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The "post amnesty" process that is supposed to be rehabilitating militants in the Niger Delta continued to face questions throughout March. Matters were not helped when a gathering of government and Niger Delta leaders associated with the process in Warri, Delta State, was interrupted by two car bombs planted by disgruntled militant

The "post amnesty" process that is supposed to be rehabilitating militants in the Niger Delta continued to face questions throughout March. Matters were not helped when a gathering of government and Niger Delta leaders associated with the process in Warri, Delta State, was interrupted by two car bombs planted by disgruntled militants.

The car bombs were meant to be symbolic and were detonated some distance from those participating in the event. The approach was almost identical to car bombs that were placed in the car park of estates of Shell and Agip in Port Harcourt in 2006 without loss of life.

The Warri incident highlighted several problems that have remained an issue over the past five years. The Federal Government has a track record of making significant vague promises to suspend conflict and then failing to follow up. Militants have relied on their ability to cause mayhem as a primary negotiating tool and have often struggled to produce any coherent agenda. "Reconciliation" initiatives have often been treated as an opportunity for those at the core of implementation to enrich themselves and it is little surprise that efforts to date have failed.

Acting President Jonathan has a key opportunity to break with the existing cycle of violence but time is limited. His replacement of the cabinet effectively removes the key players from the existing process and gives him a chance to present a fresh start. He also does not lack resources – with an earlier 'reintegration' budget ranging from $373m upwards. Militant groups also appear willing to allow some breathing space and there have been no follow up attacks to the Warri blasts as yet.

However Jonathan's opportunity is tempered by the need to do more than buy off the current crop of militants. If he does not act to address broader community concerns that include widespread unemployment, appalling service delivery and social dislocation, then the current cycle of militancy as a means of extracting resources will continue. Jonathan needs to do something dramatic for communities and the broader population to generate a counter balance to those militant and government actors who are comfortable benefiting from the current cycle of violence.

Communities Oil Industry "Stake"

There has been considerable talk generated by government announcements of a "10% share" for communities in oil producing regions by divesting part of the stake held by public operator NNPC. This has been presented as a significant move to stabilise relations between government, companies and communities. However documents seen by SDN show that the design of this initiative is far from as generous as it might seem.

The first impression to be dispelled is that the share will actually be anything like a 10% share of revenue. In fact, the core of joint venture operations is a modest part of overall oil income – government figures estimate that a drop from 60% to 40% in NNPC share of Joint Ventures (JVs) will produce just a 2.2% reduction in government income. The vast majority of oil revenue is channelled through taxes and royalties. The 10% share will entitle "communities" to something around 1% of gross oil revenues.

The second surprise is that drafted government plans are not for a "giveaway" of this share but a 'sale' to communities that will be financed through deductions from the 13% of net revenues that are already paid to states. These shares will be given to trusts whose definition six months after the initial proposal is also shockingly vague, with obvious potential to spread rather than reduce channels for corruption and violence.

Indications are that the new actors in the Presidency are only just bringing their attention around to this proposal. There is an urgent need to establish whether this proposed mechanism has redeeming features. For example, any new regime that forced greater transparency on both the government and oil companies (whose Nigerian revenues remain obscured within their global accounts) would be a step forward.

Presently the key processes are being run in reverse order. There is a desperate need to support the development of genuinely owned community governance bodies across the Niger Delta. The modes under which this can be done will require time and commitment to fully develop. Once this is begun it is appropriate to look afresh at which revenue models could be used for channelling funds to communities.