Swaziland has retained and continues to indefinitely retain its controversial status as an absolute constitutional monarchy. It is the only country in Africa with such a ‘distinctly maverick’ political order. The country’s political establishment is regarded by many critics as ‘archaic.’ There is not a vestige of doubt that there is a constant contest between the ancient norms and practices on which the Swazi monarchy is anchored and the progressive forces of democracy and fundamental freedoms which have become the linchpin of the contemporary political order. Swaziland is very rich in a diversity of cultural beliefs and practices which have been subjected to censorious criticism because of their patent incompatibility with contemporary fundamental freedoms. The international community as well as some critical sections of the Swazi community have made many calls for Swaziland to transform to a multi-party state. Contrary to the calls for democratic reforms, the Swazi monarchy has not moved an inch from its traditional position that multi-party politics is ‘divisive’ and ‘incompatible’ with Swazi tradition and therefore ‘undesirable’ in the kingdom. It is important to note that tradition is not static, it changes over time and space and that these changes are not negotiable. That tradition changes is what makes societies progressive.

THE ‘TINKHUNDLA’ SYSTEM

Swaziland is a small Landlocked Developing Country (LLDC) which is located in Southern Africa. It is bordered by South Africa on the north, west and south and by Mozambique on the east. It has a population which is in the region of 1.2 million. Its local language is called ‘siSwati’ and the Dhlamini is the royal clan. Its local currency is called the ‘Lilangeni’ which is pegged at par with the South African Rand. Like Botswana and Lesotho, the country is a former British protectorate. It gained its independence on a multi-party platform through a tortuous negotiated settlement on 6 September 1968 under the leadership of then king Sobhuza II. At independence, Swaziland adopted a Westminster-oriented constitution which provided for multi-party politics on the basis of the first-past-the-post electoral system. However, in 1976, Sobhuza repealed the independence constitution via an arbitrary royal decree which outlawed political parties. He established the ‘Tinkhundla’ system which is the basis of governance in contemporary Swaziland. This system effectively replaced multi-party politics and transformed the country into an absolute monarchy, the status which it retains today.

THE RISE OF MONOLITHIC POLITICS

The Tinkhundla system is based on ancient Swazi tradition and norms. In order to consolidate this system of governance, Sobhuza made Swazi tradition supreme over liberal principles and practices. He died in 1983 and left the country in the clutches of unique monolithic politics. After the death of Sobhuza, there were some fierce disputes over his succession. These disputes threatened to plunge the country into turmoil as different vociferous antagonists took tenacious positions. The outcome of the power struggle was that Mswati III was appointed king in 1986 in order to occupy the position that had been left vacant by his father’s death. The incumbent king has incorporated elements of modern processes of governance as a way of clothing the monarchy with a veneer of legitimacy and democratic virtue. This has created a hybrid political system which consists of badly meshed traditional and modern processes of governance. According to section 82 (1) of the constitution, Swaziland is basically partitioned into four administrative regions. These are Hhohho (this is where the capital city Mbabane is located and where the government ministries are based), Lubombo (this is where the vast of the country’s plantations are located), Manzini (this is the country’s largest commercial and industrial site) and Shiselweni (which is the country’s most impoverished region). Each region is administered by a regional administrator who is appointed by the king using his personal discretion.

THE LAST ABSOLUTE MONARCHY IN THE CONTINENT

In his character as ‘Ingwenyama,’ Mswati is construed by the majority of Swazis as the final custodian and repository of Swazi cultural beliefs and practices. He is the highest political authority in the Kingdom. He holds executive powers and he unilaterally appoints some members of the bicameral legislature, viz. the senate and the house of assembly. The present parliament consists of 65 parliamentarians. Fifty five of these parliamentarians are elected via the popular vote while the remaining 10 are unilaterally appointed by the king. All members of the Swazi parliament are independents because of the prohibition on political parties. The senate consists of 30 members of which 10 are elected by the house of assembly while 20 are appointed by the king. The King also appoints the prime minister and the incumbent prime minister is Barnabas Sibusiso Dhlamini. The prime minister is the head of government. Members of the cabinet are appointed by the prime minister after the king’s approval. Swaziland has been criticised both locally and internationally for being the last absolute monarchy in the continent. The majority view is that absolute monarchism has been outdistanced by liberal principles and practices, especially with the advent of the 21st century.

VIOLATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS

Because of the restrictions which have been imposed by the monarchy on democratic freedoms, Swaziland is among the African countries which have a chequered human rights record. According to the 2012 Ibrahim Index of Governance in Africa, Swaziland is among the six most imbalanced states in Africa. This imbalance is engendered by its poor performance in human rights and citizen participation in political processes and institutions.

The overall governance status in Swaziland is summarized in the table below.

Source: The sixth Ibrahim Index of African Governance (IIAG) 15 October 2012.

THE TRAJECTORY OF STATE POLITICS AND SOCIETY IN SWAZILAND

It is difficult to see why king Sobhuza II declared that political parties are incompatible with Swazi tradition when political parties existed in both colonial and post-colonial Swaziland. The Swaziland Progressive Party (SPP) was the first main nationalist political party to be founded in colonial Swaziland. It was headed by a distinguished intellectual and a trusted ‘point man’ of King Sobhuza II, DR John June Nquku who was also its founder. However, the party quickly bifurcated due to internal internecine and a splinter party, the Ngwane National Liberation Congress (NNLC) was founded in 1962. The NNLC was founded by a South African trained physician, Dr Ambrose Zwane. It gained ground against the SPP as most of the SPP supporters defected to the NNLC because of discontentment with the leadership style of Nquku. After a failed attempt to gain independence via the vehicle of monarchical values and beliefs, king Sobhuza II move to form the Imbokodvo National Movement (INM) in 1964. There were also a number of other political parties which were founded in colonial Swaziland. These were the Swaziland Democratic Party (SDP), the Swaziland United Front (SUF), the Mbandzeni National Convention (MNC) and the exclusively white United Swaziland Association (USA). Of all the political parties which were founded in colonial Swaziland, the INM became the most popular party as it gained overwhelming support. This is because it largely identified with the needs and aspirations of many Swazis.

The party overwhelmingly won the 1964 and the 1967 elections, winning all the seats in the house of assembly. At independence, Swaziland’s political landscape was dominated by the INM and Sobhuza enjoyed his party’s hegemony. However, by the beginning of the late 1960s, opposition political parties began to gradually mount a challenge to Sobhuza. In the 1972 post-independence parliamentary elections, the NNLC wrestled 3 of the 24 seats from the INM. This development did not please Sobhuza, who has always wanted to completely dominate Swaziland’s political dispensation. Sobhuza started to criticize the independence constitution, particularly its Bill of Rights which provided for fundamental freedoms, particularly the freedom of association. Despite that Swaziland got its independence via political organisation, the King started to abhor opposition politics. In order to secure his interests of becoming Swaziland’s ‘undisputed deity’, he decided that his best bet was to outlaw political parties in the kingdom. He argued that the Swazi constitution has many shortcomings and he enacted the Legislative Procedure Order number 7 of 12 April 1973 in which he authoritatively stated that:

‘The constitution has indeed failed to provide the machinery for good government and for the maintenance of peace and order
The constitution is indeed the cause of growing unrest, insecurity, dissatisfaction with the state of affairs in our country and impediment to free and progressive development in all spheres of life

The constitution has permitted the importation into our country of highly undesirable political parties alien to, and incompatible with, the way of life in our society and designed to disrupt and destroy our own peaceful and constructive and essentially democratic methods of political activity; increasingly this element engenders hostility, bitterness and unrest in our peaceful society.’ (Mzizi; 2005:30,31).

The Proclamation further stipulated that ‘the constitution of the Kingdom of Swaziland which commenced on the 6 September 1968 is hereby repealed.’ After this proclamation the King usurped legislative, judicial and executive powers. The carte blanche with which the king started to exercise control over the affairs of the nation marked a new ricochet in the trajectory of state politics in Swaziland. The King’s action was a classical ‘civilian coup d’etat’ which Swaziland is likely to take some more decades to recuperate from. Political parties were outlawed under the proclamation’s decrees 11, 12, and 13 of 1973 which stipulate that:

11. All political parties and similar bodies that cultivate and bring about disturbances and ill-feelings within the nation are hereby dissolved and prohibited
12. No meeting of a political nature and no procession or demonstration shall be held or take place in any public place unless with prior written consent of the commissioner of police, and consent shall not be given if the commissioner of police has reason to believe that such meeting, procession or demonstration, is directly or indirectly related to political movements or the riotous assemblies which may disturb the peace or otherwise disturb the maintenance of law and order.
13. Any person who forms or attempts or conspires to form a political party or who organises or participates in any way in any meeting, procession or demonstration in contravention of this decree shall be guilt of an offence and liable, on conviction, to imprisonment not exceeding six months (Mzizi; 2005:30,34).

After this proclamation, political parties, including the king’s INM went underground. The NNLC, which was the major political party during that time, was forced to disintegrate. Leaders of opposition parties began to be harassed and detained without trial as a way of eliminating every remnant of opposition politics in the kingdom.

ELECTIONS WITHOUT CONTEST: SWAZILAND’S TINKHUNDLA SYSTEM

In order to consolidate his position that opposition political parties are ‘alien’ to the Swazi way of life, Sobhuza II immediately appointed a Royal Constitutional Review Commission (RCRC) in 1973. The primary objective of the commission was to delve into ways in which Swazi cultural values and practices could be manipulated in a way that they can form the basis of the country’s monolithic constitutional order. In 1978, the king enacted the Establishment of the Parliament of Swaziland Order which formed the basis for the present-day Tinkhundla system (see Motsami; 2012:1). The Tinkhundla system was established in and through the spirit, letter and context of the 1973 proclamation. The 1973 proclamation, coupled with the Tinkhundla system, imposed on the people of Swaziland a seemingly bogus Swazi identity which has become the lifeblood of the monarchy.

Swaziland has a bifurcated political architecture that is characterized by ancient forms and processes of governance which are badly meshed with modern ones.According to section 79 of the Swazi constitution, ‘the system of government in Swaziland is a democratic, participatory, Tinkhundla-based system which emphasises devolution of state power from central government to Tinkhundla areas and individual merit as a basis for election or appointment to public office.’ Section 80 (3) stipulates that the Tinkhundla units or areas are ‘inspired by a policy of decentralization of state power’ and that they ‘are the engines of development and the central pillars underpinning the political organization and economic infrastructure of the country through which social services to the different parts of the Swazi community are facilitated and delivered.’

The Tinkhundla system effectively replaced the multi-party system. Under the system, those who contest for public office are bound to do that in their personal capacity and not as ambassadors of political parties or any other form of political association. Traditional authorities, particularly chiefs are the linchpin of the Tinkhundla regime. These authorities play a concrete role in vitiating dissent and entrenching the monarchy in a changing context. Purported Swazi cultural values, norms and beliefs are used via the Tinkhundla regime to make the monarchy a ‘sacred cow’ which is scarcely accountable to the Swazi nation for its actions of commission and omission. The concept of separation of powers does not exist in the Tinkhundla system primarily because the head of government is appointed by the head of state (the king). The head of government is therefore not accountable to the Swazi community but to the king maker who determines the duration of the appointment (Joubert, Masilela, and Langwenya, 2008: 28). Swaziland is therefore a classical case of fusion of powers. Chiefs are expected to ensure that the people who live within their area of jurisdiction continue to be loyal to the monarchy.

They act as ‘Swazi’s cultural old guards’ whose chief objective is to perpetuate the cultural principles, values and practices on which the monarchy is built. The Tinkhundla regime is therefore entirely the king’s watchdog. The chiefs are responsible for the administration of communal land as well as the allocation of land and they directly report to the king. Subjects who participate in politics are often victimised by the responsible chief and in some cases they can even be evicted from their community. In order to divert their subjects’ attention from politics, the chiefs often keep them occupied by requiring them to participate in community projects and royal functions like umhlanga (reed dance), incwala (Swazi’s annual ‘national prayer’ which takes place at the king’s palaces, lusekwane (an equivalent of a reed dance but is exclusively attended by young boys and it culminate in the killing of a bull by the regiments using bare hands) and kuhlakula (weeding). The chiefs are required constitutionally to convene a meeting at least two times a year in their respective regions.

In order to ensure that the chiefs are accountable to the king and that they serve to propagate his interests, the chiefs are appointed by the king via his sole discretion. Swaziland has experienced some chieftaincy disputes because some Swazis maintain that the position of a chief should be inherited and not necessarily appointed by the king. There is also the Council of Chiefs whose tasks include advising the king on issues relating to Swazi custom and chieftaincy. This council consists of twelve chiefs from the country’s four regions and they are appointed by the king (section 251 (1) of the Swazi constitution). Chiefs have recently been involved in the recruitment of personnel in the Swazi National Army. They can recommend individuals from their chiefdom to be recruited in the army. The argument here is that they are more informed of the capabilities of their subjects because they interact with them regularly.

The chiefs are appointed by the king and most of them are either the king’s relatives or those who pay entire allegiance to the king. For example, in 2000, Mswati arbitrarily depose chief Macetjeni and Kamkhweli and appointed Prince Maguga Dhlamini, who is his brother and this occasioned serious disputes in which the deposed kings refused to recognised Maguga. Mswati is superfluously rich King with 13 wives and his lavish lifestyle has engendered controversy and criticism in the country and beyond. The Forbes Magazine estimated Mswati’s wealth to be worth above US $100 million yet more than two-thirds of the Swazis live in brutish wretchedness. In April 2011, concerned Swazis reacted against Mswati’s abuse of taxpayers’ money to buy a private jet, to build new royal residences for his wives, to fund the reed festival and to purchase ‘royal vehicles.’

CONSTITUTION WITHOUT CONSTITUTIONALISM: THE SWAZI CONSTITUTION

The constitution is the linchpin of any political order. Since the 1973 decree which nullified the independence constitution, Swaziland has been operating without a written constitution. Between 1973 and 2006, the monarchy used the 1973 decree, the Tinkhundla system and Swazi cultural beliefs and practices to govern the country. As time passed, operating without a constitution became more and more unsustainable. Swazis began to express their discontentment with this situation. Pressure mounted on the monarchy from pro-democracy sections of the Swazi community and the international community at large regarding the need for a constitution. In response to the discontentment, the king decided to establish the Constitutional Drafting Committee in 2002, a step which led to the enactment of a new constitution in the kingdom. The constitution of Swaziland was signed by the King on the 26 July 2005 and entered into force on the 8 February 2006. The entering into force of the Swazi constitution brought the widespread optimism among the majority of Swazis and sections of the international community that a new era had dawned in the country. The Swazi constitution looks very attractive but it has some unresolved contradictions. Like any other democratic constitution, the Swazi constitution provides for a range of democratic freedoms including the freedom of assembly and association. Section 25 states that:

(1) A person has the right to freedom of peaceful assembly and association
(2) A person shall not except with the free consent of that person be hindered in the enjoyment of the freedom of peaceful assembly and association, that is to say, the right to assemble peacefully and associate freely with other persons for the promotion or protection of the interests of that person.

However, despite this provision, the permissibility of political parties in Swaziland remains uncertain. If this provision is properly interpreted, one can arrive at the conclusion that political parties are permissible under the constitution. However, the constitution is silent about political parties despite that it recognises the freedom of association. Swaziland does not have a legislative framework which regulates issues of political parties such as membership, registration, and access to funding. The death of this legislation points to the position that opposition political parties are illegal in the kingdom. It is clear that the draconian 1973 proclamation remains intact and continues to form the basis for Swaziland’s monolithic political system. This is because there is no provision in the constitution which revokes the proclamation. The monarchy is hostile to political parties such that in January 2011, the king’s private secretary Samuel Mkhombe and a member of the king’s advisory council, Mathendele Dhlamini were fired following their attempt to resuscitate the INM. What makes the confusion regarding the permissibility of opposition politics in Swaziland is that in February 2011 the Attorney General (AG) issued a statement implying that political parties are permissible or can operate in the country but only that they cannot form a government.

It appears the freedom of association referred in the constitution is constricted to organisations such as the church, community based organisations and interest groups. One cannot divorce the freedom of association from the freedom to form or join political parties because this freedom forms the linchpin of the freedom of association. When it comes to the freedom of association, Swaziland presents a classical case of a country with a self-defeating constitution which is the epitome of constitutional bankruptcy.
Section 63 of the Swazi constitution stipulates the duties of citizens and some of the duties are to ‘promote democracy and the rule of law” and to “combat misuse and waste of public funds and property.’ This is misleading because it is difficult to see how citizens can promote democracy in a state where they are not allowed to form or belong to political parties. This is because popular participation in the political processes and institutions of a country forms the basis of democracy and political parties are the vehicle of popular participation. Democracy is also characterised by the ability of the citizens to make their government accountable. This is important in the combat against the embezzlement of public funds. Political parties and interest groups play a major role in this regard. Swazi’s inbreeding constitution is exacerbated by other instruments which arbitrarily oppress democratic freedoms such as the Suppression of Terrorism Act (STA).

One of the political objectives of Swaziland as stipulated in section 58 (1) is to be ‘a democratic country dedicated to principle which empower and encourage the active participation of all citizens at all levels in their own governance.’ It is difficult to see how this objective can be pursued in the context where political organisation is banned and where legislations such as the STA are used to suppress civic liberties. The Swazi constitution deifies the king by giving him excessive powers and the prerogative to use his personal discretion in governing almost every aspect of the country.

THE SUPPRESSION OF TERRORISM ACT (STA)

King Mswati III assented to the STA on 7 August 2008. The objective of the STA as stipulated in this instrument is to ‘prevent, fight, and suppress terrorist activities’ in keeping with the letter and spirit of the United Nations. On 14 November 2008, the government declared some organisations ‘terrorist entities’ under the STA. These organisations include PUDEMO, the Swaziland Youth Congress (SWAYOCO), the Swaziland People’s Liberation Army (SPLA), and the Swaziland Solidarity Network (SSN) which is based in South Africa. These political organizations are known for their agitation for the democratization of the kingdom. Their activities cannot in any way be construed as acts of terrorism. The instrument is also use to suppress the activities of civil society organizations which are critical of the monarchy. It should be noted that the global fight against terrorism is premised on the human rights movement. It seeks to ensure that innocent people are not arbitrarily deprived of their lives through the infamous acts of terrorist organisations. It also seeks to safeguard the rights of people who are suspected of being terrorists or members of terrorist organisations. There is overwhelming evidence to support the view that the promotion of human rights is at the depths of the global strategy to combat terrorism. Paragraph 85 of the Outcome Document of the September 2005 World Summit Declaration states that:

‘We recognize that international cooperation to fight terrorism must be conducted in conformity with international law, including the Charter and relevant international conventions and protocols. States must ensure that any measures taken to combat terrorism comply with their obligations under international law, in particular human rights law, refugee law and international humanitarian law.’

Addressing the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) on 26 September 2008, Mswati said that the Swazi parliament had ‘recently promulgated the Anti-Terrorism Act.’ He said that the country ‘joins the rest of the world in condemning all forms and acts of terrorism’ and that it ‘support efforts for the full implementation of the global counter-terrorism strategy in order to send out a clear message to all perpetrators of terrorism” (Amnesty International, 2009:5). What distinguishes the United Nations’ framework for combating terrorism from the STA is that the latter serves to violate human rights in ways which purport to promote them. The definition of a ‘terrorist act’ under this instrument is so elastic that even any act can potentially be regarded as an “act of terrorism,’ even singing in public. It is important to distinguish political violence from terrorism. In a society where the state is not responsive to the needs and aspirations of citizens and avenues of dialogue are virtually closed, people have a tendency to resort to violent means. These include protests which may turn violent depending largely on how the state responds to them. Swaziland offers a good example of a state in which the avenues of dialogue as far as the need to introduce multi-party politics is concerned are virtually non-existent. Having been frustrated by the apparent dearth of such avenues, progressives have resorted to mass protests as a means of registering their discontentment. To call protests (even in cases where they may turn violent) acts of terrorism would be itself an act of terrorism of all acts of terrorism.

Swaziland has ratified a number of international human rights instruments. It is a party to the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR) which it ratified on 6 March 2004, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (CCPR) which it ratified on 26 March 2004, the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (CERD) which it ratified on 07 April 1969, the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) which it ratified on 26 March 2004, Convention Against Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CAT) which it ratified on 26 March 2004, the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC) which it ratified in September 2005, and the African Charter on Human and People’s Rights (ACHPR) which it ratified on 15 September 1995. By virtue of being a party to these international and regional human rights instruments, Swaziland has the obligation to abide by the provisions of these instruments. Not only that some provisions in the STA are incompatible with the respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms but the instrument’s salient purpose is to oppress dissent. The instrument can be characterised as a ‘human rights coup.’ It negates the commitment which Swaziland has made when it ratified international human rights instruments.

It is clear from the Swazi context and the texts of the STA that this instrument is used by the monarchy as a smokescreen behind which to arbitrarily suppress political agitation, particularly opposition politics. The 1973 royal proclamation and the STA are some of the instruments which demonstrate the willpower of the Swazi monarchy to openly manipulate certain values and principles in order to maintain power.

WHICH WAY SWAZILAND?

Since the 1973 unilateral proclamation by king Sobhuza II which banned political parties in Swaziland, the Swazi monarchy has largely been able to convince the Swazi community that political parties are “unSwazi” and “inherently divisive”. This is what Iqbal noted:

‘The autocracy has for decades successfully convinced the majority of the populace that since the country has always been a kingdom, a tradition rooted in Swazi culture,... the concept of the political party and even basic democratic principles are “alien” and therefore incompatible with tradition.’ (Iqbal: 2011)

This ‘imposed identity’ has managed to deeply permeate the social and political fabrics of the Swazi community. The monarchy has managed not only to sustain but to reinvent and reanimate this identity in the face of an overwhelming tide of change which is contrary to it. It has also survived because unlike other Southern African countries, Swaziland has been and continues to be largely ‘invisible’ to the international community. This is because the country largely finds itself on the periphery of the attention of the international community partly because ‘it is not of strategic international interest.’

The monarchy’s efforts to clothe itself with the facade of democracy through the adoption of bogus democratic instruments such as the Tinkhundla system and the 2006 constitution demonstrates that it is aware that there is need to constantly give Swaziland’s monolithic political order new life. However, the situation in which Swaziland finds itself is comparable to a prisoner’s dilemma. This is because the monarchy is faced with the challenge to strike a balance between the progressive forces of democratization and the ancient Swazi norms and practices on which the monarchy is built. There is no doubt that the incumbent King Mswati III is still largely popular and considered a legitimate and uncontested leader of the monarchy. For example, the publisher of the ‘Times of Swaziland’ newspaper, Paul Loffler, stated that:

‘Swaziland does not need democracy. We have never had genocide, we have never nationalised farms, our municipalities run like clockwork, the cities are clean, there are no potholes-or not many and we have little violent crime.’ (The Sunday Times, 05 June 2011).

The redeeming feature of the Swazi monarchy is that it is largely characterized by peace as compared to many of Africa’s ‘multi-party’ states. Swaziland has never experienced a humanitarian catastrophe such as those which took place in Zimbabwe, Rwanda, Sudan, Uganda, Cote d’Ivoire, and Libya. This is one of the chief reasons as to why many Swazis believe in the monarchy. However, there are basically four constituencies in Swaziland as far as the legitimacy of the absolute monarchy is concerned. The first constituency consists of the die hard conservatives or traditionalists. viz, those Swazis who believe that the king’s legitimacy should not be questioned and even that he should not be made accountable for his actions of commission and omission. This position is largely based on the conception that the king always makes the right decisions for the Swazi community. It is also premised on what this study elects to refer to as ‘hijacked nationalism.’ The constituency consists of chiefs and other traditional leaders, government officials (particularly high ranking ones), and members of the Liqoqo. These groups support the king primarily because of the benefits which are derived from that support. It also consists of the ordinary Swazis who, through years and years of the propagation of the position that opposition politics is ‘alien’ to the Swazi nation by the monarchy, have come to religiously believe in that position. Some members of this constituency are prepared to pay with the last drop of their blood in defence of the monarchy.

The second constituency consists of gradual liberalists. These are Swazis who believe that the absolute monarchy should be Swaziland’s permanent political order. However, due to factors such as corruption, the monopolization of the political kingdom by the Dhlaminis’, poor governance in areas such as food security and HIV/AIDS, this constituency believes that the monarchy should be reformed but not radically. The major element of this reformation is to ensure that it is all-inclusive. This constituency also believes that the monarchy can also be reformed via the adoption of pieces of legislations which prioritizes the aspirations and needs of the people of Swaziland, excluding the agitation for dismantling the monarchy. However, this constituency is not vocal. It tends to constrict its aspirations to mere reveries.

The third constituency consists of ‘progressive’ liberalists. This consists of those Swazis who are convinced that opposition politics should be allowed to operate in the country but the monarchy should be preserved. They also believe in the need for Swaziland to promote other democratic freedoms within the framework of the monarchy. The final constituency consists of radical liberalists who believe that Swaziland needs to be disembarrassed of the absolute monarchy and replace it with a democratic and competitive political dispensation.

The position which is taken in this article is that history is the most difficult thing to defy, especially when it has changed. There is not a vestige of doubt that history has earnestly changed such that it is becoming increasingly difficult and hardly justifiable to sustain a political dispensation like that which obtains in contemporary Swaziland. This is primarily because Swazi’s absolute monarchy is premised on a ‘shifting edifice,’ that is, cultural norms and practices. It is in the nature of societies and culture to change over time and space and this is not negotiable.

That culture is not static is what makes societies progressive. There is no doubt that there is a strong link between cultural change and development. The Swazi tradition on which the monarchy is premised is increasingly becoming a major impediment to the realization of the aspirations of the Swazis, particularly the freedom to form and belong to political associations. However, the Swazi monarchy is only sustainable via the maintenance of the status quo as far as the monarchy-purported Swazi cultural values, norms and practices are concerned. Swazi’s cultural practices are not unique in Africa.

The difference is only that some African leaders did not capitalize on tradition to impose an identity on the people with the view to entrench themselves in power. It can be said that the Swazi monarchy manipulated tradition just like many incumbents in Africa manipulate elections in order to maintain power. However, the wind of democracy and respect for fundamental human rights and freedoms has outdistanced political systems which are founded on ancient norms and practices such as a monarchy, let alone an absolute monarchy like Swaziland. This is what Phiri had in mind when he argued that:
‘From this distance, the problem of Swaziland is thus the status of the monarchy. The issue here is not openly the legitimacy of the King, but whether in this modern era (an age of political and structural transformations, and the respect for basic human rights) he should continue enjoying the archaic and traditional privileges that previously defeated communities reserved for sovereign potentates during the last two centuries.’ (Phiri as Cited by Bohler-Muller and Lukhele-Olorunju; 2011: 3).

It is becoming increasingly patent that the monarchy’s entrenched position that opposition politics is contrary to traditional Swazi norms and beliefs has reached a ‘tottering and faltering’ point at this point in history. The only question remaining is not whether the monarchy will come to a dead end but when will it do so because it cannot be permanently sustained. There shall definitely come a point at which Swaziland will transform to a multi-party state, voluntarily or via an unstoppable wind of change. One of the many areas in which history is known to be foolproof is that when it has changed, it does not matter how long a certain establishment has been in place. This is one way in which the successes of the Arab Spring can be explained.

It also explains the success of the Libyan revolution. That history is sure to impose consequences when one defies it is what Gaddafi failed to realise when he decided to invoke his military mantle with the view to face out the Libyan revolt. Having presided over Libya for close to half a century, Gaddafi became entirely convinced that nothing can depose him from the presidency. Contrary to this conviction, he eventually died a brutish and ignoble death after his capture by ‘cockroaches and rats’, the terms which he used to refer to the revolutionaries. Robert Mugabe of Zimbabwe, Paul Biya of Cameroon, Yoweri Museveni of Uganda, and Yahya Jammeh of Gambia are possibly making themselves victims of a changed history.

There already exists a sizeable and growing constituency of Swazis who have become disaffected with the monarchy and are committed to disembarrass Swaziland of this type of political establishment. This ‘liberated zone’ is slowly but earnestly growing and it has the support of the international community because it seeks to promote internationally valued norms of democracy and human rights. This is a ‘liberated zone’ in the sense that it has dissociated itself from the norms and practices which are being used by the monarchy to suppress democratic freedoms. Force can be used to suppress the physical aspects of the “liberated zone” but the values, principles and norms of the zone cannot be chained or reversed but can only be delayed.

However, while it is desirable (because it is inevitable) for Swaziland to transform to a multi-party state, it is important to interrogate how such a transition could possibly be effected. This is because a transition from an absolute monarchy to a multi-party state in itself does not guarantee that Swaziland will transform into a peaceful, democratic and progressive state. If poorly managed, the transition can engender unprecedented political, social and economic problems in that country. Such a transition cannot be expected to take place overnight. It should be preceded by broad democratic reforms which will form the basis for state politics and society in post-monarchy Swaziland. Such reforms may take time to be implemented especially when the political will to do so is impoverished.

There are basically two ways in which Swaziland can be transformed to a competitive and democratic political system. The first one (which is likely to be acceptable to the monarchy) is to maintain the monarchy in the context of multi-party politics. This occurs when political parties are allowed to exist and vie for public offices. However, the king and the Ndlovukazi will continue to play an important role in Swazi politics. The only difference is that the king will have to be divested of executive powers. He will become a ceremonial one but he may retain the power to accent to legislations in the context of a balance of power system. In this political order, there will be an executive head of state who is elected via the ballot. The position of the king will continue to be hereditary and the king and the Ndlovukazi will continue to be
the highest custodians of Swazi cultural values and practices.

This system is capable of ensuring that Swaziland retains its cultural tradition within the context of a modern democratic state. This appears close to the nature of transformation which the International Crisis Group (ICG; 2005:1), proposed when it maintained that Swaziland should be transformed into a constitutional monarchy which is characterised by:

• The elimination of all vestiges of the 1973 state of emergency, including removal of the king’s arbitrary powers over the legislature and judiciary as well as his right to appoint the prime minister and the cabinet;
• Legalization of political parties
• A directly elected house of assembly with oversight of royal spending and an elected prime minister as head of government;
• Codification of traditional law and its reconciliation with common law, and appointment of an independent judiciary by an impartial judicial commission, and
• Civilian oversight of professional security forces.

The second approach is a radical one. It calls for the dismantling of the entire institution of the monarchy root and branch and the introduction of multi-party politics. This option is difficult to achieve (especially through dialogue) because of the nature and degree of the change involved. What should be understood about multi-party politics is that there is nothing inherently bad about it. It just requires leadership to respect the will of the people. The problem comes when incumbents want to maintain a stranglehold on power when the popular will has shifted. This is not a problem which can be attributed to multi-party politics. It tends therefore to be misleading to say that multi-party politics is divisive as the Swazi monarchy has maintained.

Whichever form of transition the people of Swaziland may elect to effect; dialogue should be at the centre of the transition. Swaziland does not need to implement any transition via a civil war like the case of Libya. It is important to engage the king at a highly intellectual level with the view to influence him to effect a transition which is in the best interest of the people of Swaziland. The major role in any transformation in Swaziland should be played by progressive local actors. However, progressive local actors in Swaziland have received very little international attention and support. The international community, particularly South Africa, SADC, the African Union, and the European Union has a role to play in any political transformation which might need to be implemented in Swaziland. The role would be to influence the king through dialogue and the imposition of sanctions (where and when necessary) and also to give financial and other forms of support to progressive local actors.

ENDNOTES

Bohler-Muller, N. and Lukhele-Olorunju, P. August 2011. ‘Swaziland: The Last Gape of an Absolute Monarch?’ Policy Brief No 54, Africa Institute of South Africa. Johannesburg: EISA.
Iqbal, Z. 2011. ‘Swaziland: The forgotten land of avarice.’ Available at: http:/www.iijd.org/index.php/news/entry/Swaziland-the-forgoten-land-of-avarice/ (Accessed 20 February 2012)
Joubert, P. Masilela, Z. and Langwenya, M. 2008.’Consolidating Democratic Governance in the SADC Region: Swaziland.’ EISA Research Report No. 38.
Motsami, D. ‘Swaziland’s Non-Party System and the 2013 Tinkhundla Elections: Breaking the SADC Impasse?’ Institute for Security Studies Situation Report, Pretoria. 15 August 2012
Mzizi, J. B. 2006. ‘Political Movements and the Challenges for Democracy in Swaziland.’ Research Report No 18, Johannesburg, EISA.
Amnesty International, 2009. ‘Suppression of Terrorism Act Undermines Human Rights in Swaziland.’ Amnesty International Publications and International Bar Association.
International Crisis Group, ‘Swaziland: The Clock is Ticking.’ Policy Briefing No 29, Pretoria, Brussels. 14 July 2005.
International Trade Union Confederation, ‘Swaziland: The repressive side of an absolute monarchy.’ Union View No 3, May 2009.
*Moses Tofa is the author of ‘Humanitarian Intervention in Metaphorical Metamorphosis: Memories from the Experiences of Libya and Cote d’Ivoire.’ He is a political analyst and a Peace, Security and Development Scholar with the African Leadership Centre.

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