in Buffels Draai,
but it will only be ready to accept Bisasar's volume in 2012. Buffels Draai
is also located much further away from the city centre and thus Bisasar
would remain a 'transfer site'. According to Khan, the rubbish that cannot
be compacted will be left there to rot.

Khan's own research revealed that neither the local nor national branch of
the Department of Water Affairs and Forestry had received a permit
application from Durban Solid Waste (DSW) to close the dump, even though the
local water system is affected by such a decision.

Khan recalls the council's long history of false promises to the community
that it would close the dump. After reneging on a promise to close the dump
in 1987, the council announced, 'The remaining life expectancy of the dump
tip site is nine years.' The town clerk then led the community to believe
that the dump would indeed be turned into a recreational and sporting site.
However, in 1996, the city again broke its promise, and another operator's
permit was granted, without community consultation.

Public reaction was swift, as people blocked the site entrance of the dump,
held demonstrations and marches, and circulated a petition to council that
gained 6000 signatures. But nothing worked, so Khan decided to take legal
action on behalf of the residents and schools.

As the battle raged, a wealthy white-dominated suburb to the north of Durban
was quickly closing its landfill. Umhlanga, situated at the shore's edge and
expanding into rolling sugarcane-covered hills, was 'earmarked for up-market
property development,' according to Bryan Ashe. The rubbish tip, along with
waste from other closed landfill sites elsewhere in Durban, was rerouted to
Bisasar Road. Attempts to increase dumping in the African township of Inanda
were met by community protests, including the stoning of Durban municipal
trucks. Bisaser again received an added inflow.

Khan shows me the area the council said it would return to the community
after the partial closure: two small strips of land on the Bisasar Road dump's
outer edge. I ask about plastic covering that was lining some of the
terrain. She urges me to inspect it carefully. Indeed, nursery plants are
still intact in plastic pots, lying on plastic sheets rolled out several
weeks earlier.

According to Khan, these are meant to create the public impression, however
tenuous, that the soil is rehabilitated and that plants are indeed growing
there. They stand in stark contrast to other, wilting plants in the same
area but that are submerged in Bisaser Road soil. Khan explains that the
proposed plan to turn the area into a recreational zone is also ridiculous,
because after a dumpsite is closed, it cannot be used for another 30-50
years due to decommissioning requirements.

The city also tries to divide the African and Indian people in the area, she
says. African people moved into the area when the Apartheid laws relaxed.
They live in informal shack housing, some surviving by scavenging off the
dump because of the high unemployment rate. The city's main concession to
them was to build a few pitlatrines and chemical toilets on the edge of the
settlement, abutting the road. These don't appear hygienic or, for women,
particularly safe.

The immediate short-term interests of very desperate poor people are thus
being posed against those of the other neighbours, although it is the
lowest-income people who will no doubt suffer the most severe health and
safety problems in the medium-term if the dump remains open.

As she stands up, Khan bats away a nagging fly. 'If you cook you have to
close everything,' she points out. At the beginning of 2003, DSW management
gave residents insecticides 'Baythroid' and 'Bayt' to combat the
debilitating fly problem. Complains Khan, 'This will cause even more harm to
the environment.'

Khan's sister emerges from the kitchen to interrupt our conversation,
warning that she is going to be late for her appointment with the doctor.
Clutching a bag of medication and her car keys, Khan apologises and ushers
me to the front door. Khan was diagnosed with cancer in 1996. Her nephew
died of leukemia.

In fact, seven out of ten households in this downwind area of Clare Estate
have reported tumour cases, and it is entirely probable that dump emissions
are the culprit. According to studies, the limits of waste emissions
considered potentially hazardous were exceeded at Bisasar Road many times
over: hydrogen chloride by 50%, cadmium by 200%, and lead by more than
1000%. Limits for suspended particulate matter were also exceeded.

As the waste decomposes, there are additional concentrations of methane,
benzene, toluene, trichloroethylene and formaldehyde. Further cause for
worry comes from a New York State Health Department Study, which shows that
women living near landfills have a four-fold increased susceptibility to
cancer.

Having hoped so deeply for a new beginning and the end of the toxic dump, I
leave feeling more than a little deflated. Beyond the fakery of perfume rods
and plastic covers, I want to find out why Bisaser Road has suddenly become
what the World Bank actually terms an 'environmentally friendly' pilot
project, for the creation of a global greenhouse gas market.


Climate crisis


My next port of call is municipal waste official Lindsay Strachan, whose
title is Manager of Engineering and Projects. Strachan has been intimately
involved in the methane-to-electricity project, and is based on site at the
Bisasar Road Landfill. 'It's where the action is', he insists.

Strachan enthusiastically launches into the mantra of climate change doom
that we are all getting accustomed to hearing in the media. There is every
reason to be alarmed, he convinces me:

· 'Continental shelves are breaking off the size of
Manhattan.'
· 'The president of the Maldives is worrying about his
island going under.'
· 'Rising sea levels means the waves are a meter higher.'
· 'The increase in temperature gives rise to hundreds of
types of diseases.'

So what can be done? The global establishment is divided:

· the US, Australia and a few other retrograde countries
simply refuse to address global warming;
· the manic-growth industrial zones of China and India -
as well as slow-growing South Africa - are not prepared to adopt more
energy-efficient economic development strategies; and
· most of the global elites endorsed a deal hammered out
in Kyoto, Japan, in December 1997, that had taken ten long years of
deliberation, like an elephant birthing a mouse.

The Kyoto Protocol, which formally came into effect on February 16, is
indeed a mere mouse in the evolution that our global society must urgently
make, merely to survive. China, India and South Africa are not even pushed
to change anything, as Kyoto now stands.

According to Heidi Bachram of the Oxford-based NGO network Carbon Trade
Network, the Kyoto Protocol contains 'inadequate targets to reduce
(greenhouse gas) emissions'. A key UN scientific advisory board, the
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change confirms that Kyoto's targets for
reducing emissions (5.2% by 2012) are miniscule compared to the 50 -70%
reduction required to merely stabilise the existing concentrations of gas in
the atmosphere.

Nevertheless, the signing of Kyoto and its even slower ratification by 156
countries are hailed as successes. Many environmentalists endorse it,
because it is considered at least a first step towards more substantive
change.

Even though South Africa ranks amongst the top twenty greenhouse gas
polluters in the world, it was considered a 'developing' country, and hence
was not listed by Kyoto as a target country for emissions reduction.
Strachan explains, 'Our dustbins need to be filled before they can be
emptied.'

Needless to say, Strachan avoids extending the metaphor: South Africa's
wealthy communities have already overflowing dustbins, and low-income black
people are left to rummage through these, in desperate search of thrown-away
items of even minimal value. This is a particularly poignant issue in
Bisasar Road, given how many people nearby survive by scavenging at the
dump.

Still, Kyoto worries Strachan: 'What are we going to do about carbon
trading, emissions reductions. Do we do something like Kyoto advises? Our
president is saying, "Where is this project? Where is any project? Where's
anything? Where can you show that X tons are being reduced by SA?"'

But Kyoto has a catch that concerns more probing ecologists. The emissions
'reductions' may actually occur in a form that leaves the world without any
substantive reduction. To attract US support, which then never materialised,
Kyoto negotiators agreed to the idea of market-based emissions trading.

The compromise is the Protocol's Achilles Heel, for it allows a major
polluter to continue emitting carbon dioxide, but with an offset in the form
of a carbon 'sink', or some other contribution to lowered emissions
elsewhere. This strategy, says Bachram, 'is likely to undermine these
already weak targets and exacerbate global injustice in the process'.

Strachan sees carbon trading through more optimistic eyes: 'Let's have a
flexible mechanism. Make it such that if profit makes you thrive, let's make
it profitable to reduce emissions.'

This flexible, profitable mechanism allots carbon credits to projects like
Clare Estate's Bisasar Road methane-to-electricity conversion. The credits
can be purchased by industrialised countries and corporations, as a way of
avoiding the reduction of their own emissions. Hence if a polluter
over-pollutes it can buy credits from a polluter who had under-polluted.

But likewise, if a polluter (like Russia) under-pollutes (because of
post-Soviet deindustrialisation), it has an incentive to sell credits -
which are called 'hot air' - to an over-polluter. This means that there will
be a tendency to pollute up to the maximum Kyoto allows, rather than achieve
declines in leaps and bounds, which we all must do if we are to avoid
heating up the atmosphere. In other words, the permissible ceiling for
carbon emissions will, with this mechanism, become a floor.

In late 2004, when I began looking more deeply at this complicated world of
economics and nature, the Mail & Guardian newspaper (10-16 December 2004)
declared the merits of emissions trading: 'Carbon credits are a triumph of
capitalism, creating a commodity from nothing - clean pockets of air that
gain value through being certified. They have created a market that will be
worth between $10- and $30 billion by 2008.'

The UK was the first country to establish a national market in greenhouse
gases. Though the British Treasury provided more than R2 billion worth of
incentives for emissions trading, the New Labour government shirked its
commitment to increase energy supplied by renewables by 20%.

With this sort of official support, the carbon trade lobby has succeeded in
getting the market off the ground. According to Strachan, 'In the last two
years there was suddenly this birth of carbon traders. They never existed
before, something like 400 000 carbon trading companies in the world. It's
unbelievable.'

One such firm is even run with the support of the former South African
tourism and environment minister, Valli Moosa, who in November was elected
the president of one of the world's most important ecological agencies, the
IUCN. The carbon trading lobby certainly appears formidable, especially with
the World Bank playing a central role.


Banking on the carbon market


The Bank introduced its Prototype Carbon Fund (PCF) in 1999 in order to
provide investment outlets for industrial country governments and
corporations, ostensibly on behalf of 'Clean Development Mechanisms' (CDMs)
in the Third World. A quick $180 million (more than R1 billion) was injected
to finance projects such as the methane emissions extraction next to Khan's
house. Her catastrophic fate, and those of others in similar projects, was
to be used as the clincher in thousands of business deals being brokered
around the world.

Strachan is excited. Ahead of the World Summit on Sustainable Development in
2002, he says, there was already 'a big rush to get South Africa on the map'.
Durban, in particular, decided 'to take the lead', with Mayor Obed Mdlaba
and City Manager Mike Sutcliffe at the helm. City officials soon realised
that their own goldmine could be unearthed from landfills like Bisaser Road.

And so it was that a $15 million deal to launch a CDM project was signed
with the PCF and given the 'thumbs up', says Strachan, in October 2003. If
it becomes operational, landfill gas will be collected from three sites in
Durban, and methane (a harmful greenhouse gas) will be converted to
electricity, and then supplied to the grid.

No one is against extracting the methane from the rotting garbage. But
Durban officials say they won't go to the trouble of doing so without the
$15 million subsidy, because the electricity generated in the process costs
so much more per kilowatt hour than Eskom charges for its coal-fired power.

There are a host of technical and environmental objections raised by Khan in
her 90-page critique of the World Bank's project, as well as the need to
reverse the history of racist dumping which implicate so many wealthy Durban
residents in Khan's cancer. But morality aside, the extraction of dangerous
methane should be happening anyway, Khan agrees, so long as no further
rubbish is brought to Bisasar Road.

And hence what bothers Khan is that the Bank's interests are now in keeping
the dump open as long as possible, so they can make more money off rotting
and often toxic trash that turns into methane and produces electricity. More
cancer in Clare Estate is good for the World Bank's budding business, Khan
concludes.

The documents appear to back her up. According to the Bank's baseline study,
'The production of methane can theoretically continue in excess of 30 years.
Bisasar is sized and operated to be used for up to 15 more years.' Bisasar
Road Landfill averages 4000 tons of waste dumped each day, an amount that
'will continue to increase in the near-term'.

So, if the Bank business plan is followed, not only will the dump not close,
but the flowthrough of waste and the emission of toxins will actually
increase.

Khan's suspicions about the Council's inclination to break promises were
confirmed when she looked into the PCF's 'crediting period'. The project
opted for a seven-year crediting period, with the expectation of renewing it
twice. So, in this scenario the project's lifetime rose to 21 years.

The final nail in the community's coffin came from the World Bank's baseline
scenario which indicated that, 'because of the growing waste generation per
capita in the municipality.there is no plan to close. the Bisasar Road
site.during the PCF project life.' If the World Bank has its way, Khan may
be fighting this dump for the rest of her life.


Community costs and benefits


In response, Strachan is adamant that the community will benefit from the
project. Landfill gas comprises 50% methane and the gas wells (some of which
were already installed because the gas was currently being flared) will suck
out all that gas and convert it to electricity thus making the air safer to
breathe.

Khan is not convinced, because the World Bank's own Monitoring Process
document for the project reveals that whilst most of the gas emissions will
be combusted in the engines for generation of electricity, some of the gas
will still be released into the atmosphere and burned in flares.

Furthermore, the Bank concedes that the tools for measuring how much gas can
actually be converted to electricity are highly uncertain. Engines and
flares combust the landfill's gas with different efficiencies. A Bank
document even admitted, 'It is unclear with which portion the gas from
project wells is either flared or utilised.'

Although the World Bank says it will monitor this process at monthly
intervals, a footnote (the small print) gives away the game: 'Not all
methane collected will thus be converted into CO2 but a small portion will
be emitted as methane into the atmosphere.' The community's already damaged
lungs will be further clogged with landfill pollution, not merely the scent
of perfumed rot.

Strachan also tries to convince me that the electricity generators will be
placed on the site where the dispersion model shows it will cause the least
harm. But the community is located all around the dump, I point out. His
rebuttal is that the combustion process will spew out an equivalent amount
of emissions to a rush-hour's worth of traffic on busy Umgeni Road (the
major throughway at the bottom of the dump).

Khan disagrees, and pulls out a huge stack of reports for reference. She
calculates that each year, the generators will pump out 95 tons of nitrogen
oxides, 319 tons of carbon monoxide, 323 tons of hydro-carbons and 43 256
tons of carbon dioxide. Carbon monoxide reduces the oxygen-carrying capacity
of the blood; nitrogen oxides are a respiratory irritant and exacerbated
asthma; and carcinogens such as benzene and butadiene could be found in
hydrocarbons.

Other dangers abound. Improvement of ground water and air quality are listed
as World Bank priorities, yet one report confessed, 'It is difficult to
provide the environmental safeguards that assure safety of the local
population.' The Bank also concedes that the project might 'adversely effect
the value of the land holdings surrounding the landfill site'.

Strachan's assurance that CDM projects have very stringent ecological
controls is contradicted by PCF projects which are receiving a response
similar to Khan's, in Brazil, Argentina and Thailand. In the Brazilian case,
for example, a tree plantation that was not indigenous to the area is being
grown to help finance a corporation, Plantar, which in turn will burn the
trees into charcoal which will be used in an iron smelter to produce more
cars. Not only was community consultation deeply flawed, the whole logic
simply falls apart under scrutiny.

Job creation was another pro-community rationale for the Bisasar Road
experiment. However, there are plans for only 70 new positions (50
unskilled) over the 15-year lifetime of the project, hardly impressive for
what may be a R100 million investment.

Part of the community distrust can be traced to DSW's history. For example,
Khan points out that DSW is already flaring dangerous gases in Bisasar,
instead of redirecting them into nearby gas piping. The city, which prides
itself on its advanced attitudes, simply does not require gas capture and
flaring from permit holders.

It is just one of the ways that Durban officials show an acute awareness
about the costs that landfill operators would incur, and disdain for the
health risks to the public.


Consultation turns into intimidation


But the power of the people has yet to be tested, and here a surprise
appears to be in the offing.

Strachan assures me that consultation is central to Bisaser Road's
Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA). Indeed, in all documentation, the
World Bank emphasises the merits of consultation with affected communities.

Khan prepared thoroughly for this particular battle. As she wrote in a
letter of complaint to the World Bank, neither the Clare Road City Councilor
nor DSW management ever discussed the project's implications. But nor did
the Bank take consultation seriously, for the time allocated for objections
in late 2004 was a mere 10 days. More disturbing, consultation was to be
conducted through the Bank's PCF website. According to Bachram, 'This shows
that the PCF is woefully out of touch with the reality of a community living
around a waste dump.'

But in jujitsu activist mode, Khan suddenly turned the flawed consultation
process to her advantage. She filed a vast formal complaint, filled with
technical environmental, health and social analysis. In November, Bank staff
came to visit Durban to check on the project. Suddenly the fruits of Khan's
labours became visible, as three newspaper articles described her problems,
and as she and her supporters - local and even international - began
flooding the Bank with complaints which were sufficiently substantive to
cause widespread concern in the PCF crowd.

After sensing the rising grassroots anger, Bank officials and their
financial backers began to seriously consider withdrawing from the project,
Strachen admits. 'Now the World Bank has given us a quick visit last year.
We're talking about businessmen as well, we're talking about people who need
to assign their money to projects,' he says. 'They were probably thinking,
"Consult all you want but hell can't you hurry it up a bit. We only have 60
years on this earth!"'

Perhaps Khan's rebuttal, had she overheard, would be similar in frustration:
'Hell, can't you hurry closing the dump? At least your children have 60
years to live. My cancer-ridden body only gives me just a couple more years.'

Stachan later informed me that the World Bank's 'quick visit' resulted in a
deadline imposed on the government to sort out the situation: December 2005.
The city may fail to meet the challenge. In a follow-up interview by phone,
Strachan confesses to me that the appeals process is 'rotten. We're being
held hostage by a single person.'

Does Khan have any alternatives to suggest? One is to use the money going to
the cost of the project to close the dump and create a buffer zone. 'The
city can afford to pay us replacement value for our homes and for damages,
since the estimated costs of the project are greater than R120 million,'
insists Khan.

Another idea is to pump the gas to the Petronet gas pipeline running past
the site, instead of converting the landfill methane directly to
electricity. 'This would cost very little compared to the project cost,'
says Khan.

Strachan's rebuttal sounds politically correct, yet doesn't quite make
sense: '[What] if something goes wrong with this pipeline? If the land
subsides or they do something funny with their pipeline, what happens to our
gas? We rather opted for something whereby we sort it out on site, in our
own home. That's an onsite solution. Don't send the problem to someone else's
backyard and tell them to sort out our methane. We think it's very
irresponsible. The world thinks it's very irresponsible.'

But to act as a front for investors who want to avoid their
emissions-reduction obligations is far less responsible, I'm thinking.
Instead of World Bank carbon trading, the more genuine solutions would be to
impose strict government regulations against excessive greenhouse gas
emissions, and introduce community-based power generation systems that use
renewable, environmentally-friendly technologies.

Maybe what's obvious simply cannot be put on the agenda, because of these
vested interests. I'm learning just how political this process has become.
For example, research by Heidi Bachram shows that these sort of projects
regularly ignore the problem of over-consumption by 'voracious rich
minorities', the people and industries who caused the environmental mess-up
that we were in today.

And that leads logically to a manipulated process of blame-shifting to the
Third World, as the preferred international elite strategy. As Khan puts it,
'The poor countries are so poor they will accept crumbs. The World Bank know
this and they are taking advantage of it.'

Bachram also argues that industries involved in buying credits to offset
their emissions will simply continue to pollute, to the detriment of the
communities in which their factories are based.

Engen, for instance, is a notoriously bad neighbour nearby in South Durban,
and on the night of January 18 the entire residential community of at least
50 000 people was stunned by an enormous explosion at the local refinery.
These sorts of companies will continue to emit carbon and encourage
unsustainable petrol consumption as long as it is profitable.

Bachram concludes, 'Communities like Clare Estate and South Durban will see
no real benefits from emissions trading and in fact will be the victims of
even more pollution.' In short, emissions trading represents 'carbon
colonialism', she contends. The introduction of property rights to pollute
the air means that whoever controls carbon credits effectively controls the
atmosphere.

But where there is colonialism, there is also resistance. Khan's detailed
rebuttal to the carbon trading project has slowed the process of approval.
There are so many flaws in Durban's PCF proposal that she thinks she may
win. She has certainly intimidated her opponents, and - like Julia Roberts
of Erin Brokovich movie fame - is becoming a quiet kind of role-model
heroine for me.

Strachan, meanwhile, is at first philosophical about what appears to be an
impending defeat. 'The first project in Africa is literally slipping through
our fingers,' he says. 'Stopped in its tracks. Completely.'

So instead of investing in Durban, the Bank PCF team appears to be forging
ahead in Latin America, the Middle East and even Uganda, with Strachan
helping as a consultant. In Kampala, the municipality will 'rake in R300
million on their project,' he tells me. 'South Africa probably won't be able
to say that we spearheaded the CDM market or better still we spearheaded the
emissions reductions market. There is disappointment, but such projects will
go on elsewhere.'

Because of Khan's appeal, the city is losing R20 000 each day, says
Strachan, and he is obviously very frustrated: 'Her objection is 90 pages
thick. She was invited by the World Bank to Milan to learn about clean
development mechanisms.' In fact, Khan tells me later, two environmental
groups - Carbon Trade Watch and the TransNational Institute - funded her
2004 trip so that more people around the world might understand the dangers
of carbon trading. It was her teaching the World Bank, not the other way
around.

Strachan continues, 'When an objection goes through the minister we have to
spend money, time and effort. People are looking at the past. Not the new.'

But what is really new? It's a new project, with new money, and it also may
be new feeling for white South Africans to be 'patted on the back' - as
Strachan himself put it - by the big financial agencies and corporate
players, for being first in Africa to implement a multimillion dollar carbon
trading deal.

Perhaps realising that the potential glory is slipping from his grasp,
Strachan becomes visibly angry. As for Khan and her colleagues, 'We'd like
to put the whingers on one boat and send them off!'

Indeed. Though it is certainly not the last word, perhaps that attitude says
it all. For this slur is particularly poignant, as it was used during
apartheid to exclude and degrade people who had been shipped from India to
work on white-owned land in the mid-19th century, in order to magnify their
utter vulnerability. The insult smacks of that earlier generation of white
colonial men who came to South Africa, encountering resistance to their
easiest path to profit, prestige and power.

Even if at great cost, the resistance offered by communities - especially
courageous grassroots women like Sajida Khan - was finally successful
against colonialism and apartheid. We may be watching something quite
formidable again.

* Trusha Reddy served as an intern at the University of KwaZulu-Natal Centre
for Civil Society in early 2005. This article was first published on the website of the Centre for Civil Society at the University of KwaZulu-Natal and reproduced here with kind permission of the author. Pictures are available at http://www.ukzn.ac.za/ccs

* Please send comments to editor@pambazuka.org

Guinea: Newspaper editor and lawyer released

2005-02-24

http://www.irinnews.org/report.asp?ReportID=45680

The Guinean government has released the news editor of an independent weekly newspaper and the lawyer of an opposition politician who disappeared following last month's assassination attempt on President Lansana Conte after holding them in custody for three days. Benn Pepito, the news editor of La Lance, and Paul Yomba Korouma, a lawyer who had been acting for missing opposition politician Antoine Soromou, were arrested within hours of each other on Wednesday night. They were both freed on Saturday.

Guinea: Newspaper editor freed after being secretly held for three days

2005-02-24

http://pambazuka.org/en/category/media/27032

Reporters sans frontières (RSF) has expressed relief at the 19 February 2005 release of newspaper editor Mohamed Lamine Diallo, known by his pen name Benn Pépito. Pépito was secretly detained for three days in connection with his reporting on an opposition leader wanted by the authorities. "We welcome Benn Pépito's release but we continue to be concerned about violations of the confidentiality of journalists' sources in Guinea," RSF said. "Even when state security is involved, political coverage can never justify secretly detaining a journalist."
The English version follows. La version anglaise suit.

IFEX - Nouvelles de la communauté internationale de défense de la liberté
d'expression
_________________________________________________________________

MISE À JOUR D'ALERTE - GUINÉE

Le 22 février 2005

Le rédacteur en chef de "La Lance" libéré après trois jours de détention au
secret

SOURCE: Reporters sans frontières (RSF), Paris

**Mise à jour d'une alerte de l'IFEX du 17 février 2005**

(RSF/IFEX) - RSF est soulagée après la libération de Mohamed Lamine Diallo,
alias Benn Pépito, rédacteur en chef de l'hebdomadaire indépendant "La
Lance", le 19 février 2005, en fin d'après-midi. Selon des sources locales,
la libération du journaliste a été décidée lors d'une rencontre entre le
président Lansana Conté et le Premier ministre, Cellou Dalein Diallo. Ce
dernier a ensuite reçu les ministres de l'Administration du territoire, de
la Justice et de la Sécurité.

"Nous sommes satisfaits de la libération de Benn Pépito, a déclaré RSF. Mais
nous restons vigilants quant aux affaires de violation du secret des sources
en Guinée. La couverture d'un dossier d'actualité politique, même s'il
touche à la sécurité de l'Etat, ne peut justifier la détention d'un
journaliste au secret", a indiqué l'organisation.

Le 19 février, le directeur de la Sûreté de Conakry et le procureur de la
République avaient déclaré à une délégation de journalistes qu'ils leur
"rendaient" Pépito et qu'ils auraient pu le faire bien avant s'il "avait
accepté de coopérer". Cité par l'Agence France-Presse, le journaliste a
déclaré que "toutes les questions qui [lui] ont été posées concernaient
Antoine Soromou".

Avant cette libération, les associations de presse avaient décidé de lancer
une campagne contre le ministre de la Sécurité, Moussa Sampil. Tous les
hebdomadaires paraissant cette semaine vont consacrer une page affichant la
photo du ministre et le dénonçant comme un "ennemi des journalistes". RSF
soutient cette intiative.

Pour tout renseignement complémentaire, veuillez contacter Marie Vabre, RSF,
5, rue Geoffroy Marie, Paris 75009, France, tél: +33 1 44 83 84 84, téléc:
+33 1 45 23 11 51, courrier électronique: afrique@rsf.org, Internet:
http://www.rsf.org

RSF est responsable de toute information contenue dans cette mise à jour
d'alerte. En citant cette information, prière de bien vouloir l'attribuer à
RSF.
_______________________________________________________________
DIFFUSÉ(E) PAR LE SECRÉTARIAT DU RÉSEAU IFEX,
L'ÉCHANGE INTERNATIONAL DE LA LIBERTÉ D'EXPRESSION
489, rue College, bureau 403, Toronto (ON) M6G 1A5 CANADA
tel: +1 416 515 9622 téléc: +1 416 515 7879
courrier électronique: alerts@ifex.org boîte générale: ifex@ifex.org
site Internet: http://www.ifex.org/
______________________________________________________________
IFEX - News from the international freedom of expression community
_________________________________________________________________

ALERT UPDATE - GUINEA

22 February 2005

Newspaper editor freed after being secretly held for three days

SOURCE: Reporters sans frontières (RSF), Paris

**Updates IFEX alert of 17 February 2005**

(RSF/IFEX) - RSF has expressed relief at the 19 February 2005 release of
newspaper editor Mohamed Lamine Diallo, known by his pen name Benn Pépito.
Pépito was secretly detained for three days in connection with his reporting
on an opposition leader wanted by the authorities.

"We welcome Benn Pépito's release but we continue to be concerned about
violations of the confidentiality of journalists' sources in Guinea," RSF
said. "Even when state security is involved, political coverage can never
justify secretly detaining a journalist."

The news agency Agence France-Presse quoted Pépito as saying after his
release that all the questions put to him while he was detained concerned
opposition politician Antoine Soromou, who has apparently been sought by the
authorities since an abortive attack last month on President Lansana Conté's
motorcade.

The release of Pépito, editor of the independent weekly "La Lance", was
reportedly decided at a meeting between the president and Prime Minister
Cellou Dalein Diallo. The prime minister met immediately afterwards with the
ministers of territorial administration, justice and security.

On 19 February, the director of security and the state prosecutor told a
delegation of journalists that they were "handing over" Pépito and that they
would have done so long before if "he had agreed to cooperate."

Prior to his release, local press associations had planned a campaign
against Security Minister Moussa Sampil, during which all the weekly
newspapers would display a full-page photo of the minister with the
monicker, "enemy of journalists". RSF backed the initiative.

For further information, contact Marie Vabre at RSF, 5, rue Geoffroy Marie,
Paris 75009, France, tel: +33 1 44 83 84 84, fax: +33 1 45 23 11 51, e-mail:
africa@rsf.org, Internet: http://www.rsf.org

The information contained in this alert update is the sole responsibility of
RSF. In citing this material for broadcast or publication, please credit
RSF.
_________________________________________________________________
DISTRIBUTED BY THE INTERNATIONAL FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION
EXCHANGE (IFEX) CLEARING HOUSE
489 College Street, Toronto (ON) M6G 1A5 CANADA
tel: +1 416 515 9622 fax: +1 416 515 7879
alerts email: alerts@ifex.org general e-mail: ifex@ifex.org
Internet site: http://www.ifex.org/
___________________________________________________________

Nigeria: Freedom of Information Bill Scales Second Reading

2005-02-24

http://mediarightsagenda.org/sen2ndrpass.html

The Freedom of Information Bill scaled a major hurdle this week at the Senate as it sailed through the second reading with strong support from most senators.  The Senate, which concluded debates on the Bill, passed it for the second reading and referred it to the Senate Committee on Information to conduct a more detailed examination of the Bill and report back to the full house in three weeks. Unlike last Thursday’s proceedings where sharp differences characterized the comments on the Bill, most of the senators who spoke during today’s discussions described it as a Bill whose time has come and stressed that it must be passed by the Senate.

Tunisia: Freedom of Expression under Siege

2005-02-24

http://pambazuka.org/en/category/media/27017

International freedom of expression organizations today expressed grave concern about the poor state of freedom of expression in Tunisia, host country for the World Summit on the Information Society (WSIS) which is to be held in Tunis, November 2005. A 60-page report on the state of freedom of expression in Tunisia and the conditions for participation in the WSIS to be held in Tunis, November 2005 has been published today by the International Freedom of expression Exchange Tunisia Monitoring Group, a group of 13 national, regional and international freedom of expression organizations. The report, released to coincide with the second Preparatory Committee for the WSIS, in Geneva 17-25 February, sets out the findings of a mission to Tunisia of freedom of expression groups. It makes a series of recommendations to the Tunisian government to bring the country in line with international human rights standards.
International Freedom of Expression Exchange Tunisia Monitoring Group

Press Release - 22/02/05

Tunisia: Freedom of Expression under Siege

International freedom of expression organizations today expressed grave
concern about the poor state of freedom of expression in Tunisia, host
country for the World Summit on the Information Society (WSIS) which is to
be held in Tunis, November 2005.

A 60-page report on the state of freedom of expression in Tunisia and the
conditions for participation in the WSIS to be held in Tunis, November
2005 has been published today by the International Freedom of expression
Exchange Tunisia Monitoring Group, a group of 13 national, regional and
international freedom of expression organizations.

The report, released to coincide with the second Preparatory Committee for
the WSIS, in Geneva 17-25 February, sets out the findings of a mission to
Tunisia of freedom of expression groups. It makes a series of
recommendations to the Tunisian government to bring the country in line
with international human rights standards.

The main recommendations of the report are that the Tunisian government
should release all prisoners of opinion, end arbitrary administrative
detentions, release the cyber-dissidents of Zarzis and Ariana, end
harassment and assaults on human rights activists, stop blocking websites,
end censorship of books and newspapers, open up the press and
broadcasting sector, respect freedom of movement, assembly and
association, allow independent investigation of alleged cases of torture
by the security forces.

-ends-

Further information:
Alexis Krikorian +41 79 214 5530

The full report is available at:
English http://www.ifex.org/en/content/view/full/64665/
French http://www.ifex.org/fr/content/view/full/64664/


Notes:

1. The International Freedom of Expression Exchange (IFEX) is a global
network of 64 national, regional and international freedom of expression
organisations.

2. This report is based on a fact-finding mission to Tunisia undertaken
from 14 to 19 January 2005 by members of the IFEX Tunisia Monitoring
Group (IFEX-TMG) together with additional background research and
Internet testing.

3. The mission was composed of the Egyptian Organization of Human Rights,
International PEN Writers in Prison Committee, International Publishers
Association, Norwegian PEN, World Association of Community Radio
Broadcasters (AMARC) and World Press Freedom Committee.

4. Other members of IFEX-TMG are: ARTICLE 19, Canadian Journalists for
Free Expression (CJFE), the Centre for Human Rights and Democratic Studies
(CEHURDES), Index on Censorship, Journalistes en Danger (JED), Media
Institute of Southern Africa (MISA), and World Association of Newspapers
(WAN).

5. The principle findings of the mission were:
- Imprisonment of individuals related to expression of their opinions or
media activities.
- Blocking of websites, including news and information websites, and
police surveillance of e-mails and Internet cafes.
- Blocking of the distribution of books and
publications.
- Restrictions on the freedom of association, including the right of
organizations to be legally established and to hold meetings.
- Restrictions on the freedom of movement of human rights defenders and
political dissidents together with police surveillance, harassment,
intimidation and interception of communications.
- Lack of pluralism in broadcast ownership, with only one private radio
and one private TV broadcaster, both believed to be loyal supporters of
President Ben Ali.
- Press censorship and lack of diversity of content in newspapers. - Use
of torture by the security services with
impunity.

Zimbabwe: Journalist Jan Raath forced to leave country

2005-02-24

http://pambazuka.org/en/category/media/27031

The International Press Institute (IPI), the global network of editors, journalists and media executives, has condemned the intimidation and harassment by the Zimbabwean authorities that has led to a foreign journalist fleeing to South Africa. According to information provided to IPI, the Deutsche Presse-Agentur (dpa) correspondent for Zimbabwe, Jan Raath, has been forced to leave the country after considerable pressure from the police and out of fear he would be arrested. On 14 January, eight policemen and two government officials raided the offices of Raath, where he worked with a number of other foreign journalists. Over a period of two days, police carried out an intensive search of the offices without the official documentation proving they had legal authorization to carry out the search.
IFEX - News from the international freedom of expression community
_________________________________________________________________

ACTION ALERT UPDATE - ZIMBABWE

18 February 2005

Journalist Jan Raath forced to leave country

SOURCE: International Press Institute (IPI), Vienna

**Updates IFEX alert of 18 and 16 February 2005**

(IPI/IFEX) - The following is an 18 February 2005 IPI Watch List protest to the Zimbabwean government:

His Excellency President Robert Mugabe
Office of the President
Causeway, Harare
Zimbabwe

Fax: (+ 263 4) 728 799 / 708 820 / 734 644

Vienna, 18 February 2005

Your Excellency,

The International Press Institute (IPI), the global network of editors, journalists and media executives, condemns the intimidation and harassment by the Zimbabwean authorities that has led to a foreign journalist fleeing to South Africa.

According to information provided to IPI, the Deutsche Presse-Agentur (dpa) correspondent for Zimbabwe, Jan Raath, has been forced to leave the country after considerable pressure from the police and out of fear he would be arrested.

On 14 January, eight policemen and two government officials raided the offices of Raath, where he worked with a number of other foreign journalists. Over a period of two days, police carried out an intensive search of the offices without the official documentation proving they had legal authorization to carry out the search.

Raath, who also writes for the (London) Times, was questioned along with three other journalists, Angus Shaw of Associated Press, Brian Latham of Bloomberg economic news, and freelance photographer Tsvangirai Mukwazhi, about spying allegations, as well as accusations that the journalists were practicing their profession illegally and using unauthorized communications equipment.

The questioning took place after two teams of police arrived separately at the news offices. Police claimed there had been a "tip off" about spying activities. Prior to his being questioned, Raath said that at around 2:30 p.m. (local time) two men in a car had tried to force their way past the gate in front of his residence.

With regard to the behaviour of the authorities, IPI believes that it is nothing but a government-inspired attempt to suppress foreign media in the lead-up to the 31 March parliamentary elections.

The actions of the police appear calculated to apply the maximum amount of pressure on journalists in the hope that some would succumb to the intimidation and leave the country. Such a view is supported by the failure of the police to provide the necessary documentation when undertaking the search and the nature of their accusations, which are so widely drawn as to allow the police to question the journalists on almost any subject.

IPI would remind the Zimbabwean government that they have a duty to encourage an open and free media environment that supports the free flow of information. This includes the right of journalists to freely practice their profession without fear of harassment or intimidation. As on so many other occasions, the failure of the Zimbabwean government to uphold this fundamental principle is indicative of the contempt it holds for any journalist or media organisation willing to criticise its actions.

As a consequence, by virtue of the actions against Raath and the many other foreign journalists who have been forced to leave the country, as well as by its closure of news organisations under a repressive media law, the government has decimated the media profession in Zimbabwe.

With this in mind, IPI calls on the Zimbabwean government to halt its cynical and ongoing predations of the media and to follow the principle laid down in Article 19 of the United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights which states, "Everyone has the right to freedom of opinion and freedom of expression; this right includes freedom to hold opinions without interference."

We thank you for your attention.

Yours sincerely,

Johann P. Fritz
Director

RECOMMENDED ACTION:

Send appeals to authorities:
- calling on the Zimbabwean government to halt its ongoing attacks on the media and to follow the principles laid down in Article 19 of the United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights

APPEALS TO:

President Robert Mugabe
Office of the President
Causeway, Harare, Zimbabwe
Fax: + 263 4 728 799 / 708 820 / 734 644

Please copy appeals to the source if possible.

Background Note:

Zimbabwe was placed on the IPI Watch List on 20 October 2001. In a press release dated 13 September 2003 IPI said: "In Zimbabwe the enforced closure of the Daily News is yet another example of the extraordinary measures taken by the government to silence the independent media."
For information on the IPI Watch List or for IPI's most recent report on Zimbabwe, please visit the World Press Freedom Review 2003 at IPI's website: http://www.freemedia.at

For further information, contact IPI at Spiegelgasse 2/29, A-1010 Vienna, Austria, tel: +43 1 512 90 11, fax: +43 1 512 90 14, e-mail: Michael Kudlak at mkudlak@freemedia.at, Diana Orlova at info@freemedia.at, or David Dadge at ddadge@freemedia.at, Internet site: http://www.freemedia.at

The information contained in this action alert update is the sole responsibility of IPI. In citing this material for broadcast or publication, please credit IPI.
_________________________________________________________________
DISTRIBUTED BY THE INTERNATIONAL FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION
EXCHANGE (IFEX) CLEARING HOUSE
489 College Street, Suite 403, Toronto (ON) M6G 1A5 CANADA
tel: +1 416 515 9622 fax: +1 416 515 7879
alerts e-mail: alerts@ifex.org general e-mail: ifex@ifex.org
Internet site: http://www.ifex.org/
_________________________________________________________________

Great Lakes: Ministers chart ways of implementing regional security pact

2005-02-24

http://www.irinnews.org/report.asp?ReportID=45635

Eleven foreign ministers of countries in Africa's Great Lakes region met last Thursday in Kigali, Rwanda, to map out strategies of implementing a regional pact on security, stability and development signed in November 2004 in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania. The ministers, meeting under an initiative of the UN and the African Union (AU), reviewed – among other things - efforts to improve peace and security in the region, including proliferation and circulation of small arms and light weapons, border security, disarmament of combatants and defence and security cooperation among countries in the region.

Northern Uganda: Decisive weeks ahead, says ICG

2005-02-24

http://pambazuka.org/en/category/conflict/27006

Sudan: Chad mediator says has reports of Darfur attack

2005-02-24

http://www.alertnet.org/thenews/newsdesk/L23180396.htm

A senior Chadian mediator on Wednesday said he had received unverified reports that one of the main rebel groups in Darfur had broken a fragile ceasefire by attacking government troops in Sudan's western region. Allam-Mi Ahmad, a top member of a Chadian team which has been mediating between Sudan's warring parties, told reporters that rebels from the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM), had reportedly attacked government troops south of Nyala.

Togo: Gnassingbe bows to pressure for elections, but stays in power

2005-02-24

http://www.irinnews.org/report.asp?ReportID=45663

Faure Gnassingbe, who seized power in Togo following the death of his father, has caved in to international demands for quick presidential elections but has said he will not quit until they are held. Riots have erupted on the streets of the capital, Lome, since the army installed the burly 39-year-old as successor to his father, Gnassingbe Eyadema, who ruled this small West African country with a rod of iron for 38 years until his death on 5 February.

Activism and the internet

2005-02-24

http://www.backspace.com/action/all.php

This document offers a brief introduction to a few different techniques of electronic advocacy using email, the Web, and other "new media" to bring about social change. This document is not intended to endorse electronic campaigning tactics at the expense of other offline tactics.

Constitutional Court online

2005-02-24

http://pambazuka.org/en/category/internet/27028

The Constitutional Court of South Africa has launched a new Web site, www.constitutionalcourt.org.za, which offers access to cases, judgments and legal research in the fields of constitutional, public, international and human rights law, reports Balancing Act News Update. The site, developed by Vivid New Media in collaboration with Big Media, allows the public to access information on human rights, as well as link to legal organisations they can approach for help in the protection of their rights.

HIV//AIDS and Mobile Populations in Southern Africa

Health and Development Networks (HDN) and the International Organization for Migration (IOM)

2005-02-24

http://pambazuka.org/en/category/enewsl/26989

Health and Development Networks (HDN) and the International Organization for Migration (IOM) Regional Office for Southern Africa are pleased to announce a forthcoming time-limited structured discussion on: HIV/AIDS AND MOBILE POPULATIONS IN SOUTHERN AFRICA. This discussion will take place on the AF-AIDS electronic discussion forum (eForum) between February - June 2005.
Health and Development Networks (HDN) and the International Organization for Migration (IOM) Regional Office for Southern Africa are pleased to announce a forthcoming time-limited structured discussion on: HIV/AIDS AND MOBILE POPULATIONS IN SOUTHERN AFRICA This discussion will take place on the AF-AIDS electronic discussion forum (eForum) between February - June 2005.

The overall aims of this discussion are to share our experiences and raise awareness about the issues of mobile populations and HIV/AIDS, particularly in the Southern African region. The discussion will explore the specific factors that increase HIV/AIDS vulnerability for mobile populations as well as examine how HIV/AIDS affects migration patterns. It will also focus on the particular challenges raised by dwindling human resources in the healthcare sector and its links to HIV/AIDS. Your contributions and comments on the following themes will be particularly encouraged:

Topic 1: Migration and HIV/AIDS - How does migration and population mobility lead to increased HIV/AIDS vulnerabilities in Southern Africa?

Topic 2: Migration and HIV/AIDS - How does HIV/AIDS affect migration and population mobility patterns?

Topic 3: The brain drain of healthcare professionals from Southern Africa The discussion will begin soon, although we welcome your early contributions now.

If you are already a member of the AF-AIDS eForum DO NOTHING, further information will be sent to you in the next few days. To join the eForum, send an email to:

join-af-aids@eforums.healthdev.org <mailto:join-af-aids@eforums.healthdev.org> More information on the links between HIV/AIDS and mobile populations in Southern Africa may be found on the IOM website: www.iom.org.za <http://www.iom.org.za> Following the discussion, a summary will be prepared that captures the highlights of all contributions - all contributors will be duly acknowledged and cited. The summary will be published by IOM/HDN in hard copy as well as CD-Rom versions.

If you have any questions about the discussion, or would like to be more directly involved, please let us know. We look forward to working together to make this a stimulating and meaningful discussion on this important topic of HIV/AIDS and mobile populations in the region.

HDN eForum Resource Team Email: info@hdnet.org
Web: www.hdnet.org

Sustainable Africa email Newsletter

2005-02-24

http://www.conserveafrica.org.uk

One of the main aims of this free Newsletter is to bridge the information gap between Africa and developed countries by creating, strengthening and providing a forum for the exchange of information about experiences, activities, events and good practice that contribute to the promotion of sustainable development in Africa.The newsletter is being sent out to a wide range of organisations, networks, institutions and individuals based in Africa or elsewhere and interested in or working in the field. It currently reaches more than 3000 subscribers worldwide.
The Sustainable Africa email Newsletter (3,500 subscribers).

One of the main aims of this free Newsletter is to bridge the
information
gap between Africa and developed countries by creating, strengthening
and
providing a forum for the exchange of information about experiences,
activities, events and good practice that contribute to the promotion of
sustainable development in Africa.

The newsletter is being sent out to a wide range of organisations,
networks, institutions and individuals based in Africa or elsewhere and
interested in or working in the field. It currently reaches more than
3000
subscribers worldwide.

To subscribe, please visit http://www.conserveafrica.org.uk

A library in your letter box

New GDN service brings the British Library of Development Studies collection to research institutes in developing and transition countries

2005-02-24

http://www.gdnet.org/online_services/journals/gdn_journal_services/document_delivery/

Accessing relevant development knowledge is a key challenge for many researchers in developing and transition countries. The Global Development Network (GDN) and the British Library of Development Studies (BLDS) have teamed up to address this issue with a new Document Delivery Service. The service will provide research institutes in the South with access to Europe's largest research collection on economic and social change in developing countries. Aimed at knowledge professionals within research institutes, it allows them to search the BLDS online catalogue and request a photocopy of any article or document chapter to be mailed to them at no cost. 

Deadline Extended in $100,000 Development Gateway Award

2005-02-24

http://pambazuka.org/en/category/fundraising/26984

The Development Gateway Foundation is extending the deadline in its global competition to reward outstanding achievement in using information and communication technologies (ICT) to improve people’s lives in developing countries. The new deadline for this year’s $100,000 Development Gateway Award is March 15.
Deadline Extended in $100,000 Development Gateway Award

Global Competition to Recognize Information Technology’s Role in Development


February 15, 2005 – The Development Gateway Foundation is extending the deadline in its global competition to reward outstanding achievement in using information and communication technologies (ICT) to improve people’s lives in developing countries. The new deadline for this year’s $100,000 Development Gateway Award is March 15.

“This competition is a global search for excellence, and we are taking every measure to find the highest-impact application of ICT to win this award,” said Development Gateway Chief Executive Officer Alan J. Rossi. “Then in June, we will profile the winner and runners-up to demonstrate for all to see the results that can be achieved using ICT to improve people’s lives.”

This year, as the number of Internet users worldwide surpasses the 1 billion mark, about half of those users will be in developing countries. “I strongly believe that access to ICT can change the lives of the poor dramatically, if we can ensure access to ICT for the poor,” said Grameen Bank founder Muhammad Yunus, winner of the 2004 award.

Grameen Bank-Village Phone was chosen from over 200 nominees for the 2004 Development Gateway Award, then known as the Petersberg Prize. The award recognized Grameen’s innovation in combining microfinance and mobile telephone service to help create a new class of women entrepreneurs in Bangladesh who raised themselves from poverty while providing rural villages with essential communication services.

For the 2005 competition, please go to www.developmentgateway.org/award for more information and nomination forms. Nominations already submitted can continue to be updated at this site.

Johannesburg: Employee Volunteer Week 2005

Charities Aid Foundation Southern Africa

2005-02-24

http://pambazuka.org/en/category/fundraising/26981

Charities Aid Foundation Southern Africa (CAFSA), in collaboration with its corporate and non profit partners, is pleased to launch Employee Volunteer Week 2005. Visit www.volunteerweek.org.za for more information.

Rotary World Peace Scholarships-Worldwide

2005-02-24

http://www.rotary.org/foundation/educational/amb_scho/centers/scholars/index.html

The Rotary Foundation is now accepting applications for the Rotary World Peace Scholarship. Successful candidates would pursue a master's level degree in international studies, peace studies, and conflict resolution at one of the eight Rotary partner universities: University of Bradford, University of California, Berkeley; Duke University; University of North Carolina; Sciences Po; International Christian University; University of Queensland; Universidad Del Salvador.

The AISI Media Awards

2005-02-24

http://pambazuka.org/en/category/fundraising/26992

The AISI Media Awards were introduced in 2003 to encourage more informed coverage of the information society and ICT for development issues in Africa as part of ECA's Information Society Outreach and Communication Programme.
Economic Commission for Africa (ECA)
African Information Society Initiative (AISI)

Announcement - 2005 AISI Media Awards

Deadline for Applications: 31 July 2005
Deadline for Application – AISI/GKP/SDC Special Category: 30 September 2005

The Economic Commission for Africa (ECA) and its partners are pleased to
announce the 2005 AISI Media Awards.

The AISI Media Awards were introduced in 2003 to encourage more informed
coverage of the information society and ICT for development issues in
Africa as part of ECA’s Information Society Outreach and Communication
Programme. The Awards are aimed at individual journalists and media
institutions based in Africa that are “promoting journalism which
contributes to a better understanding of the information society in Africa.
Although the media in Africa are beginning to report on ICT issues, there
is still a wide gap in their knowledge and comprehension of the subject in
relation to development trends within their national context. The aims are to:

Create greater awareness on the role of ICTs in the development process
within the framework of the African Information Society Initiative (AISI);
Support African media to specialize and master ICTs and development
issues thereby sharpening their skills and knowledge base;
Enhance access to information on this subject area by various African
stakeholders, thereby raising greater awareness; and
Stimulate national debates on key issues and emerging trends.

The AISI Media Awards is intended to be an annual event to honour media
institutions and professionals. The winners of the 2004 Awards were
announced in September 2004 at the Highway Africa Conference held in
Grahmstown, South Africa. Details of the 2003 and 2004 AISI Media Awards
can be found at: http://www.uneca.org/aisi/mediaaward.htm



AISI Media Awards 2005

The deadline for the 2005 AISI Media Awards programme is 31st July 2005.
Entries can be made in the following categories:

1. The AISI/GTZ Media Awards 2005

This Award has four sub-categories:

Radio: Programmes from commercial and national public radio
stations, including news, discussion, documentaries and features.

Print: Articles from regional or national newspapers, including
specialist magazines.

Television/Video: Factual (documentary and features) and news.

Community Media: This category will examine nominations from local
community media (newspapers and community radio) that demonstrate
innovative use and appropriation of ICT applications.

Prizes for the four categories will be as follows:

First Prize: US $3,000
Runner-up: US $1,500


2. AISI/IDRC Media Awards 2005

This Award has two sub-categories:

IDRC/AISI Reporting ICT Research and Innovation. This award is
geared towards encouraging Media practitioners’ focus on issues related to
ICT research and innovations in Africa under the framework of the
International Development Research Centre's (IDRC) Acacia Programme.
Research into the impact of ICTs on African communities and information on
ICT innovations, such as WAP applications, the Simputer, or open source
applications are important areas that could have far reaching consequences
for the development of marginalized people. This award will therefore seek
to encourage the dissemination of this type of information through the
media, by acknowledging the best media report on ICT Research and/or
innovations and their relationship to the development of the African
continent and its people.

IDRC/AISI Reporting on ICT Policy. This award is to encourage
increased reporting on ICT policies (process and implementation) in Africa
under the frameworks of the International Development Research Centre’s
Acacia Programme and ECA’s Africa Information Society Initiative (AISI).
The objective is to stimulate interest in the formulation and
implementation of national e-strategies in countries on the continent and
to support informed reporting by the media.


Entries will be considered for print (articles), radio and television
programmes

Prizes for the two sub-categories will be as follows:

First Prize: US $3,000
Runner-up: US $1,500


3. AISI/IICD Media Awards 2005

This Award has two sub-categories:

IICD/AISI Award on Local Content Applications. This award aims to
recognize users of innovative or pioneering applications of ICTs to local
content defined as ''the expression of the locally owned and adapted
knowledge of a community" in Africa. Applications can be from any sector
and use of any medium with a demonstrated link with ICTs that provide
opportunities for local people to interact and communicate with each other,
expressing their own ideas, knowledge and culture in their own languages.

IICD/AISI Media Award on Local Content. This second IICD award will
recognize an outstanding story, campaign, or project in which the
significance of local knowledge and content is raised in local, national,
or regional fora.

Entries will be considered for magazines, websites, radio and television
programmes

Prizes for the two sub-categories will be as follows:

First Prize: US $2,000
Runner-up: US $1,000


4. AISI/OSIWA Media Awards 2005

This Award has two sub-categories:

¨ OSIWA/AISI Best Female Reporter on ICT4D Issues. This category
recognizes female journalists on the continent and their interest and
reporting of ICT for development issues. The overall objective of this
award is to encourage women journalists to enter into reporting on
specialized fields such as information and communication technologies.

¨ OSIWA/AISI Reporting on ICTs and Rural Communities. This award is
to support and stimulate interest in the media to report on how ICTs can be
used in rural areas in Africa. OSIWA is assisting communities gain access
to independent information and uncensored media, and promoting diversity in
media ownership as a tool for increasing their participation in public
life. Under the ECA AISI framework, this award is aimed at encouraging the
media to report on strategies for democratizing access to the Information
Society.

Entries will be considered for print (articles), radio and television
programmes

Prizes for the two sub-categories will be as follows:

US $3,000 for First prize
US $1,500 for Runner-up


5. AISI/GKP/SDC Media Awards 2005

This is a special category under the 2005 AISI Media Awards programme
aiming at recognising journalists reporting on the WSIS process and Africa.
The Award aims to encourage African journalists and bring to international
recognition thoughtful and incisive reporting on Africa and the WSIS
process. The Awards will be made for published journalism by African
journalists (print, radio, TV or web) that go beyond describing projects or
new initiatives to analyse broader questions such as the impact of ICTs on
development in Africa and Africa’s meaningful participation in the WSIS
process. The winning entries will be disseminated internationally and
honoured at the second phase of the WSIS scheduled to take place in Tunis
from 16 to 18 November 2005.

Prizes for this category will be as follows:

First Prize: US $2000
Runner-up: US $1000

More on AISI Media Awards programme: http://www.uneca.org/aisi/mediaaward.htm




JUDGING

Judging will be based on the entries for the stated category, and winners
will be those, who in the opinion of the Judges have made a significant
contribution to promoting and raising awareness on the information society
in Africa in all the areas mentioned.


CONDITIONS FOR ENTRY

1. Conditions governing the Awards:

ECA has the right to reproduce and transmit in any media, for
non-commercial purposes, the work that has been selected.

ECA has the right to cancel the Awards at any time, when the selected
entities and individuals are found ineligible or don’t fulfil the criteria
laid down for the award.

The decision of the judges shall be final.

Members of the panel of judges for the Award and members of the sponsoring
institutions shall not be eligible to submit an entry.

2. Criteria for entries:

All entries must have been published and broadcasted by an African Media
institution during the year 2004/2005. Entries can be submitted in more
than one category but THREE COPIES OF ALL MATERIAL ARE NEEDED FOR EACH
CATEGORY ENTERED. Also, SUBMISSIONS IN AFRICAN LANGUAGES SHOULD BE
TRANSLATED (in the case of print) and/or TRANSCRIBED INTO ENGLISH OR FRENCH
for RADIO AND TV PROGRAMMES.

Entries that cover only international issues are ineligible unless, they
relate to, and develop an understanding of, current information society
issues in Africa.

3. Submission of Entries:

A FULLY COMPLETED FORM MUST ACCOMPANY EACH SUBMISSION; OTHERWISE THE ENTRY
WILL BE DISQUALIFIED.

Entries must be cassettes/CDs for radio and VHS/CD for TV and video entries
and original materials for print entries.

All material in a language other than French and English must have
translation and/or transcription included in the submission.

Submissions can be in English, French, or Arabic.

Closing date for the 2005 AISI Media Awards: 31 July 2005
Closing date for AISI/GKP/SDC Special Category: 30 September 2005
Submit to:

Ms. Kidist Belayneh (kbelayneh@uneca.org)
ECONOMIC COMMISSION FOR AFRICA, AISI/GKP MEDIA AWARD
DISD, 5th Floor, ECA Building, ECA, PO Box 3001, Menelik II Avenue
Addis Ababa, Ethiopia
Website: http://www.uneca.org/aisi/mediaaward.htm

4. Winners:

The winners will be selected from entries, which in the opinion of the
Judges, make a significant contribution to public awareness and
understanding of the information society, and which provide analysis on
issues concerning access, policy/regulatory environment, the social and
economic impacts of ICT for development. A public announcement will be made
shortly after the selection for all the categories.

The selection will be followed by an official notification from the ECA and
the respective partners for each category.

The winning entries will be disseminated internationally and honoured at
the 2005 Highway Africa Conference, which will take place in September 2005
in Grahamstown, South Africa. For the AISI/GKP/SDC category, however, the
Awards will be made at the second phase of the WSIS scheduled to take place
in Tunis from 16 to 18 November 2005.

For further information, please contact Aida Opoku-Mensah
(aopoku-mensah@uneca.org)

[END]

_______________________________________________
To post a message, write to: WOUGNET-L@wougnet.org
WOUGNET-L information page and archives: http://lists.wougnet.org/mailman/listinfo/wougnet-l
Questions about using WOUGNET-L mailing list: http://www.wougnet.org/Support/list_faq.html
Information about WOUGNET: http://www.wougnet.org
WOUGNET-L is hosted on Kabissa - Space for change for Africa

Eliminating Violence Against Women in Muslim Societies

2005-02-24

http://www.learningpartnership.org/events/2005/vawsymposium.phtml

Violence against women, a manifestation of the historically unequal power relations between men and women, today remains one of the primary obstacles to empowering women and achieving peace and security for all. Women have been systematically deprived of knowledge and skills that might help them to become better equipped to protect themselves against violence, including knowledge of the existing laws, religious texts, positive cultural resources, international injunctions on human rights, and the demands made by other women for rights in their community and elsewhere. In the WLP Symposium, speakers will address major challenges to eliminating violence against women and girls and discuss grassroots, national, and regional measures needed to raise awareness, initiate reform legislation, and create synergy for ongoing efforts to prevent violence and to promote women's human rights.

New Master’s Degree in Environmental Security and Peace

2005-02-24

http://www.upeace.org/programmes/esp.cfm

The University for Peace of the United Nations (UPEACE) is pleased to announce that applications are open for the Master’s in Environmental Security and Peace, which will be launched in September 2005 at UPEACE headquarters in Costa Rica. The Master’s in Environmental Security and Peace is designed to train skilled and motivated people who fully understand these complex issues and their inter-linkages, and who can undertake high quality research and can develop and implement sound management and policy decisions to strengthen environmental security, promote environmental peacemaking and build the foundations for peace worldwide.

Benin: Senior Advisor Local Governance

SNV Benin

2005-02-24

http://pambazuka.org/en/category/jobs/26976

SNV Benin provides advisory support to some 30 mostly rural and middle sized municipalities (population 25-100.000) with the objective to strengthen the capacities of the local governments, especially in the fields of planning, local finance and project preparation and management. These activities take up a large part of the programme.
Senior Advisor Local Governance

http://www.vacatureblad.org/index.cfm?fuseaction=default

Benin

VACANCY ANNOUNCEMENT SNV

For SNV Benin (duty station Dogbo) we are looking for a

Senior Advisor Local Governance, with specialisation in drinking water supply

The decentralisation process in Benin took a major leap ahead with the successful organisation of the first-ever local elections at the end of 2002. Since then, local development has become the responsibility of the mayors and councillors. SNV Benin provides advisory support to some 30 mostly rural and middle sized municipalities (population 25-100.000) with the objective to strengthen the capacities of the local governments, especially in the fields of planning, local finance and project preparation and management. These activities take up a large part of the programme.

The advisors of SNV Benin are organised in five Advisory Teams in Dogbo, Natitingou, Kandi, Parakou and Cotonou-Porto Novo, each with 5 - 7 advisors. Together they cover the whole territory of Benin.

SNV wishes to strengthen its team in Dogbo with a Local Governance advisor specialized in water issues, especially the provision of drinking water and sanitation.

Your main responsibilities will be
- Support the strengthening of local government institutions, NGOs and other relevant stakeholders involved in local governance through the provision of professional advice;
- Work to foster institutional linkages between local, regional and national level institutions and assist the promotion of democratisation in governance and civil society capacity development;
- Assist the local governments to achieve the Millennium Development Goal related to the supply of safe drinking water;
- Explore and identify opportunities for the development of activities related to Integrated Water Management issues, especially in the wetlands of the coastal zone of Benin
- Promote, develop and participate in water related knowledge networks at provincial, national and international level
- Interest new clients for SNV's services and maintain high quality client relationships;
- Contribute to team learning and establish strategic alliances.

Requirements
Educational background: Masters in Public Administration, general economics, sociology or politico logy or equivalent, with specialisation in supply of drinking water and interest in water management issues
Experience: 7-8 years of advisory experience (of which at least 4-5 in a developing country) in the area of Local Governance with a focus on supply of potable water. Good communication skills and familiar with capacity development and participative planning methods.
Other: commitment to SNV's mission, values and vision on advisory practice; academic level of working and thinking; excellent inter-cultural understanding and skills.
Language: fluent in French and English.
Positioning: hierarchical under the Portfolio Coordinator of the SNV Dogbo team.

Description of the region
Health services: acceptable (clinics in Cotonou)
Security: good
Accessibility: 120 km (2 hours) from Cotonou; good road network with other parts of the country and neighbouring countries; frequent flights to Paris and other destinations; very reasonable telephone, E-mail and internet connections.
Education: national schools in Dogbo (French and British schools in Cotonou)
Possibilities for employment for partner: very limited in Dogbo, more probable in Cotonou

Salary: Minimum Euro 2536,00 - maximum Euro 3945,00 gross per month, excluding attractive secondary conditions and individual allowances.
Desired appointment date: as soon as possible
Contract period: 2 years

Information / application:
Your can apply on-line through the internet www.snvworld.org until March 4th, 2005.
Reference number: BJ/1562
Women are in particular invited to apply.
More details will be available at: Dsterre@snv.nl
We do not appreciate any commercial mediation

Marketing Officer

Science and Development Network

2005-02-24

http://pambazuka.org/en/category/jobs/26996

The Science and Development Network (SciDev.Net) is the world's leading online source of news and information about the role of science and technology in developing countries.

We are looking for a MARKETING OFFICER with at least 2 years experience, responsible for implementing the marketing strategy and news dissemination plans, as well as email and print marketing campaigns, and monitoring statistical data about the use of the website.

You will have a keen eye for detail, excellent communication skills and the ability to work independently and as part of a dynamic team. A science and/or development background is advantageous. The position is based in London.

Please send a covering letter, C.V. and some examples of your work to jobs@scidev.net by 04 March 2005

Further details: www.scidev.net/marketing

Office Manager

AFFORD

2005-02-24

http://pambazuka.org/en/category/jobs/26978

AFFORD's Office Manager's role is to manage the effective running of AFFORD's busy office and oversee the implementation of efficient administrative and Human Resources processes and systems.
AFFORD seeks new office manager


28/01/2005

Office Manager

£20k - £25k benefits London



Six-month initial contract (renewal subject to funding)



The African Foundation for Development (AFFORD; www.afford-uk.org) is
an African-led charity with a mission to expand and enhance the
contribution that Africans in the diaspora make to Africa's
development. AFFORD acts as a facilitator and supporter of new ideas
to the benefit of UK-based African organizations and individuals
working for Africa's development.



AFFORD's Office Manager's role is to manage the effective running of
AFFORD's busy office and oversee the implementation of efficient
administrative and Human Resources processes and systems.



Our ideal candidate is friendly, flexible, adaptable, unflappable,
mature and willing to support a small, dynamic team of people
dedicated to mobilizing Africans in the diaspora in support of
Africa's development. A natural organizer, our ideal candidate will
be able to devise appropriate systems to ensure the smooth running of
AFFORD's operations and persuade others to use them.



Closing date for completed applications is Friday 18 February 2005.




For a job pack please visit

http://www.sourcecoms.com/srs/candidates/



Here you will need to register – once you have done so you will see
the advert.

Programme Advisor

Batsirai Group

2005-02-24

http://pambazuka.org/en/category/jobs/27001

The Batsirai Group is a Zimbabwean non-governmental organisation working to strengthen community response to HIV & AIDS. Following a successful two-year placement, the organisation is currently seeking to consolidate its work in promoting community participation within its partner communities and within its own staff. The postholder will also assist in strengthening systems documentation, organisational learning and participatory monitoring and evaluation.
For over 30 years, CIIR/ICD has been leading the way on practical international development issues for more than thirty years. Whether through placing development workers overseas, or in our policy and advocacy achievements, CIIR/ICD has a track record of making a difference. We work with people of all faiths and none.

Programme Advisor -Capacity building, organisational learning and documentation
Batsirai Group
Chinhoyi, Mashonaland West Province – Zimbabwe
Two-year contract


The Batsirai Group is a Zimbabwean non-governmental organisation working to strengthen community response to HIV & AIDS. Following a successful two-year placement, the organisation is currently seeking to consolidate its work in promoting community participation within its partner communities and within its own staff. The postholder will also assist in strengthening systems documentation, organisational learning and participatory monitoring and evaluation.


The applicant will have a Diploma / degree in Social Sciences, Community Development or other relevant studies.

The postholder will have a minimum of 3 years experience in Community Development work, involving community mobilization/training and experience in applying participatory approaches. In addition, s/he should have at least 2 years of experience in monitoring & evaluation. Good practical experience of non-formal adult education & training and mentoring is also essential.

S/he will have a proven understanding of HIV & AIDS as a development and human rights issue. Good interpersonal, communication and computer skills and the ability to assist in the development of knowledge management systems are also essential.

Willingness to travel extensively and to stay over in communities where there are only basic facilities is also crucial for the post.

Formal training in participatory monitoring & evaluation and experience in the use of Reflect and Stepping-Stones methodologies would be highly desirable.




It is essential that you complete the application form in full, as very specific information is required and will be used to decide whether or not you will be shortlisted for interview.

For further information and an application form visit www.ciir.org (see section " jobs @ CIIR").

Please return the completed application form to:Recruitment@ciir.org

Closing date: 10th March 2005 (by 17.30)

Interviews: Late March or early April 2005

Project Manager, African Year for Violence Prevention

African Union

2005-02-24

http://pambazuka.org/en/category/jobs/27000

While under direct supervision of the Director of Social Affairs of the African Union, the incumbent will also be accountable to the WHO regional Advisers on Violence Prevention in the African (Brazzaville) and Eastern Mediterranean (Cairo) Offices, and periodic reporting to these advisers at 2-3 month intervals will be required.
Project Manager, African Year for Violence Prevention: Terms of Reference

Title: Project Manager, African Year for Violence Prevention
Grade:P4.
Duration of post:6 months, with possibility of renewal.
Commencement date: As soon as possible
Duty station:Addis Ababa

Background
In 2003 Heads of Member States of the African Union (AU) passed a resolution endorsing the recommendations of the World report on violence and health and requesting Member States to develop national plans of action for violence prevention and systems for data collection on violence. The AU resolution further requests that Member States declare 2005 an "African Year of Prevention of Violence" (EX/CL/Dec.63[III]), for the purpose of scaling up and coordinating violence prevention policies and activities.

Main tasks and responsibilities of the position

While under direct supervision of the Director of Social Affairs of the African Union, the incumbent will also be accountable to the WHO regional Advisers on Violence Prevention in the African (Brazzaville) and Eastern Mediterranean (Cairo) Offices, and periodic reporting to these advisers at 2-3 month intervals will be required. The specific duties and responsibilities of the Project Manager are as follows:
?Coordinate preparation and publication of a brief report on violence and health in Africa, with participation of WHO Regional Offices.
?Publicize the Year for Violence Prevention to African Union Heads of State and governments and promote violence prevention activities by Member States.
?Liaise with UN agencies and other partners to link the Year with existing events at the regional and country levels.
?Identify and engage violence prevention agencies in Africa, including focal points in Ministries of Health, in order to form an African violence prevention network.
?Coordinate preparation of draft AU plan of action, with input and assistance of WHO Offices.
?Organize a high-level African Conference on Violence Prevention to mark the year and discuss the plan of action.

Qualifications required

Education
Advanced university degree, masters or equivalent, in public health or social sciences.

Skills and competencies
Excellent leadership and project management skills. Able to think strategically but manage detail and complexity. Able to manage a number of concurrent activities. Proven ability to work effectively and tactfully in an interdisciplinary, multi-cultural environment. Excellent written and oral communication skills. Proficient with common software packages.
Experience
Seven or more years experience in the violence and injury prevention field and/or human and social development area, with some experience in violence prevention, of which at least three years have been at the international level. National- and/or district-level experience in working in developing countries is essential. Experience aligning people and organizations with diverse points of view and interests to achieve common goals. International experience in working with UN and other international non-governmental organizations, bilateral and multilateral agencies on a similar project is desirable. Experience in public health is an advantage.

Languages
Excellent knowledge of English and French. Knowledge of Arabic and/or Portuguese is an asset.

Web Production Editor

Science and Development Network

2005-02-24

http://pambazuka.org/en/category/jobs/26997

The Science and Development Network (SciDev.Net) is the world's leading online source of news and information about the role of science and technology in developing countries.

We are looking for a WEB PRODUCTION EDITOR with at least 3-4 years experience to manage the editorial production process for the SciDev.Net website ensuring both accuracy of published material and efficiency of the production process, and coordinating the implementation of new features on the site.

You will have solid experience of html coding, a keen eye for detail, communication skills and the ability to work independently and as part of a dynamic team. A science and/or development background is advantageous. The position is based in London.

Please send a covering letter and C.V. to jobs@scidev.net by 04 March 2005

Further details: www.scidev.net/productioned

Fahamu